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The aim of this monograph is to reveal the complex development of 20th 
century Norwegian environmental philosophies from a comparative per-
spective by outlining not only the role of the similar philosophical premises 
they derive from, but also how the differences in the chosen strategies af-
fected the changes in the Norwegian environmental politics. That is why 
one of my main objectives is to analyze the origin and the elaboration of 
some concepts and ideas, which contribute to clarifying the multi-sidedness 
of the topic by going beyond the well-known theory of the founder of deep 
ecology, namely, the one of the Norwegian philosopher, mountaineer and 
environmental activist Arne Næss. 
Before examining which ones are the questions we should not lose while 
examining both the genealogy and the impact of Norwegian ecophiloso-
phies, I will first specify why ecophilosophies and why in Norway. In this 
context, I raise the hypothesis that it is not accidental that the Nordic con-
ceptualization of ecophilosophies took place in Norway since the Norwe-
gian mountains became a crucial condition for the appearance of a unique 
philosophy of climbing developed in the mid-1960s. That is why I argue 
that it is the unique philosophy of climbing attracting some of the most il-
luminative Norwegian mountaineers and eco-philosophers that prepared the 
ground for the establishment of 20th-century Norwegian ecophilosophies. 
Despite the fact that Norwegian ecophilosophies can be defined as having 
similar philosophical premises in so far as they all question the conse-
quences of the expanding role of anthropocentrism, I will give arguments in 
favor of the thesis that we should talk about Norwegian ecophilosophies in 
plural rather than ecophilosophy with a capital letter.  
Furthermore, I will investigate how the possibility to talk about Norwegian 
environmental philosophies in plural is driven by what I call turn of imagi-
native rationality (also due to some intellectual influences of Mahayana 
Buddhism and Hinduism), which revives the idea of rationality as irreduci-
ble to the one of cognitive rationality. I will also examine how rehabilitating 
the normative validity of imaginative rationality can benefit revealing the 
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ambiguous groundings of both radical anthropocentrism and radical biocen-
trism. 
Thus I will explore why disenchanting the methodological pitfalls of an-
thropocentrism does not necessarily lead to appealing for radical biocen-
trism, especially if the role of ethical gradualism is taken into account. Re-
thinking the influence of the latter will be interpreted as another key prem-
ise for specifying why we should discuss the role of Norwegian environ-
mental philosophies. Since most of the debates about the process of self-
realization within the framework of Norwegian ecophilosophies are closely 
tied with justifying the role of solidarity, in one way or another, I will inves-
tigate how the latter can be achieved by cultivating moral sensitivity to-
wards others, which to be understood as a form of moral commitment to the 
biosphere as such.  
The first chapter of the current monograph is devoted to examining the ori-
gin and the conceptualization of so-called philosophy of outdoor life 
(friluftsliv) in Norway by clarifying what particularly Norwegian aspects of 
this phenomenon are. One of my main objectives is to analyze to what ex-
tent Norwegian philosophy of outdoor life can be defined as a crucial prem-
ise for establishing Norwegian ecophilosophies of the mid-20th century.  
Regarding the origin of the concept of outdoor life, which was introduced at 
the phase of Romantic Movement in Norway, I aim at revealing Norwegian 
outdoor life’s contextualization within so-called by B. Tordsson National 
project. 
Concerning the image of the fairy-tale hero Ash-lad, who embodies the typ-
ical Norwegian, I analyze how building the Norwegian identity is examined 
by the distinguished Norwegian ecophilosopher and environmental activist 
Sigmund Kvaløy Setreng as grounded in reconsidering the attitudes towards 
nature as a part of national psychology. That is why I explore how by clari-
fying the genealogy of the Norwegian national building movement, we can 
outline the correspondence between national identity and different attitudes 
towards time and nature. It is also important to outline how the ontological 
premises of the relationship between competence and time are clarified by 
answering the following questions. How is Per-and-Pål’s1 time justified as 
opposed to Askeladden’s (Ash-lad’s) one? Is Askeladden’s competence a 
matter of introducing a different type of competence? And last but not least, 
                                           
1 According to the fairy tale, Per and Pål are Askeladden’s brothers whose behavior is associated by 
Kvaløy with what typically Danish is. 
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to what extent are the Norwegian attitudes towards nature a prerequisite for 
discussing what typically Norwegian is? 
In turn, so-called by Tordsson Social project of outdoor life requires the so-
cio-cultural transformations provided by the industrialization in Norway to 
be examined, as well as to explore how the changes in the outdoor life af-
fected the role of the mountain, which was defined by Br. Berntsen as typi-
cal Norwegian. In this context, I will analyze the impact of some culturally 
different conceptions regarding environmental protection on the discussions 
about Norwegian philosophy of outdoor life. 
Furthermore, the challenges of so-called by Tordsson Modernization project 
will be determined as opening some new perspectives for Norwegian out-
door life. The modifications regarding the risks of growing sportification 
will be explored as a result of the clash of two different socio-cultural con-
ceptualizations of nature, i.e. the ones supporting the ideal of uncorrupted 
nature and the idea of nature as a source of exploitation. 
Investigating the development of Norwegian outdoor life as benefiting the 
justification of so-called by Tordsson Ecosocial project, I will analyze how 
the specificities of the outdoor life in question determined the formation of 
20th century Norwegian environmental philosophies. Clarifying the meth-
odological similarities between Norwegian ecophilosophies and Norwegian 
outdoor life philosophy, I will examine why it is the common social, eco-
nomic and political contexts in which Norwegian outdoor life took place 
that provoked some similar attitudes, namely, the understanding of nature to 
be examined as dependent on the gradual transformation of so-called by 
Berntsen growth and preservation (vekst og vern) debate (which took place 
in Norway in the mid-1960s) into the one about ‘sustainable development 
vs. environmental protection’ (vekst vs. vern). 
On the other hand, I will compare the works on nature of some illuminative 
Norwegian philosophers, mountaineers and environmental activists such as 
Peter Zapffe, Arne Næss, Sigmund Kvaløy Setereng and Nils Faarlund for 
the purposes of revealing how they have been influenced by the activities of 
the NTK and KKK climbing clubs. 
In this context, I will specify the implications of the ideas of exercising and 
practicing philosophy of climbing. The ideas will be explored as displaying 
two different sides of the process of climbing that make us discern between 
Norwegian climbing as an existential experience and Norwegian climbing 
as a sport. In turn, so-called Norwegian anti-expeditions to Tibet, whose 
aim was to practically prove that trackless experience in nature is more im-
portant than winning a climb will be investigated as an example of the way 
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Norwegian philosophy of outdoor life became a collective ideal without 
turning into a mass ideology. 
The analysis of these issues will be done for the sake of outlining another 
embodiment of imaginative rationality, namely, what Næss described as ‘to 
think like a mountain’2 mode. Furthermore, I will clarify why this way of 
thinking can be understood as introducing a new type of ontologically 
grounded rationality since ‘thinking like a mountain’ is one of the most im-
portant goals of the process of co-experience in the mountains, as recog-
nized by Næss, Kvaløy and Faarlund. 
I will also explore why adopting the methods of ontological ethics can bene-
fit reconsidering the ambiguous reasons of simplifying Zapffe’s implicit 
ecophilosophy as a pessimist project, which is described as such in contrast 
to the philosophies of Næss and Faarlund who emphasize the role of joy for 
the interaction between man and nature. 
Against the background of the aforementioned examinations, I will investi-
gate the impact of Næss’s reflections on his life in the mountain cabin 
Tvergastein by revealing the role of his anthropology of cabin man. The lat-
ter will be compared with what Kvaløy defined as Zapffe’s anthropology, as 
well as with Næss’s own pedagogical and cultural philosophy. 
The current monograph will be also focused on giving arguments in favor of 
conceptualizing the pedagogical advantages of adopting Norwegian phi-
losophy of outdoor life. For this purpose, I will analyze the origin of the fol-
lowing phenomena displayed in the works of the ‘father’ of Norwegian phi-
losophy of outdoor life, Nils Faarlund: the reasons for the arising threat of 
the sportification of outdoor life, the genealogy of so-called dictatorship of 
understanding (forståelsesdiktatur), which inflicts the pseudo-stability of the 
ecosystems as well as the methodological challenges of adopting so-called 
conwaying (vegledning) and guiding (veiledning) models, which are an in-
evitable consequence of overexposing the role of contemporary technologi-
cal culture. All these issues will be analyzed by revealing to what extent 
they benefited the parallel development of the Norwegian ecophilosophies 
as ‘stretched’ between the extremes of the ideology of industrial develop-
ment and the theories of environmental protection. 
As another primary objective, I aim at analyzing why the Norwegian phi-
losophy of outdoor life contributes to clarifying Faarlund’s idea of nature as 
                                           
2 The phrase was introduced by the American environmentalist Aldo Leopold. 
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a way home. Furthermore, I will also specify why within the framework of 
contemporary technological culture in Faarlund’s sense, the feeling of being 
out in nature radically changes its embodiments.  
Special attention will be paid to the way the rehabilitation of intrinsic value 
of nature benefits revealing why the idea of outdoor life as a way home ex-
pands to the idea of ‘nature is a home of culture’, as Faarlund suggests. In 
this context, one of the main methodological contributions of Faarlund’s 
theory will be sought in his analysis of ecolife as a life having a pedagogical 
value. Against the background of the aforementioned investigations, I will 
examine what it means to ‘be together with nature and in nature’ in Faar-
lund’s sense since the basic minimum of tools is devoted to strengthening 
the engagement of the whole personality including intellect, emotional and 
corporeal abilities at once. 
I will also explore how moral learning and moral understanding regulated 
by the principles of imaginative rationality encourage the principles of 
complexity versus the ones of complication in Kvaløy’s sense to be adopt-
ed. By outlining why the former principles can be successfully implemented 
in what Faarlund calls a process of conwaying (vegledning), I will clarify 
the origin of the conceptual differences between conwaying (vegledning) 
and guiding (veiledning), as displayed by Faarlund. Last but not least, I will 
analyze why his ideal of conwaying is conceptualized as a guiding principle 
of Askeladden’s school, which affected the introduction of one new para-
digm of experiential learning.  
In the second chapter, devoted to the writings of the prominent Norwegian 
philosopher, playwright, poet and lawyer Peter Wessel Zapffe, I will outline 
the crucial premises of his theory, which give grounds he to be defined as 
Norway’s first ecophilosopher. Furthermore, Zapffe’s philosophy is unique 
in many respects compared to the other 20th-century Norwegian ecophiloso-
phies as well. In this context, I will analyze the genealogy of some impor-
tant topics such as why his theory of biosophy represents a certain type of 
experiential philosophy, which is irreducible to applied biology regardless 
of the fact that he uses ‘biosophical’ and ‘biological’ as synonyms. Fur-
thermore, I will explore why we can find some implicit premises for intro-
ducing biological and ethical gradualism in Zapffe’s theory of four interest 
fronts due to which biological interest front is examined as intrinsically 
connected with social, autotelic and metaphysical ones. Against the back-
ground of these investigations, I will outline whether we have good reasons 
to claim that Zapffe’s experiential philosophy is not based on a deprived of 
any hope whatsoever pessimism, as Næss warns. By comparing and con-
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trasting Schopenhauer’s and Zapffe’s theories of tragic, I will also clarify 
why regardless of Zapffe’s questionable theory of biological morality, he 
builds a well-grounded conception of humankind’s place in the biosphere 
that is equally critical to imposing both radical anthropocentrism and un-
grounded biocentrism. 
The contextualization of Zapffe’s theory of biosophy will be revealed by 
analyzing the influence of G. Berkeley’s theory of ‘esse est percipi’ and J. 
von Uexküll’s biosemiotics. The impact of Berkeley’s and Uexküll’s con-
ceptions will be explored by specifying the dependence of individual per-
ception on the environment in respect with the aspects of the biological con-
stitution of the different representatives. Furthermore, I will examine why 
due to the specificities of human constitution, we can talk about unfixibility 
in Zapffe’s sense, which is crucial for understanding man’s place in the bio-
sphere. In this context, one of the questions, which I will discuss, is how can 
we compare and contrast different environments (Umwelt in Uexküll’s 
sense) if we remain on the level of comparing and contrasting different per-
ceptions alone? Would not it mean that thus we should reduce biosophy to 
ethology?  
On a macro methodological level, one of my main objectives in this chapter 
is to analyze how biosophy, if it is interpreted as experiential philosophy, 
leads to avoiding both epistemological and ethical relativism while clarify-
ing interspecies relationships. For the purposes of outlining the gist of bio-
sophy, I will pose the question how to understand Zapffe’s mode of talking 
about “biosophy or biology”, namely, whether we should compare two 
methods, two alternatives or two specific synonyms. I will also explore how 
analyzing the complex genealogy of biosophy, we can specify the multiple 
projections of man’s interaction with the environment as socially, ontologi-
cally, metaphysically and existentially determined ones. 
Investigating the aspects of Zapffe’s biosophy, I will examine why his con-
cept of vital balance should be extrapolated since it raises the issue how to 
interpret Zapffe’s relevant statement that expressibility in the biological 
front is a heterotelic one. It is also important to clarify why the fight of in-
terests in Zapffe’s sense can be determined as preserving the vital balance 
of all living beings. 
In turn, special attention will be paid to the role of autotelic-metaphysical 
engagements in order to specify why revealing both their origin and impact 
contributes to understanding not only the differences between human beings 
and the representatives of other species, but also the complex nature of hu-
mankind as such.  
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Clarifying the aspects of complexity of the different interest fronts, I will al-
so examine to what extent the justification of surrogate objects in Zapffe’s 
sense depends on the development of some fixation mechanisms, as well as 
on specifying why he does not provide a clear distinction between the latter 
and the mechanisms of compensation.  
On the other hand, the analysis of so-called by Zapffe life’s feeling raises 
another significant problem, which requires further examination, namely, 
how can we interpret what Zapffe defines as feeling in itself mode, i.e. do 
we have to refer it to the existence of life, to life’s feeling, or to their mutual 
ontological dependence? That is why I will investigate why the autotelic in-
terest in Zapffe’s sense can be described as a universal one if it is inter-
preted in respect with the metaphysical interest. 
Furthermore, the differences between the surplus and lack of equipment of 
the living beings, as represented by Zapffe, will be an object of investiga-
tion due to the purposes of clarifying why the surplus and lack should not be 
understood as a surplus and lack of real capabilities alone. Another specifi-
cation, which will be made, is the one regarding the ontological difference 
and the difference concerning the normative validity of capabilities and ex-
pressibility, especially while analyzing the role of fixation mechanisms. 
That is why I will focus on revealing the complexity of Zapffe’s theory on 
three levels, namely, on the one of equipment (capabilities), on the level of 
fixations, as well as on the one of solutions since they all provide different 
configurations of how one task can be fulfilled by a given subject.  
In this context, I will analyze the origin of the differences by specifying 
why the surplus of equipment does not necessarily presume an over-fixation 
in Zapffe’s sense to be adopted. Special attention will be paid to the issue 
regarding the blurred distinction between surrogate objects and compensa-
tory objects, as well as the one between real and imaginary anchoring, 
which illustrate why the criteria of real and unreal are necessary but not suf-
ficient ones. The latter specification would be examined in respect with jus-
tifying why subjective and objective values of the process of anchoring do 
not lead to both moral and epistemological relativism. 
Referring to the aforementioned issues, as displayed in Zapffe’s theory, I 
will look for an answer to the following questions. If we agree with Zapffe 
that only the one who is aware of one’s interests has a destiny (so-called in-
terest bearer), what would be the status of people who, for some reasons, are 
unaware of these interests? Does it mean that we have to compare them 
with sentient animals and if so, how can we avoid going beyond the diffi-
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culties provoked by objective naturalism, while interpreting the aforemen-
tioned surplus and lack of capabilities? 
Furthermore, I will examine how investigating the role of Zapffe’s ethical 
yes and no, we can clarify why so-called cultural break in his sense is as 
important as the biological one, especially if we want to reveal how the in-
terpersonal (interspecies) interaction can be ruled out not only by the multi-
frontal engagements, but also by contradicting autotelic and heterotelic 
needs.  
Regarding Kvaløy’s reception of autotelic interest, as represented by Zap-
ffe, I will specify why one of the main problems of this interpretation is that 
Kvaløy equates so-called ethical era with the autotelic one. Special attention 
will be also paid to some of the crossing methodological points between 
Kvaløy’s ecophilosophy and Zapffe’s philosophy concerning the question 
why both philosophers, albeit to a different extent, rely on ethics in reviving 
the ideal of uncorrupted nature. 
Specifying Zapffe’s conception of morality, I will examine the different 
types of morality introduced by him, as well as why so-called biological 
morality is a problematic issue. I will outline why Zapffe’s theory of solv-
ing existential problems by introducing morality, which should have an ap-
parent impact on the practical experience can be one of the strongest argu-
ments against defining him as a nihilist. Regarding the contradictions deriv-
ing from Zapffe’s conception of biological morality, I will clarify the gene-
alogy of the problems, which stem from concepts such as the ones of bio-
logical value and biological responsibility. 
In turn, reconstructing the methodological framework in which Zapffe’s 
fundamental theory of tragic takes place, I will examine why the origin of 
the intersection of the autotelic and metaphysical engagements can be de-
scribed as based on the strive for contextualizing man’s initial feeling of 
cosmic panic. That is why I will analyze the origin of one of the main con-
cerns about how to interpret Zapffe’s idea of world’s responsibility, taking 
into account that the metaphysical strive for meaningfulness faces the con-
straints of the autotelic mode of thinking due to which the world is recog-
nized as an aim in itself.  
Looking for a solution to this problem, I will also investigate why a meth-
odologically relevant point in distinguishing between the two types of tragic 
in Zapffe’s sense (namely, so-called subjective and objective tragic) is the 
one that avoids the contradiction between man and environment regarding 
both the internalization and the evaluation of feeling pain and suffering.  
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Against the background of the aforementioned investigations, I will outline 
whether we can unquestionably accept Zapffe’s distinction between so-
called deficient and surplus pessimism, as well as how this distinction af-
fects the existential potential of man compared to other species. 
In the third chapter, devoted to the heritage of maybe one of the most well-
known deep ecologists worldwide, Arne Næss, I will analyze why most of 
the methodological difficulties he faces, while discussing what relevant 
ecophilosophy and environmental politics should look like, derive from nar-
rowing morality to moralization.  
Examining Næss’s theory of deep ecology, I will specify how its conceptu-
alization is driven by being aware of the impossibility of solving ecological 
problems in the long run by adopting ecological means alone. That is why I 
will investigate how one of the main conceptual advantages of supporting 
the aims of deep ecology is concerned with the requirement for giving ar-
guments, which to clarify why deep ecology’s realization is possible only if 
ecology is defined as a necessary but not sufficient condition for the non-
contradictory justification of the principles of bioegalitarianism.  
Revealing the projections of Næss’s statement Here I stand, I will outline 
the process aspects of the transformation of a certain place into a home 
specifying the role of his attempts at revealing why home is a good place to 
live in. 
In this context, examining the implications of Næss’s Ecosophy T as a per-
sonal philosophy will be done for the purposes of clarifying why it can also 
be defined as a certain type of mountain ecosophy. 
In turn, comparing Næss’s theories of deep ecology and ecosophy, I will fo-
cus on some problems, which arise from the fact that providing ontology of 
the contents is not a sufficient condition for denying the relativism of sensu-
alism. In turn, the problems how to noncontradictory define the normative 
validity of intuition as a norm, as Næss suggests, will be investigated in de-
tail. 
Exploring the aspects of Næss’s conception of self-realization, I will look 
for an answer to the following questions: what are the reasons for recogniz-
ing self-realization as a top norm in Næss’s sense? Furthermore, if we need 
to cultivate ecological self to perceive reality, how can we explain the ‘natu-
ralness’ of so-called beautiful actions? In other words, if we all ‘naturally’ 
produce ‘beautiful actions’ in Kant’s sense, as Næss suggests, how can the 
cultivation of intuition derive from the reality as such?  
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Another problematic issue, which will be paid attention to is Næss’s idea of 
extending neutrality of moral community to all species, while evaluating 
human behavior in ethical terms. Instead of arguing for the principle of 
moral neutrality, which questions the idea of morality itself, I will examine 
the benefits of adopting ethical gradualism from a comparative perspective 
by emphasizing the influence of Spinoza’s and Gandhi’s theories3 on 
Næss’s ones. 
Regarding Næss’s reception of Spinoza’s theory, I suggest Spinoza’s influ-
ence to be traced in three directions, namely, in rehabilitating the role of joy 
by specifying the functions of pleasure, happiness and perfection, in outlin-
ing the possible misuse of emotions, as well as in exploring the origin of 
maturity of feelings through sorting out conflicts. 
In turn, I will clarify how if it is the ethics of minimal interference that pre-
sumes a certain peaceful cooperation to be established, we can justify and 
inflict changes addressing the process of suffering, as well as measuring 
who suffers most in order to help him/her first, as Næss suggests. 
On the other hand, pointing out the problems, which arise from narrowing 
the role of morality in deep ecology, I will explore why adopting Næss’s 
theory of vital needs means that we should rely on an ideal intuition of what 
vital need is. On a macro-methodological level, I will investigate why most 
concerns about Næss’s conception of what relevant environmental politics 
should look like arise not only from his vague definition of what a vital 
need is, but also from Næss’s ambiguous theory of vital rights.  
Presuming that deep ecology is justified by the process of deep questioning, 
as Næss suggests, I will also explore whether we can justify the equal right 
of the organisms to live and blossom, as based on so-called by him obvious 
value axiom. The connection between the intrinsic value of all living beings 
and the universal right defining what a valued interest is will be clarified, as 
well as whether the latter can be determined beyond the field of utilitarian 
ethics. Furthermore, I will analyze why Næss’s statement that a given spe-
cies is not ‘more valuable’ than the rest can easily turn into a speculation, 
especially when examining the cohabitation in so-called mixed communi-
ties. Another significant problem, which will be discussed, is how to pro-
vide one and the same classification deriving from Næss’s presumption of 
having ‘no duty’.  
                                           
3 These theories will be mainly examined for the purposes of outlining how they have influenced the 
formation of Næss’s ecophilosophy as such. 
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In particular, the failure of justifying the role of ethical gradualism on the 
level of environmental politics will be investigated against the background 
of Næss’s theory of population reduction. That is why I will clarify why de-
nying the role of ethical gradualism leads to diverting bioegalitarianism into 
a certain kind of speciesism, which is as dangerous as radical anthropocen-
trism is.  
In this context, I will reveal why one of the main problems regarding so-
called Apron diagram is provoked by the implications of the normative va-
lidity of the process of derivation. For this purpose, I will look for answers 
to the following questions. If we keep relying on the principles of logical 
deduction, how can we recognize the beliefs on level two, representing 
Næss’s deep ecology platform, as grounded in the ones on level one, and at 
the same time, to postulate diversity on level one and unity on level two, 
taking into account that deriving from some diverse premises would not 
necessarily lead to reaching an agreement about the platforms they ground?  
Furthermore, if the process of derivation is not based on “structuring” some 
value priorities, as Næss suggests, then, we should analyze whether the 
normative validity of level two concerning the agreement about deep ecol-
ogy platform can be interpreted as unquestionably determining the actions 
on level four. In turn, if the activities of the adopters of so-called shallow 
ecology movement are merely recognized on levels three and four, as Næss 
argues, is not it problematic for the supporters of deep ecology movement to 
be restricted in their actions to levels one and two?  
Analyzing the possible answers to the aforementioned questions, I will ex-
amine why we should not explore the political implications of deep ecology 
movement alone, but also trace how the difficulties stem from Næss’s am-
biguous position of giving priority to ecological problems over the ones 
raised by some other movements such as the movements of peace and jus-
tice. That is why one of the topics, which will be a subject to investigation 
is what makes Næss claim that deep ecology movement provides more solu-
tions than the rest.  
Regarding the practical implications of the ecopolitical initiatives as well as 
the role of specifying the objectives of deep ecology movement, the issue of 
whether we should give preference to Gandhi’s ethics of non-violence or to 
so-called by Næss pacifist forms of activism will be explored. It will be 
done for the purposes of examining the origin of the preference in question 
in order to clarify the genealogy of the ways some Norwegian environ-
mental campaigns (such as Mardøla and Alta campaigns) are held.  
 26
In this context, I will also bring to light the following questions. How can 
we evaluate the situation deciding whether to initiate what Næss defines as 
forms of radical struggle? How can we delimit the latter so that to prevent 
struggle’s degradation into pure violence? Would it be a question of time, or 
of number of people involved? Does not this distinction rely yet on some 
implicit forms of violence as a means for achieving certain goals?  
On the other hand, the advantages and disadvantages of Næss’s reception of 
Gandhi’s theory in the field of environmental politics will be mainly traced 
on two levels: on the level of Næss’s reception of one of the sources of 
Hindu tradition, as represented in Bhagavad Gita, as well as on the level of 
gestalt ontology in so far as in the strive for grounding a new type of proc-
ess philosophy both Næss and Kvaløy adopt some principles of Mahayana 
Buddhism.  
In turn, comparing and contrasting Næss’s and Kvaløy’s theories in the 
fourth chapter will be done in order to outline how regardless of the fact 
that Næss and Kvaløy adopt similar philosophical premises such as the 
commitment to preserve the biosphere as a necessary condition for self-
realization, the analytical reflection on the overestimated role of anthropo-
centrism at the expense of the values of bioegalitarianism etc., they build 
different visions of what relevant environmental politics should look like. In 
this context, I will investigate to what extent the differences in question de-
rive from ascribing different normative validity to ethics and gestalt ontol-
ogy respectively. That is why one of my objectives is to clarify whether it is 
the strive for environmental politics that needs a well-established ecophi-
losophical basis for its existence, or ecophilosophy is merely justified as a 
response to the attempts at controlling industrial development.  
I will also analyze why in contrast to Næss’s gestalt philosophy based on 
structuring space in gestalt systems, so-called by Kvaløy river time can be 
characterized as a time of constant change, which guarantees the coherence 
of space and time at once. Furthermore, recognizing the normative validity 
of time and space will be investigated for the purposes of finding an answer 
to the question why is the world picture based on the inexhaustible (unex-
ploitable) dynamic rhythm of nature?  
On the other hand, Kvaløy’s conception of a new form of getting attached to 
a place, which corresponds to Næss’s theory of how to develop a sense of 
belonging, will be analyzed by specifying to what extent the aforemen-
tioned attachment is determined in the life’s stream by the river time. In 
turn, defining ecophilosophy as a process philosophy will be investigated by 
tracing what kind of ideas of processuality it entails, namely, how it is in-
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fluenced by the idea of processuality, as displayed in Mahayana Buddhism. 
Due to the fact that similarly to Næss, Kvaløy adopts some of the main 
principles of Gandhi’s ethics of non-violence, Kvaløy’s reception of Bhaga-
vad Gita will be examined as well.  
On a macro methodological level, I will go back to specifying the role of 
Kvaløy’s ecophilosophy by posing two main objectives. I will analyze why 
defining ecophilosophy in Kvaløy’s sense is not just a matter of combing 
two words together, namely, the ones of ‘eco’ and ‘sophy’, as Næss claims. 
Against the background of the idea of total system crisis, I will clarify to 
what extent Kvaløy’s ecophilosophy corresponds to Næss’s theory that 
ecosophy understood as a matter of showing love strengthens the wisdom 
about man’s home. Furthermore, I will also outline how the decentralization 
of knowledge affecting the decentralization of politics in Kvaløy’s sense 
takes place as a counteraction to the monopolization of both knowledge and 
politics. 
Secondly, special attention will be paid to Kvaløy’s well-known distinction 
between complexity and complication as well as to the normative validity of 
their different embodiments. For the purposes of this specification, I will 
explore why the distinction in question is of crucial importance for reverting 
the transformation of the ‘industrial development versus environmental pro-
tection’ debate into the one about ‘growth and environmental protection’.  
Another significant object of investigation will be the one of discussing how 
the commonly shared conceptions of what a meaningful activity is make 
one society both ecologically and socially balanced as well as how the pre-
sumption of complex growth has an impact on the development of human 
potential and capabilities. 
Exploring the implications of Kvaløy’s distinction between complexity and 
complication, I will outline the internal relations between cultural traditions. 
That is why I will examine why the projections of Kvaløy’s conception of 
two types of culture (so-called mono and multi-cultures) are based on two 
different visions of time, which justify two different types of aesthetics. 
Going back to new time’s tragedies dominated by the ontological ambition 
of time compression, I will investigate to what extent the consequences of 
Kvaløy’s differentiation of organic and mechanical times are grounded in 
the fundamental distinction between complexity and complication. In turn, 
the quantification of time, which underlies the contradiction of so-called 
specialists and generalists as well as its crucial importance for understand-
ing the influence of meaningful work upon developing relevant environ-
mental politics on the global scene will be explored in detail. 
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On the other hand, I will outline how the problem of rehabilitating the role 
of national environmental politics in the field of global economics is af-
fected by what Kvaløy calls Gaia vs. Servoglobe debate, which represents 
the conflict between two different worlds, the one of constructivism and the 
one of improvisation.  
Furthermore, specifying the complex relations between Kvaløy’s ecophi-
losophy and environmental politics, I will analyze the connection between 
the functioning of the ecosystems and establishing democracy in Næss’s 
and Kvaløy’s sense, as well as why so-called life’s democracy does not 
have to be interpreted in the field of moral and political naturalism. Refer-
ring to Næss’s theory, I will clarify why a new ecological grounding of de-
mocracy requires special attention to be paid to exploring how democracy is 
‘dependent’ on ecology as well as in what sense. Revealing the implications 
of Kvaløy’s theory, I will explore how the lack of democracy questions the 
types of personality encouraged by a given society, namely, how so-called 
by Kvaløy multisided person can confront the “pyramidal” one for which 
the climax of freedom is the successful integration in a hierarchically organ-
ized society. 
On a macro-methodological level, Kvaløy’s theory regarding the contradic-
tion of the initial complexity of nature, which encompasses the diversity of 
living beings and nature’s complication, achieved by the means of industrial 
development, will be investigated. It will be done by clarifying whether the 
contradiction in question is based on the arising tension that derives from 
the technological culture’s ambition to impose the normative validity of in-
dustrial development at any expense. In this context, I will analyze why the 
dialectical tension between complexity and complication can be described 
as based on the ‘complication society’s’ strive for being recognized as a 
complex society with a capital letter.  
Regarding the debates about what specifically Norwegian environmental 
politics should look like, I will clarify the origin of both Kvaløy’s and snm’s 
criticism of the potential accession of Norway to the EU. The criticism in 
question will be examined by revealing to what extent it is not only a result 
of a strong personal stance on side of Kvaløy, but also a logically deter-
mined position, which includes some of the guiding principles of snm. That 
is why I will also outline how we should interpret snm’s claim that Norwe-
gian No to the EU is a ‘positive no’.  
Last but not least, I will investigate why ecological crisis turns into a global 
one in Kvaløy’s sense. Exploring how the economic stabilization affects the 
homogenization of the ecosystems since growth has many forms such as bi-
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ological, technological and economic growth, I will reveal the contextuali-
zation of bioeconomics, as represented in the works of Næss and Kvaløy. 
Examining the implications of Gunnar Skirbekk’s ecophilosophy in the fifth 
chapter of the current monograph, I will analyze how it provides some solu-
tions to the problems, which are left open by both Næss and Kvaløy. I will 
also explore why Skirbekk’s line of arguments is closer to the one formu-
lated by Kvaløy rather than to Næss’s theory by pointing out the origin of 
the methodological differences between them.  
Skirbekk’s contributions to the development of 20th-century Norwegian en-
vironmental philosophy could be clarified from three main perspectives, 
namely, from the one of his attempts at questioning the limits of technologi-
cal rationality by building so-called hermeneutic competence, from the per-
spective of rethinking the role of ethical anthropocentrism for the purposes 
of justifying the one of ethical gradualism as well as from the perspective 
regarding Skirbekk’s theory of the impact of vital needs and vital interests 
on revealing the important role of the welfare state. 
Extrapolating Skirbekk’s conception of the pitfalls provoked by the overex-
posed optimistic belief in some technological fix, I will investigate why the 
scientific expertise in Skirbekk’s sense does not necessarily coincide with 
the technological one, albeit the latter undoubtedly functions as a certain 
kind of scientific expertise.  
For the purposes of revising the theory of technological rationality, as repre-
sented by Skirbekk, I will explore why questioning the normative validity of 
this rationality is of crucial importance for rehabilitating the complex under-
standing of man’s self-realization as dependent on the realization of nature.  
Furthermore, due to clarifying how the sense of belonging can be cultivated, 
the reasons behind Næss’s and Kvaløy’s appeal for revising the status of the 
scientist and the politician by equipping them with an extended competence 
will be outlined. Comparing and contrasting Næss’s and Kvaløy’s concep-
tions, I will examine how Skirbekk introduces another important point justi-
fying the image of so-called overcomer as a certain type of super-amateur 
(generalist) in Næss’s and Kvaløy’s sense. On a macro methodological lev-
el, I will outline why this new type of hermeneutic competence brings to 
light the crucial perspective of disenchanting the belief in the technological 
fix. 
The second main perspective regarding Skirbekk’s writings which I will fo-
cus on concerns why ethical gradualism is needed in order relevantly to 
evaluate the borderline cases in which (due to some ethical evaluations) one 
species (or representatives of one and the same species) should be given 
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priority over another (or others) in normative terms, as well as why the pri-
ority in question should be understood without entirely rejecting the impact 
of biological gradualism. Against the background of the aforementioned in-
vestigations, which affect the methodological relations between ethical and 
biological gradualism, I will analyze the role of so-called principle of advo-
catory representation, as adopted by Skirbekk.  
Within the field in which he makes the distinction between being a subject 
to a biological life and being a subject to a biographical one, special atten-
tion will be paid to his conception of the broader application of the criterion 
of maturity. 
On a macro methodological level, I will also investigate why Skirbekk de-
scribes the need of rethinking the dialectical connection between paradig-
matic and gradual ways of thinking as one of the biggest challenges, which 
affect the justification of the moral status of non-humans. 
For the purposes of specifying why ethical gradualism is irreducible neither 
to anthropocentrism, nor to biological gradualism, the reasons behind relat-
ing the three types of categories, namely, the ones of moral subjects, moral 
agents and moral discussants in discourse ethics, as displayed by Skirbekk, 
will be investigated. In this context, I will specify how taking into account 
the complex relationships between moral discussants is of crucial impor-
tance for understanding why discourse ethics provides more relevant solu-
tions in terms of cultivating moral attitudes towards moral subjects in con-
trast to deontological and utilitarian ethics.  
Analyzing both the specificities of Skirbekk’s thought-experiments with the 
robots and Martians displayed as borderline cases of creatures, which can 
meet some of the criteria of moral agents and the role of biological gradual-
ism as such, I will reveal how the bodily experience affects the possibility to 
talk about moral experience, not only about ethical knowledge. 
I will also explore how the aforementioned complex relationships have an 
impact on what Skirbekk defines as subjective and objective needs and in-
terests. Thus I will investigate why it may turn out a subjective interest to be 
developed from the perspective of the inter-subjective interests while fulfill-
ing a vital need in time. 
Furthermore, extrapolating Skirbekk’s theory, I will clarify how tracing the 
development of given subjective interests such as social interests, which are 
not recognized from the very beginning as vital interests for humans, gives 
an answer to the question why moral evaluation comes merely on human 
side. 
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In this context, I will analyze how determining social identity as a demarca-
tion criterion for distinguishing the group of the moral subjects from the 
ones who are defined as ‘incapable’ (for one reason or another) moral 
agents or moral discussants requires the need of so-called by Skirbekk mini-
ethics of the modern world to be explored. 
Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I will examine how the other 
side of the coin of the properties debate regarding the principle of advoca-
tory representation, as formulated by Skirbekk, contributes to clarifying the 
distinction between continuity and discontinuity, which is differently inter-
preted from the perspectives of utilitarian and deontological positions. That 
is why I will explore how the reconsideration of the problem of suffering in 
Skirbekk’s sense affects the issue of compassion, while evaluating the atti-
tudes towards moral subjects as well as how it can benefit going beyond the 
continuity-discontinuity criterion and thus to reduce the impact of ethical 
anthropocentrism.  
Taking into account the genealogy of these problems, I will analyze how the 
implementation of ethical gradualism into the field of environmental poli-
tics may contribute to achieving ecological sustainability in the long run, as 
Skirbekk points out. I will also clarify why his notion of solidarity benefits 
recognizing the normative validity of ecological sustainability for the func-
tioning of the welfare state as well as the attempts at overcoming the eco-
logical crisis by cultivating collective socio-political responsibility.  
Investigating how Skirbekk’s theory of ethical universalizability and soli-
darity affects rethinking both the problems of vital needs and normative va-
lidity of the process of distribution of goods will be done against the back-
ground of the pros and cons of welfare state.  
Furthermore, I will explore how dignity, as defined by Skirbekk, becomes a 
prototype characteristic of the principle of non-humiliation, which provides 
us with the opportunity to talk about communal in the sense of commonly 
shared solidarity. Adopting such an interpretation will be examined as giv-
ing an answer to the question why maximizing the overall non-humiliation 
in Skirbekk’s sense looks only at first sight as a principle with utilitarian 
connotations. 
The issue of specifying the role of vital needs, which is crucial for Skir-
bekk’s conception of environmental politics, will be explored as intrinsi-
cally connected with the notion of just distribution. Extrapolating the 
aforementioned investigations, I will reveal the significant role of discursive 
interpretation outlining the normative validity of the relation between inter-
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est and rights as well as the fundamental connection between the processes 
of distribution and delegation in the field of environmental politics.  
Last but not least, I will analyze why another important methodological 
contribution of Skirbekk’s theory can be seen in the rehabilitated relation-
ship between vital needs and vital interests, on the one hand, and the justifi-
cation regarding the flow of people and capital in the welfare state, on the 
other one. The investigation of these issues will be discussed as providing 
some new perspectives for the problems brought to light by the increasing 
flow of people and growth of capital, as defined by Kvaløy. 
The perspectives in question will be explored against the background of 
Skirbekk’s conception of political culture. Thus I will analyze why he rec-
ognizes one of the biggest challenges of establishing political culture in the 
modern welfare state by questioning the normative validity of the new to-
pography imposed by the sustainable development society as well as by re-
vealing why the traditional way of mapping is no longer valid. 
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“…the day we no longer experience the wonder of existence  
will not be the day that we have found the answer, 
but the day we have lost the question.” 
Gunnar Skirbekk A Young Man’s Search for Meaning 
I.1. THE PUZZLE OF NORWEGIAN 
PHILOSOPHY 
OF OUTDOOR LIFE (FRILUFTSLIV) 
Before examining which one is the question(s) we do not have to lose while 
analyzing both the genealogy and the role of Norwegian ecophilosophies, 
we should first clarify why ecophilosophies and why in Norway. The 
unique attitude towards nature is an illuminative characteristic of the Nordic 
worldview, which has constantly been demonstrated in time. Some proofs 
of it can be found in the different embodiments of the understanding of na-
ture such as the practical wisdom of the Icelandic Eddas, the amazing sense 
of orientation demonstrated by the Vikings who conquered many places 
without using compass, the significant influence of the pantheistic visions 
concerned with clarifying the role of national identity in Romanticism etc. 
However, reconstructing the genealogy of Norwegian ecophilosophies by 
outlining the methodological continuity of the aforementioned phenomena 
is a necessary but not sufficient condition for finding an answer to the ques-
tion why in Norway. 
In this context, I raise the hypothesis that it is not accidental that the Nordic 
conceptualization of ecophilosophy takes place in Norway. Being the Nor-
dic country with high mountains (except Iceland) is a crucial condition for 
the appearance of a unique philosophy of climbing developed in the 20th 
century. Despite the fact that Norwegian ecophilosophies can be defined as 
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driven by the idea of reconsidering the significance of expanding anthropo-
centrism, I suggest that we should talk about ecophilosophies rather than 
ecophilosophy with a capital letter.  
I also investigate why Norwegian ecophilosophies implicitly derive from a 
philosophy of climbing, which becomes justifiable due to its functioning as 
based on some principles of applied ethics such as the ones of solidarity, 
cooperation and trackless experience in nature. The aspects of philosophy in 
question cannot be fully comprehended if we underrate the influence of 
what I call turn of imaginative rationality4 provided by the philosophy of 
climbing in Norway that requires the extension of the conception of ration-
ality to be recognized as irreducible to the cognitive rationality as such. 
The ‘official birth’ of the Norwegian ecophilosophies can be dated back to 
the 1960s, albeit it also incorporated some philosophical conceptions of na-
ture displayed by some ‘earlier’ illuminative intellectuals such as 19th-
century Danish-Norwegian philosopher Niels Treschow, Norwegian polar 
explorer and scientist Firdtjof Nansen, 20th-century Norwegian existentialist 
and mountaineer Peter Wessel Zapffe, who was a friend and supporter of 
both the founder of ecosophy Arne Næss and one of the informal leaders of 
the snm movement Sigmund Kvaløy Setreng5. As one of the commonly 
shared features of these conceptions, I point out the attempt at rethinking 
the unquestionable faith in the role of biocentrism by justifying moderate 
biocentrism, or ethical gradualism. 
The multiplicity of Norwegian ecophilosophies concerns the conceptualiza-
tion of at least two alternative ecophilosophies of two well-known moun-
taineers, philosophers and eco-activists, namely, the ecosophy of Arne Næss 
and the ecophilosophy of Sigmund Kvaløy Setreng. In this context, I will 
analyze why they share some philosophical prerequisites concerning the re-
consideration of the relationship between man and nature, but build differ-
ent visions of what successful environmental politics should look like. 
Another crucial characteristic of Norwegian ecophilosophies is their strong 
connection with the development of sciences such as biology, ecology, so-
cial economy, social anthropology etc. These philosophies aim at inflicting 
                                           
4 I argue that the turn of imaginative rationality concerns the rehabilitation of normative validity of 
feelings and emotions, which in turn leads to avoiding the reduction of rationality to cognitive ra-
tionality. In this context, I extrapolate the role of so-called moral imagination (Johnson 1993: 3-4). 
5 Nowadays, the Norwegian ecophilosophy still remains an object of investigations in the works of 
Gunnar Skirbekk, Trond Jakobsen etc.. 
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change since one of their main objectives is to show how adopting different 
philosophical models can contribute not only to revealing the pitfalls of 
overexposed anthropocentrism, but also to provide us with some construc-
tive solutions to how protecting nature for the sake of both nature and man-
kind is possible only by introducing relevant economic, social and cultural 
changes at once. That is why I will explore why comparing and contrasting 
different ecophilosophies is a matter of tracing the genealogy of different 
vital interests rather than using different vital words alone. Due to the im-
plementation of scientific knowledge, the philosophies in question encour-
age cultivating complex sensitivity and informed consent on side of general 
audience, while trying to eradicate the negative effects of populism as such. 
On a macro methodological level, it means that the interdisciplinary scien-
tific framework benefits Norwegian ecophilosophies to be prevented from 
turning into ideologies, which to serve different political and economic in-
terests. 
Talking about ethics in this context is of crucial importance since the idea of 
normative validity contributes to clarifying why nature can have a value in 
itself, e.g. why the value of biosphere has to be understood as an intrinsic 
value concerning the complex net of ecosystems, which do not contradict 
man’s nature. On the other hand, ethics is a significant factor in reconsider-
ing the idea of life’s orientation by adopting philosophy of outdoor life 
(friluftsliv); not only in revealing its practical wisdom, but also in giving ar-
guments in favor of the thesis that we should cultivate sensitivity towards 
others. On a macro methodological level, it also contributes to recognizing 
the initial connection between the aforementioned philosophy and modern 
pedagogy. 
In turn, I will explore why reducing the role of anthropocentrism does not 
obligatory lead to appealing for radical biocentrism. Since most debates 
about the role of self-realization are tightly concerned with justifying soli-
darity, I will investigate how this realization can be fulfilled by cultivating 
moral awareness towards others understood as a form of moral commitment 
to the biosphere as such. 
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1.1. The Long Way of Norwegian History 
of Philosophy 
In the postwar period, I outline three significant methodological steps in 
Norwegian philosophy: the establishment of ethics as a university disci-
pline, Næss’s participation in the UNESCO group for coining the term de-
mocracy as well as the introduction of what Truls Gjefsen calls “the third 
way” (Den tredje vei) (Gjefsen 2012: 197-206), i.e. the rehabilitation of the 
role of Eastern philosophy as providing solutions for the dilemmas, which 
the Western philosophy faces.  
Historically speaking, the development of Norwegian ecophilosophies took 
place against the background of the Norwegian traditions in outdoor life, 
more specifically, against the background of the ones concerned with the 
mountain life.  
Regarding the discussions in Norway about the introduction of a new cur-
riculum in history of philosophy6, they took place when the Norwegian phi-
losophy of climbing reached its peak. Its starting point was the set of tech-
niques of climbing based on different philosophical visions of the role of 
nature. Næss argued that similarly to climbing, which requires adopting 
given techniques in order to reach the peak, the philosophical investigation 
presumes mastering a rank of logical procedures, which to benefit revealing 
the gist of the philosophy in question. On a macro methodological level, I 
raise the hypothesis that this is one of Næss’s first attempts to clarify why 
the way is more important than the goal itself; a philosophical conception, 
which underlies both Norwegian ecophilosophies and Norwegian philoso-
phy of outdoor life.  
                                           
6 Næss’s idea of preparing a new compendium in history of philosophy was in many respects a re-
ply to Skard and Winsnes’ Times and Thoughts. Leading Ideas in the European Intellectual History 
(Tider og tanker. Ledende ideer i europeisk åndshistorie) (Ibid). He believed that philosophy may 
become understandable only if we clarify the concepts and the connection between premises and 
conclusions, e. i. to compose one problem-oriented history of philosophy (Ibid: 206-207). For the 
purposes of his History of Philosophy. Introduction to Philosophical Problems (Filosofiens historie. 
En innføring i filosofiske problemer) (1953), Næss borrowed relevant literature from the University 
Library and transported the whole amount of 125-kilo books to his cabin Tvergastein (Ibid: 207). It 
was a great challenge to include not only chapters on Chinese and Indian religions, but also some 
chapters on not well-known French philosophers as well as American pragmatism, which was very 
important for Næss, but remained little known in Norway at that time (Ibid).  
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If we had good methodological reasons to call the aforementioned aspects 
‘steps’, the third step could be characterized as a ‘turn’ in so far as the in-
troduction of so-called third way inflicts serious changes in the Norwegian 
worldview attitudes regarding nature as well as in their philosophical con-
ceptualization.  
Analyzing the influence of Mahayana Buddhism and Hinduism on the intel-
lectual efforts of Næss, Kvaløy and Faarlund to clarify Norwegian outdoor 
life ecophilosophy is beneficial for revealing what are the reasons for justi-
fying the need of a new type of rationality. 
Examining Gandhi’s philosophy of non-violence, which was adopted by 
both Næss and Kvaløy as well as what I call horizontal relatedness, contrib-
ute to revealing the dialectical entity of man-nature relatedness as a neces-
sary condition for rehabilitating the impact of ethics. Thus only ethical an-
thropocentrism can be relevantly questioned without falling into the trap of 
moral objectivism. In turn, understanding Norwegian ecophilosophies as 
process philosophies is useful for clarifying one of their main objects of in-
vestigation, namely, how biosphere, defined as a complex net of ecosys-
tems, can have an unquestionable intrinsic value. 
First and foremost, it is important to emphasize that it is not only the climb, 
which makes the third way’s embodiment possible because realizing the 
maxima “the way is the goal” is the climax of the long-lasting traditions in 
both climbing and philosophizing7. The long way from realizing the need of 
choosing environmentally friendly techniques of climbing to reconsidering 
the one of rehabilitating man’s initial connection to the biosphere, as a mat-
ter of a mutual social and political engagement, concerns the recognition of 
diversity as belonging to the gestalts of both nature and humankind.  
On a macro methodological level, I argue that the introduction of the third 
way can be characterized as a turn in the Norwegian ecophilosophies since 
it signifies the transformation of the philosophy of climbing as a necessary 
condition for building ecophilosophies, which presumes a synchronization 
of practical wisdom with unique worldview attitudes to be made. In this 
context, I will examine the philosophy of Norwegian outdoor life as a sig-
nificant factor of this synchronization exploring how it aims at cultivating 
people’s sensitivity towards nature as a net of mastering multiple living 
strategies, which to be in tune with nature’s mechanisms. This biospherical 
                                           
7For a more detailed analysis of so-called anti-expeditions, see Gjefsen 2012: 187-196, as well as 
Faarlund 2015. 
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diversity is one of the main prerequisites to talk about ecophilosophies in 
plural, taking into account that harmonization in nature is not equivalent to 
harmony. Regarding the establishment of so-called anthropoinvasion, I 
claim that the idea of harmonization, which is replaced with human under-
standing of harmony, presumes the exclusion of any ‘natural’ contradiction 
whatsoever. Disenchanting the genealogy of harmonization vs. harmony is 
of high importance for avoiding the traditional way of talking about egali-
tarian and eliterian approaches towards nature. 
That is why I define Norwegian ecophilosophies as process philosophies, 
which are more than just the sum of the single ecophilosophies they entail.  
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2. SOME METHODOLOGICAL CONCERNS 
ABOUT THE GENEALOGY 
OF NORWEGIAN PHILOSOPHY OF 
OUTDOOR LIFE  
2.1. Is Norwegian Philosophy of Outdoor Life 
a Premise of Norwegian Ecophilosophies? 
According to Gunnar Skirbekk, Norwegian identity is built on nature (Skir-
bekk 1992: 1). While the Danish landscape is characterized with flat areas, 
the Norwegian one is famous with its high mountains and picturesque 
fjords, especially in the western part of the country. Adopting Romanticist 
interest to look back at the wild nature means to reconsider the symbolic 
capital of what was a crucial part of Norwegian way of living, namely, to 
reconsider the symbolic capital of the landscape, which makes it different 
from the ones in Denmark, Sweden and Finland. 
Thus the difference in the landscapes becomes a prerequisite for establish-
ing some cultural differences. In turn, Bjørn Tordsson discusses the devel-
opment of one new form of aesthetics “advancing a physically and sensu-
ously active relationship with the landscape” (Tordsson 2007: 63). It is the 
aesthetics in question that makes revealing the genealogy of outdoor life so 
important for understanding the premises of so-called by Tordsson National 
project. This genealogy is initially concerned with elaborating unique eth-
ics, which to contribute to shaping what he defines as a common under-
standing of natural and cultural characteristics (Ibid) recognized as a goal in 
the name of building a national identity.  
Regarding the methodological similarities between Norwegian ecophiloso-
phies and Norwegian outdoor life philosophy, I argue that they face similar 
social, cultural, economic and political challenges. In turn, the need of solv-
ing these dilemmas illustrates why so-called by Br. Berntsen ‘growth and 
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preservation’ (vekst og vern) debate in Norway gradually turned into ‘in-
dustrial development vs. preservation’ (vekst vs. vern) one.  
Following the classification of Tordsson, I will investigate the methodologi-
cal connections between outdoor life and so-called National project charac-
terizing Norwegian Romanticism, which shows the need of specifying the 
relationships between Norwegian city and folk cultures. Furthermore, I will 
continue with the role of outdoor life for so-called Social project, revealing 
the significant impact of the class-stratification on the arising symbolic 
capital of leisure time. In turn, examining the formation of outdoor life 
within so-called Modernization project, which covers the interwar period, I 
will analyze how the new understanding of nature as an exploitable source 
implicitly contributes to discerning alpinism and philosophy of climbing. 
On the other hand, investigating the works of some illuminative Norwegian 
philosophers such as Peter Zapffe, Arne Næss, Sigmund Kvaløy and Nils 
Faarlund as well as analyzing how they have become zealous supporters of 
Norwegian environmental activism being influenced by the activities of 
NTK (Norsk Tindeklub) and KKK (Kolsås Klatreklubb) clubs, I aim at re-
vealing how so-called moral geography of Nansen8 can be established as a 
source of inspiration for these mountaineers and philosophers. 
Exploring the development of Norwegian outdoor life as benefiting the jus-
tification of so-called by Tordsson Ecosocial project, in the recent research I 
also provide some arguments in favor of the pedagogical advantages of 
adopting outdoor life’s philosophy, as represented in the writings of some of 
the most prominent experts in this area such as Nils Faarlund, Gunnar 
Breivik, Bjørn Tordsson, Atle Tellnes. Analyzing both the philosophical 
and socio-cultural implications behind Faarlund’s statement that ‘outdoor 
life is a home of culture’, I will clarify the origin of the following phenom-
ena; the ones concerned with the wide-spread sportification of outdoor life, 
so-called by Faarlund dictatorship of understanding (forståelsesdiktatur) 
(Faarlund 2003: 26) as well as the methodological challenges faced while 
adopting so-called conwaying (vegledning) and guiding (veiledning) mod-
els, which arise as an inevitable consequence of the recognition of the con-
temporary technological culture. 
In turn, revealing the genealogy of Norwegian ecophilosophies, we have to 
examine the socio-cultural background of the outdoor life traditions be-
cause, as Næss himself argues, outdoor life is a term indicating a “positive 
                                           
8 I refer to Tordsson’s thesis of Nansen’s moral geography (Tordsson 2003: 116). 
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kind of state of mind and body in nature, one that brings us closer to some 
of the many aspects of identification and Self-realization with nature that 
we have lost... We should see true friluftsliv as a route toward paradigm 
change” (Næss 2003: 178). He makes a list of the ‘positive aspects outdoor 
life can bring to ecophilosophy’ (Randall 2007: 80) such as “favourable 
conditions for contact between humans”, a setting for training suitable for 
group work and leadership, “new impulses encouraging reflections of fun-
damental questions”, ”options for personal development”, “opportunities for 
one to realize oneself” etc. (Ibid: 80-81). 
Comparing philosophy of outdoor life with the one of sport in Norway, I ar-
gue that we talk about two different philosophies of free time having two 
different prototype characteristics, namely, the ones of cooperation and 
competition. In this context, I raise the hypothesis that while Norwegian 
ecophilosophies and Norwegian philosophy of outdoor life respectively can 
be defined as philosophies of home, philosophy of sport can be determined 
as a philosophy of arena.  
Home is the place, where we can make room for the individual life as a pro-
ject, i.e. to situate it in its total openness to the world itself. Tordsson argues 
that “the feeling of being someone goes well with feeling at home at a 
place, which raises memories and acknowledges a lived life” (Tordsson 
2005: 179); a claim corresponding to what Zapffe calls to bear life, as it is, 
due to the help of nature (Zapffe 1978b: 204), i.e. the place where one’s 
self-realization is experienced as a part of the realization of life as such. 
Furthermore, home is where the subject recognizes the dialectics of life in 
its anachronism at the expense of the overdeveloped capacity for situated-
ness; where its pure openness to the biosphere (openness, which is deter-
mined by the initial openness of mankind as belonging to the universe) is a 
matter of reviving forgotten interrelatedness. In this context, I aim at show-
ing that the openness in question is a necessary and sufficient condition for 
overcoming the frustration provoked by the feeling of terror vacui. How-
ever, we should keep in mind that the latter can be interpreted in two differ-
ent ways: as a synonym of the fear of ‘no man’s land’ becoming a driving 
force of anthropoinvasion, or as a stimulus for reconsidering man’s place in 
nature’s bosom. 
According to Næss, outdoor life is a rich life achieved by simple means; one 
conception, which underlies the modern understanding of outdoor life phi-
losophy. Another common characteristic of Norwegian ecophilosophies and 
philosophy of outdoor life is the idea of man’s engagement with the bio-
sphere, which presumes the mobilization of his/her rationality, emotions 
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and corporeal experience at once. What ecophilosophers call an engagement 
with the biosphere understood as a net of ecosystems, the outdoor life phi-
losophers coin as a capacity to read ‘situation’s distinctive nature’9 (Tords-
son 2005: 165), taking into account that the crossing point between them is 
the unquestionable normative validity of solidarity and its different em-
bodiments10. The practical implications of the latter are considered as a long 
and uneasy process of cultivating sensitivity towards otherness in all its rep-
resentations. It is solidarity showed by both philosophies that is based on 
the principle of self-realization, which is achieved by justifying respect to 
nature as a matter of self-respect. Last but not least, both philosophies adopt 
some similar “means” such as responsibility and thoughtfulness, which are 
realized by mobilizing the capacities of man’s nature as such. 
On a macro methodological level, anthropocentrism can be disenchanted by 
questioning the epistemological dualism based on the binary opposition 
‘mind-body’. On the other hand, reconsidering what I called horizontal re-
latedness cannot be achieved by simply reviving Rousseau’s appeal ‘Go 
back to nature!’ because it should have been paraphrased as ‘Go back and 
make your nature home again!’. This appeal cannot be considered as a form 
of reestablished anthropocentrism unless it is interpreted as a process of ori-
entation in life, which requires rethinking the wholeness of man’s experi-
ence, namely, what I call one’s experiential gestalt11. 
In this context, the role of pedagogy12 for outdoor life traditions is to justify 
the most relevant choice among many other choices. Talking about experi-
ential gestalts, I go back to what Tordsson defines as a way of learning in 
the process of experiencing, which is understood as a form of experiential 
                                           
9 According to Næss, outdoor life is a „concrete theme”, but it cannot be separated from metaphys-
ics (Næss 1973: 181). That is why understanding nature begins with direct experience, which, how-
ever, “soon stimulated reflection” (Ibid). 
10 Within Norwegian ecophilosophies, there are different interpretations of what kind of category 
solidarity is. For example, Næss describes it as an ontological category, which in turn affects the 
way the process of self-realization is understood.  
11 The term is borrowed from Lakoff and Johnson (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 81). 
12 Norwegian outdoor life’s traditions gradually became a subject to investigations on side of the 
Norwegian philosophy of outdoor life, which adopted some methods from the scopes of pedagogy 
and sociology. This process is driven by researchers’ attempts to find the most successful ways of 
teaching people how to orient themselves in nature. In other words, they try to outline how one to 
cultivate the sensitivity towards the biosphere as a necessary and sufficient condition for one’s own 
self-realization as a human being. 
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learning deriving from the implicit human connections with the biosphere. 
In turn, outdoor life’s learning relies on developing strategies within the 
process of life orientation while searching for an ontologically suitable life 
style. Nature gives room for interpretations (Ibid: 172), but it depends on 
the actors whether they will recognize it as a home for living opportunities 
or as an arena of self-sufficient goals. It is the open horizon of the biosphere 
that recognizes the act of addressing as more important than the addressee 
itself. Only against such a background, making the aforementioned oppor-
tunities ‘ours’ is not a matter of manifesting possession of being, but rather 
of justifying gestalt experience. 
Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I draw the conclusion that in 
respect with Norwegian ecophilosophies and Norwegian philosophy of out-
door life respectively, we see common visions of the role of biosphere, 
which gives me grounds to talk about similar types of experiential philoso-
phies whose prototype characteristic is the initial total openness of man and 
nature. Another important similarity is the way the idea of complexity is in-
terpreted as grounding the process of self-realization by following the 
rhythm of nature without leading to objective naturalism. In turn, the main 
methodological risk is the complex rhythm of life to be complicated by sub-
stituting the qualitative aspects of evaluating the biosphere with its quantita-
tive projections. Furthermore, I raise the hypothesis that the rhythm of na-
ture reveals why the definition ‘in progress’ can noncontradictory be re-
placed with the one of ‘in process’, disenchanting the myth that nature’s 
growth can be successfully substituted with the one of sustainable develop-
ment. 
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2.2. The Story of Norwegian Outdoor Life. 
The Traditions of Philosophy 
and the Philosophy of Traditions 
Examining the genealogy of outdoor life phenomenon in Norway requires 
outlining and comparing the concrete implications of the different socio-
cultural prerequisites, which contributed to its formation, as I mentioned 
above. Thus we can reveal not only the unique profile of the phenomenon in 
question, but can also emphasize the role of European tendencies in outdoor 
life, which have influenced its consolidation. 
The term of outdoor life was firstly mentioned in Norway in the era of Ro-
manticism since its recognition was closely tied with the need of defining a 
well-grounded national project (Tordsson 2007: 63)13. According to Nils 
Faarlund, the ‘father’ of Norwegian outdoor life philosophy, Norwegian 
constitution established in 1814 was a milestone of a process showing how 
the country has turned from a Danish province into a union with Sweden 
(Faarlund, Dahle and Jensen 2007: 394)14. The growing interest in nature 
was not an intrinsic characteristic of Norwegian Romanticism alone. In the 
current research, I look for arguments in favor of the thesis that Norwegian 
conceptualization of outdoor life was driven by the changes brought by 
adopting imaginative rationality since the latter contributed to cultivating 
sensitivity towards Otherness by the practices of moral understanding and 
moral learning. Extrapolating these investigations to the level of ecosophy15, 
as formulated by Arne Næss, I argue that learning how to ‘be is someone 
else’s shoes’ (which is the definition of empathy) should be paraphrased to 
how to ‘be in the net of biosphere’s shoes’, taking into account that gaining 
such a knowledge is considered as implicitly ‘encoded’ in human existence. 
As one of the prototype characteristics of Norwegian ecophilosophies and 
Norwegian philosophy of outdoor life, I outline the role of the aforemen-
tioned imaginative rationality, namely, how one meets the challenges in na-
                                           
13 Norway became a province of Denmark for the period 1536-1814, when the struggle for political 
independence was favored by the deteriorating position of Denmark in Napoleon wars. 
14 Regarding Norwegian constitution, he argues that Norway has been preceded only by the US and 
France, emphasizing how “the struggle to fulfill the process of establishing a free nation” has gained 
more power, when the century passed (Ibid) 
15 We should keep in mind that Næss does not recognize this process of learning as a moral process. 
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ture with a corporeal, meaningful and rationally integrated action of under-
standing (Tordsson 2005: 173). The latter is driven by the fact that outdoor 
life’s nature is described as a “world full of expressions, colors, disposi-
tions, esthetic and other qualities” (Ibid: 172). It is the voice of nature that 
requires adopting imaginative rationality because it is the only one, which 
can properly encompass the diversity of the biosphere, where the harmoni-
zation is not equivalent to harmony, as people wish. 
According to Tordsson, we discover different sides of ourselves when we 
handle situations, which are different from the day-life ones (Ibid: 173). 
Such an experience is embodied in the formula “I enjoy the mountain” (Jeg 
liker meg i fjellet) (Ibid). In this context, I argue that the mountain is not 
passive scenery for the Norwegians, but a container of life, where one 
achieves one’s self-realization supported by nature. Referring to Tordsson’s 
statement that climbing the mountains means a different way to be a human 
than the one, which is a result of going around the mountains (along the val-
leys) (Ibid: 165), I also point out that in this example, two different modes 
of being are displayed, which presume two different models of self-
realization. 
On a macro methodological level, rehabilitating the meeting between man 
and nature can be conceptualized due to the principle of imaginative ration-
ality as a meeting guided by the formula ‘objectivity is transperspectivity’. 
It means that facing nature with an open face, one faces oneself in the diver-
sity of one’s own personality. Thus adopting imaginative rationality benefits 
reconsidering the positive role of emotions and feelings, which are an indis-
pensable part of one’s personality, but which are usually neglected in the 
name of manifesting the faith in cognitive rationality and cognitive abilities 
respectively. Grounding the thesis that feelings and emotions are not irra-
tional, but rather imply a different type of rationality, which also has a nor-
mative validity, would contribute to avoiding the pitfalls of both moral rela-
tivism and moral absolutism, i.e. to trace how the different attitudes towards 
nature in the Nordic countries are inspired by some differences in the 
worldview in so far as the latter is based on a different type of philosophical 
conceptions that have their own socio-cultural prerequisites. Such a world-
view imposes a new type of kalokagathia, recognized as an ideal, which re-
lies on how to exert a strong and harmonious body having a sharp mind and 
a good heart in nature. 
In turn, the role of imaginative rationality should also be explored on a dif-
ferent methodological level since the idea of representing man’s holistic ex-
perience of nature is important for revealing the origin of the Norwegian 
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traditions in ecophilosophy. Beginning with the holistic implications of Tre-
show’s conception of ‘human-nature dilemma’16, which is explored in his 
famous work Human Worth and Human Well-being (Menneskeværd og 
Messeskevel) (1807) to Arne Næss’s gestalt ontology, I draw the conclusion 
that the implicit premises of understanding the genealogy of the reception of 
nature in Norway requires clarifying the significant role of imaginative ra-
tionality for the gestalt understanding. 
In this context, I give a preference to the concept of moral experiential ge-
stalt in so far as cultivating our sensitivity towards the net of the biosphere 
in Næss’s sense is a matter of justifying given prototype characteristics of 
our moral experience so that we to recognize the importance of different 
moral identities even for the ones who cannot be determined as moral dis-
cussants by default.  
                                           
16Treshow is recognized as a predecessor of the modern Norwegian ecophilosophy and deep ecol-
ogy in particular (Witoszek 1999: 460). See also Randall 2007: 1, 25. 
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2.2.1. Norwegian Outdoor Life in the Romantic Era 
Romanticism in Norway was influenced by the Romanticism in Europe, albeit it 
followed its own line of development. According to one of the most prominent 
researchers of Norwegian outdoor life traditions, Bredo Berntsen17, it was Jean-
Jacques Rousseau’s conception of happiness of man who has gone back to na-
ture that “contributed to the establishment of Romanticism in Europe, and then 
to the one in Norway” (Berntsen 2011: 24). This way of thinking broke with 
one long-lasting tradition, which goes back to the early Jewish-Christian time 
and which has been strengthened during the Renaissance. It has been influenced 
by the theory of Francis Bacon saying that man was created in God’s image and 
left to be a master of nature (Ibid). Berntsen argues that Romanticism in Nor-
way has first blossomed after the end of the Napoleon wars as well as after the 
constitution at Eidsvoll was signed, relating the role of wild nature to the issue 
of national pride (Ibid: 25)18. 
In this context, it is important two aspects of Berntsen’s theory to be em-
phasized, namely, that the perspectives on environmental protection 
(naturvernets dimensjoner) have three lines of development – a practical 
dimension, a value-oriented dimension (an emotional dimension) as well as 
a cultural one (Ibid: 34). Examining the role of so-called value-oriented atti-
tude towards nature and the influence of the aforementioned dimensions 
during Romanticism in Norway would benefit clarifying some explanations 
such as Witoszek’s ones that Norwegian Romanticism has been driven by 
“antiromantic” tendencies (Witoszek 1998). 
It is the cultivation of the axiological attitude that illustrates why the prob-
lem of nature’s utilization is not a matter of ‘realism’, but rather of clarify-
ing some complex socio-cultural relations, which show how the practical 
perspective can be defined only in respect with the axiological and cultural 
perspectives. These dimensions, which represent how, against the back-
                                           
17In his book, Green Lines: History of Nature and Environmental Protection in Norway (Grønne 
linjer. Natur- og miljøvernets historie i Norge) (1994), Berntsen provides a detailed analysis of how 
the understanding of nature in Norway changes in time. 
18 The pre-history of the reception of nature can be traced back to the Early Middle Ages, when the 
laws about nature were passed. Berntsen finds the roots of this tradition in Gulating law (Gulat-
ingsloven), which specified the conditions for using nature as a source. The problem of its utilization 
was recognized as a conflict for the first time in the beginning of the 16th century. It was caused by 
the distribution of the water saw (utbredelsen av vannsagen), representing the first ostensible con-
flict between growth and protection (‘vekst og vern’), between technology and nature (Ibid: 18). 
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ground of so-called National project, the admiration of nature was concep-
tualized by developing a new ethical attitude that acquires more than one 
methodological perspective to be adopted. These alternative perspectives do 
not question the Norwegian Romanticism itself. On the contrary, they bene-
fit revealing its specific image, which is closely tied with European Roman-
ticism has also cultural and axiological dimensions (regarding the under-
standing of nature). 
What are the particular implications of outdoor life’s philosophy against the 
background of the Norwegian Romantic Movement? First, we have to clarify 
that regardless of the fact that Romanticism came to Norway as influenced by 
the one in Germany, Norwegian outdoor life’s traditions were closer to the 
ones in England. According to Nedrelid, the ‘classical’ outdoor life (Det klas-
siske friluftslivet) was introduced by the Englishmen in the early 18th century 
when England, being the first industrialized country, faced the consequences 
of the industrialization resulting in a gradually increasing need of leading a 
life in nature (Nedrelid 1992: 282)19. Thus ‘Activities such as hunting, fish-
ing, going for a walk and skiing’ (Ibid) gained a value in themselves. Nedrelid 
claims that Englishmen and then Norwegian citizens went to the mountains in 
order to experience nature, water and waterfalls, albeit it was not necessary 
for their work or day-life20 (Ibid). 
On the other hand, the better understanding of the development of outdoor life 
traditions requires the important role of folk culture in Norway to be empha-
sized. Norwegian ecologists, Mytting and Bischoff, argue that Norwegian 
hunters, food gatherers, agriculturalists, farmers, fishermen etc. have trans-
ferred through generations a number of activities and skills, “which today we 
take in as outdoor life activities” (Mytting og Bischoff 1999). 
Otherwise, exploring Norwegian Romantic Movement as conceptually 
‘frightened’ by the Romantic Movement in Europe21 would have contrib-
uted to blurring its profile since Romanticism was not a homogenous phe-
nomenon. On the contrary, investigating the multilateral relations between 
so-called by Berntsen practical, value-oriented and cultural perspectives 
would help us to follow the development of the ethical attitudes towards na-
                                           
19For this interpretation, see also B. Tordsson ’The Risk-taker in the Light of Some Different 
Perspectives on Outdoor Life (“Risikotakeren” i lyset av forskjellige perspektiver på friluftsliv) 
(2000). 
20 According to Nedrelid, outdoor life is a key symbol for Norwegian culture (Ibid: 285). 
21 See Witoszek 1998. 
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ture, avoiding this development to be seen through the clichés of ‘pure’ 
Romanticism. 
Furthermore, Faarlund examines one very important aspect for rethinking 
the genealogy of nature during Romanticism, namely, that it is this move-
ment that puts in question the idea of nature as res extensa, encouraging the 
cultivation of ethical attitudes towards environment (Faarlund, Dahle and 
Jensen 2007: 394). He claims that the leading philosopher of the Age of 
Enlightenment, René Descartes (1596-1650), “opened up nature for an 
unlimited exploitation” (Ibid) neglecting its intrinsic value and thus indi-
rectly influencing the Industrial revolution by putting forward the basis of 
the natural sciences. Since the conditions of industrialized Europe have pro-
voked a counter movement favoring the reconsideration of the intrinsic 
value of nature, outdoor life was defined as a “legitimate child of the Ro-
mantic movement of Europe” (Ibid: 395). 
One of the main methodological advantages of referring to Faarlund’s the-
ory for the purposes of clarifying the genealogical connection of European 
and Norwegian Romantic movements is concerned with the way he de-
scribes the encounter with the free nature. Extrapolating his conception, I 
argue that the encounter in question can be defined as driven by the princi-
ples of ontological ethics, which provides the understanding of realization 
as the highest form of a self-realization in the complete openness towards 
the world22. The phenomenological implications of this meeting are seen in 
recognizing the transperspectivity as a prototype characteristic, which has 
normative connotations. In turn, an illustration of the latter can be found in 
rethinking the role of transperspectivity as a dialogue between two equal 
representatives, which have achieved a unique level of closeness due to im-
aginative rationality.  
                                           
22 These ideas will be explored in detail in the chapter on Faarlund. 
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2.2.1.1. The First Use of the Term Outdoor Life in Norway 
The term outdoor life (‘friluftsliv’) was coined in 1860 by the famous Nor-
wegian playwright Henrik Ibsen who introduced it in his poem On the 
Heights (På Viddene)23. According to Faarlund, the French expression ‘la 
vie en plain air “might have inspired Ibsen to apply the word to describe the 
‘free-nature life’” (Faarlund 1989: 94; Leirhaug 2009: 2). The concept in 
question is used in the middle part of Ibsen’s poem On the Heights24 refer-
ring to a young nameless man who leaves his home. While planning to go 
back with a reindeer pelt for his mother, he meets a stranger who convinces 
him to choose the life in the mountains. Later, the term of outdoor life ap-
peared in a three-act drama called Love’s Comedy (1862) (Leirhaug Ibid: 5), 
where it becomes “the representation of the Romantic” (Ibid: 3-4) by illus-
trating the feelings of Svanhild who chooses so-called marriage of conven-
ience with Guldstad25. The third appearance was in the manuscript of Ib-
sen’s last drama When We Dead Awaken (1899), where he mentioned the 
outdoor life for the last time in his writings26 (Ibid). The word is pro-
nounced by the elder sculptor Rubek describing the personality of his wife 
Marta at the time he met her27 (Ibid). 
According to Faarlund, Norwegian national identity is closely tied with “the 
land, which emerges in the outdoor life” (landet, “som det stiger frem” i friluft-
slivet) (Faarlund 1991: 3) (Leirhaug 2007:70). In this context, we have to inter-
pret his statement “Life in the mountains is an outdoor life, which takes place in 
the mountain” (Mestre fjellet) not as a tautological one, but rather as an existen-
tial statement. As a statement that reveals the entity of one nationally deter-
mined worldview. Referring to C. Rubenson’s conception28 saying that “We 
learnt to examine/know about (at kjende) mountain in that way” (Rubenson 
1978: 118), a way, which is equivalent to love, Faarlund specifies the existential 
projections of understanding outdoor life29. 
                                           
23 The references follow Leirhaug’s classification. Leirhaug 2009: 2-3.  
24In the lonely mountain farm//My abundant catch I take//There is a hearth, and table,//And friluftsliv for 
my thoughts. (Leirhaug 2009: 3). 
25Now I shall put aside my friluftsliv//The leaf is falling; let the world receive me! (Leirhaug 2009: 5). 
26Leirhaug argues that the manuscript in question is an older draft of the drama’s last section. 
27Professor Rubek (nods): – bought you, despite all that fermenting friluftsliv in you (Leirhaug 2009: 6). 
28 C. Rubenson is one of the first Norwegian mountaineers. According to him, it is the sense of belonging 
to nature that provokes city people to go out to the sea, forests and mountains (Rubenson 1978: 117). 
29The existential project is specified by reviving imaginative rationality, which implies the highest norma-
tive validity to love while both knowing and experiencing the world around us. See also Leirhaug 2007: 98. 
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2.2.1.2. The Role of Outdoor Life 
in the Debates about Norwegian City and Folk Cultures 
Reconsidering the significant role of the internal connections between Nor-
wegian Romanticism and Romantic Movement in Europe, we should clarify 
the genealogy of “two traditions within Norwegian outdoor life, namely the 
outdoor life as understood by so-called city culture and outdoor life as dis-
played by folk culture (bykulturens og landsbygdas friluftsliv) (Breivik 
1978: 8-10). Furthermore, the conception that the privileged class looked at 
wild nature “with an open mind” (especially after 1905)30 requires some 
other specifications to be made31. In this context, I argue that understanding 
outdoor life within the framework of Norwegian city culture, which strives 
for getting an inspiration from folk culture, is not a homogenous tendency, 
but rather a matter of outlining a net of multilateral references. 
According to Faarlund, outdoor life has to be examined as ‘an arena where 
nature meets culture; as culturally connecting with the past mechanism (som 
en kulturell tilbakekoblingsmekanisme) (Faarlund 1973b: 4). However, 
Breivik raises the critical argument that outdoor life derives from the prem-
ises of the city culture against the countryside (landsbygd) ones (Breivik 
1979: 4-5). While farmers have knowledge (kjennskapen og kunnskapen), 
the adopters of city culture have interests and will (vilje) (Ibid). Breivik ar-
gues that outlining “the roots of national Romanticism are representative for 
nothing but outdoor life in the mountain, as developed by the city culture”32. 
Extending Faarlund’s statement that Romanticist vision of outdoor life has 
to be examined through its own optics, I reach the conclusion that the gene-
alogy of Norwegian outdoor life requires exploring the origin of the differ-
ent socio-cultural layers, which intersect. It is the optics in question that 
provides us with a view on the city and folk cultures, being inseparable 
                                           
301905 is the year marking the end of the union between Norway and Sweden. 
31 Due to the cultural heritage of the Kalmar union (1397-1523) between Norway, Sweden and 
Denmark (under the leadership of the latter), many intellectuals in Norway, who have been educated 
in the traditions of Danish culture, were skeptical about the idea Norwegian folk culture to be recog-
nized as a main source of inspiration. The debates about the status of folk culture can also be fol-
lowed on the level of the debates about the national language, namely, about the need of introducing 
national language on the basis of the Norwegian western dialects.  
32 Røttene i nasjonalromantikken ikke er “representativt for noe saerlig mer enn friluftsliv i fjellet 
slik det ble utviklet av bykulturen” (Breivik 1978: 12). See also Leirhaug 2007: 57. For the discus-
sions between Breivik and Faarlund, see Leirhaug 2007: 56. 
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from the understanding of ‘low’ and ’high’ cultures, literary language and 
dialects, as displayed against the background of the nation-building process 
in Norway. 
Accepting Breivik’s criticism is understandable if we presume that there are 
‘privileged’ lens in such optics; i.e. that there are some mechanisms forcing 
us to see the whole picture from only one initial perspective. Claiming that 
outdoor life is an arena, where nature meets culture means that transper-
spectivity is commonly shared by default: as nature meets culture, as culture 
meets nature, taking into account that the arena itself provides the multiple 
projections of the meeting as such. In other words, the interest of the repre-
sentatives of city culture in nature is only one of the many layers concerned 
with investigating the search for the genealogy of National project in Nor-
way. That is why I agree with Faarlund that the Norwegian outdoor life tra-
dition is about identity, about “touching and being touched by free Nature” 
(Faarlund, Dahle and Jensen 2007: 395). 
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2.2.1.2.1. Askeladden33. The Fairy Tale 
of the National Project of Outdoor Life 
Norwegian nature can be seen not only by adopting the aforementioned 
phenomenological optics, but also through developing “pragmatic lenses”34 
(Witoszek 1997: 222), i.e. by outlining how the cultural heritage, which is 
implemented in the oral traditions contributed to shaping the Norwegian na-
tional identity in respect with the ideals of Romanticism. Ash-lad fairy tale 
is a Norwegian popular fairy tale documented in 184435, which was consid-
ered as having a character that embodies the typically Norwegian qualities 
by contrast to the other Scandinavians36. It is not by chance that Sigmund 
Kvaløy Setereng analyzes the role of the new rationality, which positively 
influenced the process of building national identity by rethinking the impact 
of nature. Interpreting the plot of the story by referring to Bergson’s con-
ception of laughter, he poses the following question. Why did not the chil-
dren in Denmark and Sweden have a leading figure such as Ash-lad 
(Kvaløy 2007: 84)? 
Kvaløy argues that almost one third of the traditional Norwegian fairy tales 
has this specific character, the Ash-lad, who does appear neither in the other 
Scandinavian fairy tale collections, nor in brothers Grimm’s collection 
(Ibid: 83). As one of Ash-lad’s illuminative qualities, Kvaløy points out the 
reconsidered attitude towards nature as a part of Norwegian national psy-
chology (Ibid ).  
                                           
33 ‘Ash-lad’ in Norwegian. 
34 However, analyzing Witoszek’s statement that deep ecology is a therapy for the cultural neuroses 
that troubled Ibsen, Hamsun, Sandemose and other “sensitive Norwegian souls” (Witoszek 1999: 
459), we face one more concern at least, namely, how does deep ecology represent an expanded 
version of the values of Norwegian rural Enlightenment to the rest of the globe (Ibid: 456)? If we 
identify the values of deep ecology with the ones of Norwegian Enlightenment, it would mean to 
neglect the complex socio-political background deep ecology took place in as well as its unique phi-
losophical aspects. Furthermore, one of the main objectives of deep ecology is to provide some rele-
vant mechanisms for ‘healing’ not only the individual, but also the social and political helplessness 
in front of the environmental disasters and thus to introduce a given type of biocentrism as a counter 
measure. On a macro methodological level, it means that this objective is concerned not only with 
healing, but also with proposing a thoughtful decision-making paradigm, which to prevent the trans-
formation of the short-turm problems into long-lasting ones. 
35 It is documented in Asbjørnsen and Moe’s collection of fairy tales. 
36The plot of the story is retold due to Kvaløy’s interpretation. 
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According to Kvaløy, instead of trying to prove himself in the outer world, 
Ash-lad “sits by the fireplace, stirring the ashes and watching the ever-
changing flames of the fire (Ibid). He is fascinated by the process, how 
nothing is constant, and how he can kindle and re-kindle the process but 
never control it”37 (Ibid). This initial attentiveness towards the world de-
fined as “the watchfulness of the flame” (Ibid) provides the idea that the 
complex understanding of the world itself is possible only through adopting 
a new type of rationality, which to arm the self with a new complex compe-
tence. Such rationality affects extending the concept of the encounter with 
the world by revealing that the process of contemplation displays a new 
type of competence regarding our practical experience. That is why I argue 
that extrapolating the concept of encounter by establishing this existential 
competence is a logical consequence of expanding the idea of rationality, 
which is primarily recognized as a cognitive rationality. 
Judging by those investigations, I draw the conclusion that changing the ori-
entational metaphors inflicts the change of what Tordsson calls ‘Nansen’s 
moral geography” (Tordsson 2003: 116). The result is that the idea of future 
“as an already made map” (Kvaløy 2007: 83) does not exist any longer38. 
                                           
37 Kvaløy retells one of the versions of Ash-lad stories (Ibid: 83-84), according to which he had two 
brothers, Per and Pål. They were living in a kingdom, where the daughter of the king never laughed. 
That is why the king announced that if someone makes her laugh, he will marry the princess and 
will get one half of the kingdom. Per and Pål started to practice for the competition, while Ash-lad 
kept watching the fireplace showing no interest at all. Per prepared a trick of a march ending with an 
unusual limp. In turn, Pål learnt to imitate a priest who was popular with reciting masses at break-
neck speed. Having got tired of his mother’s nagging, Ash-lad left home, but “instead of being di-
rectional and goal seeking”, he was “observant and fascinated” by what he saw along the road (Ibid: 
83). Kvaløy points out that on his road, Ash-lad got experience, which Per and Pål missed being ob-
sessed with the goal. In this context, Kvaløy quoted Gandhi’s statement “The road is the goal and 
the goal is the road” (Ibid). Reaching the castle, Ash-lad looked for work and was employed by the 
chief cook to carry firewood and water (Ibid: 84). Hauling water from the local well, Ash-lad found 
an unexpectedly beautiful fish, which he decided to catch. On his way home, Ash-lad met a lady 
with a golden goose. They agreed to trade and the lady told him that the goose has magic skills. If 
someone comes over and touches it when its owner says “If you want to join, just hang on!”, that 
someone gets stuck to the goose (Ibid). Ash-lad himself also found out that anyone touching some-
one, who is attached to the goose, is caught in the same way (Ibid). Similar things happened to sev-
eral people and when Ash-lad reached the princess’s balcony, there was a huge queue of people be-
hind him, falling and bumping into each other. Having seen the members of her entourage in that 
position, the princess bursted into laughter (Ibid). 
38 For Ash-lad, the only future is the one whose complexity of challenges consists of sitting and 
sharing food with hungry old people, enjoying the shape of a round stone etc. 
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Adopting the new experiential competence makes me argue that justifying the 
meeting of man and nature due to the specificities of the Norwegian world-
view, requires adopting particular moral experiential gestalts, which to con-
tribute to revealing how Norwegian national identity in Romanticism is built 
on questioning some principles of deontological ethics, as represented in the 
deeds of Ash-lad’s brothers Per and Pål. 
Going back to the level of the theoretical investigations, I conclude that one 
of the methodological advantages of adopting Kvaløy’s interpretation of 
Bergson’s idea of laughter is that we can trace how due to establishing the 
role of imaginative rationality, the new experience can be reconsidered by 
the practices of moral understanding and moral learning. It is possible since 
thus we are provided with the opportunity to non-contradictory conceptual-
ize even this experience, which due to the traditional paradigms looks un-
subjectable to any classification whatsoever. 
Ash-lad’s highly developed capability to improvise can be defined as a pro-
totype characteristic of the new competence, giving arguments in favor of 
so-called by Faarlund Askeladden-school versus Per and Pål’s time (Aske-
lad-skolen versus Per og Pål’s tid)39 (Faarlund 2000b: 211). It concerns the 
impact of two different worldviews recognized by defining two different 
living competences, which ground two different national projects respec-
tively. Faarlund claims that the framework of interpretations is also closely 
tied with reconsidering the idea of rationality. Otherwise, the latter should 
provide the implementation of a cost-benefit analysis in the decision-
making process, which make us live in Per and Pål’s time (Ibid). The con-
temporary culture requires adopting a depersonifying way of thinking (a 
thinking, which takes into consideration the pure cognitive rationality alone, 
underrating the significant role of our emotions and intuition), while so-
called cultures close to nature (naturnære kulturer) (Ibid: 212) rehabilitate 
the choice of a life in harmony (vegvalg for et liv i lage) (Faarlund 1996: 2). 
In turn, the pathos of the investigations of Norwegian outdoor life in the 
1970s corresponded to one of the inquiries conducted in the early 18th cen-
tury when a new type of evaluation (Faarlund 1991: 6) was introduced. He 
defines the aims of philosophy of nature as peace and tranquility achieved 
in the outdoor life (Faarlund 1992: 9-12). 
On a macro methodological level, the analysis on Askeladden’s outdoor life 
philosophy shows why this philosophy of nature has to be examined as an 
                                           
39Faarlund 1997: 3. See also Leirhaug’s reconstruction of Askeladden’s school (Leirhaug 2007: 84). 
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axiologically oriented philosophy, i.e. as a philosophy of nature’s life 
(natur-livsfilosofi) (Faarlund 2000b: 212). In this context, I argue that it is 
the embodiment of the new imaginative rationality that has much to do with 
the process of choosing rather than with a given choice of life in peace; a 
process, which is based on the recognition of the intrinsic value of nature as 
a value in itself. That is why Faarlund claims that the world is not “only a 
rebus” (Ibid: 213), but also a way towards life, which is a way of knowing40.  
Going back to the plot of the story contradicting two different types of time, 
namely, Per-and-Pål’s time vs. Askeladden’s one is possible if we recon-
sider them from the perspective of Norwegian nation building movement. It 
is important to outline the ontological grounding of the relationship between 
competence and time answering the following questions. What is ‘Per-and-
Pål’s competence’? Is it just a lack of competence or rather a different one? 
To what extent is Askeladden’s competence defined as such due to the aims 
of the nation building movement, and to what extent does Per-and-Pål’s 
time refer to the cultural heritage of the Kalmar union respectively? 
In this context, I reach the conclusion that contradicting the aforementioned 
competences is a result of contradicting two different visions of time (past 
and present time), which are laid in one and the same temporal plane for the 
purposes of compromising two models of national identity. Reinterpreting 
Kvaløy’s conception, we can outline how the differences of the landscapes 
(the ones between Norway and Denmark) function as socio-cultural bound-
aries revealing the contrast between two visions of time. This contrast can 
be determined as an axiologically grounded one, which is based on the con-
tradiction of what Kvaløy calls organic time (embodied in Askeladden-
time) and mechanical one (embodied in Per-and-Pål’s one)41.  
                                           
40 In turn, the way towards life in harmony can be reached by the process of experiencing and un-
derstanding since in the meeting with home culture and free nature (defined as the good “helpers” 
(hjelperne)), Askeladden polished his manners, not only his education (“fikk Askeladden sin dan-
nelse, ikke bare ut-dannelse”) (Ibid: 4). 
41The distinction between organic and mechanical time will discussed in the chapter on Kvaløy.  
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2.3. How ‘Social’ Is Norwegian Outdoor Life 
in the Social Project? 
We should emphasize that the process of what Berntsen calls transition 
from Romanticism to industrialization, which gave birth to the modern out-
door life (Berntsen 2011: 24-29) as well as was focused on justifying the 
mountain as belonging to the typical ‘Norwegian’ (Ibid: 30) is provided in a 
new, complex way, taking into account the specificities of growing class 
stratification and the need of preserving the ‘old’ ideals of being in nature. It 
turned out that outdoor life kept being a home of the Norwegian climbers, 
who denied the role of alpinism as a sport activity. Referring to Conwentz’s 
theory42 (Ibid: 51), I argue that Norwegian philosophy of outdoor life at that 
time used to have much to do with different culturally determined concep-
tions of what environmental protection should look like. 
In turn, examining the transformation of Norwegian outdoor life’s tradi-
tion43 requires the genealogy of some new aspects to be explored. Tordsson 
argues that in the interwar time working class recognized the outdoor life as 
an ideal, as a way of deliberation (befrielsesvei) (Tordsson 2002: 3), contra-
dicting the reconsidered old ‘new’ ideal of being in the forests and moun-
tains, which became a “symbol of the class society” (Ibid: 2). It is the class 
stratification that inflicted the need of interpreting this ideal as a collective 
one since the old values were incorporated into a new system. Thus the role 
of Norwegian outdoor life was reconsidered by gaining a new collective 
value and a new symbolic capital 44. Furthermore, the stratification in ques-
tion contributed to the justification of the ‘positive’ symbolic capital of the 
collective camping and hiking introduced by the Norwegian social Democ-
                                           
42 According to Berntsen, Hugo Conwentz considers the work on environmental protection as an 
expression of “culture and civilization” (Ibid: 50-51). 
43The socio-cultural dilemmas in Norway also had another aspect since they were reshaped under 
the influence of the war situation in Europe. In the interwar period, the activities of the Land associa-
tion were focused on the polar expeditions aiming at appropriating Svalbard and Greenland (Rein-
ertsen og Asdal 2010: 19) (Berntsen 2011: 87).  
44Analyzing the contribution of Sjur K. Selland, Berntsen claims that his article entails cultural op-
timism. In the publication of 1920 Selland argued that nature is not only a product of material prof-
its, but also one of “an organic connecting totality” (heile) (Ibid: 75). Thus the “reconciliation be-
tween capital and work” (as Eriksen claims) (Ibid), as well as the critique of the misuse of nature 
were examined as a critique of modernity against the background of the growing industrialization. 
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rats (Gåsdel 2007: 80), which was a result of the increasing impact of the 
relation between work and leisure time. 
The arising social stratification is one of the reasons for examining and rep-
resenting nature as an arena of resources, which can be a subject to exploita-
tion. Recognizing the practical perspective as the only one possible perspec-
tive at the expense of the axiological and cultural ones has its inevitable 
negative consequences.  
Going back to the aspects of time dimensions, I reach the conclusion that 
the class-stratification provided a new understanding of time because the 
latter was more often considered as a matter of possession on human side. 
The competence that required Ash-lad’s understanding of time was replaced 
with one established for the sake of imposing time itself, which became a 
source of justifying the most relevant and flexible competence while being 
in nature. In this context, outdoor life gained a collective value whose way 
of functioning was determined by the arising symbolic capital of the leisure 
time understood as a time, which is possessed by the individual for his/her 
own needs. 
On a macro methodological level, the interwar period in Norway can be 
characterized with the acceleration of the misuse of nature. That is why not 
only the fight for gaining land, but also the one for nature was considered as 
a matter of preserving the national identity.  
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2.4. The Challenges of Modernization 
to Norwegian Outdoor Life 
The methodological consequences of the increasing class stratification be-
came more apparent in the war period as well as in the first year after the 
war45, when the idea of nature as a place of living survived multiple trans-
formations from a global perspective. In the first year after the war, the bat-
tle was no longer a battle for being, but rather for taking the challenge of 
living at different places, which are not necessarily homes.  
After the liberation in 1945, the Norwegian Labor party (Arbeiderpar-
tiet) (which governed for 20 years) supported the economic growth as 
well as established “working places through industrialization and planned 
control of the development of society” (Reinertsen og Asdal 2010: 20)46.  
In Norway, the first reforms were made in the beginning of the 20th century 
(after 1905), when the Prime Minister Christian Michaelsen introduced a 
new workday; one reform that positively affected the idea that the distress 
has a high negative symbolic capital (Berntsen 2011: 61). That is why we 
may argue that all the counter strategies have to be oriented towards en-
couraging one collective ethos47 (Tordsson 2007: 66-67) only in formal 
terms since the latter is based on the new elitarian ideal of being alone in 
wilderness as a stance of independence. 
Regarding policy on nature, there was a “clear continuity between interwar 
period and the time before” (Ibid), which caused seeing nature as a re-
source. The latter has to be used for the best of society and its citizens as 
well as in a rational and good manner respectively. 
                                           
45According to Tordsson, war strengthened the connections between the city and countryside in 
Norway (Tordsson 2002: 4). 
46 In turn, the conception regarding ‘humanized’ nature is a result of exaggerating the utilitarian role 
of thinking based on the pure cognitive rationality, which provoked what Tordsson described as the 
role of free time, namely, the need of deliberating from the instrumental rationality by reconsidering 
the closeness to nature and arising freedom (Tordsson 2003: 116). One project that was conceptual-
ized by Labor party’s radicals who were deeply involved in promoting the slogan ‘outdoor life for 
all’ and who participated in the interwar era in building a new welfare state (Tordsson 2007: 4). 
47I extrapolate Tordsson’s concept of individual ethos, which has to be mirrored by the modern con-
temporary society (Tordsson 2007: 66). 
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An illuminative illustration of this thesis can be seen in what Faarlund 
writes about the ‘destiny’ of Ash-lad’s story and how it gained a new popu-
larity during the war respectively. The need of rehabilitating the ‘romantic’ 
image of nature through reconsidering the axiological, practical and cultural 
perspectives in Berntsen’s sense represents the willingness of re-justifying 
the image of humanity as such in a pan-European context. In other words, 
going back to the cultural heritage as a source of strengthening the national 
identity was determined as a part of the global strives for rethinking the role 
of the national values in the name of mankind’s ones by revealing the im-
pact of solidarity on social level, as Tordsson claims. 
Reconsidering the increasing modifications of the debate about growth and 
environmental protection into the one about industrial development versus 
environmental preservation, the Norwegians began to discuss the ecological 
situation as a precedent; regardless of the political-economic system, the 
role of weather, accidents (uhell) and divine power, it is described as a be-
ginning of wisdom (Berntsen 2011: 117). In the after war period, the afore-
mentioned contradiction was modified as one grounded in growing techno-
cratic optimism versus the need of environmental changes. The debate took 
place against the background of the classical understanding of the role of 
natural sciences. In this context, we may claim that the value of scientific 
knowledge was interpreted as having two sides contradicting the idea of 
progress and the one of process.  
From the perspective of nature, the way back to nature was determined as a 
long way to practical wisdom, which brings us back to the new implications 
of the debate about episteme and techne. That is why the dilemmas can be 
recognized as stemming from the normative validity of practical knowledge. 
According to P. Anker, in the 1960s nature was transformed from “a place 
of work into a place of leisure” (Anker 2007: 456), which happened within 
the framework of the sizable industry of vacationing (Ibid). The public ac-
cess to nature became a politically potent issue due to the arising social dis-
tress and the need of dealing with it (Tordsson 2007: 67).  
Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I draw the conclusion that the 
modification of the growth and environmental protection debate also af-
fected the increasing sportification of Norwegian outdoor life48. It was a re-
                                           
48 According to Tordsson, while Norwegian outdoor life did not have an important place in building 
the after war society, idretten played a central role in the project of Modernization (Tordsson 2002: 
4). 
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sult of the clash of two different socio-cultural conceptualizations of nature, 
which first, concerned the ideal of uncorrupted nature and second, deter-
mined nature as an arena of resources. On a macro methodological level, I 
argue that the debate contradicted two conceptions of growth: the second 
conception culminated into what economists called ‘sustainable develop-
ment’, while the first one was mainly focused on the theory of de-growth 
(especially in the mid-1960s). The contradiction gained new power against 
the background of the interwar politics, when economic development was 
justified by the idea of capital, which was gained for the sake of obtaining a 
surplus of resources (Berntsen 2011: 99). When the work was evaluated 
from the perspective of capital, it contributed to developing a new type of 
rationality, which supported the strengthening of class struggle49.  
In this context, I reach the conclusion that the clash between development 
and environmental protection became a fact due to the clash of different in-
terests, which should have had to be uncontradictory anticipated by so-
called ethics of conservation (Ibid: 109). The contradictions were more ap-
parent in the after war period since compensating the losses of war inflicted 
the need of accelerating rationality by looking for additional sources of ex-
ploitation in order to broaden the net of capital investments. Yet in 1970s 
Norwegian state began to work on integrating the outdoor life to the Mod-
ernization project (Tordsson 2002: 5). 
In turn, Norwegian nature was also considered as an arena for recreation50 
(Ibid); an issue, which has had a central place in the social policy of the 
Norwegian Labor party. The latter was focused, among other problems, on 
supporting vacations that are longer than three days as well as on the con-
solidation of public outdoor life areas51. 
In conclusion, mirroring the individual ethos is not a unilateral process since 
building collective ethos presumes the ideal ‘to be alone in wilderness’ to be 
reproduced in any time and at any place available. In turn, vacation has to 
‘occur’ at the ideal place and time supported by the means of technologies 
                                           
49The struggle in question took place within the framework of the similarities between economic 
liberalism and social democracy, as Trond B. Eriksen claimed (Berntsen 2011: 109). 
50 Tordsson also emphasizes that it is an arena of social fight (between upper and lower classes) 
(Tordsson 2002: 3). 
51 The Outdoor life law (Friluftsloven) of 1957 included another important right, which character-
izes Scandinavian environmental policy, namely, so-called public right to access (allemannsrett) that 
gave people access to nature, also on a private basis (Berntsen 2011: 125). 
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for a maximum number of people, recognizing the subject’s leading role in 
the ‘man-nature’ relationship. In this context, I draw the conclusion that na-
ture becomes an area of an over-exploitation. It is interpreted as a human-
ized nature, which means that it is misrecognized as nature that cannot func-
tion without humans.  
 63
2.4.1. The Sportification of Norwegian Outdoor Life 
The dramatic fight of preserving the methodological balance between the 
need of rehabilitating the intrinsic value of nature and its utilitarization was 
also represented on a different level, namely, on the one of arising sportifi-
cation of Norwegian outdoor life. Justifying mass sport as a part of the state 
policy after the Second World War in Norway became a significant compo-
nent of the strategy to develop ways of keeping the requirements of free 
time high.  
According to one of the ‘fathers’ of Norwegian philosophy of sport, Gunnar 
Breivik, Norwegians like seeing themselves as “especially active” (Breivik 
2010: 195). Being active is considered as an important part of improving 
health and social welfare by practicing different sports. The two paradigms, 
which Breivik analyzes, are the ones of Olympic sports and outdoor life52.  
One of the main methodological concerns provoked by the aforementioned 
model is that the paradigm of outdoor life could interfere with the one of 
sport, referring the components of national identity to praising the physical 
experience and doing exercises alone. In other words, exploring outdoor life 
hides the risks it to be examined as a net of activities by overrating the role 
of physical participation at the expense of the worldview’s implications and 
the complexity of cultural and social attitudes respectively.  
On the other hand, tracing the origin of the two words used in Norwegian 
for sport – the words ‘sport’ and ‘idrett’ contribute to showing the arising 
risk philosophy of sport to be replaced with the theory of sport, as Breivik 
argues. He clarifies that the word ‘idrett’ comes from Old Norwegian. Used 
by the Vikings, it has meant ‘strong deeds’ including “not only activities 
like running, swimming and sailing, but also the ability to ride a horse, 
make a poem and use a sword. It contained all the sides of a full-blown hero 
of the Viking era, similar to Homer’s Bronze Age heroes” (Ibid: 195). In 
this context, Breivik makes the specification that today the word can be tak-
en in its narrow sense, in a sense similar to the word ‘sport”, but he will use 
it in a broader sense including play, games, dance and outdoor activities 
(Ibid). One of the reasons is that adopting the broader sense of the word 
                                           
52 Breivik claims that ‘life in the open air’ (Ibid) includes practices such as hunting and fishing fol-
lowed by hiking and climbing, which gave the ‘modern’ outlook of outdoor life in the 19th century 
(Ibid: 195-196).  
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benefits examining the role of sport among other outdoor activities, such as 
outdoor life. 
In turn, the methodological advantage of investigating the common geneal-
ogy of the outdoor activities in Norway is concerned with revealing the 
multiple aspects of the national worldview, especially the ones related to the 
axiological perspective in Berntsen’s sense. Neglecting outdoor life’s axio-
logical perspective would lead to simplifying it as a fundamental experience 
concerned with shaping unique moral experiential gestalts. It is the lack of 
axiological neutrality that makes the clarification of complexity of physical 
activities and psychological attitudes so important for specifying the bound-
ary between real outdoor life and philosophy of outdoor life. In other words, 
exploring the axiological perspective benefits recognizing ecophilosophy as 
a particular worldview philosophy, which cannot reduce the ‘transcendental 
experience in nature’ (Repp 2001: 109-110) to the unlimited exploitation of 
nature’s resources. 
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2.5. How Did Norwegian 
Outdoor Life Change in the Ecosocial Project? 
According to Tordsson, outdoor life turned into a starting point in criticizing 
the whole Modernization project (Tordsson 2002: 5). Referring to Breivik’s 
statement that technological culture has “bankrupted” (har spilt fallitt), 
which affected the reconsideration of outdoor life as both thinking and liv-
ing form (Ibid), he argues that the meeting with nature cannot give pills for 
headache to one “ill living form” (en syk livsform) (Ibid: 6). In this context, 
the question of “what outdoor life” (“hvilket friluftsliv”) is a starting point 
for the lively discussions about “what society” (“hvilket samfunn”)53 (Ibid). 
Clarifying the origin of 20th century Norwegian ecophilosophies in respect 
with outdoor life, I argue that they are closely tied with the idea of justify-
ing what the best environmentally friendly politics should look like. In turn, 
Norwegian environmental activism concerned the ways of establishing eco-
politics grounded in the ‘right’, in the sense of epistemologically relevant, 
informed consent as presuming the adoption of a certain kind of knowledge.  
It is important to emphasize that the need of such activism in Norway was 
not merely a result of the collision between big concerns’ interests and av-
erage people’s ones. One of the main aims of Norwegian activism at that 
time was to politically revive the idea of uncorrupted nature as a matter of 
defending political right since the aforementioned two types of interest af-
fected the degree as well as the regulation of nature’s use, but from different 
perspectives. The conflict of interests was rather focused on the subject, 
namely, whether this is the ordinary people or the state. While the govern-
ment supported the thesis that knowledge was necessary for justifying the 
interests, Mardøla and Alta actions showed that knowledge dominates what 
kind of interests to choose. That is why in the 1960s and early 1970s, we 
saw two different projects of ecopolitics in Norway. The first one was 
grounded in supporting given interests, which had to be protected by the 
means of science (science and nature were interpreted as sources of a simi-
lar kind, i.e. as sources of utilization), while the second one were based on 
the need of informed consent, which was recognized by the citizens as hav-
                                           
53 Tordsson argues that the tendencies to drag (trekke) outdoor life in the Modernization project for 
the purposes of serving the dominating societal development ware in this way considerably moder-
ate (Ibid). 
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ing a high value. The tension derived also from the fact that the attempts at 
accelerating the ecopolitical mechanisms took place within the framework 
of the ‘classic’ understanding of the concept ‘environmental protection’ 
(naturvern)54.  
Furthermore, environmental protection (including the preservation of the 
opportunities for outdoor life) turns into a necessary condition for societal 
development. It gradually became a part of the ecosocial project of the late 
1960s, which made possible to talk about “growth and environmental pro-
tection” as a subject to utilitarian ideology (Berntsen 2011: 144). During 
this period, giving natural sources to concession was a crucial problem dis-
cussed in so-called governmental Long-time Program (Langtidsprogram) 
(1973) because it strengthened the tension of the ‘versus’ mode. In tune 
with the aforementioned issues, so-called modern ecological thinking 
gained power. It also influenced the international trends showing why the 
technological invasion has a long-lasting influence upon mankind’s devel-
opment. 
                                           
54 Following Berntsen’s explanation (Berntsen 2011: 133-134), we can see how the idea of envi-
ronmental protection was exploited in two different ways: in the party programs and by the envi-
ronmental activists respectively  
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2.5.1. The Impact of Earthliness, or What Does It Mean to 
Be at Home in Nature? 
Maybe one of the first attempts to clarify the need of having ecophilosophy 
can be implicitly seen in the writings of Nansen who argues against reduc-
ing the role of philosophy of outdoor life. He appeals for discerning touring 
culture due to the philosophy of outdoor life and due to the city culture re-
spectively (Samuelsen 2010: 25). The distinction in question depends on what 
kind of values we would prescribe to the initial meeting between man and na-
ture: whether the latter will be recognized as a total openness or as a meeting by 
which man is ‘in’ nature without encompassing it. 
Nansen argued for rehabilitating the ideals of outdoor life encouraging the es-
tablishment of the individual relationships with free nature as a guarantee of 
meeting the criteria of a successful self-realization. He explored the implications 
of the statement that people ‘should always walk alone’ against one of the main 
mountain rules of Norwegian outdoor life, namely, ‘never go on a tour alone’ 
(gå alltid alene… mot gå aldri på tur alene) (Østrem 2003: 2). In his well-known 
speech called Outdoor Life (Friluftsliv) (1924) Nansen opposed the city life and 
the one in nature encouraging the examination of the roots of outdoor life. It is 
the latter that “can compensate us and bring us back to “one more human exis-
tence” (til en mere menneskelig tilværelse) (Nansen 1995: 146). He pointed out 
that the stimulus to go back to our own nature is the simple outdoor life, in the 
forests, fields and mountains, “in the big heights, in deep loneliness (i den store 
ensomhet), where completely new thoughts come out to us and leave marks, 
which cannot be removed so fast again” (Ibid: 146-147). Thus one instinctively 
begins to feel oneself as a different person, as a “more natural and healthier per-
son” (Ibid: 147). Thus one feels that one has something, which “lies below” 
(som ligger under), which is one’s real personality. One comes back with a a 
fresher and healthier attitude towards life compared to the one in the city (Ibid). 
The aforementioned stances show that feeling at home in nature can be 
achieved through turning loneliness into a prototype characteristic of our ex-
perience, which to guarantee the transparence of the total openness of man and 
nature. Therefore going back to the roots of outdoor life means to adopt a new 
paradigm of moral learning. The paradigm in question could be based on the 
ideal of experiential learning; a process that could be compared with Gunnar 
Repp’s theory of outdoor life’s know how (Repp 2001: 112). 
In this context, I draw the conclusion that the methodological continuity be-
tween Nansen’s conception and the theory of the founder of deep ecology Arne 
Næss can be traced back to how Nansen’s ‘moral geography’, as described by 
Tordsson, functions as based on ontological ethics. Extrapolating Tordsson’s 
conception who claims that Nansen’s moral geography is grounded in the pre-
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sumption of natural man, who lives in his/her natural environment (Tordsson 
2003: 15), we can outline the changing profile of the ‘nature-culture’ relation-
ships (Ibid), emphasizing not only the dichotomic connections, but also their 
way of functioning as a dialectical relationship in Faarlund’s sense, namely, by 
recognizing nature as a home of culture (Faarlund 1989).  
The pathos of Nansen’s theory was to reveal the disadvantages of giving prefer-
ence to life in the city as being ‘captured’ in only one living form (so-called by 
him cage life (et kasseliv)) (Nansen 1995: 145) at the expense of adopting mul-
tiple living forms in noncontradictory manner. On a macro methodological lev-
el, it means that one of the main prerequisites for comparing Nansen’s and 
Næss’s philosophies can be seen in rehabilitating spontaneous experience as a 
prototype characteristic of the aforementioned experiential learning due to the 
principles of imaginative rationality. For Nansen ‘to live richly’ is what is for 
Næss ‘to live a life that is simple in means but rich in ends’ (Næss 1978: 144) 
because both of them emphasize the achievement of self-realization as a way of 
reconsidering man’s place in nature as being at home. 
Another methodological similarity concerns the diachronic implications of the 
aforementioned moral geography, taking into account that both Nansen and 
Næss refer the presumption that ‘nature is a home of man’ to the very past; an 
ideal past, which could be revived by the practices of experiential learning. One 
of the benefits of adopting such a learning is that it would arm us with experien-
tial moral understanding, which, paraphrasing Sigmund Kvaløy, would make 
the self-realization possible by grasping life’s complexity rather than by 
strengthening its complication (Kvaløy 1976: 19). Favoring the simple life in 
nature understood as a way of fulfilling a particular worldview philosophy (i.e. 
of accomplishing a given personal life philosophy) is grounded in the presump-
tion that total openness is an essential mode of being. Both Nansen and Næss 
(albeit adopting different means) couple self-realization with the process of 
identification, which is projected within Næss’s ecosophy under the guise of a 
form of identification that is deprived of moral connotations55 
In turn, in the essay My Belief (Min Tro) (1922) Nansen appealed for establish-
ing new morality based on the old guiding stars (ledestjernene) solidarity and 
love (Nansen 1995: 214-215) (Samuelsen 2010: 85). Regarding the promotion 
of self-realization within the framework of ontological ethics, the role of soli-
darity and love in Næss’s writings can be examined by outlining the influence 
                                           
55 This thesis will be discussed in detail in the chapter on Næss. 
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of Erich Fromm56; an influence, which is usually overlooked at the expense of 
the ones of Spinoza and Mahayana Buddhism57.  
Furthermore, one of the possible parallels regarding the specifically Nordic 
understanding of nature can be drawn between Næss’s theory and the one of 
the Icelandic philosopher P. Skúlason who discussed ‘earthliness’ as a 
grounding principle making one feel oneself a human being. Being fasci-
nated by the mountain Askja, Skúlason argued that it represents the Earth it-
self saying that I am I, and You are You, and We are We because we are 
what we are in the face of Askja (Skúlason 2005: 48). Similarly, Naess dis-
played the idea that nature has a soul referring to Sami people’s claim that 
river also has a soul58. Analyzing both conceptions makes me conclude that 
it is adopting the principles of imaginative rationality that justifies the nor-
mative implications of the aforementioned understanding since imagination 
does not ‘add’ additional being, but rather reveals the complexity of the 
hidden one in a way, which does not put in question its objectivity. Thus 
Næss’s question of what it means ‘to think like a mountain’ is comparable 
with Rudolph Otto’s idea of numinous producing a state sui generis, which 
can be achieved neither by cognitive rationality alone, nor by relying merely 
on ethics (Otto 1970: 5).  
                                           
56 Andrew Brennan argues that Fromm used the term biophilia describing “a healthy love of life, in-
terest in living things and joy at one’s own being alive” (Brennan 2013: 113). Næss anticipates 
Fromm’s conception saying that love of others and love of ourselves are not alternatives (Ibid). Fur-
thermore, genuine love is “an expression of productiveness and implies care, respect, responsibility 
and knowledge” (Ibid). In this context, Brennan pays attention to Næss’s quotations of Fromm’s 
ideas exploring how the development of a philosophy of joyful affirmation of life distances Næss’s 
ecosophy from the followers of Leopold’s land ethic (Ibid).  
57 This influence will be examined in the chapter on Næss. 
58 He also argues that “I do not step into the river”, as Heraclites claims, but “ I am the river” (Næss 
and Haukeland 2008c: 3). 
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2.5.2. The Steep Way of Norwegian Philosophy of Climbing 
According to Anker, Norwegian ecologists at that time can be characterized 
as “advocates of a recreational nature” emphasizing the significant role of 
recreational values and conservation of nature (Anker 2007: 459). In this 
context, I draw the conclusion that it is the arising symbolic capital of rec-
reational values that makes the risk of reducing nature to res extensa bigger 
in the name of searching for its unique, scientifically recognizable value. 
KKK (1967), consisting of 37 climbers led by Reidar Eriksen, Egil Myhre, 
and Per Gaarder, functioned as a local climbing club which countered the 
elitism of NTK (Olsen 1992: 67). In turn, NTK was considered to be “per-
haps the most exclusive of a myriad of outdoor recreation societies,” whose 
slogan was formulated by the prominent Norwegian philosopher and moun-
taineer, Peter Wessel Zapffe: “Climbing to other sports is like champagne to 
bock beer,” displaying the spirit of “this upper crust fraternity” (Anker 
2007: 458). In the late 1920s, Arne Næss met Zapffe for the first time in 
Kolsås, which was called a “center for advanced friluftsliv” (outdoor life) 
(Kolsrud 1992: 119); a meeting that became one of the most crucial prereq-
uisites for the further development of 20th-century Norwegian ecophiloso-
phies. According to Bruskeland and Støren, both Næss and Zappfe had been 
climbing Kolsås for over 30 years before the KKK was founded, and thus 
their climbing ethics was formulated as a matter of a “live” practical phi-
losophy (Bruskeland and Støren 1992: 79).  
Regarding climbing techniques, bolt climbing was promoted by Næss 
against the principles of NTK and the British influence in 1930s, while so-
called clean climbing (Kolsrud 1992: 116) was imposed by the “father” of 
the Norwegian philosophy of outdoor life, Nils Faarlund, and some other 
supporters in the late 1960s. During his stay in Austria (1954-1955), Næss 
was struck by the idea that the climbers in Norway should become as crafty 
as the Austrian ones, but by sharing another philosophy of climbing (Næss 
1978a: 125). He was one of the first climbers to argue that the aim of climb-
ing is not the experience of the climbers themselves, nor the mountain’s 
formations or routes, but rather the realization of the pilgrim meeting with 
the mountain (Ibid).  
The anticipation of bolt climbing techniques had much to do with the fact 
that Kolsås and some other cliffs around it became “arenas” for climbing 
(Kolsrud 1992: 122). At first sight, it appears that bolts were recognized as 
aiding the process of conquering the mountain in so far as they made the 
most difficult ways accessible for the climber. Accessibility itself turned in-
 71
to a key prerequisite for justifying the environment as an arena for conquer-
ing difficult or inaccessible peaks. However, rejecting the idea that peaks 
should be named after the people who have climbed them was a significant 
element of the new philosophy of climbing59. 
On a practical level, the use of bolts showed an increasing tendency to ex-
pand dependence on external factors to overcome the difficulties the climb-
ers faced, but it happened against the background of understanding man’s 
responsibility toward both others and nature. Otherwise, the problem of in-
teracting with nature would have been reduced to how to approach the peak 
of a mountain fast and effectively, with “effectiveness” defined from climb-
er’s perspective alone.  
If effectiveness had become a key characteristic of climbing and replaced 
the “natural” intensity of the climbing experience itself, the debates about 
safety would have been simplified to the choice and application of means 
and their instrumental value. It would have been a problem triggered by the 
use of bolts as means rather than by their contribution to easing the interac-
tion with nature. Bolt climbing was recognized as dominated by so-called 
responsibility for the product (Ibid: 123), namely how long the bolts will 
last and whether the climber has the competence to adequately place them. 
This tendency has developed in time with the more widespread introduction 
of “modern” ideas of climbing due to increasing industrialization and its 
impact on turning nature into an exploitable source. 
Analyzing the ethical aspects of bolt climbing makes it questionable to de-
fine it as uncritically adopted within the values of climbing sport’s ethics. 
Bolts are introduced in order to meet the requirements of rising safety con-
cerns, i.e. to improve the safety level of all climbers involved. In the 1950s, 
the essence of climbing was defined by Kolsås by the following formulas: 
“Never stay on one bolt!” and “The first man should never fall down!” 
(Høibakk 1992: 62). The shared responsibility for the others is one of the 
most significant embodiments of the interaction between the climber and 
the mountain that grounds the understanding of climbing ethics as a certain 
type of applied ethics.  
In the article Bolt Climbing, published in the journal Norwegian Mountain 
Sport (Norsk fjellsport) (1948), Naess claimed that it is not right to enlist 
                                           
59 Naess mentions the name of the well-established Norwegian climber, Einar Hoff-Hansen, as an 
illuminative representative of a tendency toward wide egalitarianism and anti-heroism at that time 
(Hohle 1992: 41). 
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and encourage people to take up a sport which might create great sorrow for 
their relatives (Hohle 1992: 42). It is an experience that presumes not only 
that one will make particular engagements, but also necessitates awareness 
of one’s responsibility to the experience itself, which is understood as an in-
separable component from the responsibility to climber’s life as a whole. To 
a certain extent, bolt climbing naturally entails the avoidance of experiential 
dualism, i.e. separating the climbing experience as an object from the 
climber as a subject.  
Examining the value of climbing itself, I would argue that the role of train-
ing in the context of climbing is not equivalent to training for a sport. In the 
1930s, climbing was addressed in Kolsås as “our dear sport” (Olsen 1992: 
54), which shows that its prototype characteristics had less to do with the 
contemporary understanding of sport philosophy than might be thought. 
Climbing was described as “dear,” since joy and fun are the characteristics 
that give coherence to the climber’s experiential gestalt. As it is defined by 
the members of the club, Kolsås was not a goal in itself, it was a preparation 
for the mountain (Høibakk 1992: 65) in which participants cultivated their 
skills in order to be able to face physical, mental, and psychological chal-
lenges. Mastering such skills was designed to improve contact with nature 
and others rather than make the aforementioned skills goals in themselves. 
In this context, a specification must be made. The ideas of exercising and 
practicing this philosophy of climbing—which are expressed by another 
representative of the later Kolsås generations, Dag Kolsrud, with one Nor-
wegian word signifying both activities (the word “utøvelse”)—should be 
examined in its double meaning, discerning between climbing as an existen-
tial experience and climbing as a sport. Since Kolsrud calls clean climbing 
an example of “a new ideology within exercising/practicing of climbing 
sport” (Kolsrud 1992: 116), it is important to emphasize that in the begin-
ning, Norwegian bolt climbing was adopted as a means for keeping the 
complex interaction between man and nature as transparent as possible, 
while the forthcoming ideology of sport built on exercising rather than on 
“practicing”—understood as an existential mode of becoming—presumes 
treating the means as goals in themselves. On a micro-methodological level, 
it shows that the ideology of sport is focused on bolts rather than on bolt 
climbing, absolutizing the role of equipment by making it an object of se-
vere competition: the more fashionable the equipment is, the better the 
climbers are. This is one idea whose development brings bolt climbing as it 
was introduced by Næss in Norway into question. 
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In turn, the revolutionary impact of “clean climbing” consisted in its intro-
duction as a practical and environmentally friendly way to climb, since the 
changes in technique caused changes in the philosophical influences behind 
them. While the egalitarian ideas of NTK were influenced by British phi-
losophy, clean climbing opened the door for a stronger American intellec-
tual influence. According to Kolsrud, the American influence in question 
became more apparent in the late 1970s and early 1980s, triggering changes 
which, however, were not very instructive only for Norway (Ibid: 115). The 
Alpine traditions, the role of the mountain, and the philosophical founda-
tions of outdoor life in the the lives of Norwegian climbers predisposed 
them toward adopting the practices of Central Europe. In practice, such an 
impact means that the latter were rather replaced with some American ideas, 
shifting the focus to style and technology, and to the growing interest in 
safety equipment and free climbing (Ibid). 
Free climbing itself was triggered by the generational shift in Kolsås in the 
early 1970s, as well as by the international development of the field of 
climbing, which both contributed to raising free climbing to the level of 
sport. The climbing in question also showed how the use of German words 
and expressions for climbing were being replaced with new English termi-
nology. As Kolsrud himself argued, the secondary language in Kolsås was 
no longer Ny Norsk60, but English (Ibid: 117).  
The intensive internalization of climbing in Norway led to its transforma-
tion in the face of the increasing impact of industrialization on society gen-
erally. This transformation had both its positive and negative sides with re-
gard to the uncritical reception of different ideals. In the case of Norwegian 
climbing, although the uncritical import of American ideals partly followed 
other dividing lines, it revealed how the development of climbing follows 
the development of society (Ibid). 
In this context, the sportification of climbing caused by the internalization 
of foreign values can be seen as emerging from an uncritical acquisition of 
foreign norms, which in turn provoked the replacement of climbing ethics 
with the one of sport. The transformation in question presumed a change in 
the mode of becoming: the meaning of the climbing experience guided by 
the formula “Because it (the mountain) is there” was substituted with the 
                                           
60 Ny Norsk (New Norwegian) is one of the two official Norwegian written standards. It was created 
in the mid-19th century in order to provide an alternative to Danish, which was still dominant in 
Norway at that time.  
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Kolsås’s “Because we are here”61. Thus, in order to understand the geneal-
ogy of the subject change in climbing, we should focus on outlining the nor-
mative validity of experiential gestalt as grounded in the complex pattern of 
implementing different ideals of climbing—namely, whether climbing is 
recognized as ascending a trackless passage (ferdsel) or a well-trodden way 
(Ibid). 
However, so-called clean climbing is not only a cliché (Ibid: 115). In terms 
of safety, the better equipment is, the faster and safer the climbing is. On the 
other hand, the necessity of creating more elaborate equipment does not ex-
haust the debate about the purpose of climbing, which is a significant argu-
ment in favor of the thesis that such an interest is not necessarily a sign of a 
need for its sportification.  
Since industrialization requires a mass production of artifacts, climbing fac-
es the negative influences of those changes. The so-called lime debate 
(kalkdebaten) (Ibid: 117) in Norway is an illuminative illustration of how 
the aforementioned mode of non-necessity comes into question through 
pressure to mass-produce climbing equipment. The debate concerns the 
quality of “climbing production,” which “does not have only cosmetic or 
psychological effects” (Ibid: 119). It is taking place at a time when free 
climbing is being introduced, showing a gradual change in climbers’ atti-
tudes towards exaggerating the role of equipment. This is also one of the 
first signs of the forthcoming sportification that makes the price a value in 
itself, and thus encourages striving for sportification for commercial rea-
sons. 
In turn, raising the level of safety does not lead to ruining the mountain, 
since clean climbing happens “almost silently and tracelessly” (Ibid: 116). 
That new securing process is based on placing and removing bolts with 
one’s hands, as ease of execution is not recognized within the contemporary 
context as merely raising the level of efficiency, i.e. as reducing the time for 
reaching the goal, but also extending the space for both others and environ-
ment by “cleaning” given signs of man’s presence in it. On a macro-
methodological level, it means that the formula “Easy and fast” is a formula 
                                           
61 These formulas are answers to the question of why people climb. The first one was given one 
hundred years ago by Albert Mummery (as a response to the question of why he climbed the Mat-
terhorn in the Alps). He emphasized that the real subject of climbing is not the climber, but the 
mountain. The second answer shows the growing desire among the members of Kolsås to establish 
a certain type of group belonging which strengthens self-realization via the process of identification 
(Ibid: 117). 
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which differs when adopted in extreme rock climbing or indoor climbing, 
because it does not concern the amplification of time, but the clarification of 
space understood as a horizon of interacting rather than as an arena for cer-
tain sport activities. 
As Kolsrud emphasizes in his essay, clean climbing established both a con-
cept and its own activity, but it does not follow that safety should be put un-
der the umbrella of climbing itself (Ibid). Clean climbing does not have to 
be exploited to win a climb, to move upwards, but only to prevent and stop 
falling without ruining nature.  
 76
2.5.2.1. The Turn of Imaginative Rationality and Its Impact on the 
Philosophy of Climbing in Norway 
“Magic” underlying climbing does not have to be interpreted as a form of 
anthropomorphism, nor as merely an effective metaphorical expression, but 
rather as a new type of rationality extending the boundaries of cognitive ra-
tionality. An illuminative example in this respect is Næss’s idea of what it 
means to “think like a mountain”62. Such a mode of thinking becomes un-
derstandable through the adoption of imaginative rationality, which gives 
normative validity to the state of contemplation. The latter provides the jus-
tification for man’s being-for-itself as a “natural condition,” i.e. as a condi-
tion initially concerned with nature’s being-in-itself. On a macro-
methodological level, the state of contemplation internalized as the purest 
form of meeting between man and nature has to be recognized as the most 
relevant form of self-realization based on the biosphere’s realization.  
Furthermore, the rehabilitation of the normative validity of man’s holistic 
experience shows how mastering practical wisdom depends, in its initial 
stage, on a focus upon the physical experience of the climber, including the 
issues of food and clothes. Despite the fact that the physical experience is a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for clarifying the whole process of 
self-realization, it contributes to specifying why the concept of knowledge 
should be extended beyond the boundaries of pure rationality. In this con-
text, we can outline the other aspect of imaginative rationality. “Talking and 
feeling like a mountain” presumes the rehabilitation of a certain type of on-
tological grounding, namely, seeing/hearing like a mountain, which is one 
of the most important goals in the process of contemplation as defined by 
Næss, Kvaløy, and Faarlund. 
On a micro-methodological level, the reconsidered normative validity of 
understanding through the mode of imaginative rationality clarifies one of 
the puzzling topics in Næss’s and Kvaløy’s writings—how to talk about a 
mountain (i.e. Tseringma63) as a god, father, mother, or princess in an onto-
logically grounded way. At first sight, the reader faces the challenge of in-
terpreting the aforementioned statements purely metaphorically. However, 
the temptation to talk about irrationality comes from the conceit of insisting 
on examining reality from the perspective of the formula adaequatio intel-
                                           
62 The expression “to think like a mountain” was coined by the American environmentalist, Aldo 
Leopold, in his book A Sand County Almanac (1949). 
63 Tseringma (also Gauri Sankar) is a mountain in the Himalayas. 
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lectus et rei, which ascribes irrationality to non-existing things. If we refer 
to the non-existence, we would question one of the main principles of the 
20th-century Norwegian ecophilosophies—the idea of meaningfulness (rec-
ognized as a surplus of meaning) determining the process of man’s self-
realization (to be understood as driven by nature’s realization). Although 
the surplus of meaning is justified as ontologically grounded, i.e. as stem-
ming from a surplus of determined being, it does not follow the regulations 
of the adequation of intellect and things, since the correlation requires eval-
uating the role of both emotions and corporeal experience.  
Due to adopting the concept of imaginative rationality, we can see how the 
dialectical tension between man and nature can be handled—by reconsider-
ing the presumption that irrationality has nothing to do with rationality as 
such.  
On a macro-methodological level, this means that the process of under-
standing concerning man’s self-realization is impossible if we reduce it to 
cognitive knowledge as such. This would exclude complex understanding, 
which is a key in cultivating sensitivity towards Otherness in all its repre-
sentations. An insight in this direction is provided by A. Jensen, who com-
ments on the Norwegian word “kjennskap” (knowledge as understanding) 
(Jensen 2000: 102-103), illustrating how encouraging sensitivity towards 
the biosphere presumes adopting an awareness that has an uncontradictory 
normative validity. 
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2.5.2.1.1. How Ethical Is Norwegian Philosophy of Climbing? 
Some Aspects of Applied Ethics 
In this context, we can find well-grounded arguments supporting the under-
standing of the Norwegian philosophy of climbing espoused by Zapffe, 
Næss, Kvaløy, and Faarlund as based on applied ethics. Regardless of the 
fact that ethics plays an implicit role in their writings, they agree about the 
main issue of climbing, which gives license to discuss Norwegian climbing 
philosophy as underlined by unquestionable applied ethics. The latter pro-
motes the principle of cooperation over competition, as well as the rule of 
protecting nature rather than ruining it.  
A good illustration of this is the so-called “anti-expeditions.” Sigmund 
Kvaløy, who was one of the many young adherents of Næss, spoke of their 
eighteen-day road trip from Oslo to Gandhi’s institute in Varanasi (1969) as 
a turning point in clarifying the role which Gandhi’s ethics of non-violence 
can play in overcoming the problems triggered by Western thinking. In 
1971, N. Faarlund, Kvaløy, and Næss set out on an “anti-expedition” to Ne-
pal with the aim of helping the local Sherpa in their campaign to protect the 
sacred mountain Tseringma from the invasion of tourist-mountaineers. Dur-
ing that trip, Næss completed a sketch of a new environmental philosophy 
(or “ecosophy”), Kvaløy formulated the principles of ecophilosophy of a 
“life necessity society” (as opposed to the dominant “industrial develop-
ment society”), and Faarlund was inspired to continue his philosophy of 
outdoor life as a wider approach to outdoor education (Brennan 2013). 
Judging by the aforementioned examinations, I would argue that in the be-
ginning, dating back to Fridtjof Nansen’s description of his experience in 
Jotunheimen (Nansen 1978: 17), the evaluation of climbing still relied on 
the contradiction between Homo Ascensus and Homo Viator triggering rem-
iniscences of Romanticism’s ideal. The ideal in question presumes vertical 
space to have higher symbolic value as a space of freedom and self-
realization. It is the space where “fresh” and “free” are determined to be on-
tological synonyms (Nansen 1978a: 48) that in turn determine the realiza-
tion of our nature in so far as both body and soul should “claim their right” 
(Rubenson 1978: 117). 
The coherence of corporeal and spiritual experience having normative va-
lidity is illustrated in the early 20th-century Norwegian environmental texts 
as focused on the “material” part of the preparation, and its value as ground-
ing the realization of the expeditions. The complexity of the climbing ex-
perience is gradually specified as an experience driven by all man’s capa-
bilities, namely, by the coordination of his intellectual, emotional, and cor-
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poreal abilities. The engagement of corporeal abilities is recognized as be-
ing of high importance, since the choice of relevant equipment is essential 
not only for safety, but also for environmental protection. The latter in-
volves other considerations, such as the way that traces left by the climber 
carry ethical implications due to the presumption that the climbers should 
pass through the deep snow unaggressively. 
An example in this respect is Zapffe’s essay Soveproser (Sleeping Bags) 
(1934), in which first contacts with wild nature are evaluated through the 
opportunity to spend the night under the open sky in sleeping bags. This di-
rect physical interaction with nature is motivated by traditions reaching 
back to the first Norwegian polar explorers, R. Amundsen and H. Hansen 
(Zapffe 1978: 178). In turn, the outdoor life shapes man’s mentality in a 
unique way, which leads to implementing practical wisdom against a differ-
ent background. Referring to this explanation, I would argue that the afore-
mentioned background has to be understood as stemming from a different 
idea of compression of time and space. The practical striving for efficiency, 
which is focused on shortening the time and space for realization, inflicts 
the justification of mechanical time at the expense of organic time,64 as well 
as the recognition of city space at the expense of nature’s space. 
While Zapffe describes the interaction in question as driven by the necessity 
to introduce one biological-ecological theory (Ibid: 175), Rubenson charac-
terizes the physical as a part of the religion of the stars’ sky. The latter does 
not have to be understood only as a metaphorical expression, but rather 
within the framework of numinous. It provides ethics per se by which man’s 
self-realization is defined as intrinsically connected to the process of the bi-
osphere’s realization. 
On a macro-methodological level, it means that the wide set of requirements 
regarding corporeal experience determines the way that successful (from an 
ethical point of view) interaction with nature should be accomplished. On a 
micro-methodological one, climbing values are justified by the normative 
validity of striving for harmony. If body and soul are in harmony with each 
                                           
64 Kvaløy refers to Bergson’s distinction between organic and mechanical time. 
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other, it is a necessary and sufficient condition for recognizing harmony 
with nature 65. 
On the other hand, the democratization of climbing as represented by 
Rubenson can be sought by seeing applied ethics as a matter of a collective 
responsibility that encourages cooperation at the expense of competition. 
The point is no longer to talk about loneliness, which is not reducible to ei-
ther the concept or the feeling of being lonely, but rather to talk about the 
intrinsic value of transperspectivity on a generic level. On the other hand, 
men as belonging to mankind interact with different living forms because 
they are also a part of the net of biospherical knots in the sense described by 
Næss.  
The need of clarifying the role of ethics is explicitly stated by Faarlund, 
who claimed in one of his early writings, Mountain and Mountain Plateau 
(Fjell og vidde) (1968)—published in the Journal of Climbing (Tidsskrift 
for klatring)—that it is of crucial importance to introduce a more binding 
ethical evaluation of both climbing (klatreetisk vurdering) and action, so 
that it can be built on facts rather than on illusions (Faarlund 1968: 32). Re-
ferring to his thesis, we should clarify that the evaluation does not have to 
be understood within the framework of objective naturalism, nor does it 
question the role of what I called imaginative rationality in climbing. On the 
contrary, it has to be focused on specifying relevant ethical rules in govern-
ing the diverse moral experience concerned with climbing. Thus, it should 
aim at outlining in a noncontradictory way the methodological connection 
between ethics and moral experience as it pertains to the contact of the 
climbers with the mountain. It is the development of an ethical grounding 
for climbing—recognized by Faarlund as a significant branch of the outdoor 
life—that justifies Faarlund’s philosophy as a form of modern pedagogy re-
quiring the cultivation of one’s awareness of the diversity of the biosphere. 
In turn, the idea of democratization—understood as a pluralism of interre-
lated living forms—has its adopters in Næss and Kvaløy, who try to imple-
ment the principles of “natural” democratization as the most relevant socie-
tal model. The expression “natural democracy” is not an ontological oxy-
moron because the latter word is implicitly seen as grounded in the initial 
                                           
65 This thesis is also supported by Faarlund, albeit he does not emphasize the normative connection 
between man’s harmony and nature’s harmony, namely that the former is a necessary and sufficient 
condition for the realization of the latter due to its strong ethical connotations. Faarlund stresses the 
fact that it is one and the same harmony, but does not explicitly reveal the premises of the ontologi-
cal ethics lying behind this assertion (Faarlund 1978: 46). 
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interrelatedness of the living things, which have value in themselves. The 
ethical connotations derive from the presumption that all living things have 
an unquestionable intrinsic value, a value that depends on the fact that there 
is no Living Thing with capital letters. 
In this context, I would argue that we should discuss the philosophy of 
climbing as based on applied ethics rather than the philosophy of alpinism. 
A reason can be found in Zapffe’s essay What Is Climbing Sport? (Hvad er 
tindesport?) (1933) (Zapffe 1978a: 86). Judging by his explanations, I draw 
the conclusion that the Norwegian philosophy of climbing up to the late 
1960s is irreducible to the philosophy of sport, because it should be under-
stood through the Norwegian word idrett 66. It is a matter of a physical ac-
tivity that stems from the complexity of man’s emotions, expectations, and 
cognitive abilities, and is focused on how one should situate oneself in the 
world. In contrast to the present day, idrett used to be recognized as a proc-
ess of applying practical wisdom in different activities in order to orient 
oneself within the world. This idea contradicts the common contemporary 
understanding of sport as a competitive physical activity focused on achiev-
ing concrete goals by scoring points or breaking records.  
Extrapolating from Kvaløy’s distinction between organic and mechanical 
time, I would claim that if idrett relies on the changing attitude towards 
time—from viewing it as a natural rhythm to seeing it as an intensification 
of speed—then the difference between sport and idrett can be defined as a 
difference between pace and speed, a difference wherein pace reaching its 
maximum corresponds to nature’s rhythm, while maximum speed refers to 
the “best” time available according to calculations by humans. 
It is the sensitivity towards the world embodied in the concept of idrett that 
allows cooperation to be recognized as having a high normative validity. As 
Zapffe himself claims, climbing is a certain type of experiential learning 
with strong moral connotations, since it is seen as signifying the difference 
between good and bad (Ibid: 87). Developing this idea, he explicitly argues 
that climbing is not a sport, but rather a Dionysian confirmation of life 
(Ibid). The Dionysian potential comes from the meeting with nature, which 
requires mastery of a different type of practical wisdom through what I 
called imaginative rationality. The latter determines the way in which nature 
can be understood as elusive. This elusiveness is one of the objects of man’s 
                                           
66 There is no difference in the translation of the words “sport” and “idrett” in English. 
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striving that allows the climber to obtain an aura of transcendence insofar as 
practical wisdom helps unify knowing and feeling in a state of beyondness.  
According to Zapffe, the climber does not “crawl up,” but “sets himself up” 
(Ibid). The Dionysian entity of climbing is also emphasized by the idea of 
so-called fighting geniality (en vildt strittende genialitet) having its exotic 
combinations. On a macro-methodological level, it means that the turn of 
imaginative rationality allows us to understand cooperation within the 
framework of ontological ethics as a form of cultivating sensitivity towards 
Otherness in all its representations. Furthermore, cooperation is recognized 
as engaging both cognitive abilities and emotional dispositions, i.e. as creat-
ing moral understanding that presumes a high level of responsibility on the 
part of the climber during the meeting between climber and mountain.  
The more concrete aspects of the imaginative rationality can be traced 
through climbing because the latter provokes ecstasies beyond the norm. 
Faarlund adds one more distinction, namely the distinction between ascend-
ing and climbing. So-called “free climbing” mediates a form of movement’s 
ecstasy (en form for “bevegelsesrus”), which relies on “seeing the solutions 
in one passage and living out the solutions” in question (Faarlund 1978: 46). 
The climber measures the rhythm of the mountain with his own pulse be-
cause both of them have no beginning and no end (Ibid). The mode of be-
yondness becomes based on the prerequisite of nature’s repetitiveness, 
which is later interpreted in the context of increasing technocratization as a 
vicious circle.  
The turn of imaginative rationality for climbing is also represented in 
Næss’s writings, where Zapffe’s Dionysian entity is recognized as a “climb-
ing booze” (Næss 1978a: 122). Naess’s experience in the Pyrenees in the 
early 1930s is described as relying on spontaneity and prolongation of en-
gagement (Ibid). According to him, climbing “in the high mountains has 
much to do with a given mountain’s mythology” (Ibid). This justifies a new 
type of meaningfulness, which is reaffirmed by rehabilitating the normative 
validity of spontaneity. The mythological framework should be outlined as 
contributing to the recognition of meaningfulness that becomes identifiable 
through the mode of beyondness. The methodological similarities between 
Zapffe’s and Næss’s ideas of climbing can be found by outlining the ecsta-
sies they describe as prototype characteristics of the existential experience 
of climbing. The Dionysian is comparable with the booze, since in the ec-
stasies the climber sees the open face of nature, which fills him with joy. 
Like Næss, Faarlund defines climbing as a life philosophy that is based on 
the development of joy as its highest value. While in his early writings he 
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sees the practical effects of applied ethics, in later writings the implicit idea 
of rehabilitating the role of ecolife through the lens of ontological ethics is 
emphasized. It concerns the intrinsic joy of life philosophy affirmed as a 
way towards nature. Similarly to the way the mountain grasps the man, man 
grasps the mountain in a non-aggressive way.  
In turn, imaginative rationality is embodied in the idea of the sacred in the 
sense of Faarlund. It is his idea of the “very sacred mountain” (Faarlund 
1983) that determines the distinction between “grasping” in its literal mean-
ing versus the act of self-realization. Such an understanding is part of al-
ready established tradition concerning the mythology of the mountain. Ac-
cording to Næss, the Big Mountain (Storfjellet) is what is called in mythol-
ogy a God (Næss 1978a: 120). A similar idea grounds the normative valid-
ity of the extended idea of rationality in Mahayana Buddhism, which has 
the benefit of avoiding the simplifications of anthropomorphic explanations. 
Næss claims that Tseringma makes it possible to identify the mountain with 
Buddha himself (Ibid).67 In this respect, the most significant representation 
of implicit ontological ethics can be seen in how he argues that a new type 
of rationality has to be justified in order the meeting between man and 
mountain to be understood as crucial for their common realization.  
                                           
67 The strong references to Mahayana Buddhism are a result of the anti-expeditions. 
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2.5.2.1.2. The Role of Norwegian Climbing Ethics 
as Ontological Ethics 
Ontological ethics is important for understanding 20th century Norwegian 
ecophilosophies since referring to it is a ‘natural’ (in the sense of logical) 
consequence of striving to find a complex perspective, which to clarify the 
problem of normative validity and its representations regarding man’s inter-
action with nature. This striving is also a logical result of two ways of think-
ing about the biosphere (Breivik 1979: 10), which can be determined as two 
worldviews that are not merely contradictory, but can also be reconciled 
with each other in terms of outlining the necessity of building the whole 
picture of rationality as irreducible to cognitive rationality.  
Last but not least, the need to justify the role of ontological ethics against 
the background of philosophy of climbing is driven by what G. Breivik calls 
a strive for a ‘new global ethics’ (Ibid: 15), which stems from the world sit-
uation itself. In this context, I claim that the latter stems from the need to 
recognize the interrelatedness of all living forms, for which the only one 
way to avoid reference to the paradigm of objective naturalism is to recon-
sider the influence of ontological ethics as a way of justifying the normative 
validity of the meeting between man and nature. On a macro methodologi-
cal level, it contributes not only to avoiding the implications of growing an-
thropocentrism, but also to avoiding falling into the trap of radical bioegali-
tarianism. 
Faarlund argues that our life can be easier in so far as life in nature is easy 
by default due to its naturalness. According to him, it is easy to live for 
birds, fishes and forest (Faarlund 1989). The overlap between his views on 
climbing experience and experience in nature can be seen in the way the 
word of grasping mediates the methodological connection between the ideas 
of joy and the sacred. It is the outdoor life that “grasps us with joy” (griper 
oss med glede), and thus deepens both our knowledge and the sense of fel-
lowship (Faarlund 1976: 29). Faarlund’s thesis illustrates how joy makes 
the integrity of our experience and knowledge possible by developing the 
idea of rationality, which introduces the one of common engagement. Re-
garding the logical connection between understanding and learning, since 
the latter leads to the development of the former, I argue that a certain type 
of fellowship should be encouraged. This would lead to a strengthening of 
moral understanding through the practices of learning that are recognized as 
moral practices. 
Against the background of the aforementioned investigations, it is important 
to clarify why the idea that we can talk about pessimistic and optimistic vi-
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sions – a conception that is even supported by Næss in his evaluation of 
Zapffe’s theory – reveals only one side of the problem. Rather than empha-
sizing the aforementioned distinction based on overexposing the literal tex-
tual references in their writings, I focus on pessimism and optimism as mu-
tually interconnected representations of climbing philosophy. 
According to Zapffe, the first practical experience in examining the moun-
tains is characterized by a feeling of helplessness, thoughtlessness as well as 
cramps of desperation and a reliance on destiny (Zapffe 1992: 147). In this 
context, I argue that such emotions also contribute to the state of ecstasy, as 
loneliness has many faces that help to spur climbers’ self-realization in the 
mountain. Analyzing Næss’s statement that the mountain is always on both 
our side and life’s side (Næss 1978: 124), I also claim that what he calls 
balance refers to harmony, which is not equivalent to the process of har-
monization. The latter presumes that the dialectical tension of nature’s own 
development has already been obtained. If the move from balance to balanc-
ing corresponds to the move from harmony to harmonization, so-called pes-
simistic feelings turn into a necessary condition for people and nature to be 
on one and the same side, making man aware that he/she is not the master of 
the universe.  
Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I claim that seeing Zapffe’s 
philosophy as contradictory to the ones of Næss and Faarlund is possible 
only if we interpret their texts as illustrating fundamental contradictions in 
the grounding of ontological ethics. Such a simplification would put in 
question the essential nature of Norwegian climbing philosophy – namely, 
the normative validity of experiential philosophy, whose prototype charac-
teristic is practical wisdom driven by the imaginative rationality. This can 
lead to misunderstanding common ideas about the role of bioegalitarianism 
as inflicting man’s self-realization through the idea of biosphere’s realiza-
tion. If Zapffe’s philosophy is examined as a pessimistic one focused on 
mankind’s initial deficiency, then the idea of self-realization itself would 
lose its normative validity for good.  
Loneliness, understood and felt as a state of not only being but also feeling 
alone, can be seen as merely one possible representation of one’s experience, 
taking into account that it is a necessary but not sufficient condition for trig-
gering the sense of wholeness with nature. The idea of loneliness is still im-
plicitly stated by Rubenson, who says that it is not the concept of it, nor the 
feeling, but loneliness itself (Rubenson 1978: 119). Therefore, what is evalu-
ated in a negative way as pessimistic, wrongly equating concrete representa-
tions with their normative validity should be rehabilitated as a crucial condi-
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tion for the realization of the state of ecstasy, since the latter has both logic 
and ethics sui generis. Within the framework of ontological ethics, the ethics 
of the numinous becomes recognizable as a way of clarifying why ecstasy can 
be explored only in a dialectical way, i.e. by combining the methods of cata-
phasis and apophasis as mutually supplementing each other. In the state of ec-
stasy, jubilance is indiscernible from the deep sense of morality and alien-
ation, because the tension of their contradiction is what makes the cataphasis 
possible. 
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2.6. A Brief Historical Overview of Norwegian 
Ecophilosophies 
Together with Næss, Kvaløy68 was one of the founders of the famous eco-
philosophy group at the University of Oslo. In June 1969 he was inspired by 
an exhibition called “And after us…”69, organized by some students of the 
Oslo School of Architecture, whose idea was to attract people’s attention to 
the fact that children “after us” will have no environment to live in (Anker 
2007: 463). Having invited some architects to join the students in ecology70, 
some climbers of the Alpine Club as well as some philosophers including 
Kvaløy established Co-working Groups for the Protection of Nature and the 
Environment at the University of Oslo (Samarbeidsgruppene for Natur-og 
miljøvern) (snm) (1969).  
At that time Næss’s positivism, which was developed much under the influ-
ence of the Vienna Circle, was associated by the students with “administra-
tive nihilism” as well as with “the technocratic military complex and the 
Vietnam War” (Ibid). Due to the students’ pressure for a larger control, 
Næss left the seminar Nature and humans and went to his cottage. The cru-
cial result was that Kvaløy had to organize the seminar to his own mind. 
Anker claims that “the Ecosophy Group would thus occupy Næss’s seminar 
from the autumn of 1969 through the spring semester of 1970, after which 
they would meet at the department of Zoology where Mysterud71 worked” 
                                           
68Kvaløy (1934-2014) grew up in the mountain village of Lom and became an air mechanic for the 
Norwegian Air Force. He was interested in mountain climbing, philosophy and jazz. As an assistant 
of Næss since 1961, he wrote a M.A. thesis under his supervision in 1965 and then started a PhD in 
philosophy, trying to implement the methods of philosophy to the ecological thinking at the De-
partment of Zoology (Anker 2007: 459). According to Anker, “As active members of the Alpine 
Club, Kvaløy, Faarlund, and Næss sought to energize the Norwegian tradition of outdoor life among 
the Department’s ecologists” (Ibid). 
69It was a traveling exhibition inspired by the writings of Rolaf Vik (1917-1999) about the eco-
crisis. The exhibition was sponsored by the Norwegian Society for the Conservation of Culture 
(Ibid: 463). 
70 The students attending the seminars were mainly from the department of philosophy, which was 
in turmoil after a week-long student occupation led by the radicals and the followers of Mao (Ibid). 
They were appealing for a new curriculum, which meant abandoning the one introduced by Næss. 
71Ivar Mysterud (1938) is a professor in zoology, one of the Finse ecologists fighting against the hy-
dro-power developments (Ibid: 461). 
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(Ibid). According to him, the change was influential for Kvaløy, who set the 
agenda of the seminar, albeit the discussions gradually shifted due to the in-
fluence of Mysterud’s and other ecologists’ conceptions (Ibid). 
In turn, Kvaløy described how the seminar Nature and humans has devel-
oped one ‘activist oriented concept” (et aktivist-orientert begrep), namely, 
the one of ecophilosophy (“økofilosofi”) (Kvaløy 2002: 122). The justifica-
tion of ecophilosophy in Norway took place against the background of 
strong ecoactivism, which accompanied the theoretical clarifications of the 
philosophy in question. An illuminative example in this respect was so-
called Mardøla action (Mardøla-aksjonen) (Ibid: 121) representing the 
common efforts of the Norwegians to protect Mardøla waterfall, one of the 
highest waterfalls in Norway, from turning it into a hydro-power station72. 
According to Kvaløy, it was Næss who emphasized Gandhi’s central point73 
that participating “in the middle of society’s conflicts” is the most important 
human source of knowing (Kvaløy 2002: 122). In this respect, the action in 
Mardøla, which was a failure in terms of managing to stop the construction 
work, was considered as a success since it has brought Gandhi’s principles 
into the public eye. 
Within the framework of the arising need ecophilosophy to become more 
useful while justifying ecopolitics, so that to inflict political, economic and 
social changes, outlining the differences between Næss’s and Kvaløy’s en-
vironmental philosophies is important for understanding what kind of solu-
tions they provide. What are the arguments behind the choice of ecophi-
losophy (Kvaløy) and ecosophy (Næss) respectively?  
                                           
72In the summer of 1970 the civil disobedience sit in with more than one hundred and fifty protes-
tors blocking the construction site (Anker 2007: 464). Kvaløy called Næss who came to join the pro-
test. In the very end, both of them were carried away by the police meeting the mixed feelings of the 
local workers who wanted to secure their jobs. Anker provides a detailed explanation of the situation 
how Næss joined the demonstration in its dramatic last week, “so that the media could get an image 
of the famous philosopher being taken away by the police” (Ibid: 465) (Gjefsen 2012: 278-289). 
73His opening speech was entitled Gandhi’s thought and method and their relevance for activism to 
protect nature. The focus was on the industrialization of Norway’s rivers against the background of 
the arising eco-crisis. 
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According to Kvaløy, when Næss started to write the first version of his 
book Ecology, Society and Lifestyle (Økologi, samfunn og livsstil) (1973)74, 
he contacted the snm group and offered them to replace the term “ecophi-
losophy” (“økofilosofi”) with the one of “ecosophy” (“økosofi”) (Ibid). On 
the other hand, the group was complaining that its members have been 
spending the whole winter in establishing ecophilosophy as a ‘signal-word’ 
(som et signalord) (Ibid) by defining it as an objective field such as sociol-
ogy and psychology. In turn, one of Næss’s main concerns was that ‘ecophi-
losophy’ will turn into a neutral field of studies skipping the ‘philo’ part 
(which provides the idea of total engagement and love). Kvaløy argues that 
ecosophy could easily be associated with something esoterical, such as an-
throposophy and theosophy (Ibid). Furthermore, he did not give up saying 
that studying ecophilosophy is always concerned with making total com-
mitment (Ibid). Kvaløy argued that the difference was partly a difference 
between “this, which was considered as important to be done” (hva som ble 
oppfattet som viktig å få til) and “this, which had to be a matter of priority 
along a time scale” (hva som burde prioriteres langs en tidsskala) (Ibid). 
Against the background of the aforementioned discussions, Næss’s deep 
ecology raised new concerns about the methodological projections of verti-
cal versus horizontal relatedness. As Kvaløy claims, the ecophilosophy 
group accepted the idea of distinguishing between self in small letters and 
Self with a capital one, but the Hindu philosophy and the theories of Spino-
za75 were considered as anachronous to the contemporary society (Ibid: 
124). 
                                           
74 The first report of the group was the manifest Ecocrisis, Nature and Humankind (Økokrise, natur 
og menneske), which raised further discussions about the preference of the word ‘ecosophy’ over the 
one of ‘ecophilosophy’. This debate was a crucial inspiration for Ecology, Society and Lifestyle 
(Kvaløy 2002: 122). 
75 The criticism concerns Næss’s statement that Spinoza is the first ecophilosopher. Furthermore, 
Kvaløy’s critique of Næss’s interpretation of some principles of Hinduism is provoked by the fact 
that Næss’s reception is closer to his own philosophical theory. 
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2.7. Some Reflections on the ‘Minimum’ and 
‘Maximum’ of Norwegian Cabin Culture 
Anker explores how “the ecological philosophies” had an influence upon the 
homes in which the respective philosophers have worked76. They are used to 
be inspired by the ideal of the primitive hut; an ideal that has its roots in the 
epoch of Romanticism and even earlier (Anker 2010: 8). Among many exam-
ples illustrating human strive for going back to nature oriented life-style, he 
points out Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Gilbert White, John Muir whose cabins 
look like a “hang-nest” (Ibid: 21). Stressing the vertical dimension is of cru-
cial importance because thus the intellectuals have the opportunity to enjoy “a 
distant epistemological bird’s eye view of nature seen from homes, which are 
located on a mountain top” (Anker 2003: 131).  
However, the reminiscences of Rousseau’s ideals are a necessary, but not suf-
ficient condition for explaining the complexity of Norwegian cabin life. In 
this context, I argue that while the reminiscences can be clearly revealed, the 
ideal of cabin life gradually became more and more dependent on the cultural 
contaminations brought by the increasing tension between nature and culture. 
Similarly to the symbol of Ashladden, the cabin life was recognized as an il-
luminative part of the typical Norwegian, which made the ones who led such 
a life able to identify themselves through nature.  
In turn, Nansen describes the cabin life as shaped in respect with Romanti-
cism’ s folk lore outlining the initial connection between the ideal of national 
and the one of nature. He talks about the old Jan Gjender who represents “a 
glimpse” from the Norwegian fairy tales with his self-built hut spending the 
long winters reading Voltaire (Nansen 1978: 17). Another vision is provided 
by G. Breivik who defines the mountain pastures as a model of a cabin life, 
which contributes to living in harmony with nature (Breivik 1979: 13). Fur-
thermore, the joy of classical Norwegian cabin life (Næss 1999: 42) was rec-
ognized as an embodiment of the pleasure of prosperity to live in the moun-
                                           
76 According to Anker, the way philosophers describe nature is implicitly concerned with the archi-
tecture of their houses (Anker 2010: 8), namely that the proximity of architecture, art and biological 
sciences illustrates how their theoretical conceptions reflected upon the building and the functions of 
their houses (Ibid). He argues that the dream about a solidary life in a cabin is embodied in the 
works of Henry Thoreau, Heidegger, Aldo Leopold and Næss since the cabins have been located as 
far as possible from “the social realm yet close enough to suggest various schemes for management 
of the household of nature and society” (Ibid: 22).  
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tain. That is why the prosperity in question does not have to be interpreted in 
economic terms, but rather in terms of positive symbolic capital whose nor-
mative validity is grounded in the potential of practical wisdom as a signifi-
cant element of ‘typical’ Norwegian. 
Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I suggest examining Næss’s re-
flections on his own life in the cabin Tvergastein for the purposes of exploring 
the genealogy of anthropology of cabin man he provides. The latter is a con-
tribution to what Kvaløy defined as Zapffe’s anthropology and nature phi-
losophy as well as to Næss’s own pedagogical and cultural philosophy 
(Kvaløy 1974b: 66). 
On a macro methodological level, the continuity of Norwegian philosophy of 
outdoor life and Norwegian ecophilosophies can be outlined by analyzing the 
conceptualization of what T. Gjefsen calls a classical Norwegian culture of 
cabin life (den klassiske norske hyttekulturen) (Gjefsen 2012: 99). It turns in-
to a significant premise showing how similarly to the Norwegian philosophy 
of climbing, Norwegian cabin life is strictly regulated by the principles of ap-
plied ethics. Furthermore, we may argue that cabin culture promotes its own 
environmental ethics, which is based on the requirements determined by the 
given place. Thus the life style that is appropriate for the place has as a main 
norm simplicity in means and richness in ends in Næss’s sense. However, this 
formula should be interpreted not as a formula grounded within the frame-
work of objective naturalism, but rather within the one of ontological ethics in 
so far as the cabin culture is about feeling the completeness of man and na-
ture, as driven by the maxima ‘all things hang together’. 
Furthermore, analyzing Næss’s theory of the existential role of his cabin 
Tvergastein, we can outline the principles of ontological ethics. Norwegian 
culture of cabin life is driven by the uncontradictory justification of so-called 
‘maximum’ and ‘minimum’ understood as axiological marks. Næss claims 
that the cabin should provide a long rank of both maximums and minimums: 
minimum use of fuel, maximum space (utsikt), minimum triviality, maximum 
internal value (egenverdi), minimum chattering (snikksnakk), maximum con-
templation (dybdeboring) “ (Ibid). According to him, one old cabin is not an-
other museum’s function, but also revives the past: “It can be happy or sad”77 
(Næss 1995: 78-79). Everything obtains an increasingly complex character 
                                           
77 The cabin can be characterized as “happy” or “sad”, taking into account that these conditions are 
determined in comparison with the human ones, albeit being irreducible to them since joy and sor-
row are inherent to the possibility of having different living situations as a mode of becoming. 
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and thus thanks to Hardanger caraway (karvet), the mountain78 mixes with it 
as a component (Ibid). In turn, the “mixing” becomes something unitary, 
“something integrated, with its own existence, where all elements hang to-
gether” (Ibid). On a micro methodological level, it means that nature, moun-
tain, cabin, things and the person become one whole. It lays in the concentra-
tion (ligger i konsentrasjonen) of these things and takes place in a tremen-
dously rich world, determined as a necessary requirement for knowing our 
place in the world (Ibid).  
An important point in this respect is Næss’s classification of a specific group 
of people defined by Zapffe as people who prefer the vertical terrain at the 
expense of the horizontal one (Ibid: 60). As people, who strive for achieving 
the understanding of the macro cosmos rather than taking it for granted within 
the carefully planned space. In this context, we can go back to the idea of 
Homo Ascensus as a cabin man who zealously fights for finding a home with-
out aiming to conquer the universe. 
According to Næss, the cabin vision is the one of good life, namely, of life 
without mobility in a vertical dimension, which, however, is commuting be-
tween hanging (pendling) shortly in the high mountain, shortly in a low center 
of culture (Ibid: 28). In other words, the good life is the one in which the cul-
tivation of the sense of belonging helps one to find his/her place in the world 
by becoming a subject who is aware of his/her intrinsic connectedness with 
nature.  
On a macro methodological level, it presumes the process of mapping rather 
than planning to be adopted since one can find one’s place, but would be un-
able to have the whole landscape at a glance. The landscape is bigger than the 
place, but it is the landscape that contributes to calling one place a home. In 
turn, the cabin life is recognized as a phenomenon, which has strong traditions 
in the Norwegian culture. That is why Næss talks about cabin models refer-
ring to the great enthusiasm of Amundsen and Nansen (Ibid: 29); these mod-
els were supposed to be something, which gives the possibility to have a life 
‘inside’ (Ibid: 28). However, it is not the ‘inside’ mode that is the main pur-
pose of their building. Næss himself appeals for having much colder and more 
primitive cabins than the ones, which were warmer as well as equipped with 
some advantages (Ibid: 29) because they provide people there with the oppor-
                                           
78 See Næss 2008a: 124. 
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tunity for a long-lasting concentration79. It is the latter that makes the process 
of mapping irreducible to the one of planning, and at the same time, achiev-
able for the individual as a process having a value in itself.  
The ‘minimum’ of physical conditions is defined as a necessary and sufficient 
condition for having a life with a ‘maximum value’ since the life in tune with 
nature is always a ‘rich’ one. Being framed by a minimum that is impossible 
unless it is dialectically recognized as a certain kind of maximum, the cabin 
life entails both one macro cosmos and one micro cosmos. It is a space for 
spending the winter and in this sense, it is described as a place of the music of 
wind, which reminds of the music of sleeping compartment during the night 
(Ibid: 30). It is also a micro cosmos with four, big, beautiful ideas of stars 
(stjernetanker) on the wall, which is two meters high (Ibid). In other words, 
the projections of the micro cosmos can be seen in the way it provides the ex-
istential situatedness of man in the world by delimiting his/her presence to a 
given space, which he/she can call home. However, the sense of belonging to 
the macro cosmos developed by becoming an integral part of its micro projec-
tions is not a state, which is given by default to human beings, albeit it can be 
described as a ‘natural’ one to a certain extent. This state can be achieved by 
mastering the concentration that ignores the objects of secondary interest such 
as the ones, which do not concern human vital needs, interests and rights80. I 
argue that it is a matter of cultivating sensitivity towards our own being into 
the world in so far as it strengthens the growing eco-consciousness about the 
fact that the macro cosmos can be revealed in all its greatness, even in the 
smallest of its representations. 
On a macro methodological level, we can argue in favor of justifying the 
aforementioned holism as a matter of adopting a certain type of ontological 
minimalism as a premise, which to bring a given type of existential maximal-
ism to life. Thus Næss’s anthropology of the cabin life advocates not only fo-
cusing on the purely practical aspects of one of the main principles of ecol-
ogy, namely that ‘everything hangs together’, but also on reconsidering the 
                                           
79 Næss argues that the two important sources of information he takes with him at the cabin are Spi-
noza’s book Ethics and the note book called Introduction to Logic (Ibid: 34). 
80 In this context, Næss makes the problematic statement that we can describe the way of living in 
Tvergastein as a subculture (Ibid: 29). Such a statement raises many questions since the alternative 
lifestyle defined by Næss is supposed to function rather as a lifestyle, which to contradict the con-
temporary industrial living standard, being deprived of the pejorative implications one subculture 
brings with itself. However, Næss does not go into detail what would be the concrete crossing points 
between the cabin life and subculture. 
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latter as a necessary condition for reevaluating what life’s meaningful situa-
tion is. It is the cabin life whose internal value is grounded in the meaning of 
life’s nature as such that makes us claim that since life in nature has a value in 
itself, we can give a meaning to our own lives. It can happen if we follow 
such a life due to which the quality of life is irreducible to the standard of liv-
ing. Furthermore, the latter illustrates why the aforementioned holism is not a 
purely ‘biological’ one. Otherwise, the quality of life should have been indis-
pensible from the standard of living81. 
Within the anthropology of cabin life, we can outline again some arguments 
in favor of avoiding the discussions about dead things to be understood as a 
process of ascribing human qualities to unanimated objects. It is the recogni-
tion of the initial biospherical equilibrium that determines the modes of being 
not only of humans but also of other species.  
Similarly to Norwegian philosophy of climbing, where applied ethics is close-
ly tied with postulating some rules for environmental protection and coopera-
tion against the ones of competition, in the cabin life, the ethics in question 
requires defining regulations due to which both the ontological and ethical 
balance between the minimum and maximum can be kept. Some of these 
rules mentioned by Næss are the following: “Close the door of the warmed up 
room. Man slips in, breaths again and snaps the door shut so that his/her last 
part to be on the right side of the doorstep. The very last rule is “Do not ask 
the householder (host) whether the cabin is not too far!”(Gjefsen 2012: 99). 
Furthermore, life experience, which is axiologically marked through the cate-
gories of maximum and minimum, is heterogeneous one because it entails 
purely practical activities as well as some conditions having implicit ethical 
connotations. However, within the aforementioned order, they seem to obtain 
double axiological connotations. It is a matter of differentiating their contents’ 
representations, which are placed in one and the same ontological order. A 
possible explanation of such a conceptualization can be seen in the presump-
tion of understanding philosophy as a practical wisdom. In other words, it is 
interpreted as a specific experiential philosophy for which there is no sharp 
difference between theoretical and practical experience. It is the unique phi-
losophy that transforms the cultural practices in its own discourse. The culture 
in question is defined by Næss as counter-culture (motkultur) (Ibid) since it is 
                                           
81 All these things have a life in the sense that they have an ineradicable intrinsic value regarding 
their ‘right’ to be a part of this same world. 
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a culture of nature, by which the calmness, modesty and joy of nature are rec-
ognized as absolute values (Ibid). 
On the other hand, the increasing differentiation between nature and culture 
imposed by the growing technocratization provokes the need of returning to 
nature by living a balanced life. Judging by these investigations, I argue that it 
is the arising social stratification that leads to the gradual transformation from 
cabin life to the culture of cabin life due to which national and transnational 
become mutually dependent because they are both affected by what is called 
‘life in harmony’. 
Since the process of man’s self-realization is intrinsically tied with nature’s 
realization, I argue that if the cabin life can be defined as life in harmony, the 
culture of cabin life can be determined as life in harmonization that cannot be 
reduced to the life in harmony because it is not a state, but rather a process of 
permanent becoming for the subject. 
Referring to Anker’s theory that the ‘oikos’ is not merely a “vague metaphor 
for ecology”, taking into account that built houses provide a key to under-
standing the household of nature (Anker 2003: 131), I reach the conclusion 
that the withdrawal in the mountain is a climax of the existential willingness 
of rehabilitating the initial connection between man and nature. It is due to 
creating conditions for achieving the total openness between them, i.e. 
through legitimizing situatedness by which we to reconstruct our first touch 
with nature, so that man to find his/her lost home in the bosom of biosphere, 
where he/she belongs to. 
Extrapolating Gjefsen’s theory about the culture of cabin life, I draw the fol-
lowing conclusion, namely that the initial strive for rediscovering a place as a 
home is concerned with the implicit willingness of demonstrating the authen-
ticity beyond all possible definitions of otherness. It means that due to the au-
thentic life in the mountain, one no longer wants to be recognized as a guest 
in the bosom of biosphere. If ecology is defined as a science of home 
(‘oikos’), then Norwegian ecophilosophies can be described as illuminative 
representations of “a given type of enlightened knowledge”, i.e. of ‘the wis-
dom about home’ as in Næss’s case (eco-sophy), of wisdom about the pri-
mary man’s place in the universe since love has an experiential entity in re-
spect with the fact that it derives from life as such. 
Regarding Næss’s anthropology of cabin life, the cabin men (hyttemennesker) 
are the ones who feel at home in the mountain due to the fact that they have 
recognized with both their reason and senses that they belong to this moun-
tain. According to Næss, the cabin men automatically adjust to one way of ex-
isting, which is different from the city life (Næss 1995: 80). The existence in 
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question can be interpreted by referring again to the distinction between qual-
ity of life and living standard arguing that mountain’s existence has the qual-
ity of life as its prototype characteristic, by contrast to the city one, which is 
dominated, as Næss claims, by the easy access, more info gained by the mass 
media, the complicated house holding, the big mobility and the scarcity of 
self-made things (Ibid). 
On a micro methodological level, the cabin man is defined as an amateur in 
Næss’s sense in so far as it is the one who does not rely on a narrow special-
ized knowledge about the world, but has a broad competence, which is irre-
ducible to a given technocratic expertise82. The amateur is described, by con-
trast to the specialist, as the one who does not operate with the purely cogni-
tive knowledge since he/she rehabilitates the role of understanding by reviv-
ing the normative validity of feelings, emotions and imagination. In other 
words, the cabin man does not take the responsibility of the expert to control 
the world of nature by pretending to know everything about it, but rather to 
live in it with ‘open senses’. 
According to Næss, the amateur in Tvergastein is aware that the whole re-
search is incompatible with the grounding positive feeling for nature (Ibid: 
82) because the direct examination of strong feelings matters just as much as 
the abstract thinking83 (Ibid). In turn, judging by Næss’s arguments, we can 
claim that the main object of the anthropology of cabin life is how to develop 
sense of belonging since it concerns how a given place in the mountain is 
never a place but a home, by contrast to the places in the big cities. Due to the 
raising mobility, every single place is formally recognized as a home but this 
place as such never presumes a sense of belonging to be internalized.  
                                           
82 The problem of generalists and specialists is interpreted against the background of the choice be-
tween ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ technologies for the pruposes of solving environmental crisis. It will be ex-
amined in detail in the chapters on Kvaløy. 
83 Næss argues that the simplest chemical processes are self-related in one fascinating world (Ibid: 
86). 
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2.8. Norwegian Outdoor Life. Where 
to Go from Now on? 
The Norwegian politics faced a new threat in the late 1980s, which raised 
the discussions about ecopolitics in a new voice, namely, the ones about the 
problems concerned with the possibility of producing nuclear energy 
(Berntsen 2011: 235-236). Thus the well-known arguments for the unre-
stricted exploitation of natural sources gained new strength since the eco-
logical dilemmas became more complicated: they were provoked by the 
tension of the forthcoming global catastrophe, which could not be restricted 
to a given scope or scopes, hiding the risks nature and mankind to be devas-
tated. In this context, it is important to examine government’s attempts to 
change the social attitudes by diverting the mode of speaking as changing 
the use of words. Consequently the government replaced the word of atomic 
energy (atomkraft) with the one of nuclear power (kjernekraft) (Ibid: 238). 
According to Berntsen, the old social democracy’s fight was engaged with 
the development of atomic technologies since the main arguments were the 
economic, but not the moral ones84.  
On the other hand, it was the period of increasing environmentalism in 
Norway. As Berntsen argues, it was people’s activism against building Alta 
waterfall that gave a new direction to the fight85 (Ibid: 249-250). What were 
the consequences of the aforementioned discussions and the arising civil 
disobedience? The result was that two thirds of the water falls in Norway 
were overbuilt or were in a process of building, which required the law to 
be changed86. In this context, I argue that what Næss calls Norwegian gov-
ernmental traditions in environmentally unfriendly politics derived from 
substituting the ideals of ecopolitics recognized as politics of sources with 
the one of preserving resources. 
                                           
84 In the debate, the parties against “atomic energy socialism” (atomkraftsosialisme) in Norway 
were Center Party (Senterpartiet), Liberal Party (Venstrepartiet) and Socialist Federation (Sosial-
istisk Valgforbund) (Ibid: 241-243). 
85 Having had harsh discussions, the political line was that Alta’s concession should be finished at 
any expense. This decision provoked a big demonstration in Oslo with more than 2000 participants 
(Ibid: 252). However, at the following meeting of the Parliament, the construction was stopped 
again with a vote of 95 members against 32 (Ibid). 
86 In 1979 the Norwegian federation of protecting environment (Naturvernforbundet) organized one 
new initiative called “Save our last waterfall” (Vern våre siste vassdrag) (Ibid: 254). 
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The next turning point in the Norwegian debates about environmental poli-
tics, as represented by Norwegian public committee (“Liedutvalget”) and 
the Norwegian federation for protecting environment, made Berntsen claim 
that there were two completely different ‘energy cultures’ at that time (Ibid: 
258), i.e. it raised the question whether the government to encourage the 
production of oil or to stabilize it87.  
In this context, the aforementioned debate about the exploitation of natural 
sources can be described as the climax of the contradictions regarding the 
conceptions of industrial development and environmental protection since 
they were also strengthened by some arguments raised against the potential 
accession of Norway to the EU. From this point of view, the ecopolitical 
concerns were a part of a strong tradition based on the need of strengthening 
bioregionalism. However, one of the main problems was provoked by the 
significant role of the Norwegian Oil Fund, which determines the economic 
stability of the country even after the economic crisis of 2011 took place88.  
In other words, the dilemma was no longer about ‘if’, but about ‘when’ and 
‘how’ the sustainable development should be controlled. The socioeco-
nomic situation, when the first referendum for the EU membership was con-
ducted, was quite different from the one in the mid-1990s. While the first 
referendum was organized against the background of the discussions re-
garding the ‘growth and environmental protection’ debate, the second one 
was dominated by the strategies for surviving on the global arena by raising 
the gross national product (Ibid: 317-319). The second debates incorporated 
the legacy of the first ones regarding the concerns about the social and eco-
logical crisis (Ibid: 320), but also added a new element – the faith of 
Brundtland’s government that it is still possible to compromise growth with 
environmental protection (Ibid: 317). 
In Brundtland’s report called Our Common Future (1987), which was an 
object of investigations on side of both Næss and Kvaløy, we can trace the 
threat of the inevitable consequences of so-called by Berntsen tyranny of 
                                           
87 While in 1976 Labor Party (Arbeiderpartiet), Conservative Party (Høyre) pled for expanding the 
growth of energy, Progress Party (Fremskrittspartiet), Center Part (Senterpartiet), Socialist Left Par-
ty (Sosialistisk Venstreparti), Liberal Party (Venstrepartiet) insisted on a sooner stabilization of the 
growth in question (Ibid: 259). 
88 The Fund guarantees the financial independence of Norway for the future generations, and, from 
an economic perspective, the question is not whether, but rather under what circumstances it could 
be used in a situation of a global crisis. 
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the small decisions, namely, some decisions that are good in a short-term 
perspective, but become uncontrollable in a long-term one. The methodo-
logical concern was emphasized by Berntsen saying that Brundtland’s re-
port was well developed on a county level89, but not on the communal one 
(Ibid: 293). 
In turn, the ungrounded optimism regarding the omnipotent power of the 
short-time solutions (defined for the sake of solving global problems) also 
derived from the overexposed optimist faith in the role of local responsibili-
ties (bioregionalism), which remained an open question in Brundtland’s re-
port. In this context, the dilemmas about industrial development and envi-
ronmental protection were narrowed to specifying the different aspects of 
the sustainable development itself. Nature and human health were under-
stood by reexamining the normative validity of growth as such, but not by 
analyzing their own values. In other words, controlling the side effects of 
the industrial development was determined as equivalent to initially encour-
aging the benefits for nature and people. Judging by the aforementioned in-
vestigations, I reach the conclusion that controlling is necessary but not suf-
ficient condition for rethinking the role of environmental protection since 
thus we fall into the trap of man’s made idea of normative validity, which 
does not coincide with the intrinsic normative validity of nature. 
On the other hand, transforming the formula ‘Think globally, act locally!’ 
into the one of ‘Think locally, act locally!’ does not provide us with ulti-
mate solutions because both working “too globally” and “too locally” inflict 
the risk of replacing the language of normativity with the one of the ideol-
ogy. 
What are the concrete challenges to the philosophy of Norwegian outdoor 
life? Referring to Berntsen again (Ibid: 273), I claim that one of the main 
contemporary problems is that striving for specifying the concrete opportu-
nities for its development, the outdoor life may lose the power to contribute 
to the consolidation of man’s experiential gestalt. It may lead to one to be 
                                           
89 The county division is an important policy implementation. The counties were introduced for the 
first time in 1972 as a part of the process of decentralization, which started in the 1970s (Ibid: 258). 
The division in question contributed to raising local people’s awareness about their responsibility in 
governing local ecopolitics. However, the research of 1990s showed that the oil industry introduced 
a tax of 20% of the waste gasses in Norway (Ibid: 328). Despite the fact that the production of CO2 
was limited in 1992, Labor Party and Conservative Party did not step back from the statement that 
the “clean technologies” (renseteknologiene) will solve all the problems we have (Ibid). 
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able to mobilize one’s physical abilities alone, but not one’s mental and 
corporeal abilities at once. Regarding outdoor life, it would mean that im-
proving physical potential may become a goal in itself and thus to justify 
the sportification of outdoor life90.  
While in the beginning the ‘fight’ for outdoor life was focused on defining 
and specifying its scope and regulations respectively, contemporary debates 
are rather concerned with how to keep its normative validity in one fre-
quently changing context without making it anachronic to both nature and 
society. The global need of taking a morally and economically justifiable 
stand upon climate changes makes developing sensitivity towards nature a 
moral engagement, which is more demanding than ever. It presumes estab-
lishing a new normative order due to which discussing the role of industrial 
development (and especially the one of sustainable development) as well as 
the one of environmental protection within the framework of Norwegian 
philosophy of outdoor life is merely possible by adopting performative 
rhetoric. That is why the concrete connotations of dealing with technocratic 
optimism inflict the distinction between what kind of nature we want and 
what kind of nature is possible (Damman 2001: 730), namely, between what 
is possible and what is desirable by referring to different types of rationality 
models. 
                                           
90 The genealogy of this risk was examined in detail yet in the first writings of Faarlund. 
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3. THE CONCEPTUALIZATION 
OF 20TH-CENTURY 
NORWEGIAN PHILOSOPHY OF OUTDOOR 
LIFE  
AS AN OUTDOOR LIFE PEDAGOGY 
The analysis of the socio-cultural situation in the 1960s, which became a 
fruitful premise for the arising Norwegian ecophilosophies would be in-
complete without outlining the illuminative role of N. Faarlund for the justi-
fication of Norwegian philosophy of outdoor life. As a devoted mountain-
eer, he had the ambition to turn “Practical know-how about outdoor vaca-
tions” (Anker 2007: 458) into a philosophical training; one training, which 
to contribute to the development of self-realization as closely tied with pay-
ing respect to nature. One of the first steps in that direction was the estab-
lishment of the Norwegian Mountaineering School in 1967 and his lecturing 
in Oslo at the Norwegian School of Sport Sciences since 196891 (Ibid).  
The popularity of Faarlund’s courses, giving practical knowledge about is-
sues such as outdoor cooking, choosing proper winter clothes as well as 
pedagogical and psychological knowledge regarding man’s self-realization 
in nature can be ascribed to the idea of introducing contemporary model of 
Socratic teaching against the background of Scandinavian pantheist tradi-
tions. Faarlund’s model provides more particular strategies of the type 
‘questions-answers’ by specifying the aspects of problem-solving process, 
while the issues of self-realization follow some of Socratic principles of ar-
guing. The individual has to cultivate his/her sensitivity towards nature as a 
                                           
91 According to Anker, Faarlund’s school and lectures “became legendary among environmentalists 
seeking a combination of philosophical training and practical experience in dealing with the wild” 
(Ibid). On the other hand, behind the idea of examining “outdoor life as a means to pursue scientific 
research” (Ibid) we had a person who had a very diverse academic background. Faarlund’s aca-
demic degrees included degrees in engineering and biochemistry, training in landscape architecture 
and ecology (Ibid). 
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matter of self-realization in the process of conwaying, taking into account 
that the personal responsibility is as important as the one adopted by the 
generations.  
Thus revealing the image of nature as a net of knots of biosphere in Næss’s 
sense is justified in the process of conwaying when the self should become 
a Self with a capital letter finding his/her place as a part of the universe, e.g. 
realizing that he/she is equally responsible for rehabilitating the total open-
ness of the meeting between man and the world. In this context, solving 
practical issues is a necessary step for clearing the ground for the open 
questions of self-realization (namely, for the real Socratic dilemmas of phi-
losophy of outdoor life). 
Concerning the aspects of outdoor life’s practical wisdom, it can be de-
scribed by referring to one of the mottos introduced by Bob Handerson, 
namely, “Each day we reacted less like tourists and more like tenants [na-
tives, as in native to a place]” (Handerson 1997: 1). In other words, the phi-
losophy of outdoor life can be recognized as a way of rehabilitating cozi-
ness of nature understood as a way home. This idea is examined in detail by 
Faarlund in most of his writings. The contradiction between the tenant and 
the tourist brings us back to the distinction between alpinism as a sport and 
Norwegian philosophy of climbing since it is not the idea of place but rather 
the one of situatedness, which became an illuminative issue in the Norwe-
gian moral geography of that time. On a macro methodological level, the 
implications of such a practical wisdom are seen in the process of joyful 
learning of nature’s mechanisms: the one I called moral learning due to the 
principles of imaginative rationality. 
It is the symbiosis of the theoretical legitimization of nature as home and its 
practical anticipation as a home, in which we all live that gives us reasons to 
oblige the subject not to cause his/her de-subjectification, but on the con-
trary; to oblige himself/herself (due to the power of self-commitment) to be 
committed to the biosphere. Regarding the practical implications of outdoor 
life’s wisdom, the latter is understood as a “principal tradition for outdoor 
education”, which seeks the “seeping of nature into one’s bones and thus 
remains an apprenticeship for how to dwell in Nature.” (Ibid). 
In this context, another important specification has to be made. Philosophi-
cal knowledge and practical know-how going hand in hand are an illumina-
tive characteristic of the Nordic way of living, which is based on developing 
different strategies for encouraging practical wisdom. In turn, the latter can 
have different representations, as I showed while analyzing Kvaløy’s recep-
tion of Ash-lad’s story. Thus Faarlund’s philosophy of outdoor life, “which 
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inspired not only Næss, but also the inner circle of Norway’s most devel-
oped young mountaineers and environmentally concerned ecologists” (An-
ker 2007: 459) provided the establishment of practical wisdom as a process 
of striving for the fulfillment of self-realization. Since in Faarlund’s model 
the process is recognized as more important than the goal itself, the afore-
mentioned wisdom can be described as entailing some of the characteristics 
of Socratic ideal, namely, searching for the sake of searching embodied in 
the formula ‘the way is the goal’, which is the only one relevant way of self-
realization and self-recognition respectively. While the demon of Socrates is 
one’s own consciousness, in Faarlund’s case, we can argue that it is envi-
ronmentally friendly consciousness that concerns the existential value of 
human being. 
That is why one of the first steps which Faarlund made towards the concep-
tualization of outdoor life was concerned with its reconsideration as a 
“transformation tool” in building “an ecologically sensitive society” (Faar-
lund in Reed and Rothenberg 1993: 164). Paraphrasing Handerson, I draw 
the conclusion that outdoor life’s transformative power consists in justifying 
the quest one to be a tenant (i.e. native with nature) understood as a matter 
of collective cultivation of sensitivity towards the tenant in question. The 
decontextualization is not a process of pure reduction, but rather of recon-
textualization, of finding a new meaning there, where the old one has al-
ready disappeared. To a certain extent, Norwegian outdoor life, determined 
as a tool of transformation in Faarlund’s sense entails some of the character-
istics of Socrates’s demon, but they are reconsidered within a new frame-
work, namely, within the one of so-called by Faarlund technological culture 
(Faarlund 2003: 3). In turn, the latter provokes the need of encouraging one 
collective demon, which to raise social awareness of self-realization as a re-
alization of both being in nature and being with nature. 
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3.1. Challenging Man in Nature. The 
Methodological Contribution of Nils Faarlund  
Faarlund analyzes the term ‘outdoor life’ against the background of the 
challenges posed by the environmental, political and ecophilosophical de-
bates of the mid to late 20th century. In his article Outdoor Life: What, Why, 
How (Friluftsliv: Hva, Hvorfor, Hvordan) (1973)92 he defined it in respect 
with the role of our values in ecophilosophical understanding; as a type of 
ecophilosophy that is “crucial to address the ecocrisis” (Faarlund 1973).  
Analyzing the genealogy of Norwegian outdoor life philosophy, it shows 
that for more than thirty years Faarlund explores its development in a dia-
chronic perspective outlining the multilateral connections between nature 
and culture. His analysis also concerns the contemporary situation, where 
the aforementioned connections were a result of many different (and some-
time contradictory) factors, which in turn determined the double-bind inter-
pretation nature and culture to be considered as contradicting and mutually 
complementing each other at once. The seeming paradox arises from the 
fact that the development of so-called by Faarlund technological culture 
provides both underrating the intrinsic value of nature and the requirement 
the latter to be reconsidered again since ecological crisis inflicted the need 
of building a positive philosophy against the crisis in consciousness. On the 
other hand, the technologic culture, which protects its own right of exis-
tence, produces mechanisms against the philosophy of outdoor life in order 
to justify its functioning as an uncontradictory one. That is why the philoso-
phy of outdoor life is questioned ‘from below’ by encouraging the arising 
symbolic capital of philosophy of sport, which aims at occupying outdoor 
life’s arena93. 
                                           
92 The ideas of this article have been revised several times. 
93 One of the main contemporary methodological challenges concerned with the need of redefining 
the relationship between outdoor life and sport as well as the new pedagogical aims and methods of 
shaping the profile of the collective subject is how to ground the image of so-called by Tordsson 
‘risk-seeker’. The problem is only the tip of the iceberg since it increases the risk of recognizing the 
sportification of outdoor life as the only one possible form of interacting. In turn, the formula ‘high 
speed-quick changes’ extends the opportunity of reconsidering leisure time as an arena of self-
realization. On a macro methodological level, we can clarify the pedagogical value of outdoor life if 
we follow how this arena has become a space of different embodiments of self-realization. That is 
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Against the background of Dahle’s definition that outdoor life is “feeling the 
joy of being out in nature, alone or with others” (Dahle 2007: 23), it is impor-
tant to clarify to what extent we can agree with Ese’s statement that outdoor 
activity will be ruined by too many cultural contaminations (Ese 2007: 52). 
Within the framework of contemporary technological culture, the feeling of 
being out in nature radically changes its representations because sometimes 
the idea of outdoor life’s joy may put in question the existence of nature as 
such. On the other hand, new is always considered as opposing old since the 
latter gets pejorative connotations, especially when it is compared with the 
new, justified as a presumably good one. This process makes the evaluation of 
cultural contaminations a more complicated phenomenon because not all the 
time the cultural contaminations contribute to turning outdoor life’s philoso-
phy into an old-fashioned ideology. In other words, the contaminations do not 
always have to be examined by adopting more complicated equipment and 
more complicated ideology respectively, but they can rather be understood as 
benefiting the reconsideration of the intrinsic value of nature. Such an exam-
ple is the growing interest in the impact of life-long learning, one of the peda-
gogical ‘achievements’ of our time, which requires justifying the process of 
learning as a process encouraging cultural transmission against the back-
ground of the challenges, which this culture poses. 
The dialectical entity of the elusive boundaries of cultural contaminations is 
revealed by Faarlund who used to examine the relationships between nature 
and culture since the 1980s onward. That is why it is not by chance that one 
of his illuminative definitions, namely, ‘nature is a home of culture’ (Faar-
lund 1989) (Leirhaug 2009: 79) should be read beyond exaggerating the 
role of cultural contaminations. Furthermore, justifying simplicity with 
which people can meaningfully engage with nature can also be recognized 
as one of the main principles of Faarlund’s pedagogy of outdoor life. 
Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I argue that it is the conway-
ing in Faarlund’s sense that is one of the prototype characteristics of out-
door life, which is determined as a pedagogical arena. Conwaying is not 
only a matter of adopting relevant means, e.g. not only does it have to be 
examined from a utilitarian perspective, but also from a deontological one. 
The differences in the choice of means provide the differences in the ap-
proaches, but we should keep in mind that the differences in the latter also 
                                                                                         
why building the image of the risk-seeker can be described as a matter of disguising the ideology of 
mass sports.  
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inflict differences in values. Thus preferring one or another approach de-
termines the way we choose the means in axiologically relevant manner. 
Understanding the need of defining outdoor life as an alternative pedagogi-
cal way was yet discussed in one of Faarlund’s first articles, namely, in the 
article called Outdoor life: Specifying the boundaries of the scope (Friluft-
sliv – emneområdets innhold) (1967) in which he outlined for the first time 
the role of the premises for justifying the pedagogical role of outdoor life 
(Faarlund 1967: 38-43)94. On the level of ethics, I raise the hypothesis that 
Faarlund’s attempts at examining the genealogy of outdoor life can be in-
terpreted as a genealogical analysis of the relationship between so-called 
values of contemplation (kontemplative verdier) and values of moderniza-
tion 95. It is the examination of these values that contributes to revealing 
how the idea of outdoor life understood as a way home is expanded to the 
idea ‘nature is a home of culture’. In this context, one of the main methodo-
logical advantages of adopting Faarlund’s theory is that he reveals the de-
velopment of Norwegian philosophy of outdoor life in a broad perspective 
since he explores the dialectical connections between the aforementioned 
values. On a micro methodological level, it means that Faarlund investigates 
the values of contemplation and modernization not only as mutually exclud-
ing categories, but also as values whose contradiction is a guarantee for 
their existence and development. Rehabilitating the symbolic capital of the 
values of contemplation for the purposes of reconsidering the role of phi-
losophy of outdoor life is a ‘natural’ reaction against the arising impact of 
the values of modernization, which have to be somehow restricted in the 
name of preserving the value of self-realization. In other words, if the influ-
ence of the latter was not so strong, the values of contemplation would have 
lost their significant meaning while benefiting the self to be recognized as a 
Self with a capital letter96. Thus exploring the aforementioned values as 
functioning on the principle of contaminated vessels contributes to recon-
                                           
94 The topic of values is elaborated in Faarlund’s article Outdoor Life: What-Why-How (Friluftsliv: 
Hva-Hvorfor-Hvordan) (Faarlund 2003). See also the role of normative and descriptive premises 
(Ibid: 44). 
95 See Leirhaug 2007: 78, Note 70. 
96 My thesis is that vertical moral geography presumes that Selves with a capital letter are born this 
way, while the horizontal moral geography encourages the transformation of the selves into Selves 
with a capital letter. In turn, justifying vertical moral geography, which is based on the significant 
value of competition as one of the most important principles of contemporary technological culture, 
requires questioning the value of recreation. 
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sidering why the philosophy of outdoor life provides a way home97 to a 
home where ecolife in Faarlund’s sense requires particular values to be 
adopted. In turn, these values are reintroduced against the background of the 
increasing uncertainty of exploiting the idea of values as such. Therefore, 
Faarlund’s conception of ecolife could be recognized as a measure against 
the threat of expanding moral relativism, which finds its grounds in the con-
temporary technological culture. 
One of the main methodological concerns is how to normatively conceptu-
alize one of the prototype characteristics of outdoor life, namely, the spon-
taneous experience in nature, in a normative way. Faarlund searches for so-
lutions in the scope of so-called scientific ecology (vitenskapen økologi), 
which clarifies the characteristics of the aforementioned ecolife. I draw the 
conclusion that the normative aspects of the life in question have to be ex-
plored by revealing what the ‘profitable life’ in nature means. The latter 
does not have to be explored within the paradigm of meritocracy as gaining 
utilitarian benefits from nature, but rather as a way of being enriched in the 
process of self-realization. Therefore, leading a profitable ecolife means to 
take the responsibility to become a Self with a capital letter while respecting 
nature as a net of biospherical knots. 
In this context, I reach the conclusion that revealing the normative aspects 
of outdoor life presumes to analyzing two of Faarlund’s main concepts, 
namely, the concept of ecolife understood as a “life in harmony” (liv i lage) 
as well as the one of spontaneous experience whose normative validity is 
recognized in the joyful experience of nature (endring med glede) (Faarlund 
2000: 6; Leirhaug 2007: 102)98. The latter does not have to be interpreted 
from the perspective of moral relativism, which to require a hedonist value 
to be ascribed to the experience in question. On the contrary, due to the 
principles of imaginative rationality, outdoor life, internalized as a joyful 
life in nature, presumes one to reconsider the intrinsic value of nature as a 
value in itself, which supports the process of self-realization. Defining 
ecolife as a life in harmony can be extrapolated to Nansen’s statement that 
adopting outdoor life means to follow the individual path of maturity (Ran-
dall 2007: 38) due to which the path itself is more important than its end. 
Thus the value of the process, whose normative validity is grounded in es-
                                           
97According to Faarlund, in the field of environmental studies, we have one spontaneous way (en u-
middel-bar vei) to changing our way of living with joy. See also Leirhaug 2007: 68. 
98 See also Faarlund 1973, Leirhaug 2007: 45. 
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tablishing philosophy of outdoor life as a significant experiential philoso-
phy, brings us back to the paradigm of ontological ethics. Its most illumina-
tive representations can be revealed by examining the normative validity of 
so-called by Faarlund joy of way (veg-glede), joy of work (arbeids-glede) 
and joy of life (livs-glede) (Faarlund 1995: 2). 
Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I draw the conclusion that 
staying with an open face towards nature in Faarlund’s sense is due to the 
normative validity of spontaneity understood both as a spontaneity of man’s 
joyful experience and spontaneity as an intrinsic value of nature, which is 
determined as a free nature. According to Faarlund, harmonic life is possi-
ble only in free nature (at harmonisk liv…bare er mulig i fri natur) (Faar-
lund 1985), which in turn shows that we have to examine the methodologi-
cal role of what he called spontaneous understanding (u-middel-bart for-
ståelig)99 (Faarlund 1983) (Leirhaug 2007: 63). That is why I argue that the 
normative validity of the latter is a result of adopting imaginative rational-
ity. It is an understanding, which presumably opens the door for both antici-
pating the diversity of the living forms and the diversity of the ways of self-
realization. 
One of the first classifications, which Faarlund offered is concerned with 
the formula “to learn how to use nature without misusing it” (Vi må lære å 
bruke naturen – uten å forbruke den) (Faarlund 1968: 3). However, during 
the 1990s, the problem was a result of the changing socio-cultural situation. 
Faarlund defined three perspectives, namely, political, commercial and 
thematic ones (den politiske, kommersielle, og tematiske) (Faarlund 1992: 
39). Against the background of the arising tension between the fascination 
of free nature and nature’s culture (naturens kultur), the political dimension 
was recognized as replacing the thematic one, while it was supposed to give 
way to the commercial dimension (Ibid: 13). In time, this conception made 
even a more radical turn since Faarlund argued that in modernity commer-
cial interests made use of free nature as “an arena for trendy exhibitionism” 
inspired by the restless building of identity (Faarlund 1999: 5)100.  
                                           
99 See Faarlund’s reference to Konrad Lorenz (Faarlund 1985). Leirhaug 2007: 63. 
100 According to Leirhaug, in his writings since 2000, Faarlund was not so much concerned about 
clarifying the concept of outdoor life. An argument in favor of this statement is that he no longer 




Outlining different type of interests is important for reconceptualizing the 
normative implications of the idea of free nature and the one of Norwegian 
outdoor life respectively in tune with given socio-cultural changes. In this 
context, I argue that justifying the understanding of nature as a home of cul-
ture in Faarlund’s sense is a ‘natural’ consequence of establishing one new 
philosophy of outdoor life. However, it had to meet the requirements of a 
rapidly changing reality, which in turn makes the boundaries between the 
aforementioned three perspectives blurred. 
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3.2. The Pedagogical Role of Ecolife 
In this context, Faarlund shows how “the complex ecosystem can be the 
best model for vigorous democracy” (et livskraftig demokrati) (Faarlund 
2003: 26). Extrapolating his statement, I reach the conclusion that absolutiz-
ing the cognitive rationality and its embodiment in some cultural forms en-
courages justifying the pseudo-stability of ecosystems since what Faarlund 
defined as techno-cultural premises led to the dictatorship of understanding 
(forståelsesdiktatur)101 (Ibid).  
Furthermore, democracy in Faarlund’s sense has to be interpreted as a right 
of non-contradictory existence of plurality of forms and a right of under-
standing diversity itself respectively. The two meanings became inter-
changeable in his writings, especially when he discussed the role of “de-
mocracy of understanding”. In this context, I draw the conclusion that out-
lining thw problem is again a matter of extrapolating Aristotelian principle 
adequation of intellect and things (adaequatio intellectus et rei) in respect 
with imaginative rationality that makes the two modes of existence, namely, 
the ones of ‘to be with nature’ and ‘to be in nature’, ontologically inter-
changeable.  
In turn, democracy of understanding benefits diversity in question to be an-
ticipated by all human senses as well as the pedagogical value of conwaying 
to reveal how to cultivate man’s consciousness about philosophy of outdoor 
life as a matter of practical wisdom on both mental and physical levels.  
Regarding the cultivation of sensitivity towards intrinsic value of nature as a 
matter of self-realization, Faarlund provides different strategies how to en-
courage the development of collective imaginative rationality in so far as 
the problem-solving process is based on both knowledge and experience. 
Knowledge without experience lacks the implications of values, which 
would affect reducing moral understanding to cognitive one and thus to in-
flict the justification of moral objectivism, which provokes what Faarlund 
called dictatorship of understanding. 
In turn, the distinction between the aforementioned types of understanding 
(democratic and dictatorship ones), based on different definitions of what 
living forms are, presumes some different types of motivation to be devel-
                                           
101 He does not go further in calling the latter an ideology, which would illustrate how the premises 
of technological culture are recognized as the only one normative premise. 
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oped, which individuals should cultivate depending on the moral geography 
they choose. Extrapolating Faarlund’s thesis, I introduce two types of moral 
geography, as I already mentioned. The vertical moral geography requires 
adopting the competition as a stimulus with a high value, which has to initi-
ate the process of self-realization. On the other hand, so-called by Faarlund 
motive of achieving (prestasjonsmotivet) could be examined as an illumina-
tive component of what I call horizontal moral geography since it inflicts 
the reconsideration of life’s quality within the framework of ontological eth-
ics. 
According to Faarlund, the competition motive is the driving power of the 
representatives of the technological society since it channels the powers of 
affects. It is a derailment of the motive of achieving (Ibid: 28). If outdoor 
life is grounded in the idea of control and conquering of nature (Et friluft-
sliv bygget på behersker-og beseirerholdningen til natur) (Ibid), it recog-
nizes the latter as a field of competition (konkurransebane) (Ibid). When it 
is built on such premises, the outdoor life would use all the helping devices 
as well as would have no consciousness of how the used field would de-
velop in the future (Ibid)102. On the other hand, the motive of high quality 
performances is a driving force of man, which encourages the willingness as 
well as making choices regardless of the absolutization of qualifications 
such as winner, high status, winning of accepted goods, as Faarlund argues 
(Ibid).  
That is why Faarlund suggests that the motive of achieving is the driving 
force of enjoying both being with friends and being with (med) nature (Ibid: 
32). Equating the two modes, namely, the ones of ‘to be in’ and ‘to be 
with’, he outlines the boundaries of human existence as depending on the 
recognition of the intrinsic value of nature rather than the one of recreation, 
which exploits nature as its arena. In this context, I reach the conclusion that 
the aforementioned modes could be examined as modes of ‘being in itself’ 
and ‘being for itself’ whose dialectical relationship makes them inseparable 
in the process of self-realization. On a micro methodological level, it means 
that the quality of life, understood beyond the perspective of utilitarian eth-
ics imposed by technological culture, depends on the presumption that one 
is at home only if one is on one’s way to nature.  
                                           
102 Otherwise, this opportunity means that one, like in sport (i idretten), has set some rules, which 
would secure equal conditions for all competitors (Ibid). 
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Thus the normative choice of ecolife is modified into a utilitarian choice of 
having a comfortable life, which is presumably justified as the best life’s 
choice ever. Extrapolating Faarlund’s statement that outdoor life’s values 
determine both the evaluation of quality of choice and the activities we take 
up (Ibid), I draw the conclusion that the normative validity of the motiva-
tion driven by the philosophy of outdoor life affected the lack of normative 
discrepancy between intentions and actions. The way you choose deter-
mines an object of choice, which inflicts the relevant actions for proving the 
need of choosing this way. That is why Faarlund talks about a fundamental 
engagement involving the whole personality (Ibid). Furthermore, experienc-
ing nature is inseparable from the experience of man’s own actions since 
complexity is a prototype characteristic of outdoor life philosophy. 
In turn, the basic minimum of engaging whole personality includes the in-
corporation of intellect, emotional life (følelsesliv) and corporeal experience 
in an interactive unity (kroppslig utfoldelse i et samspillende hele) (Ibid). 
According to Faarlund, in the outdoor life we are not interested in meteor-
ology, glaciology, hydrology etc. “We are interested in weather and climate, 
in having knowledge about glaciers and rivers, as well as about and water-
falls. It would be our life in nature that makes us gain knowledge about 
phenomena and conditions, which we cannot get a view by ourselves” (Ibid: 
42). Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I draw the conclusion 
that philosophy of outdoor life could be described by adopting the concep-
tion of experiential knowledge in so far as the latter contradicts the ‘compli-
cation’ imposed by the economization of science. Thus the differences be-
tween the two paradigms of knowledge can be interpreted as provoked by 
the differences in the profile of the interested groups, taking into account 
that the idea of interest is explored within two different ethics, namely, 
within the framework of ontological and utilitarian one. While for the 
adopters of outdoor life the mutual interests are understood as arising from 
the common experiential knowledge, the ones of life provided by the tech-
nological culture concern the scientific knowledge as favorable to obtaining 
practical benefits in supporting one’s interests or another’s. 
Extrapolating Faarlund’s statement again, I also claim that the entity of ex-
periential knowledge is closely tied with experiencing nature and interacting 
with the ecosystems, which, as a process, is “not limited to the branches of 
human knowledge” (Ibid: 31). It means that due to imaginative rationality, 
which encourages the principles of complexity rather than the ones of com-
plication in Kvaløy’s sense, moral learning and moral understanding could 
be achieved by going back to what Faarlund called conwaying, namely, to 
the process of transmitting experiential knowledge so that the collective ex-
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periential knowledge to contribute to the process of individual self-
realization.  
One of the main methodological benefits of Faarlund’s idea of conwaying 
could be traced on the level of building collective imaginative rationality, 
which to rehabilitate the normative validity of experiential learning as such. 
According to him, outdoor life’s learning (friluftslivslære) (Ibid: 37) pre-
sumes examining already discussed normative and descriptive premises, 
which determine the grounding norms for the practical outdoor experience 
as well as the choice of perspective of studying (turvalg) (Ibid). Further-
more, exploring the origin and functioning of norms requires investigating 
the ethics of outdoor life (friluftslivets etikk) (Ibid: 38), which is preceded 
by recognizing the role of ecophilosophy and ecopolitics as well as the 
mechanisms of so-called forms and qualities of experience (opplevelses-
former og opplevelseskvaliteter) (Ibid). In turn, the practical side of outdoor 
life is dependent on mastering the skills, which are important for the plan-
ning and realization of the tours in nature. These skills include the physical 
and mental abilities of the participants, their experience in respect with a 
given planning, the specificities of the region (time, season, geographical 
specificities) etc. (Ibid: 39-40). That is why, as Faarlund argues, the con-
wayer has to obtain general understanding of outdoor life (helhetssyn på 
friluftsliv), practical wisdom (praktisk dyktighet i friluftsliv) and methodic 
teaching (metodisk skolering) (Ibid: 44).  
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3.2.1. The Impact of Centralization in Eductaion – 
Hemsedal 
and Telemark Schools of Outdoor Life 
Examining the traditions of Norwegian philosophy of outdoor life requires 
comparing and contrasting the models imposed by two schools, namely, by 
the Mountain University College in Hemsedal (Høgfjellskolen i Hemsedal) 
and the one in Telemark (Høgskolen i Telemark). While the former is asso-
ciated with the name of Faarlund, some of the most significant representa-
tives of the latter are Bjørn Tordsson and Atle Tellnes (Østrem 2003: 15).  
As it was already mentioned above, Faarlund established the Mountain 
University College in 1967 and it was one of the first institutions, which ar-
ranged courses in mountain ski jumps, climbing and hiking (Mytting og 
Bischoff 1999) (Østrem 2003: 16). According to Jensen, the school was 
opened for making people enthusiastic about nature as well as motivating 
them for a different way of living inspired by the conwaying in outdoor life 
(Ibid). Few years after the school was established, a two-year course in 
conwaying started. Referring to the governmental report number 40 (About 
Outdoor Life), which was approved in 1988, Faarlund argued that examin-
ing outdoor life is a matter not only of improving people’s health, but also 
of thoughtful (hensynsfull) use of nature as well as avoiding its misuse 
(Ibid). 
Faarlund’s conwaying model has as an objective to clarify some aspects of 
conwaying process in respect with the philosophy of outdoor life, namely, 
to specify the role of the conwayer and his/her functions. Regarding the lat-
ter, he claimed that they are mainly concerned with expanding the scope of 
knowledge about outdoor life beginning with the ‘close and known’ (det 
nære og kjente) for the individual and the group and then focusing on the 
‘distant and unknown’ (det fjerne og ukjente) (Faarlund 1999: 4). Some 
other functions concerned the groups’ safety, which has to be in tune with 
nature’s interests. They include responsibilities such as developing common 
responsibility, defining the relevant size of the group etc. Furthermore, the 
key issues of Faarlund’s model were focused on how to qualify experienced 
conwayers in outdoor life as well as how to find institutional support in 
providing the groups with relevant sets of tools, clothes, food during their 
trips (Østrem 2003: 17-18). 
In turn, the representatives of Telemark school also defined the conwaying 
as benefiting the meeting with free nature, which provides joyful and high 
quality of life’s experience. The meeting in question should encourage the 
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critical attitudes towards the use of nature’s sources emphasizing the role of 
the consequences to both man and nature. Thus developing common re-
sponsibility through common work contributes to the personal self-
realization as such (Tellnes 1992: 96) (Østrem 2003: 19). In this context, 
Tordsson outlined the significant role of experiential learning in conway-
ing103. According to him, outdoor life “is a special, process-oriented method 
of transmission, which is built on the basis of both group-working form and 
a direct meeting with nature” (Tordsson 1993: 36) (Østrem 2003: 19). The 
group-working form itself is the key premise for achieving the goals of ex-
periential pedagogy (erfaringspedagogiken) because it is grounded in learn-
ing in and by (i og av) given situations, i.e. in learning in and through 
group-acting: to learn by doing (Tordsson 1993: 198). Since the conwaying 
is a process-oriented method of transmission, the conwayer also has to re-
flect upon his/her role, to develop his/her own style of working and to dis-
cern between his/her own role and the one of the group in particular. Tords-
son distinguished between three functions – the one of the conwayer (ve-
glederfunksjonen) who has to establish a democratic structure regarding the 
group-life and its interaction, the one of the task (oppgavefunksjonen) con-
cerned with the experiential learning of the group, and the function of the 
individual (individfunksjonen) referring to the process of self-realization in 
respect with the group instructions (Tordsson 1993: 212-219) (Østrem 
2003: 23). Both Tordsson and Tellnes also emphasized the role of external 
factors such as time, nature, size of the group, its dynamic, the life style 
etc104. 
                                           
103The aforementioned specificities determine the conceptual difference in Faarlund’s sense be-
tween conwaying (vegledning) and guidance in the sense of leading (veiledning). According to Jen-
sen, conwaying is a “history, which can be referred to Faarlund and Norwegian Mountain Univer-
sity College (Norges Høgfjellskole)” in particular, while the leading is “all the rest” (Jensen 2000: 6-
7). Thus Askeladden’s ‘translation’ (oversettelse) of conwaying, as represented by Faarlund, dis-
tances the conwaying of outdoor life from the process of guiding, as introduced in the general theory 
of guidance (Ibid: 6). Furthermore, Faarlund argues that conwaying in the outdoor life is nothing but 
an attempt at bringing to life meeting with free nature (et forsøk på å levendegjøre) “under threat” of 
(i farene til) cultures’ tradition close to nature (naturnaere kulturers tradisjon) (Østrem 2003: 18). 
The image of the conwayer is represented by Faarlund within the framework of the aforementioned 
traditions as a figure, which functions like grandmothers and grandfathers in the traditional societies 
(Faarlund 1991: 4) (Østrem 2003:18).  
104 For the differences between the two schools such as the more moderate attitudes towards the use 
of devices in outdoor life, see Østrem 2003. 
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Another similarity between the two schools is that both of them stressed the 
risk of outdoor life’s commercialization as well as the illuminative impact 
of the idea that for the conwayer ‘the simple tour is the goal”. On a macro 
methodological level, expanding Tellnes’s conception of nature method, i.e. 
of what “man learns in and out of situations” (man lærer i og av situas-
jonene) (Tordsson 1993: 198) (Tellnes 1992: 99) (Østrem 2003: 19-21) is a 
guarantee of keeping the dialectical tension between already discussed two 
modes of being, namely, ‘to be in’ and ‘to be with’ nature understood 
through experiential learning as ‘to learn in’ and ‘to learn from’ nature re-
spectively. 
In this context, I draw the conclusion that the premises for the ideal model 
of conwaying can be seen in what Faarlund described as Askeladden’s 
school, which recognized one new paradigm of experiential learning. The 
conwayer has to train the group so that people to realize that we all have 
deep relationships with other species and things (Østrem 2003: 19) and that 
is why the experiential learning can be developed only through adopting 
one saturated with imaginative rationality way of thinking, which listens to 
the voice of cultural tradition and free nature. One of the main advantages 
of Askeladden’s model, which can be extrapolated to the contemporary re-
ality, is that it searches for answers in meaningful situations (I gåtefulle 
situasjoner) (Faarlund 2000a: 22) exploring the aspects of the total openness 
of man and nature. 
In other words, to understand that rehabilitating the role of experiential 
learning through Faarlund’s formula ‘the way is the goal’ (veien er målet), 
we should make not only meaningful decisions in meaningful situations, but 
also succeed in revealing the meaning of these situations, which are used to 
be considered as deprived of any meaning whatsoever. The latter is a result 
of expanding the dominance of technological culture, which reduces the 
role of the experience at the expense of cognitive rationality. 
In conclusion, the need of specifying the methodological differences be-
tween conwaying and leading can be defined as arising from the contempo-
rary challenges inflicted by the technological culture, namely, by reviving 
the complexity of moral learning and moral understanding. It is the meta-
phor of Askeladden’s school that represents why the understanding and 
learning in question are a matter of clarifying the entity of conwaying as a 
process of transmitting practical wisdom about outdoor life through the 
complex knowledge of experiential learning. This process becomes more 
and more demanding due to the fact that the technological culture is not a 
‘close to nature’ type of culture.  
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3.3. Risking Culture, Risking Life. The Role 
of Monoculture  
3.3.1. The Role of Technological Culture and 
Industrialization for Norwegian Outdoor Life 
From the late 1960s until the late 1980s, one of the main problems in avoiding 
the misuse of nature was the need of clearly outlining the boundaries between 
commercial and political. In turn, from the 1990s onwards the problem is how 
to disenchant the real threat as a threat coming from the unclear boundaries be-
tween the three dimensions outlined by Faarlund, namely, commercial, political 
and thematic ones.  
Regarding the expanding role of technology, technological culture turned nature 
understood as a way home into a store house, which affected the differentiation 
of cognitive rationality and understanding. According to Faarlund, the culture in 
question is focused on the development (‘utviklingen’), on the rational usage of 
resources (“rasjonell utnyttelse av ressursene”) (Faarlund 2003: 11), making na-
ture “something different from itself” (som noe utenfor selvet) (Ibid: 12). 
Furthermore, the uncontradictory justification of technological culture as the on-
ly one culture available leads to the absolutization of the competence at the ex-
pense of the cooperation provided by the philosophy of outdoor life. Faarlund 
claims that traditionally Norwegian outdoor life was rather based on the “qual-
ity of performance” (på kvalitet i utførelsen), i.e. on hunting expeditions, walk-
ing tours etc. rather than on the competition between the participants (Ibid: 21).  
The changing value of recreation is a key issue in clarifying the sportification of 
outdoor life. According to Faarlund, in the contemporary Norwegian society, 
the role of outdoor life is radically deprived of its traditional values being rec-
ognized as an escape from society, namely, as a form of pure escapism, or as a 
legal form of escape, which is called vacation or free time (Ibid: 22). It is also 
important to outline that it is the multilateral connections between economy and 
ecology that make the ‘invasion’ of the new ideal of recreation in the scope of 
outdoor life possible. The roots of this tendency can be referred to Faarlund’s 
statement about the branches of outdoor life, especially in Central Europe. Ac-
cording to him, they are pulled in tourism (ski centers, tourist packages), indus-
try’s interests (production of equipment) and parts of the service sector (expedi-
tions, tourism) (Ibid). 
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The recreation itself becomes a guarantee for the health status of the participants 
in the technological culture. In this context, Faarlund draws the important con-
clusion that as long as the work roles and day-life are not the most valuable 
forms of the technological societies, we need a physical and emotional engage-
ment outside of the “technological structures” (engasjement fysisk og følelses-
messig utenfor “teknostrukturen”), i.e. first and foremost, in nature (Ibid). Oth-
erwise, being a rehabilitation form of technological culture, outdoor life be-
comes an “artificial breath for one cultural form” (et kunstig åndedrett for en 
kulturform) (Ibid), which is not in tune with (i utakt med) people’s inherited as-
sumptions and the ecological interplay on the planet Earth (Ibid).  
On a macro methodological level, I argue that intermingling the principles of 
economy and ecology can be examined as a matter of intermingling some cul-
tural and living forms, which starts with their total contradiction in the very be-
ginning (when the living forms are explored as opposed to the cultural ones) 
and ends with outlining their ontological dependence.  
The genealogy of this process is based on the following logic. In the beginning, 
the recognition of technological culture depends on imposing some cultural 
forms as the only ‘proper living forms’, which in turn leads to contradicting the 
values of traditional outdoor life and the ones of recreation. Gradually rehabili-
tating the importance of going back and adopting some living forms is consid-
ered as strengthening the influence of the cultural forms. An illuminative exam-
ple in this respect is outlining the recreation as having a new symbolic capital 
outside of the field of technological culture. 
If such a turn is done not for the sake of the participants as individuals who 
adopt different moral experiential gestalts, but for the sake of the culture in 
question, the recreation becomes a part of the free time planning. In this context, 
Faarlund outlines the role of the sector of free time (“fritidssektoren”), which is 
“one very expansive sector of the economic life in the technological socie-
ties”105 (Ibid: 23). According to him, another risk is outdoor life to become “a 
combined therapy and economic milking cow in the form of the “activity tour-
ism” (“kombinert terapi og økonomisk melkeku i form av “aktivitetsturisme””) 
(Ibid). In other words, the therapeutic effect of rehabilitation could be merely 
justified in its institutionalized form due to the presumption that the alternative 
living forms also have relevant cultural functions, but they are displayed in a 
different manner. 
                                           
105The institutionalization of living forms as alternative ones is strengthened by so-called Long-time 
program (Langtidsprogram) introduced by the Norwegian parliament for the period of 1974-1977. 
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II.1. SOME INTRODUCTORY NOTES 
ON PETER WESSEL ZAPFFE 
Regardless of the fact that the conceptions of the Norwegian mountaineer, 
lawyer, writer and philosopher106 Peter Wessel Zapffe are not as well-
known as the theories of Arne Næss, they had a significant influence on the 
development of Norwegian existentialism. According to Kvaløy, “One 
might perhaps say that while neither Zapffe nor Næss have been fully ac-
cepted, they have been two of the major forces contributing to making 
Norwegian ecophilosophy and environmental politics something that prob-
ably is not easily fitted into the categories of contemporary thinking on the-
se matters elsewhere.”107. He characterized Zapffe as “Norway’s earliest 
ecophilosophical pioneer” (Kvaløy 1992b: 274), and as a “Buddhist minus 
Nirvana” (en “buddhist minus Nirvana”)108 (Kvaløy 2002: 118) arguing that 
Zapffe’s way of thinking was a type of metaphysical ecology (en slags 
metafysisk økologi), which he called “biosophy” (Ibid: 118-119). In this 
context, Kvaløy intended to metaphorically displaying the metaphysical pa-
thos of Zapffe’s philosophy, which culminated in existential pessimism109.  
                                           
106 For a detailed description of Zapffe’s “multi-sided personality” (dette mangfoldige menneske), 
see Fløistad 1989: 13. 
107 See also Randall’s translation (Randall 2007: 45). 
108 Kvaløy argues that he has suggested this expression to Zapffe and Zapffe did not “refuse” it 
(Ibid). 
109 By revealing the total openness of man and nature, which provokes a certain type of pessimism, 
Zapffe justifies the profile of a new worldview related to the Buddhist one, albeit without accepting 
the state of Nirvana as a guiding light in the process of human salvation. According to Zapffe, bio-
sophy illustrates how dynamics of life is grounded in the law of entropy exploring the aspects of so-
called ‘equilibrium through change’ (Zapffe 2011: 73). In this context, ‘tragic being’ is analyzed 
against the background of the principles of biological dynamics (Ibid). Examining the implications 
of the law of entropy is a tendency, which, as I will show in the next chapter, is based on the increas-
ing need of rethinking the normative validity of nature’s predictability questioned by man’s strive 
for omnipotence on different levels.  
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Judging by the aforementioned investigations, we should specify why one 
should give arguments in favor of Zapffe’s pessimism rather than Zapffe’s 
nihilism regardless of Nietzsche’s influence on his views of cultural de-
growth, as well as of the possibility to draw some parallels with Nietzsche’s 
melancholic metaphysics110, as Haave suggests111 (Haave 1999: 236-238). 
Zapffe himself describes Nietzsche’s theory of tragic arguing that his “aes-
thetic-tragic desire” (“aestetisk-tragiske lyst”) is imprecisely interpreted 
(Zapffe 1941: 554).  
According to Zapffe, pessimism takes place as an element of Nietzsche’s 
works, namely, as a “Dionysian comprehension” (“dionysisk erkjendelse”) 
(Ibid): thus the general law of cruelty, suffering and total destruction looks 
deep-rooted (Ibid). In turn, this understanding leads to Buddhism, to repul-
sion of acting and life (Ibid: 554-555). On the other hand, Zapffe empha-
sizes that here comes the difference with Schopenhauer: “Nietzsche wants 
to go back to life: he wants salvation from Buddhism and finds this salva-
tion in the tragedy, as it was in Greece and as it was for us” (Ibid: 555).  
Looking for some methodological similarities between Zapffe and Scho-
penhauer, I argue that we may compare Zapffe’s pessimism with Schopen-
hauer’s pessimism112 and his theory of tragic in particular, taking into ac-
count that Zapffe himself is critical to some of Schopenhauer’s ideas. He 
describes Schopenhauer as an author113 who, according to the public opin-
ion, shapes an epoch within tragic theory (Ibid: 550). By contrast to the ide-
                                           
110While describing Zapffe’s attempts at exploiting the vulnerability of human being, Næss defines 
his ideas as “disturbing, humorous, and thorough”, albeit being “clear” (Reed and Rothenberg 1993: 
104).  
111 However, Haave also outlines some methodological differences between Nietzsche and Zapffe. 
While Zapffe’s theory of tragedy can be considered as a continuation (videreføring) of the Socratic-
Christian interpretation of suffering, Nietzsche does not recognize one already firmly built meaning 
of life as a whole (Haave 1999: 237). Furthermore, Haave emphasizes that by contrast to Nietzsche 
who argues that man can define his/her suitable values by himself/herself, Zapffe’s claim on child-
lessness presumes that one would not be able to live in such a way so that in the moment of death to 
welcome a certain type of repetition (en gjentagelse velkommen) (Ibid: 238). 
112 I refer to chapter eight (On Ethics) in the second volume of Schopenhauer’s Parerga and Parali-
pomena (1851) as well as to The World as Will and Representation (Die Welt als Wille und Vorstel-
lung) (1818-1819) and the essay Studies in Pessimism: the Essays of Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-
1860) (in its English translation of 2004). 
113 He outlines that Schopenhauer is one of the authors who can be described as “biosophical” 
(“biosofisk”), which makes them more “accessible” (mere tilgjængelige) to research (Ibid: 551). 
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alists who were strongly influenced by Christianity, Schopenhauer was ori-
ented to Buddhism. Zapffe argues that he “met the world’s course not with 
Yes, but with No” (Ibid). When we do not have an opportunity to realize 
our mortal interests, we do not have any other chance but to give up the in-
terest as such, “to resign and turn from life, which, according to its nature, is 
suffering” (Ibid). In this context, Zapffe defines the task of tragedy as teach-
ing us “this art by the example of the hero” (Ibid). On the other hand, he 
clarifies that Schopenhauer goes further, namely, saying that the one who 
resigns from life and its affections, returns to Nirvana, which is a condition 
for “salvation without desire” (en salighetstilstand uten begjær) (Ibid). Zap-
ffe also outlines that Schopenhauer’s resignation is not a result of “the 
qualified fight for perfectibility” regarding what Zapffe calls qualified ca-
tastrophe, but an escape due to the first sign of resistance (Ibid: 552). 
Against the background of the aforementioned investigations, I argue that 
analyzing Zapffe’s reception of both Berkeley’s ideas and Jakob von 
Uexküll’s biosemiotics, which had a crucial influence on the formation of 
Zapffe’s biosophy contributes to revealing how the uniqueness of the latter 
affected the complex understanding of humankind’s differences from other 
species on more than one level, namely, in so-called by him biological, so-
cial, autotalic and metaphysical interest fronts displayed against the back-
ground of so-called multifrontal engagements, which will be examined in 
the next chapters. 
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2. ZAPFFE’S THEORY OF BIOSOPHY. 
“THINK BIOSOPHICALLY, ACT 
MEANINGFULLY!” 
2.1 The Influence of Berkeley’s Principle 
“Esse Est Percipi” and Uexküll’s Theory 
of Umwelt114 on Zapffe’s Biosophy 
Kvaløy defines Zapffe’s biosophical perspective as partly gaining its empirical 
validity from Berkeley’s philosophy (Kvaløy 1992a: 12)115. Another significant 
source influencing Zapffe’s theory were the works of the Baltic-German biolo-
gist and founder of biosemiotics Jakob von Uexküll. According to Zapffe, 
Uexküll’s fundamental idea can be seen as philosophically tied with Berkley’s 
principle “esse est percipi”, and even going back to Protagoras’s conception of 
                                           
114 According to Uexküll, the concept of Umwelt (surrounding world or environment) is closely tied 
with animals’ ability to discern some meaning, which goes beyond the purely instinctual reactions 
(Buchanan 2008: 21). That is why the approaches to environment do not have to be examined as be-
longing to the field of ethology alone (Ibid). Referring to Kant’s contribution of “shaking” the posi-
tion of the universe by exposing it as “being merely a human form of perception” (Ibid), Uexküll ar-
gues that we should make a step further in reinstalling “the Umwelt space of the individual human 
being in its proper position” (Ibid). In this context, it becomes logical to ask how the world appears 
to the organisms as a subjective experience (Ibid: 22). Another important specification is that since 
Umwelt is organisms’ perceptive environment, which discerns from the world as an object, we may 
witness how the Umwelt of different organisms may overlap with each other (Ibid: 25).  
115 Zapffe argues that in the field of dramaturgy, which is one of his main fields of interest, one met-
aphysical orientation is displayed by authors such as Hegel, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Josef Kőrner, 
Peter Rokseth. He argues that “biosophically relevant” is an expression, which one finds in the 
works of H.V. Brønsted (Biology and Human Understanding) (Biologi og menneskeforståelse) and 
Jakob von Uexküll (Biological Worldview) (Biologische Weltanschauung) (Zapffe 1992: 143). 
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‘homo-mensura’ (the understanding that man is a measure of everything)116 
(Zapffe 1992: 144). 
In his essay, Biosophical Perspective (Biosofisk perspektiv) (1961) Zapffe pro-
vided a detailed analysis of the way some ideas of Uexküll were elaborated in 
his own writings. Zapffe argues that the traditional dualism between individual 
and environment is no longer so effective since Uexküll has grounded the thesis 
that environment for a given species, even for the individual, is co-determined 
(eventually, completely determined) by the living beings’ perceptive equipment 
in respect with a possible inner elaboration of impressions (Ibid: 143-144). The-
se abilities and organs are the only one means, the only one way of arranging 
environmental characteristics, or if we adopt the more precise expression, to ar-
range one X, which afterwards is called or treated as an environment (Ibid). 
In this context, Berkeley’s formula ‘esse est principi’ is interpreted in a broader 
context. The durability of his thesis is judged from a point of view of “percipi” 
(utenfor “percipi”) from which one can understand “esse” without “percipi” 
(Ibid: 144). Zapffe claimed that one has been constantly disproving Berkeley’s 
thesis indeed before one has managed to compare (endnu for man rakk å sam-
menligne) ‘esse’ with the ‘perceptum’ for the purposes of finding a solution to 
the question of identity (Ibid). Clarifying Uexküll’s intention, Zapffe argues that 
the aforementioned sentence can be reformulated in the following way: “Biolo-
gist cannot work with anything but with perceptum” (Ibid: 144-145). However, 
in the process of crossing many perceptions (eventually, in their accumulation), 
so that one student of Berkeley or Uexküll to adopt a perception in order to un-
derstand animals’ perceptions, there is (in any case) one first complication, 
namely, the one of “perceptum est percipi” (Ibid: 145). Zapffe emphasizes that 
in the practical life, mixing the perception with one supposed ‘esse’ has weighty 
consequences117. If another individual has another perception, it is nevertheless 
unimportant from what Zapffe calls a biosophical point of view118, unless with 
this (perception), the thing also gains relevance in terms of interest (Ibid).  
                                           
116 He refers to Næss’s History of Philosophy (1953). 
117 Furthermore, Kvaløy metaphorically argues that at Stetind’s cliffs existence precedes essence by 
explicating the slogan “Either Sartre, or Spinoza!” (På Stedtinds vegger “forutgår eksistens essens”. 
Heller Sartre enn Spinoza!) (Kvaløy 2002: 119). Thus existence without essence requires justifying 
nature as embodying a vital energy, i.e. as obtaining a dialectical dynamics, which to guarantee the 
noncontradictory diversity of living beings.  
118 Such a conception, however, raises the problem whether we can distinguish between perception 
bringing a relevant interest and one, which brings irrelevant interest. This issue in turn raises the 
concerns about a relevant interest is, as well as whether there is a ‘disinterested’ perception as such. 
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Such an interpretation, however, raises the question whether we can have “dis-
interested” perception and if so, would not it mean that it is possible only if 
“esse” coincides with “percipi”? We should take into account that the latter 
formula is possible only if it is examined as substantially grounded which in 
turn causes its misconceptualization. On the other hand, determining biosophy 
in respect with what interested perception is provokes the following two prob-
lems at least. First, what would be the reasons for justifying biosophy as going 
beyond the pitfalls of epistemological relativism? Second, what would be the 
exact projections of the aforementioned unimportant perception, as well as do 
we have to introduce some kind of hierarchical classification of the different 
types of perception talking about more and less important perceptions respec-
tively? If so, I argue that it would lead to the ambiguous conclusion one Umwelt 
to be considered as more important (epistemologically and even axiologically) 
than another one. 
On a macro methodological level, specifying the role of perception and envi-
ronment is of crucial importance for Zapffe since the way he justifies human 
‘over-equipment’ is examined as driven by the biological constitution of man, 
albeit it is not restricted to it. Extrapolating Uexküll’s thesis, Zapffe claims that 
man’s biological constitution is not an isolated phenomenon, but it has much to 
do with the perception of the environment, which in turn makes the representa-
tives of human kind bearers of different complex interests. According to him, 
there are two conspicuous tendencies, which dominate the description of the in-
terest life of the civilized man in general (Ibid: 158). The first one is that as a 
rule, man harbors more and stronger interests than a life in a given environment 
can realize, which might be considered as a point, i.e. that it is the interests in 
question that raise the need of fixation. The other rich of consequences peculiar-
ity of human, biologically determined constitution lays in the unfixibility (ufik-
sertheten) in Zapffe’s sense (Ibid: 159). This is also what differs, to a high ex-
tent, man from the “highest animals” (Ibid). It is supposed to be a difference in 
being (i “væsen”) showing one incompatibility (Ibid). According to Zapffe, 
most of the ‘high’ animals have a “ruling” ability (“herskende evne”), which is 
concentrated in one specialized organ (Ibid). It dominates and limits their life’s 
development, together with the perceptive equipment. He refers to Uexküll’s 
thesis (as displayed in Environment and the Inner Life of Animals) that the abil-
ity in question also dominates surrounding world’s picture (omverdensbillede) 
and possible self-feeling (Ibid). 
Judging by the aforementioned investigations, we should specify how to over-
come interpreting biological constitution within the framework of natural objec-
tivism. As a possible solution, I suggest defining constitution in question as a 
matter of biological gradualism, which in turn would explain why organisms’ 
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specification is a necessary but not sufficient condition for defining unfixibility 
as a capability that is a priority of humankind alone. Otherwise, sentient animals 
would have also had the capability of looking for fixations. On a macro meth-
odological level, the tension derives from the fact that it is both biological con-
stitution as such and biological constitution as a human constitution that make 
human interests stronger than particularly biological ones. This thesis can also 
be illustrated by the fact that fixation mechanisms depend on the limitation of 
physical abilities of the organism, albeit they are not restricted to them. 
In this context, I will examine how within the theory of biological constitution 
of mankind are introduced many concepts such as the ones of under and over-
equipment in Zapffe’s sense, as well as the role of fixations, which reveal why 
the constitution in question is only a necessary but not sufficient condition for 
reconstructing the existential constitution of human beings. It is due to the fact 
that having existential constitution is closely tied with the role of environment, 
which is understood as having biological, socio-cultural, autotelic and meta-
physical projections.  
Fixation in Zapffe’s sense is a result of experiencing and/or realizing the limits 
of perceptive equipment, namely, of the ‘decentralized’ way of human life’s de-
velopment. It is the reflection on this living development that is not directed by 
one ruling ability alone. However, from that it does not follow that human per-
ceptive equipment, which determines the unfixibility can be compared with an-
imals’ equipment even in the cases when they have less specialized organs. That 
is why I draw the conclusion that the genealogy of the difference can be found 
in what Zapffe defines as a role of consciousness and fantasy in particular. 
According to Zapffe, animals’ choice in a situation is between use and non-use 
(Ibid). Therefore the less specialized the organs are, the more versatile ways 
they can be used in119. In turn, man has many similar abilities (individualized 
due to agreement) that are “potentially” available: partly, due to “the primitive-
ness of limbs” (lemmernes “primitive”), which means that they are “undifferen-
tiated forms”, partly, due to the enormous size of consciousness and fantasy 
concerning the incomprehensible function of the searching thought (Ibid). Zap-
ffe argues that this specificity is probably again concerned with the big quanti-
                                           
119 Zapffe gives an example with the bear, which can run, climb, dig, swim and beat (Ibid). 
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ties of non-differentiated protoplasm120 in the main brain whose presence has 
caused so much trouble to the corresponding parts of the medical brains (medi-
cinernes hjerner)121 (Ibid). 
Going back to the first tendency regarding the genealogy of fixations, we should 
examine the two options proposed by Zapffe. Partly, one should constantly give 
up the experience of things, which the day dreams represent in a seductive light, 
but which are unachievable in fact: e.g. to go to the moon, to win a fortune, to 
liberate people etc. (Ibid: 158). Partly, one should choose between some achiev-
able things, when one of them eliminates the other one. In turn, the need of 
choice is accompanied by choice’s pain (pine), which, in given cases, grows 
with the number of opportunities (Ibid). In this context, the interest front is de-
scribed by Zapffe as resembling a war front: the longer it is stretched out in re-
spect with certain resources, the more vulnerable it is (Ibid). One vital and all-
round developed person could suffer from realizing that he/she should have had 
hundred lives instead of one in order not to take 99% of his/her opportunities 
with himself/herself in the grave (Ibid).  
                                           
120 According to Zapffe, it is superfluous to care about species’ existence or due to some other rea-
sons, to participate in the scuffle on Darwin’s grave (i haandgemaenget paa Darwins grav) (Zapffe 
1941: 16). Successive, simultaneous or inexplicable genesis (genese) can be one and the same for 
us: we are merely allowed to hold the position on common fundamental relationship (om fælles 
grundforhold), on equality in front of law (om “likhet for loven”) during the whole life, or more rel-
evantly expressed, on the common distinctive feature of protection, experience and reproduction 
mechanisms’ functional conditions in the peculiar, earthly power field (Ibid). This fellowship can be 
traced back to life’s protoplasmic basis, as well as to the unity of the histological structure (the func-
tioning of muscles and nerve tissues) (Ibid). Referring to Uexküll’s theory, Zapffe emphasizes two 
of the many characteristics of protoplasm, namely, access to temporary peculiar characteristics and 
the one to lasting differentiation (Ibid: 41). The first sign of changes in original homogeneous matter 
regarding one individualized zoological unity is the formation of a membrane, one exterior layer (et 
ytre skikt) of firmer matter, which is called ectoplasm by contrast to the unchanged inner one, or so-
called endoplasm (Ibid). According to Zapffe, these two forms of plasm can go over each other 
(Ibid). In this context, the existence of non-differentiated protoplasm (av udiffierentiert protoplasma) 
is a condition for the form powers’ activity (Ibid: 44). In turn, plasm is defined as the material in 
which these powers manifest themselves and reach us so that due to our need of reason, we should 
end up with “something” (til et “noget”). When the material is exploited by the differentiation, the 
powers enjoy steadily plainer circumstances until they no longer come into view as changing (Ibid) 
121 He refers to Herman Poppelbaum, Mensch und Tier (Man and Animal) (1956). Remaining on 
the level of protoplasm explanations raises the risk of falling again into the trap of natural objectiv-
ism, albeit we may find some reasons for human biological specialization in protoplasm’s functions 
of differentiation. 
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Furthermore, Zapffe specifies that man (similarly to other living beings)122 is 
characterized (in the broadest outline) by the following two factors. One has an 
equipment (Utrustningen), which due to the made demands, changes from un-
der-equipment (under-utrustning) (insufficiency) (utilstrækkelighet, insuffi-
ciens) through equivalence (ækvivalens) to over-equipment (overutrustning): 
one state, where there are abilities and power left after the need is satisfied (Ibid: 
160). The second factor is the fixation’s connection (Fiksations-forholdet), 
which varies from under-fixation (including liability, the loss of conduct, the 
loss of character when something is unfavorably measured in respect with one 
given interest: it could be either the bearer’s interest or the interest of others), 
well-adapted fixation (including the satisfied fixation etc., which shows a favor-
able degree of elasticity, perfectibility, control of alternatives) to over-fixation 
(characterizing with stubbornness, ossification (forbenethet) etc.), together with 
a wrong fixation taking place in different directions123 (Ibid). Judging by Zap-
ffe’s classification, I argue that the degree of fixation determines how under or 
over-fixation depends on the equipment of the interest bearer, which to provoke 
a relevant behavior for the purposes of satisfying (partly or fully) a given inter-
est, albeit the fixation remains irreducible to the equipment in question. That is 
why we should talk about interest bearers alone. 
Furthermore, I draw the conclusion that analyzing the role of Berkeley’s and 
Uexküll’s theories for Zapffe’s biosophy contributes not only to outlining the 
unique aspects of Zapffe’s conception, but also to clarifying how biosophy 
functions as a type of experiential philosophy. It shows why we should avoid 
both biological determinism and ungrounded metaphysical spiritualism if we 
want to reveal the complexity of existential tension regarding the uniqueness of 
humankind as the only one species able to experience so-called by Zapffe cos-
mic feeling of panic, i.e. to be aware of its own being in the universe as a proc-
ess of becoming, which, however, cannot bring complete reconciliation while 
facing some biologically determined processes such as death and suffering.  
                                           
122 This specification brings some contradictions since Zapffe also argues that the ability of produc-
ing fixation is a priority of humankind. 
123 See Zapffe’s self-reference 1941: 20, 28, 81. 
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2.2. Zapffe’s Theory of Biosophy 
According to Kvaløy, Zapffe’s biosophical perspective has a deeper dimen-
sion, namely, that man is such a being that he/she requires a meaning with 
his/her life, as well as with humankind’s life as a whole: the search for 
meaning is man’s distinctive characteristic, which makes him/her different 
from all other living beings. It is a matter of an “over-equipment” (“overut-
rustning”), but nature cannot fulfill this requirement by itself (Kvaløy 
1992b: 274-275). 
In turn, Næss claims that Zapffe’s biosophy is a type of ecosophy124 saying 
that Zapffe’s conception justifies an explicit ecosophical value (Næss 1973: 
22). The crossing point is recognized in the understanding of wisdom (so-
phia) as providing knowledge and cleverness rather than a certain type of 
impersonal or abstract learning (Ibid). In this context, Zapffe’s biosophy is 
characterized as giving an insight in life (“innsikt i livet), which in turn im-
proves our anticipation of our human condition (Ibid). On the other hand, 
Zapffe’s biosophy is a “thinking about life” illustrating why the systems of 
beliefs, which mankind has been basing its feeling of life on, should be tak-
en into consideration, as well as examining why these systems guarantee the 
functioning of ultimate and determined values (Gundersen 1974: 24).  
Zapffe himself emphasizes the role of biosophy as regarding the case of 
dramaturgy125 (Zapffe 1992: 142). He specifies that biosophical view of a 
theme (within dramaturgy) clearly discerns from the metaphysical one (pos-
sibly, from spiritual, materialist, vital, teleological, religious etc.), which is 
                                           
124 According to Næss, ecosophy is “a philosophy of ecological harmony or equilibrium. A philoso-
phy as a kind of sofia (or) wisdom, is openly normative, it contains both norms, rules, postulates, 
value priority announcements and hypotheses concerning the state of affairs in our universe. Wis-
dom is policy wisdom, prescription, not only scientific description and prediction” (Drengson and 
Inoue 1995: 8). The role of ecosophy will be examined in detail in the chapter on Næss. 
125 The question of dramatic impression in Zapffe’s theory is defined as making one necessarily go 
to the precincts of psychology, while examining how dramatic should take place in the field, where 
“Life fights for its preservation and its development in one more or less favorable environment” 
(Ibid: 143). All disciplines, which have the aforementioned fight as an object of investigation should 
be applied to the examinations of the “biosophically interested researchers” (Ibid). Furthermore, 
Zapffe defines the biosophical picture of human condition in the world as an overall horizon (rund-
horizont) regarding the expanded, concrete courses, where precious interests are “entangled in a 
fight” (Zapffe 1992: 167): “so that they to make these courses a dramatic matter” (Ibid). 
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understood as a speculative, aesthetical overall view, and which the afore-
mentioned biosophical view stays indifferent, but not necessarily polemi-
cally opposite to (Ibid). If these overall pictures (the biosophical and meta-
physical ones) are of such a type that the “unknown powers” are adopted in 
order to make themselves valid by the “natural laws” and “biological life”, 
then they should have been built on the same material of observation (Ibid). 
Thus the difference would have been only in the way of interpretation 
(Ibid). Zapffe continues that the situation could have been different126 if 
they have included some impulses, which, from a given theological perspec-
tive, were broken, as well as could break in and change the course of events 
whenever (nårsomhelst); a course, which, otherwise, one should have ex-
pected due to the common experience (Ibid: 142-143). When the difference 
lays in the deeper assumptions and in one missing common platform, it is 
impossible to reach a compromise (Ibid: 143).  
In this context, the main problem is whether referring to what Zapffe calls 
‘biological life’ does not increase the risks of falling into the trap of objec-
tive naturalism, namely, while striving for overcoming the challenges posed 
by the metaphysical view on tragic, biosophical to turn into a method of ob-
jective naturalism. Another question arises of Zapffe’s definition of meta-
physical view as aesthetical one, albeit he makes the relevant specification 
that biosophical and metaphysical do not necessarily exclude each other. 
Such an analysis favors only at first sight talking about substantial similari-
ties; one speculation, which is clearly disenchanted by Zapffe. Successfully 
describing the problem of biosophical and metaphysical overviews, he, 
however, does not clarify the genealogy of the complex relationships be-
tween the views in question, namely, how biosophy can be indifferent, 
without being necessarily opposed to metaphysical view. Extrapolating his 
theory of the interest bearer, I suggest the aforementioned difficulty to be 
examined by investigating to what extent biosophical and metaphysical 
views are based on different interests, which may overlap when so-called 
multifrontal engagements in Zapffe’s sense are initiated. 
In his attempts to outline the specificities of biological experience against 
the background of metaphysical one, Zapffe argues that one belief, which is 
grounded in the prolongation (i forlængelsen) of experience, is of curiosity 
                                           
126 Here, we can talk about substantial difference.  
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interest127 alone from a biosophical perspective (Ibid). Furthermore, one be-
lief, which goes against (strider mot) experience (God provides all human 
beings’ earthly necessities (fornødenheter)128, even when people do not 
need to work), which is defined as being of interest only as a symptom 
(Ibid). In this context, the differences may be defined as differences in the 
degree of interest since in the first case, we witness an interest in itself, 
which concerns the matter, while in the second one, it affects the interest as 
such. 
Zapffe points out that the choice of method which to clarify the role of trag-
ic requires revealing the grounding connection of tragic with organic life’s 
characteristics, as well as with life’s conditions129 in the “earthly environ-
ment” (Zapffe 1941: 11). That is why applied biology is introduced as a 
method (Ibid: 12). Zapffe refers again to Uexküll’s theory, which disregards 
the philosophical consequences and examines the living cell as something 
principally different from the earth-bound (Ibid: 15-16). The latter statement 
is interpreted by a reference to Uexküll’s chapter The Problem of Proto-
plasm (Das Protoplasmaproblem) (Ibid: 16, Note 1). Among the key fea-
tures of the living beings are mentioned the ones of shaping (Formbildung), 
regeneration (Regeneration) and super-mechanical regulation (“über-
maschinelle Regulation”), i.e. the reaction, which is changed by repeated 
stimulus (Ibid).  
                                           
127 I also argue that the justification of the ontological groundings of biosophy is a logical conse-
quence of revealing the genealogy of the tension brought by the imaginative rationality within Zap-
ffe’s experiential philosophy. This issue will be examined in one of the next chapters by outlining 
so-called autotelic and heterotelic aspects of fantasy in Zapffe’s sense. 
128 Zapffe also specifies that a biosophical aspect was already constructed by the “prophet Jesus” 
(Ibid), who in his The Parable of the Sower showed how the seed corn, which fell on different 
grounds, being smaller than a nutshell, has given the general form of life and its conditions in a corn-
husk (Ibid). In On the tragic, Zapffe argues that yet Jesus of Nazareth was aware of so-called law of 
coincidence (denne tilfældighetens lov) realizing the lack of a guiding overview, an economic prin-
ciple, a guarantee of a task and meaning concerning every single germ. In this context, he outlines 
that Jesus of Nazareth was aware that not only germ’s own quality, but also the most random chance 
is decisive for its further destiny, namely, that many are called but only few are chosen (Zapffe 
1941: 18). 
129 Zapffe emphasizes that against the use of applied biology some objections can be raised in two 
directions: first, on side of the biologists who find that their science is misused, and second, from 
philosophical and aesthetic perspectives since due to the latter one refuses the interference of natural 
sciences’ thinking mode (Ibid: 12-13).  
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Exploring Uexküll’s theory, Zapffe argues that it is important to take into 
account that the possible difference of degree regarding man and maybe 
some other sentient beings is so big that it is experienced as a difference of 
being (“væsensforskjel”) in its everyday meaning (Ibid). In the next sen-
tence, Zapffe claims that we believe that tragic should connect itself with 
the spontaneous life’s experience130 (den umiddelbare livsoplevelse) and not 
with the things, which they (people and some sentient animals) represent 
within the scientific approach (problem stating) (Ibid). Thus the object of 
investigations allows one to refer to the biological ideology alone (Ibid). 
However, biological itself does not provide an explicit difference between 
experience and the objects of experience as such. Another problem is that 
due to the scientific problem solving, we may also treat the objects in the 
process of experiencing unless it postulates a certain scientific dualism. 
                                           
130 Judging by these investigations, we may speculate to what extent, such a spontaneous experience 
may have an unquestionable normative validity as an organic experience. 
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2.2.1. Biosophy as a Method 
Zapffe also outlines that in his book Elements of One Biological Worldview 
(Bausteine zu einer biologischen Weltanschauung) (1913) Uexküll gave an ex-
pression to the concerns on side of the biologists who claimed that their science 
is msused (Ibid: 12, 13). The intention was not to idolize developmental biology 
(en utvidet biologi) in a professional sense of the word, but only to consider the 
development of organic life under the view of the fight of interests (Ibid). Nei-
ther is it intended to burden the poetry theory with the terminology of natural 
sciences, nor to narrow down the life of fantasy by biological dogma131 (Ibid). 
According to Zapffe, the method goes deeper as when one cleans up an attic 
(Ibid). One puts boxes with “art and poetry” at one place, but, on the other hand, 
he/she does not take a stance on the contents (Ibid).  
Zapffe draws the conclusion that it is the need of specialization that carries such 
interferences with itself (Ibid). Paraphrasing the aforementioned example, I ar-
gue that biology can turn out to be the content of biosophical ‘boxes’ since the 
latter bring to light human existential perspective. This happens against the 
background of one’s need to throw light to the only one necessary and always 
burning question, namely, what does it mean to be a human being? (Ibid). In 
this context, Zapffe makes the important conclusion that when none of the dis-
ciplines can give us an answer, then here comes so-called good dilettante (den 
gode dilettant) (Ibid). The figure of the dilettante as obtaining a complex inter-
disciplinary knowledge is later developed by Næss and Kvaløy who introduce 
the figure of the generalist and so-called super-amateur132. 
Applied biology, however, cannot provide us with a detailed answer to the 
question What does it mean to be a human being?, which reveals why defining 
tragic is an existential problem that illustrates something different that is “more” 
than individual and species’ death (Ibid: 18). According to Zapffe, plan (under-
stood in the broadest sense) is the human way of giving meaning to things, “an 
arrangement of the coincidences with some structural groups bounded by a 
scheme in space or in time” (Ibid). Otherwise, defining the existential prehistory 
of justifying the meaning of life in respect with the idea of meaningfulness 
would have been reduced from an existential to a purely biological issue. Thus 
tragic in Zapffe’s sense would have been simplified to the physical end of be-
                                           
131 This conception, however, is not explicitly stated by Uexküll. 
132 The definition of these two categories will be a subject to special investigations in the chapter on 
Kvaløy. 
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ing, which would have made tragic be noncontradictory extrapolated to all 
forms of life on Earth. 
Many of the aforementioned difficulties regarding the specification of the term 
biosophy derive from the fact that Zapffe himself defines it in an ambiguous 
way, as Hessen points out (Hessen 2012: 148). He argues that the biosophical 
perspective or the biological method is a part of most of Zapffe’s analytical 
writings (i de fleste analytiske arbeider) (Ibid). In the monograph On the tragic, 
he gives preference to the term ‘biological’ over ‘biosophical’ (“the thinking of 
life”) because biosophical “has a mystical connotation, which does not belong 
here…” (Ibid). In some “later contexts” (I senere sammenhenger) (Ibid), Zapffe 
uses to a bigger extent the concept ‘biosophical’ (Ibid). The difference between 
the two terms is not clear apart from the fact that ‘biological’ indicates some-
thing more empirical and less mystical than ‘biosophical’ (Ibid). Hessen empha-
sizes that Zapffe talks about biological or biosophical methods, not about bioso-
phy as such (Ibid). 
However, biosophical in Zapffe’s sense cannot be understood as mystical. He 
does not imply a certain type of irrationalism to this concept, but rather empha-
sizes the difficulties in specifying what particularly biosophical is. What is de-
fined as a more frequent use of biosophical in his later writings can be explained 
with the more precise theoretical specifications regarding the overcoming of the 
problems of Uexküll’s theory, namely, the problems, which should be over-
come by relying on Zapffe’s theory of four interest fronts and the status of the 
interest bearer. On a macro methodological level, we may trace how the afore-
mentioned difficulties in both defining and contextualizing the concept of bio-
sophical derive from Zapffe’s attempts at showing why biosophical is irreduci-
ble to biological. Otherwise, human existence would have been simplified to the 
way of being in the universe. 
In this context, Hessen argues that anthropomorphization, which we see espe-
cially in the first two chapters of On the tragic, together with the fables about 
animals, should clarify human conditions by the use of metaphors from the an-
imal world (Ibid). He also argues that it is the animals as such that are of interest 
for Zapffe (Ibid).  
Zapffe himself claims that not only due to the accordance between abilities and 
tasks do animals beneficially affect men (Zapffe 1941: 48). He specifies that 
maybe they (animals) make this effect stronger by showing natural peacefulness 
by which they rest on their determined form (i sin fæstnede form) and by this 
form they give us the sense of security to feel at home (av at være i hus med) 
with one really solid-cast character (Ibid). 
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Zapffe, however, does not encourage anthropomorphization. He outlines not on-
ly the similarities but also the differences between animals and people in order 
to clarify the limitations of the over-equipment of the former. Zapffe empha-
sizes that regardless of the fact that one admires some cats’ possibilities133, the 
process of anthropomorfization is a double-bind issue. He explicitly argues that 
human character’s formation cannot approximately be compared to cat’s one 
when it is a matter of launching a being, which is no longer disputable by nature 
with itself (hvor i naturen ikke mere er splidagtig med sig selv) (Ibid). In this 
context, Zapffe draws the conclusion that it is not possible to rely on experience 
or well-known knowledge alone (Ibid: 48-49) since it is necessary to fit a bridge 
span (at passere brospænd), which can be solidly built without damages (Ibid: 
49). In this context, he clearly states that one obvious objection concerns out-
stretched anthropomorphization of animals’ conscious and unconscious life 
(den utstrakte antropomorficering av dyrenes bevisste og ubevisste liv) (Ibid). 
Judging by the aforementioned investigations, Zapffe draws the conclusion that 
antropomorphization in question can be done only if a person has merely a bio-
logical interest front, which in turn would have made him being “one abstrac-
tion” (være en abstraktion) (Ibid). 
Zapffe begins his explanation with the statement that the examinations regard-
ing the antropomorphization can also be applied to much bigger extent (rele-
vance) to human beings in their pure biological fight of interests alone (Ibid). It 
is nevertheless with malice aforethought that situations and designations are 
placed on the simplest (possible) animal level (til det enklest mulige dyretrin) 
(Ibid): thus the picture would not be polluted (skal bli forurenset) with all asso-
ciations that inevitably would appear by the transfer to human conditions (Ibid). 
Investigating the genealogy of Zapffe’s biosophy, we may trace how the afore-
mentioned interpretations raise more questions than provide answers since Zap-
ffe’s experiential philosophy is irreducible to any forms of both anthropomor-
phism and ethical anthropocentrism, especially taking into account that giving 
arguments in favor of nature’s antropomorphization would have meant to re-
duce biosophy to its ‘biological’ content. 
                                           
133 He discusses that very often one has been admiring cat’s dazzling safety in the social intercourse; 
one has been witnessing with envy how the cat has been going through (gjennemfører) its sovereign 
autonomy (sin suveræne autonomi) without being offended, as well as without losing its dignity in 
the most ignominious situation (Ibid: 48). 
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2.2.2. Biosophy as an Existential Philosophy 
Regarding the possibilities of interpreting how biology refers to biosophy, 
G. Fløistad emphasizes the role of biosophy as a method, as represented in 
the monograph On the Tragic. Fløistad refers to Zapffe’s definition that the 
chosen method is biological or biosophical (Fløistad 1989: 18). Thus this 
method is described as giving Zapffe the opportunity to start with a discus-
sion on the organic life in general (Ibid). 
Later on in his investigations on Zapffe’s work Introduction to Literary 
Dramaturgy (Inføring i litterær dramaturgi) (1961), Fløistad goes back to 
that idea while commenting on Zapffe’s essay Biosophical perspective 
(Biosofisk perspektiv). Against the background of the clarifications concern-
ing the biosophical picture of humankind’s conditions in the world, staying 
as an all-round horizon, he interprets Zapffe’s function of ‘or’ as a matter of 
choosing between two alternatives, i.e. biosophical is examined as an alter-
native of biological (Ibid: 40). Such an interpretation, however, requires 
specifying how to define both the origin and internal connections between 
these two alternatives. If we presume that biological and biosophical are 
two, substantially different alternatives, which is indicated by the connector 
‘or’ (either biosophical, or biological) rather than ontological synonyms, 
then it would mean that we cannot examine biosophy as a certain type of 
experiential philosophy. I also argue that it is not a sufficient condition to 
define the aforementioned two concepts as synonyms but as ontological 
synonyms because otherwise, the method of biosophy would have been rec-
ognized as coinciding with the methods of applied biology, which is against 
Zapffe’s conception, as well as against what Fløistad claims while specify-
ing that Zapffe uses biological method in a way that goes beyond its tradi-
tional use in biology (Ibid: 52).  
Furthermore, another problem arises from defining biosophy and biology as 
alternatives because then we face the inevitable need of constantly discuss-
ing why biosophical method is not a purely biological one, but entails the 
latter to a certain extent. In this context, one of the most apparent difficul-
ties is to specify how from the fact that the method is biological (being at 
the same ‘neutral’ since it is built on one particular vision of life) (Ibid: 79), 
it does not follow that when one chooses this method, one ends up with a 
stance against Zapffe’s complex theory of life, which is irreducible to bio-
logical interests. Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I argue that 
one of the main concerns about such an explanation is that accepting the 
thesis of the two alternatives would lead to interfering the concept of meth-
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od with the one of alternative. On the other hand, if we agree with the idea 
of method as splitting between two (substantial or not) alternatives, then, 
the next issue is how to refer the idea of experiential philosophy to the exis-
tential one in Fløistad’s sense. Fløistad defines existential philosophical per-
spective as a biosophical perspective applied to people, which should be 
given preference (skulle ligge bedre til rette), albeit we should be careful in 
providing some direct parallels between them (Ibid: 52). However, from the 
fact that the argument against talking about environment in itself is one, 
which is shared by Zapffe and some existentialists (Ibid: 53), it does not fol-
low that biosophy, as an experiential philosophy, provides the interpretation 
of what Uexküll calls functional circle as a matter of adopting existential 
philosophy alone. 
In this context, I draw the conclusion that the difference between biosophi-
cal and biological remains unclear if we neglect the ontological grounding 
of Zapffe’s experiential philosophy. An important suggestion how to inter-
pret the practical implications of the latter can be seen in what Fløistad de-
fines as an ecological perspective recognized in the broader sense of the 
word134 (Ibid: 78). 
                                           
134 According to him, the concept of method (biosophical and biological) used by Zapffe merely in-
dicates that life should be examined from an ecological perspective (fra “økologisk” synspunkt) un-
derstood in the widest sense, i.e. from the perspective of interests, recognized as the fight of the sin-
gle individuals for self-realization (Ibid). According to Hessen, Zapffe describes biosophical method 
as a type of ecology for the humankind. In turn, it would explain how we react to this challenge (the 
fear of fear) (angsten for angsten), which requires one more important, more advanced apparatus to 
be adopted than the one for the challenges, which all living beings (from the amoeba to the ape) 
meet on their life’s way (Hessen 2012: 148). 
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According to Zapffe, biosophy means a philosophy, one theoretical view 
upon existence135, which is oriented towards biology and its annexes (pale-
ontology etc.), and which in line with this, orients itself thorough empiri-
cally to all its “problems” (Zapffe 1992: 142). Furthermore, he points out 
that biosophy is a way of thinking, which is built on biology in a manner 
acknowledged by life. In “a fanatical but necessary simplification”, we can 
think about the first coming biosophical conclusion from the position of ob-
servation and introspection, without being accused of adopting free and ir-
responsible fantasy136 (Zapffe 1992a: 269).  
Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I draw the conclusion that 
biosophical is a mode of philosophical thinking that is initially based on the 
philosophy of nature rather than on nature as such. In turn, philosophy of 
nature does not have to be interpreted as an ‘artificial thinking mode’, but 
rather as providing an examination of the internal logic of nature’s complex 
development, which has its own dialectics. The latter contributes to under-
standing why biosophical and biological can replace each other if we exam-
ine them as ontological synonyms, as I already suggested. It is possible by 
determining the complexity of the mode of being as irreducible to the sum 
of its concrete embodiments. Furthermore, I conclude that it is the norma-
tive validity of biosophy defined as an experiential philosophy that makes 
                                           
135 An important aspect of Zapffe’s theory is how he examines culture from a biosophical perspec-
tive, which is another argument in favor of the thesis that biosophy does not have to be reduced to a 
method of applied biology, as Zapffe himself argues. Form a biosophical perspective, which, in its 
capacity for research, looks for a general view and clarity instead of edification of rich in comfort 
fictions, this part of culture comes out (fremtræder) as “one steady, more elaborated palace” (Zapffe 
1992: 165). The latter is surrounded by the wall of “sweat crystals (sved-krystaller)” that “human 
soul excretes in its long, feverous fight with itself” (Ibid): “hung, as it is, between the trivialities of 
self-preservation and the splendid, desperate fall in a deadly expansion “in one togetherness with 
everything” (i en “forening med altet”) (Ibid). The latter excludes every single opportunity for an 
appropriate choice of a “margarine-type” (Ibid). Thus the culturally conscious and culturally active 
part of humankind works on one endless task: to build its own valuable world inside the big value-
indifferent environment (Ibid: 167). 
136 According to Zapffe, in a phase of a million-year development, among the myriads of bigger and 
smaller differentiations, a cleavage (spaltning) takes place. It divides animals’ kingdom into two 
groups: on the one hand, we have animals, and on the other one, humankind as such (Zapffe 1992a: 
269). Regardless of some possible parallels, since man knows his/her spiritual and psychological 
over-equipment and unfixibility, he/she is determined to have one both quantitatively and qualita-
tively different (in terms of being) living form (Ibid). 
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the normative validity of its own judgments both rationally acceptable and 
deriving from the ‘real’ matter.  
Zapffe himself gives some strong arguments against simplifying the exis-
tential projections of life to the biological ones criticizing Uexküll of not 
tracing the philosophical consequences of biosophy (Zapffe 1941: 15-16)137. 
By environment Uexküll means the unifying environment where the animal 
receives its impressions from and which, in turn, it looks to act on (Ibid). 
One can say that on the one hand, through its individual perceptive equip-
ment, the animal can undertake a choice of factors that constitute man’s 
world, in so far as this world is the more comprehensive one (Ibid). On the 
other one, there is an open possibility for having an animal with perceptive 
abilities (ved sensoriske evner), which people miss (Ibid: 26-27). Thus the 
animal will experience qualities of environment, which are unknown for us 
(e.g. dog’s world of smells): since we know nothing about how the different 
animals gain impressions. Otherwise, it requires having the same type of 
perceptive apparatus: e.g., the sense of depth (dybdesyn) achieved by stere-
oscopically coordinated lens (Ibid). 
Due to the terminology of Uexküll’s Environment and Inner World of Ani-
mals (Umwelt und Innenwelt der Tiere), Zapffe adopts the expression “func-
tional circle” (funktionskreds)138, which displays animals’ total report of re-
ality (dyrets totale virksomhetsrapport) including animals’ specific world139 
(Ibid). In this context, Zapffe outlines the role of the issue raised by 
Uexküll’s attempt at defining reaction as an expression of the world’s feel-
ing (verdensfølelsen) (Ibid: 28).  
In this context, the two main questions, which he poses, are as follows: Can 
an animal reply with the same reaction (for the purposes of our same inves-
tigation) to some impressions from a different origin? Can an animal answer 
to the same perception (“fornemmelse”) with qualitatively deferent reac-
                                           
137 Uexküll’s scheme is based on the vision that the living environment of the individuals is depend-
ent on the individual’s receptive and effective equipment (dets effektoriske utrustning) (Ibid: 26). 
138 Referring again to Uexküll, Zapffe argues that every single functional circle consists of a net 
of activities (“virkenet”) and a net of signs (“merkenet”); thus in the metaphysical life, (which, in 
its “fastened” (fæstnede) form means ‘religious’ by rule), we can also see the human contribution 
to the response of world’s subject and God’s one (Ibid: 203). Thus God and world’s plan form 
together the hypothetical-metaphysical environment (Ibid). In turn, in the prolongation of bio-
logical life’s holding lay some religious benefits such as sacrifices with food and drinks 
(brændoffer og drikoffer) (Ibid).  
139 See the scheme, Ibid: 27. 
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tions regardless of the bluntness (sløvhet) or sharpness (skjærpelse) of the 
reaction, which is driven by a given repeated stimulus? (Ibid). According to 
him, it is the latter question that raises the issue of unfixibility (Ibid). Such a 
statement, however, provokes the conclusion whether unfixibility in Zap-
ffe’s sense is not triggered by environmental conditions alone under which 
the animals react. This in turn would contradict Zapffe’s other definitions of 
unfixibility regarding individual’s equipment, even if we do not take into 
consideration his previous definitions of the priority of humankind while 
shaping fixations. In other words, it would have meant that unfixability 
would be simplified to a lack of fixations concerning the presence or lack of 
a given equipment, i.e. unfixibility would be reduced from the level of po-
tentiality to the one of equipment. 
Zapffe’s answer is that as long as one should deal with only one simple re-
action and only one type of perception (sanseformidling) respectively 
(which seems to be the most important one) (Ibid), it is not a matter of a real 
experience of the object (gjenstandsoplevelse), but only of a perception of 
quality (Ibid). This conclusion, however, could be interpreted as grounded 
in the presumption that the real experience of the objects entails many per-
ceptions: not in the one that many individuals may anticipate one and the 
same object in different ways140. 
Zapffe also provides a similar conclusion, taking into account the conse-
quences of defining the concept of individual due to the biological princip-
ium individuationis141 (Ibid: 177) as determining the difference between 
given bearers of interests. On a macro methodological level, it signifies that 
recognizing the accomplishment of unity of man and environment can be 
achieved by revealing the connection between them, which is driven by the 
fact that the individual makes the latter his/her ‘own’ environment in differ-
                                           
140 According to Zapffe, most of the anchoring cases (de forankringstilfælde), which we have been 
dealing with have an individual nature (var av individuel natur) (Ibid: 177), namely, they had their 
premise in the individual human heritage and experience, its “raison d’être” was in subject’s deter-
mined need (Ibid). Furthermore, ideas and values that can profitably be called collective ones 
(kollektive) are also interpreted as a side of individual life. Thus due to our terminology, they consti-
tute a part of individual’s social life front (Ibid).  
141 It is defined as an indivisible rule in life (udelelighetens grundsætning) (in-dividuum) due to or-
ganism’s complete functionality (functions’ entity) in contrast to mucus (i motsætning til slimet) and 
non-organic matter (Ibid). In this context, Zapffe argues that it is the individuals that carry the col-
lective impulses as well as that in given cases they can fully cut the latter off (Ibid). 
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ent ways without possessing it142. Last but not least, I argue that the lack of 
possession mode is a result of one’s anticipation of the environment as a liv-
ing environment due to one’s individual capacities to interact with it on all 
levels.  
On the other hand, defining the vital balance in Zapffe’s sense as dependent 
on the accommodation capacities of the individual, namely, whether the in-
dividual has over-biological or under-biological equipment143 (Ibid: 35) 
raises the risk of advocating a certain type of biological determinism or 
metaphysical absolutism, which might be misconceptualized for the pur-
poses of providing a biosophical understanding. In this context, Zapffe ar-
gues that the aforementioned two types of equipment are brought to light, 
when a functional circle should be set in action (skal træde i virksomhet) as 
demanded (besides ability) also by need and energy (energi), plus the fact 
that the inhibitions are not present (samt at der ikke er hemninger tilstede) 
(Ibid). That is why regarding the energies in question, we can talk about 
over or under-equipment (Ibid). 
One of the main methodological concerns, which arises is, however, wheth-
er under and over-biological equipment are the only one embodiment of 
what under and over-equipment are. Zapffe himself provides a detailed ex-
amination of the complex reasons for having under and over-fixations as 
built on the complex investigation of individuals’ under and over-
equipment. Probably one of the few cases when under and over-biological 
coincide with under and over-equipment in his sense is in the process of 
fixation’s satisfaction, when the capability is neither more nor less than 
what is sufficient for realizing the fixation in question. 
On the other hand, going back to Zapffe’s theory of energy, we may explain 
why capability is irreducible to the expressibility since energy may be need-
ed only as its necessary condition. Furthermore, it is the idea of energy that 
provokes the question of life’s meaning to be interpreted beyond the one of 
satisfying needs. As one of the illuminative embodiments of how need de-
termines expressibility can be seen in Zapffe’s conception of lower and 
                                           
142Zapffe’s specification concerns the receptive functions of the individuals as organisms rather than 
their ability to transform the environment due to man’s potential to interfere into the habitat one 
lives in. 
143 According to Zapffe, over-biological or a-biological development takes place only when existen-
tial needs are secured (Ibid: 38). In turn, the distinction between biological and over-biological 
equipment partly overlaps with the one between fixed and unfixed use of organs (Ibid: 48). 
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higher potentials presuming the possibility two opposite energy types to be 
adopted (Zapffe 1992: 149). If lower potential strengthens the sense of safe-
ty, it would have meant that it decreases the need of imposing fixation 
mechanisms. However, according to Zapffe’s theory, the energy types in-
clude both positive and negative charging (Ibid). 
In turn, the question of life’s meaning as such concerns the transformation 
of the mode of being into the one of becoming i.e. it illustrates how given 
living environment turns into a meaningful space of existence rather than 
remaining an arena of being. 
The explicit conceptualization of this matter is also outlined by Næss who 
claims that one is recognized as a fragment of nature. That is why the proc-
ess of identification144 is interpreted as a process in which relationships that 
define the crossing points expand more and more in terms of defining how 
“the Self grows” (Selvet vokser) (Næss 1973: 52). 
In turn, Zapffe claims that in a biosophical light, living beings, things and 
conditions are considered as sources of destiny (kilder til skjæbne) (Zapffe 
1992: 147). He specifies that only the bearer of interests has a destiny be-
cause the world deprived of interests does not experience “a difference in 
well-being” (“forskjel i trivsel”) (Ibid: 148). For example, we can talk about 
humanly determined units such as “moon”, “ice-block”, “potato” that are 
“dissolved/merged together or dissolved, crushed and spread, burn or get 
frozen” (Ibid). Zapffe argues that many of these unities have ascribed more 
than once “history” in the sense of “identity with variations”145 (Ibid). On 
the other hand, the word ‘potential’ (potential) means fellowship, which 
connects the whole known world (Ibid). Furthermore, he points out that all 
potentials resemble each other so that if they are not hindered, they will 
“leak” (“lække”), will be “set off” (“utløses”) etc. until the higher potential 
becomes such a potential of environment146 (Ibid). For that reason, nature 
does not allow one potential to accumulate from iself. Thus the laws say 
                                           
144 According to Næss, by identification we should understand a process in which the relationships 
that define the crossing point are developed for the purposes of “including more and more” (Ibid). 
This is how the Self “grows” (Ibid). 
145 In this context, it is important to introduce ethical gradualism in order to specify identity’s varia-
tions regarding well-being, when the latter is ascribed to humans and animals respectively. 
146 One of the questions in this context is if they all resemble each other, how can we talk about low 
and high potential in general since there should be some reasons for one of those to start dominating 
the rest in the process of intermingling. 
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“Yes” to equation (utjevning) and “No” to accumulation (Ibid). If, however, 
every single position is an accumulation of energy, how can we explain the 
fact that nature does not allow one point to accumulate? 
On the other hand, Zapffe supports the idea of accumulating potentials since 
he explicitly claims that ‘potential’ means “accumulation of energy” 
(“ophopning av energi”) (Ibid). Examining the connection between so-
called high and low potentials, which are defined in physics as a tension, 
Zapffe argues that among many other things, values should be constantly 
supplied with energies from outside (e.g. economic subsidy), while destruc-
tion “gets help from nature” (Ibid: 148-149). The study of such a matter in 
biology is called ecology or bionomy (Ibid: 149). If one leaves the words to 
cover the whole “struggle for interest” with the “survival of the fittest and 
the luckiest” (Ibid), then, so-called objective dramatic (“objektivt dramati-
ske”) should be examined as belonging to the ecology of man’s life (Ibid), 
or to what Næss calls human ecology147 (Næss 1973: 265). 
On a macro methodological level, it means that so-called by Zapffe interest 
fronts illustrate why the interest bearer is affected not by the blind fate, but 
by a destiny, which has strong regulative functions. Within the framework 
of destiny, potential in Zapffe’s sense, which is understood as an accumu-
lated energy becomes a part of the biosophical perspective, albeit we may 
speculate whether the aforementioned uploading with energies from outside 
is indifferent to what can be described by extrapolating Zapffe’s investiga-
tions as a culture of technological optimism148. However, I argue that his 
definition of values (due to which they should be set from ‘within’) can be 
referred rather to the idea of ontological ethics, i.e. values to be examined as 
                                           
147 According to Næss, ecological treatment of biosphere concerns knowing this inner connection, 
namely, that we are part of the ecosphere as we are part of society (Ibid). 
148 Zapffe constantly appeals against the overexposed use of technologies in different fields of day-
life culture arguing that in many areas, the objects are too much, which makes offers be more than 
the demands (Zapffe 1992: 153). This in turn leads to creating, with the help of advertisements, an 
artificial need (Ibid). Judging by the aforementioned investigations, Zapffe makes the important 
comment that technology is also on disposal to metaphysics, and this can be traced to devices such 
as missions-planes, evangelical texts played on a gramophone, as well as to the bean mills working 
with water power or the ones, which are connected with an electrical engine (Ibid: 155). According 
to him, technology and growing surplus of free time and shopping power made possible for con-
stantly broader groups of people to also maintain an autotelic interest front having a changing cul-
tural value (valør) (Ibid: 152). 
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deriving from the complexity of nature itself by avoiding the pitfalls of both 
moral naturalism and moral relativism. 
On the other hand, following Zapffe’s interpretation, we face the challenge 
how to explain the normative validity of the ‘survival of the fittest and luck-
iest’ as well as how to cultivate the solidarity with others if this dominating 
form of survival turns into a top norm in Næss’s sense. Zapffe still leaves 
the question open giving no definite answer how we can keep living when it 
happens that most mechanisms of compensation, developed within the cul-
ture we live in, cannot help us to live a better life. Furthermore, introducing 
the idea of the survival of the fittest and luckiest illustrates why we might 
not talk about accumulation of potential by itself, but we should talk about 
accumulation of energies in so far as we have different intermingling inter-
ests. 
Otherwise, it would mean that we should overexploit the validity of so-
called intuitive models falling into the trap of objective naturalism and justi-
fying either egoism, or appeal for nihilism as a top norm.  
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2.3. How Much Vitality Could Tolerate Biosophy? 
Zapffe’s Idea of Vital Balance 
A crucial question regarding the understanding of biosophy is how can we 
define so-called vital balance? Since the latter is determined against the 
background of justifying the wholeness of the interactions between man and 
nature, one of its main projections concerns the meaning and harmony. If 
the achievement of vital balance is the ontological grounding of the har-
mony in question, then the fight of interests in Zapffe’s sense should be in-
terpreted as preserving the vital balance in all living forms, which in turn 
would mean to keep life’s own potential for development. Furthermore, the 
idea of vital balance also affects our understanding of what Zapffe calls a 
full harmony between ability and need among animals149 (Zapffe 1941: 40). 
From a biological point of view, the body makes possible three types of use: 
the balance to be fulfilled by being aware while choosing between what is 
suitable for life (livstjenlig), what is indifferent to it (livsindifferent) and 
what ruins life (livsskadelig)150 (Ibid: 47).  
According to Zapffe, there is rarely something in the organ itself such as 
“use instructions” (“bruksanvisning”) (Ibid). Furthermore, he emphasizes 
that there is nothing, which deserves the name “soul organ” (“organsjæl”), 
making the ambiguous conclusion that it should be relevant to say the same 
for the sex organs [sic!] (Ibid). Zapffe points out that most of our actions 
                                           
149 The secret of calming and recreating effect, which together with animals, has an influence on 
many people, undoubtedly lies partly in the fact that there is a harmony between capability and need 
among the animals, as Zapffe argues (Ibid). Due to a relevant degree of food and warm among the 
animals a condition (state) of joyous rest and worriless comfort (well-being) takes place. According 
to Zapffe, “World is calm as a sea and nothing more could be done” (Ibid). Regarding human being, 
as long as we know one in time, one has tried to gain a similar peace in soul (soulful peace), in in-
numerable ways such as thinking and asceticism, day-dreams, drugs and wars (Ibid). People’s 
“philo-genetical” situation (Menneskets “fylogenetiske situation”) is stopped at relatively early stage 
of specialization (Ibid: 45). Zapffe emphasizes that from a morphological perspective, human kind 
is “on its way” (“underveis”) (Ibid): it appears in a condition of “static infancy” (i en tilstand av 
“stillestaænde vorden”), which the paradox should necessarily obey to in order to cover all options 
and as such, humankind as a species has been fixed in its unfixibility (Ibid). 
150 One learns how to make the right choice among them: this is a matter of competence, which is 
acquired by experience such as making mistakes and feeling pain (Ibid). Referring to R. Eriksen’s 
book What Is Man (Hvad er mennesket) (1934), Zapffe argues that in turn, child’s self-feeling and 
self-consciousness grow with the growing self-supporting insight (Ibid). 
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pass the conscious instance (instans) in any case, where they are subjected 
to nominal control (Ibid). If they had their roots in the subconscious (due to 
the prevailing opinion), they should have been subjected to one integrated 
constellation of drives (Ibid).  
In practice, biological grounding of preserving the vital balance depends on 
whether the strive for the object can be satisfied or not151. It is a matter of 
biologically predetermined success or failure of intentional projections as 
well as of their normative validity. When the objective satisfaction of the 
strive in question is impossible, some capacities (e.g. fantasy) produce sur-
rogate objects. In this context, Zapffe outlines that the expressibility (ev-
neutfoldelsen) in the biological area is a heterotelic one, i.e. it has “its goal 
outside of itself”; it is controlled and directed by a consideration, which lies 
outside the ability and which theoretically can be examined as satisfied also 
by another ability (Ibid: 35). On the contrary, expressibility is autotelic 
when we talk about over-equipment (Ibid). 
Regarding the role of surplus and lack as such, I argue that they concern the 
mode of being, as determined by the projections of what ‘over’ and ‘under’ 
equipment in Zapffe’s sense are. However, talking about expressibility, we 
should keep in mind that the aforementioned specification should also be 
made in respect with what autotelic and heterotelic are since they both af-
fect its normative validity. Otherwise, expressibility would have been re-
duced to an autotelic need, which strengthens biological determinism under-
rating the fact that heterotelic is irreducible to autotelic also due to having 
human capabilities such as fantasy, which can have both heterotelic and au-
totelic embodiments. 
According to Zapffe, the “surplus of capability phenomenon” (fænomenet 
“overskudd i evne”), and eventually energy would play an important role in 
putting (at indfælde) tragic in the general context of life (Ibid: 36). It sum-
marizes the main thought that this phenomenon is compatible with a picture 
of life understood as attempt’s strive (forsøksdrift) showing that organisms’ 
equipment, in respect with environment’s power, has a tendency to defi-
                                           
151 Regarding abilities, individual’s “conscious and chosen instance” (“bevisste og vælgende in-
stans”) displays substrates and maintains vital balance (Ibid: 34). In this context, ability is described 
as a fund of potential life’s expressions (Ibid). 
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ciency or surplus152 (et “forlitet” eller et “formeget”) (Ibid). In the case of 
deficiency, the individual or the species would suffer or die. In the one of 
surplus, the subject is threatened by an inner blast: his/her free bunches of 
capabilities (evnebundter) stick up after useful objects and find a surrogate, 
in the best case (Ibid). In turn, it can be said that the subject produces a hy-
pothetical need out of or being at variance with the real living needs (Ibid). 
That is why Zapffe argues that both the surplus and deficiency are equally 
compatible with the wrong fixation153 (Ibid: 133-134). 
In this context, the existential panic in Zapffe’s sense can also be interpreted 
as driven by the fragility of life due to the fact that life and death are ini-
tially recognized as aspects of wholeness. Therefore, the “cosmic feeling of 
panic” is incompatible with the details of the day life in so far as the latter 
are deprived of the necessary attention and power (Zapffe 1992: 163).  
Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I draw the conclusion that 
Zapffe’s conception of the impossibility of finding a place, where one to 
feel at home for the purposes of overcoming the cosmic feeling of panic can 
be described as stemming from what he calls autotelic activity of fantasy. 
This fantasy concerns the existential affirmation of man’s awareness of 
his/her lack of home on Earth, understood as a lost possibility of finding an 
asylum in life since the attempt is defined by Zapffe as a strive for meaning. 
Analyzing the projections of Zapffe’s biosophy, I argue that it is dialectical 
life’s potential (its being for itself) that makes the autotelic and heterotelic 
embodiments of the vital balance be considered as having an unquestionable 
normative validity under different circumstances. The potential in question 
illustrates how the expressibility154 has a meaning for itself, which goes be-
yond the aspects of its real being as an over-equipment or under-equipment, 
i.e. as a surplus or deficiency of equipment, which is not necessarily identi-
                                           
152 Zapffe outlines that generally speaking, the surplus phenomena have a disappearing role among 
the animals besides life’s preserving activities (Ibid: 40). Regarding the possible surplus, he argues 
that the animal hardly has some difficulties in achieving safety in a full compatibility with the se-
verely biological offer: e.g. by fight, play and raid for pleasure (Ibid). For the purposes of fully un-
derstanding how both surplus and deficiency are a type of wrong fixation, we should examine the 
way Zapffe distinguishes between two types of wrong fixation, namely, when the ability is too 
much fixed (so-called over-fixation) and when the fixation is too loose (so-called under-fixation). 
These two cases will be examined in detail in the chapter on fixation. 
153 He gives an example with the psychopathic behavior (Ibid: 134). 
154 Furthermore, it is the existential dialectics concerning expressibility’s surplus that confronts its 
being for itself, i.e. expressibility’s heterotelic deficiency. 
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cal to the surplus or lack of possibility of becoming, only to the one of indi-
viduals’ being.  
Such a paradoxical at first sight ‘mixture’ of autotelic and heterotelic needs 
is another argument in favor of the thesis that biologically predetermined in-
tentionality is a necessary but not sufficient condition for recognizing man’s 
complex capabilities because life’s meaningfulness is irreducible neither to 
the fulfillment of a given set of objective goals, nor to the one of certain ob-
jectifiable meanings. It has much to do with understanding life as an experi-
ential strive, which can be embodied in different ways even in one and the 
same organism in time155. 
One of the main paradoxes deriving from the absolutization of biological 
behavior in Zapffe’s sense stems from generalizing its autotelic and het-
erotelic needs. I argue that biological front is irreducible to biological be-
havior in Zapffe’s sense because biological front’s normative validity pre-
sumes it to be examined within the complex net of the other interest fronts. 
In turn, biological behavior is the most illuminative illustration of under-
standing the role of autotelic and heterotelic needs as determined albeit un-
restricted to the relationships between surplus and lack. Regarding biologi-
cal behavior, in both cases (when we talk about both surplus and lack), the 
intention never succeeds in fulfilling its potential, i.e. it cannot reach, albeit 
due to different reasons, its object156. While the lack concerns the impossi-
bility the need of a given object to be satisfied, when it exists, the surplus 
mode used to presuppose the need of inventing the object (or modifying it) 
in order to avoid neglecting not the object but rather the impossibility as 
such. Thus we have a possibility for creating surrogates. 
As an example of under-equipment, Zapffe gives the one with “the released 
encaged bird” (den frigivne burfugl) (Zapffe 1941: 35). The object demands 
a capability, but it does not find it (Ibid). There is food in the cage but it is 
                                           
155 This hypothesis can be supported by Zapffe’s arguments of energy, which were already dis-
cussed. 
156 A heterotelic aspect of biological behavior in Zapffe’s sense can be traced to what he defines as 
immoral behavior. From the perspective of the latter, biological behavior cannot satisfy its needs un-
less we accept Zapffe’s questionable explanation of biological morality as the only one available 
morality. In turn, the autotelic aspects of biological behavior as such concern one ideal example, 
namely, the survival of the fittest and the luckiest to be achieved by every single living being. This, 
however, would question the normative validity of the definitions of what fittest and luckiest are. 
These issues will be examined in detail in Zapffe’s chapter on morality. 
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acquired only by a degree of competence (dygtighet), which is not present 
(Ibid). On the other hand, when capability and task overlap (cover each oth-
er) (dækker hinanden), the object looks for a capability and finds it (Ibid).  
A special case is the one with the over-equipment, or so-called unharmed 
bird in captivity. Here, we have a capability, which looks for an adequate 
object without finding it (Ibid). Having fulfilled the biological needs, the 
given objects with the given meanings regarding the development of capa-
bility come to an end (Ibid). Supplementing capabilities (such as fantasy 
and imagination (opfindsomhet)) can be of some help in providing (for-
skaffe) the unemployed capability with one surrogate object (et objekt-
surrogat); thus the conscious instance should give by itself a meaning to the 
employment force (kraftanvendelsen) (e.g. play) if there is a need for such a 
meaning (Ibid). 
According to Zapffe, for us, as people, capability often has its meaning in 
the idea that it will be “opened” (bli spillet ut) with a helping intention and 
provide a desired condition (Ibid). Zapffe claims that it is the capability it-
self that directs, and the intention is developed exactly by this capability 
alone and nothing else (Ibid: 36). Capability’s existence is often combined 
with a tendency to use it: the capability is described as “an absorbing and 
shaping pipe for available power” (Ibid). In this context, Zapffe outlines 
that the individual enjoys the fact that he/she functions knowing that he/she 
“has a life” in a good way (Ibid). 
The difficulties in justifying autotelic and heterotelic needs as an opposition 
rather than as a dialectical relationship can be illustrated by going back to 
already discussed examples of the released bird and the one, which is not 
threatened by external dangers being encaged (Ibid: 35-36). However, it is 
problematic to claim that the latter is ‘over-equipped’ compared to the for-
mer. Theoretically speaking, the over-equipment is used as an example 
showing the life of the encaged bird, but it concerns its externally deter-
mined status, i.e. it has much to do with the degree of expressibility, which 
does not necessarily coincide with the over-equipment, as I already showed. 
On a macro-methodological level, it means that over-equipment would be a 
result of external conditions such as the cage itself, not of a surplus of capa-
bility on side of the bird as such.  
As Zapffe points out later on in his analysis, the surrogate objects (under-
stood as additional objects) presume a new type of consciousness to be 
adopted by mentioning the role of playing, which differs when it is adopted 
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by people or animals157 (Ibid: 58). Applying this explanation to the encaged 
bird again, the surplus of equipment, namely, the cage of the bird giving an 
extra-safety from external threats requires a certain type of expressibility to 
be developed if we consider the threats to that bird (due to the power of our 
imagination) as a secondary object, as something, which may happen to it. 
Otherwise, the reality of the cage does not speak for itself in favor of such 
an interpretation, especially in terms of equating the over-equipment with a 
surplus of expressibility. It only signifies that the bird is placed in a bound-
ed space but from that fact it does not necessarily follow that it is, or that it 
would be exposed to any potential threat whatsoever in its life.  
On the other hand, one of the reasons for not examining the differences be-
tween the surplus and the lack of equipment as a matter of biological (fac-
tual) capabilities alone is that even when we talk about biological behavior, 
some representatives of one and the same species can, under different or 
even under the same circumstances, be defined as having surplus or lack of 
one and the same capability, as I showed while examining Zapffe’s recep-
tion of Uexküll’s theory of perception. In addition, a specification which 
should be made is the one regarding the ontological difference and the dif-
ference concerning the normative validity of the lack of full overlapping be-
tween capabilities and expressibility. The surplus of capabilities is a neces-
sary but not sufficient condition for manifesting a higher level of expressi-
bility in so far as the possibility for creating surrogate objects can be physi-
cally available but not employed. For example, some highly developed spe-
cies may have developed conscious capabilites158, but not all the representa-
tives of this species to use them. 
                                           
157 Zapffe argues that animals certainly do not distinguish between the pure pleasure game (den rene 
lyst-lek) and the process of playing, which human theoreticians interpret as an unconscious elabora-
tion of biological or social reality (Ibid). He continues that for people, in many cases there is a dif-
ference between pleasure and playing on the one hand, and duty, on the other one (Ibid). This topic 
will be an object of special interest in the chapter on Zapffe’s theory of morality. 
158 We should also question Rudolph Steiner’s idea saying that our technological fantasy is a direct 
compensation of the unavailable specialization (Ibid: 46). Following such an ambiguous statement, 
however, would mean that from the perspective of capabilities, the less developed species would 
have had elaborated the most complicated capacity of imagination. Furthermore, Zapffe argues that 
mapping living conditions in the world of the ‘lower’ animals, as well as mapping the interests in the 
world of the ‘higher’ ones would create a compelling supplement to the study of genealogy (ned-
stamningslæren) and development studies (Zapffe 1992: 150). 
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What is the role of the heterotelic needs in the field of biology then? Do 
they derive from biological behavior alone, or from something else? In this 
context, I argue that since biological behavior is focused on achieving given 
objects, which does not always presume merely some biological reactions to 
be performed, it can be considered as containing both heterortelic and auto-
telic needs in Zapffe’s sense. 
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2.4. Biosophy in the Arena of Four Interest 
Fronts159 
According to Zapffe, when the individual is engaged with fulfilling a given 
interest (possibly, being threatened), his/her pleasure, attention and ability 
are functioning together for the fulfillment (Zapffe 1992: 150). For exam-
ple, if one tries to secure oneself and one’s food by chasing and hunting, the 
situation can be described with the help of the following three factors: the 
interest or the need (the need of food, of being hungry, which is a condition 
one wants to get rid of), the object or the thing (if death means covering the 
need; its fulfillment) (the existing task), the helping means (which are on 
disposal of the hunter (armor, muscles’ power, but also skills, practice, re-
sourcefulness, cunning, fastness in carrying out), other conditions (land-
scape, weather conditions) (Ibid). In turn, the risk is associated (forbundne) 
with the process of undertaking (Ibid). It exists not only because one can 
have no chance (and due to the made efforts one could be even more tired 
or hungry), but because of the animal, which is also an interest bearer (Ibid). 
If animal’s interest is different and even opposite to the one of the hunter, 
he can by himself, or with the help of the others, launch a counterattack and 
destroy values, which have been working (som indtil nu var i behold) until 
now (Ibid). As a next condition, Zapffe outlines hunter’s object of action in 
connection with the theater, film, illusion, which arise during and after the 
undertaking (hunter’s joy, foolhardiness, fear, cowardice, the betrayal 
against fellows, the chance interpreted as a competence etc.) (Ibid: 150-
151). Furthermore, the next condition concerns the ending (Utgangen), 
which can be one of the following three options: the hunter succeeds, he 
gets food for himself and his fellows, he feels joy and he is proud of himself 
being howled by his tribe relatives (Ibid: 151). The second option is that in 
the essence there is a status quo of ‘ante bellum’, which is accepted either 
with relief (animal was over-powerful), or with a disappointment (he should 
                                           
159 According to Zapffe, individuals gain biosophical relevance given that they behave as interest 
bearers (Zapffe 1992: 145). The expression has many benefits (Ibid). It displays (dækker) the indi-
vidual as a biosophical entity and makes unnecessary to take a stance on some disputable dualisms 
such as “spirit and matter”, “soul and body”, “materialism and spiritualism”, “psychological law of 
causality and free will” (psykisk årsakslov) (Ibid). Regarding lower animals and plants, which we do 
not ascribe choosing (vælgende) consciousness, it is more relevant to talk about living conditions 
(livsbetingelser) (Ibid: 147). 
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have been able to stop it) (Ibid). The third option is the most dramatic one: 
the hunter is harmed or killed either without being able to achieve some-
thing, or because his contribution means salvation (or a brave attempt at 
salvation) made for the family or the tribe (he is a hero)) (Ibid). 
Judging by the aforementioned investigations, Zapffe draws the conclusion 
that the engagement’s components two, three and four (the object (the task), 
the helping means and the external conditions) stay in a flexible mutual 
connection with the ideas of balance, surplus and deficiency: one connec-
tion, which can cause surprising complications (Ibid). 
In this context, talking about interest fronts, as Zapffe does, contributes to 
outlining the motivation of one’s attempt to unsuccessfully make the envi-
ronment his/her own one by gaining a certain kind of cultural experience 
and economic control. The failure of this endeavor illustrates how mankind 
tries to elaborate compensatory mechanisms in dealing with so-called exis-
tential feeling of cosmic panic (Zapffe 1992: 163).  
Analyzing the implications of Zapffe’s theory, I draw the conclusion that 
one of the main methodological consequences of adopting biosophical per-
spective concerns the justification of man as a bearer of more than just bio-
logical interests, which, however, does not exclude a certain implicit bio-
logical gradualism, as I showed in the previous chapters. Since human kind 
differs from the other species as an interest bearer, one important question 
arises, namely, whether we can extrapolate the concept of interest to all rep-
resentatives of human kind in one and the same way since they are bearers 
of different interests due to their individual capabilities, albeit they also 
share some species’ interests. Paraphrasing Zapffe’s theory, I argue that the 
differences are based on different potentials for adopting different living en-
ergies. If we agree that only the one who is aware of his/her own interests, 
i.e. so-called ‘interest bearer’, has a destiny, how can we define the status of 
people who, for different reasons (e.g. biological or socio-cultural ones), are 
temporary or constantly unaware of these interests? Does it mean that we 
have to compare them with the animals whose sentience concerns the bio-
logical interests alone and would not it lead to imposing an evaluation from 
the perspective of problematic objective naturalism I already talked 
about160? 
                                           
160 An illuminative example of how such a comparison entails the growing risk of nonocontradic-
tory justifying a certain type of objective naturalism is the one in which Zapffe makes the distinction 
between so-called primitive and ‘great’ persons, which will be discussed below. 
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The word ‘interest’ is used by Zapffe as a common name for a set of terms, 
which are more or less synonymous, namely, ‘need’, ‘drive’, ‘desire’, 
‘wish’ etc. (Ibid: 145). According to him, there are four interest fronts, 
namely, biological, social, autotelic and metaphysical ones. While talking 
about fronts, he also uses the words “plans”, “fragments” or “sectors”161 
(Zapffe 1941: 50). Zapffe’s definition of front relevantly characterizes the 
entity of the interaction between species and nature, i.e. it reveals that the 
front provides a perspective on the interaction in question rather than mere-
ly focusing on its concrete projections162.  
As one of his objects of investigation, Zapffe points out the expression of 
the interest circle (den utvidelse av interessekreds) and environment, which 
“meet us” (møter os) with the transition from animal to human (Ibid). In this 
context, he refers to Uexküll’s claim that the environment of simple organ-
isms is in a close relationship with their “Merknetz”163; with the help of the 
latter, the organism chooses (“utvælger”) the environment, where it is able 
to live (Ibid). When the perception of environment is accompanied with 
some ideas of perception’s source and these ideas are embodied in a struc-
ture, we talk about understanding (“erkjendelse”) on a day-life level. In 
turn, perception’s source is theoretically set as available to influence and 
control on side of the subject (Ibid). Zapffe argues that the control of the 
environment entails a scale varying from the best passive conduct to the ac-
tive engagement of the object due to some long-term plans or a spontaneous 
need (Ibid). 
In turn, “the bearers of interests” (interessebærere) (Ibid: 619) demonstrate 
interests, which are arranged in a scale varying from an assumed indiffer-
ence (on side of the inorganic world) through groups which man projects in-
terests to (such as plants, insentient animals) to what we call sentient ani-
mals with a more differentiated interest front (Ibid). Zapffe also analyzes 
the status of so-called primitive or inferior person (“lavtstaaende” menne-
                                           
161 According to Zapffe, the description depends on the model of representation one has chosen 
(Ibid). 
162 In this context, the existence in biological front is determined as dependent on ‘individual’ and 
‘species’ biological maintenance (Ibid: 51). 
163 According to Uexküll, anatomical structure of every organism “possesses” a certain “Merknetz” 
and a certain “Wirknetz” – “a receptor system and an effector system” whose cooperation makes 
organisms survive (Cassirer 2003: 128). Due to the receptor system, the organisms receive outward 
stimuli while due to the effector one, they react to them (Ibid). Both systems are considered by 
Uexküll as “links in one and the same chain”, namely, in the functional circle of the animal (Ibid). 
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ske) who characterizes with some elementary interests, namely, with some 
biological interests and simple pleasure-interests (enkle lyst-interesser)164 
(Ibid). Then, the scale continues with an increasing differentiation and ends 
up with the “great” people (de “store” mennesker), the highest representa-
tives of their respective culture or groups (Ibid). In addition to the primitive 
man’s interests, here we also find pleasure interests and value concerns un-
derstood in the broadest sense of the word, together with some social and 
metaphysical interests at the last stages of the possible empirical (experien-
tial) differentiation (Ibid). 
In this context, it is important to outline that adjectives such as primitive 
and elementary do not entail negative axiological connotations, but merely 
both epistemological and ontological ones since they should illustrate the 
different degrees of differentiation and their internal connections, i.e. they 
have evolutionary implications. Furthermore, the idea of interest and the 
differentiation of different groups of interests follow merely at first sight the 
evolutionary mode of explanation since introducing higher interests such as 
autotelic and metaphysical ones, Zapffe gives preference to exploring the 
genealogy of existential dilemmas regarding not only the ones of being, but 
also of meaningfulness as such. In turn, an illuminative example in this re-
spect is Zapffe’s conception of multi-frontal engagements such as biologi-
cal-autotelic and biological-metaphysical engagements. Judging by the 
aforementioned investigations, I argue that the differences should be traced 
on the level of what Zapffe calls uniform object. While in the case with an-
imals, the object in question is a matter of a temporal coincidence, in the 
one with humans, it concerns the realization of temporal continuity, which 
is an existential one165. 
In the introductory notes of On the tragic, Zapffe characterizes the social 
front as closely associated with life’s maintenance front (livsopholdelses-
fronten), which also occurs among the animals (Ibid: 51). The similarity be-
tween animals’ and human social engagements is nevertheless defined as so 
scarce that there are hardly useful views, which to help us to go deeper in 
animals’ social life (Ibid). While animals probably ‘experience’ (oplever) 
their fellows only when they participate in the individual “Merkwelt” (“per-
                                           
164 However, it remains unclear what the criteria of distinguishing between the simple - pleasure in-
terests and biological ones are. Nor does Zapffe specify the difference between simple pleasure in-
terests and pleasure ones, which are recognized as ‘higher’ interests. 
165 Animals also secure their existence as well as the one of their heirs, but within the limitations of 
time imposed by the realization of their instincts. 
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ceptual world”), human being, for example, considers all his/her fellow hu-
man beings in time, i.e. from the perspective of past, presence and future 
being guided by a simple idea, namely, by the one of human kind (Ibid). 
Thereby, Zapffe claims that one can take a stance on that as a stance on a 
uniform object (Ibid). Thus average man has knowledge about his/her fel-
lows’ needs (Ibid). In this context, Zapffe draws the conclusion that the dif-
ference between social and biological needs can be seen in the fact that hu-
mans have secured a basis of existence both for themselves and for their 
heirs, being anyway unhappy due to their relationships with other people166 
(Ibid).  
Extrapolating Zapffe’s investigations, we may conclude that the difference 
between human and animals’ social fronts consists in the awareness of the 
needs of the other representatives, which are either consciously anticipated 
as closely tied with the ones of the self, or are accidentally coinciding with 
them.  
According to Zapffe, social environment is considered as always constituted 
in its last instance of people, but also entailing this, which has a meaning 
regarding the connections between people (res publicae) (Ibid) (Ibid). How-
ever, from such a presumption, it does not follow that fellows always be-
have as social objects: for example, they can also “belong” to the biological 
environment167. In this context, Zapffe draws the conclusion that compared 
to biological world, social world is constituted to a much higher degree of 
mind (av sind), of other related interest bearers, of units, which the bearers 
do open interest contacts with and which one can appeal to from the per-
spective of a better condition due to this appeal (Ibid: 52).  
An illustration favoring the aforementioned thesis can be found in Zapffe’s 
statement that sympathetic environment means recognizing others as poten-
tial bearers of interests168 (Ibid). While the ‘with’-mode characterizes man’s 
belonging as a process of being ‘with’ others in so far as by identifying oth-
ers as potential bearers of interests, one also identifies himself/herself as 
such a bearer (a bearer who is existentially dependent on others’ choices of 
interests), animals’ sense of belonging presumes the bearer to be recognized 
                                           
166 Among the social goods, he mentions the ones of love, respect and trust in particular (Ibid).  
167 Zapffe gives the examples with cannibalism, primitive fights (Ibid). 
168 According to Zapffe, the fellow human beings are a material, which by itself, or due to common 
elaboration, can appear as a sympathetic environment varying in tune with the individual needs 
(Ibid). 
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in respect with kinship’s existence and ‘natural’ recognition. That is why I 
argue that man’s indifference to others and animals’ indifference in Zapffe’s 
sense are incompatible since animals’ belonging mainly has a normative va-
lidity within the biological front (and partly, within the social one). By con-
trast, man’s belonging gains its validity being enriched with both autotelic 
and metaphysical needs, while realizing in the social front. 
According to Zapffe, the methodological difference between biological and 
social fronts comes from the distinction regarding the different performative 
potential of so-called social imperative169 (Ibid: 57). In the discussions 
about biological meaning of the principle of pleasure (av lystprincippets 
biologiske betydning)170, it is argued that if we want to avoid conflict, what 
is pleasant should be incorporated to what is useful for life (Ibid: 58). Zap-
ffe claims that something similar happens to the social environment. If the 
principle of pleasure works relying on loyalty and solidarity, everything, 
which serves the others and the whole (“det heles”) should be pleasant (and 
the rest – to be considered as unpleasant respectively) (Ibid). However, it 
remains unclear whether he provides a difference between ‘simple’ pleasure 
and social one implying a degree of usefulness due to the differences of en-
vironment.  
Furthermore, adopting such a perspective requires specifying how the con-
cept of ‘social’ pleasure is elaborated as such because remaining on the lev-
el of principles (talking about principle of pleasure) does not have norma-
tive validity alone, being necessarily grounded in loyalty and solidarity. On 
the contrary, social interactions often presume some personal distress if the 
moral agent wants to show loyalty and solidarity under given circum-
                                           
169 Zapffe argues that for the normal individual, the course of unfortunates may bring social anger, 
fear, danger and need of salvation for the social self (the social self-feeling, which is a concept bor-
rowed from Uexküll) (Ibid: 57). The social self can lose himself/herself in social catastrophes such 
as banishment, imprisonment for life etc. (Ibid). Therefore, the individual reacts due to social re-
sponsibility, i.e. he/she should respond when the right concerned authority (rette vedkommende) 
asks him/her for the social values he/she was set to guard (Ibid). If one has brought the social im-
perative, one could have been considered as responsible for doing so, i.e. his/her will or purpose 
would have been considered as a contributing factor to what has happened (Ibid). Thus his/her fur-
ther destiny would have depended on the action he/she has done. 
170 In this context, breaking social imperatives is described as balanced by developing so-called so-
cial hygiene (social hygiene), which would contribute to developing social consciousness (Ibid). 
Zapffe also talks about biological imperative (Ibid: 29). Such an imperative for the animal is “You 
should eat!” (Ibid).  
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stances. In turn, loyalty and solidarity may contribute to constructively pre-
venting rather than avoiding conflicts since societal discourse provides a 
difference between preventing and avoiding conflicts. 
On a macro-methodological level, the distinction in question is an illumina-
tive example of why we cannot noncontradictory treat ‘pleasant’ and ‘useful 
for life’ as synonyms. In turn, even if we assume such an ideal situation 
when the principle of pleasure relies on loyalty and solidarity, the responsi-
bility for serving the others will be elaborated in the best possible way with-
in the paradigm of utilitarian ethics.  
Zapffe’s further specification that social contribution can be pleasant, un-
pleasant and indifferent to pleasure respectively (Ibid) raises the risk these 
statements to be evaluated again from the perspective of utilitarian ethics 
whose normative validity concerns avoiding the unpleasant for the biggest 
number of people. This, however, does not mean that avoidance in question 
would necessarily lead to a ‘positive’ social contribution. Another concern, 
which arises from Zapffe’s interpretation, is how to define and evaluate the 
indifference to pleasure on a normative level, namely, where does such a 
normative validity stem from, while prescribing which pleasant to be identi-
fied with what good? 
Referring to aesthetic literature, Zapffe argues that autotelic is a category, 
which has its goal in itself. In this context, he points out that nevertheless, 
we look for a category that entails every single engagement in which the re-
ception or activity, or inner elaboration (adaptation) (bearbaidelse) “have 
their objective in themselves”, namely, have end in themselves (“självän-
damål”, “Selbstzweck”): being disinterested (“interesseløs”) or autotelic 
(“autotelisk”)171 (Ibid: 59-60). Zapffe continues that the concept ‘autotelic 
interest front’ can also be maintained due to a negative purpose: autotelic is 
the life’s field, which is neither biological and social nor a metaphysical one 
“as it is defined in § 14”172 (Ibid: 61).  
                                           
171 Zapffe refers to Yrjö Hirn’s Aesthetic Life (Det estetiska Lifvet) (sic!) (1913). See Note 1 (Zapffe 
1941: 60). 
172 As a reason for justifying this negative interpretation, I point out the self-sufficiency of autotelic 
front, which might be considered as deprived of interests in so far as it is predetermined in the sense 
of having its objective in itself. On a macro-methodological level, it would mean autotelic to be in-
terpreted as ‘disinterested’ neglecting the role of the ‘or’ connector. It is the field of morality where 
autotelic is subjected to rather positive definitions in respect with metaphysical in Zapffe’s sense. 
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However, similarly to the other interest fronts, it can arrange an engagement 
(et engagement), an expectation (en forventning), a course (et forløp) etc. 
(Ibid). As a rule, the subject should also collaborate with the environment, 
but in turn, without an environmental perception, it could be considered as a 
rupturing and depressing condition as well (Ibid). In this context, Zapffe 
discusses the role of ‘high’ and ‘low’ autotelic engagements173 (Ibid: 62) 
pointing out that these engagements can change or develop the value feeling 
(værdifølelsen)174. Thus the experienced thing becomes more particular 
(mere kræsen) (Ibid). In turn, the choice of object can shrink “below” (“ne-
dentil”) as well as can be expanded “above” (“oventil”) (Ibid), which gives 
a clue why we should discuss the role of the two types of autotelic engage-
ments175. 
The last front, which also raises similar methodological concerns from the 
perspective of the aforementioned three fronts, is the metaphysical front. 
According to Zapffe, the first sign of one metaphysical engagement is some 
questions such as “How big is the world?”, “What is the meaning of human 
life?” (Ibid: 64). Furthermore, he argues that essentially important for man’s 
picture of life is the circumstance that while animal probably does not have 
knowledge about its own death before it comes, man is already aware of the 
possible length of the life span (Ibid).  
                                           
173 This distinction will be examined in detail in the chapter on Zapffe’s morality. 
174 According to Zapffe, autotelic experience is detached from all connections with life; it can ap-
pear as discontinuous in respect with one constructed, biological-social destiny and as far as it goes, 
it has a stamp of infertility (Ibid: 62).  
175 Zapffe argues that most of these issues are examined in chapter nine of On the tragic. He outlines 
that there are cases when due to powerlessness (“av svakhet”), one autotelic good is given prefer-
ence over a heterotelic good, which one cannot do without (without the heterotelic need), when 
he/she is in his/her full moral power and works with heavy horizons (med svære horisonter) (Ibid: 
308) Furthermore, Zapffe emphasizes that this process works vice verse: often one low-autotelic in-
terest can replace a high autotelic interest in the process of subjective evaluation (Ibid). He also in-
troduces a scale due to which we can witness the combinations between different interests (Ibid). 
Due to the variation scale AB, we have a variety from high autotelic valuability (fra autotelisk 
høiværdighet), i.e. from the highest desirability (høieste ønskelighet) at A to low valuability (lav-
værdighet) (abomination) (avskyelighet) at B (Ibid: 158). In turn, due to another scale CD, we go 
from the direct mortality at C to the biggest biological favorability (gunstighet) at D. In conclusion, 
Zapffe outlines that the two scales run parallel from A and C to B and D (Ibid). Thus the effect of 
organisms’ “way of choosing and rejecting instance” (vælgende og vrakende instans) is the “runner” 
(løperen) EF, which moves at the two scales at once (Ibid). 
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Before exploring what specific in the metaphysical behavior is, we should 
examine some of the main methodological similarities176 and differences be-
tween autotelic and metaphysical fronts. Such an investigation presumes to 
explore how autotelic refers to life’s unfolding, and then, how metaphysical 
refers to life’s feeling as such. Starting the examination of life’s feeling, 
however, raises another significant question, namely, how to interpret the 
mode of feeling in itself, i.e. whether to ascribe it to the existence of life, to 
life’s feeling, or to their mutual ontological dependence. On the other hand, 
it is necessary to clarify why the autotelic behavior is not defined by Zapffe 
as a universal one in the sense of metaphysical behavior, albeit it is also 
self-sufficient in the sense of being a-historical. 
On a macro methodological level, I argue that world’s feeling is defined by 
Zapffe within the autotelic and metaphysical fronts from two partly related 
perspectives: due to the autotelic one, the feeling is strictly determined by 
the world itself, i.e. its subject is the world, so that the emphasis is put on its 
being in itself as world’s feeling. Furthermore, Zapffe sees the autotelic 
character of the world as deriving from the normative validity of life’s plan 
as such. The latter is defined as wholeness functioning for its own sake, for 
the sake of what it is (Ibid: 66). 
Comparing life’s unfolding and life’s feeling against the background of the 
presumption that we have autotelic-metaphysical multi-frontal engage-
ments, I draw the conclusion that the similarity concerns the contextualiza-
tion of the idea of existential continuity, which gains its normative validity 
partly due to the imaginative rationality (a fantasy in Zapffe’s sense). Ac-
cording to Zapffe, the latter is not something we can see in animals’ life 
(Ibid: 64) since the surplus can partly lie in the capability’s size, partly, be-
cause the individual has this capability in general, in addition to the rest of 
his/her equipment (Ibid). The differences, however, lie in the way fantasy is 
adopted for the purposes of realizing life’s feeling. Judging by Zapffe’s in-
vestigations, I draw the conclusion that autotelic activity of fantasy mainly 
brings life’s feeling, while heterotelic one characterizes a heterotelic meta-
physical need of finding the meaning of life’s feeling refracted through the 
lens of existential question of human life. 
                                           
176 Zapffe discusses the role of autotelic continuity of fantasy, which in turn should be discerned 
from its heterotelic activity (Ibid: 97). According to him, autotelic fantasy is cultivated for its own 
sake: it provides surrogate objects for uncovered (udækket) experiential ability and imaginary satis-
factions of different types. In addition to this, autotelic fantasy brings a spontaneous life’s feeling 
with its own luxuriant existence (Ibid). 
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From a metaphysical perspective, man is an experiential subject whose co-
herence of experience, guaranteed by the continuity of his/her conscious-
ness about the latter, is not something taken for granted, nor is it a mode 
guaranteeing the existence of experiential content. That is why I refer to 
Zapffe’s statement saying that now, probably there are people as well as 
undoubtedly some periods in every man’s life, which characterize with a 
corresponding fragmentarization of readiness for life (livsberedskap) (Ibid: 
63). He continues that in such cases, there is not metaphysical life’s feeling, 
nor is the latter available so far if man shows such a continuity of aware-
ness, which we miss among animals (Ibid). While within the autotelic be-
havior, the sense of being self-sufficient can be stated because autotelic 
life’s development is a-historical (Ibid: 62), as it was already discussed, 
within the metaphysical behavior (which may include heterotelic needs as 
well), the mode of universality is understood as a recognition of the idea of 
ontological coherence of one’s own life in principle by developing a hypo-
thetical attachment to world’s feeling177.  
                                           
177 This thesis could be illustrated again with another example provided by Zapffe, namely, with his 
definition of life’s feeling (livsfølelse) described, in the broadest sense, as a result of partial envi-
ronmental feelings (miljø-følelser), inner feelings, fantasy’s expansion of given conditions (ideas 
etc.), memory pictures and thoughts’ results, which are determined by the type of character and ac-
quired fixations as well as by individual’s “temperament” and “dispositions” (“gemyt”) (Ibid: 107).  
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2.4.1. ‘Mono’ or ‘Multi’? The Impact of Autotelic and 
Metaphysical Interests on the Multi-frontal Engagements 
The individual likes or dislikes, says yes or no to the respective retention 
(bibehold) or change of a given condition (Ibid: 145). According to Zapffe, 
clarifying the role of interest fronts is driven by the task to pursue the sim-
ple trends, to point out certain motives in the human texture of life (livs-
væv), which can be considered as gaining meaning by defining tragic (Ibid: 
50).  
Furthermore, he emphasizes not only the role of multi-frontal engagements, 
but also the impact of interest conflicts (interest collisions) (Ibid: 157), 
which in turn have different configurations as well178. 
According to Zapffe, we can dare to say that biological drive for self-
preservation, autotelic urge for development and the desire for power, to-
gether with metaphysical restlessness, are the interest fields, which most 
strongly characterize the history of the sphere of Western culture for the last 
three thousand years (Zapffe 1992: 152). For the purposes of reconstructing 
the methodological background, where tragic takes place, we should exam-
ine the genealogy of the intersection of autotelic and metaphysical engage-
ments, as they represent Zapffe’s attempt at contextualizing man’s initial 
feeling of cosmic panic.  
He argues that there are two things, which occupy man’s consciousness 
with an “absolute meaning”: the self and the enormous (uhyre) space (Zap-
ffe 1941: 112). Self feels himself/herself as a centre of a “pure existence”, 
of an “absolute existence” (Ibid). In turn, the space is where this naked, liv-
                                           
178 As an example of a conflict of two biological interests, Zapffe gives the one with an isolated gar-
rison, which cannot be defeated, but which lacks foods and drinks. Outside of the walls, soldiers can 
find both, but it is forbidden to come closer due to the threat of being shot or captured (Ibid). The 
example with the social interests concerns the question whether the politician A should give up his 
career in order to join a helping action (Ibid). As an example of a conflict of metaphysical interests, 
Zapffe gives the one whether the theologian B should live an isolated life of piety, or to devote his 
life to criticizing the Bible in order to track down the possible “fatal” wrong sources (Ibid). The 
clash of autotelic interests regards questions such as should the young man C become a painter or 
musician? (Ibid). In this context, Zapffe also explores the role of what I call multi-frontal conflicts 
presuming a conflict between biological and social interests, between biological and autotelic ones, 
between biological interest and metaphysical interest, between autotelic and social ones, between 
autotelic and metaphysical interests and between social and metaphysical ones (Ibid). For more de-
tails, see Zapffe 1992: 157-158. 
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ing self “feels himself/herself” (“befinder sig”)179 as deserted, cold, whizz-
ing and unfamiliar (Ibid). In this context, one of the main questions which 
arises is how to interpret Zapffe’s idea of world’s responsibility, taking into 
account that the metaphysical strive for meaningfulness faces the con-
straints of the autotelic mode of thinking due to which world as a goal in it-
self is questioned by man’s willingness to recognize his/her mode of be-
coming as a goal in itself as well. In other words, clarifying the role of auto-
telic-metaphysical engagements requires to trace the different embodiments 
of meaning behind what a goal in itself is as well as behind specifying to 
what extent they overlap in order to have metaphysical life’s feeling as a 
subject to autotelic-metaphysical engagement180. 
Regarding man’s status, the existential fear concerns the feeling of one’s in-
capability to encompass the world in its full transparence, which is non-
achievable as a transparence in itself. That is why world’s being for itself is 
internalized by people as a restricting being since it shows the impossibility 
of achieving one’s own independence of natural casualism, namely, future 
to be determined by the destiny of the interest bearer at any expense.  
In turn, the normative validity of metaphysical fear derives from Zapffe’s 
saying that we are tyrannized by one law, which does not ask about our val-
ues and needs (Ibid: 117). That is why the experiential grounding of this 
fear can be referred to the limited perception due to which the self cannot 
experience his/her personal situation as a world’s situation, but only as a 
matter of realizing the boundaries of the possibility of belonging.  
                                           
179 The metaphysical-melancholic vision (Det “metafysisk-melankolske klarsyn”) (Ibid: 112) has 
been mainly driven by the „fear of being” (“angsten ved det at være til”), by the state to be born hu-
man, to feel yourself left with interests, which should not be overruled (sættes tilside) (Ibid: 113). 
According to Zapffe, “world’s fear” (“Verdensangst”) is the word, which gives direction: it signifies 
“world’s loneliness” (“verdensensomhet”) and “world’s distress” (“verdensnød”) (Ibid). In turn, the 
whole situation as such is described as one of “crisis of understanding” (“erkjendelseskrise”) (Ibid: 
116). 
180 As an example of autotelic-metaphysical engagement, Zapffe gives the one of metaphysical 
life’s feeling (Ibid: 71). According to him, it can be saturated with fear or feeling of happiness to a 
higher extent than when it is considered as necessary related to metaphysical sanctions or veto 
(Ibid). On a macro methodological level, the complicated interest situations can be described as a 
combination of simpler interests: then, the situation in question is considered as a multi-frontal one 
(polyfrontal) (Ibid: 69). Thus the play between monofrontal and confluent interests can easily be ob-
served by the role, which one given object plays under life’s changing circumstances (Ibid).  
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According to him, in the human fight of interests, we can gather/divide the 
tasks into two different groups. The first one correlates with the choice of 
actions and the safety of reactions, as well as with the fixation’s conditions 
in the organism. In turn, the second one is defined in respect with capabil-
ity’s capacity regarding both some given tasks and the quantitative dispro-
portion between task and capability. Furthermore, Zapffe argues that the 
problems of meaning are rooted in both groups: such a particular problem is 
the one of meaning together with the one regarding the existence as a 
whole, which have a long-lasting history (meaning) (Ibid: 161). The two 
groups of problems are defined as being related to the object’s quality 
(Ibid). 
While one is about to solve one task, one is an object of strong and different 
emotions (sindsbevægelser), which are dependent as a general rule on the 
destiny of the undertaking process (Ibid). In turn, when the task is solved, 
the organism calms down: the functional circle is closed, capability is fi-
nally set off (utløst) and acknowledged (Ibid). If the difficulties are not 
overcome, the interest front is doomed to suffer from damage (at lide skade) 
(Ibid). Then one condition of a reduced well-being, which varies from the 
easiest disapproval to the experience of all destroying (altutslettende) catas-
trophe, takes place (Ibid). 
In this context, Zapffe points out that the solution groups can be divided in-
to two groups, namely, into the ones of real and unreal solutions (Ibid: 162). 
And when the solutions are performed (hitføres) as a matter of conduct (be-
havior) (adfærd), we can also talk about real and unreal behavior respec-
tively (Ibid). In turn, behavior and solution can collapse, but there is no 
need for that to happen (Ibid). 
If one looks around for a positive designation of the unreal solutions, some 
words come forward such as “imaginary”, “illusory”, some “fictive” and 
suggestive solutions, pseudo-, superficial (glare) (skin) and surrogate solu-
tions (Ibid). According to Zapffe, the word ‘surrogate’ signifies a low qual-
ity, but not only this. No one would have thought of calling baked beans a 
surrogate if the coffee was unknown (Ibid). He argues that the decision lies 
in the fact that the surrogate comes to the scene (passes off as) (utgives for), 
takes place as (something), has pretentions to be “the real thing” (den “egte 
vare”) (Ibid). That is why Zapffe outlines that it is important to draw the 
boundary between the good surrogate and the plain real satisfaction (Ibid: 
163). However, managing to define the surrogate as something more than a 
low quality substitute would mean to refer to the autotelic activity of fan-
tasy, i.e. to examine the surrogate as having an objective, which is not com-
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paratively determined. If we extrapolate Zapffe’s statement, it would have 
meant that the baked beans should be treated as a good surrogate if they are 
examined as well-baked coffee beans without exploring them as beans 
alone, which in turn is a premise of having a coffee. 
On a macro-methodological level, it would be possible if the substantial 
comparison is replaced with autotelic investigation of quality as such, 
namely, the baked beans to be analyzed as a result of a super-equipment (of 
some extremely well-baked beans as a sort); then, the surrogate would be a 
good coffee sort, which gives the possibility of having well-baked beans. 
Furthermore, this would mean that the surrogate is not necessarily subjected 
to a negative evaluation.  
It is subject’s capacities and the qualities of the object, defined as a neces-
sary condition for finding both real solutions and surrogate ones that make 
the problem of the embodiment of meaning relevant on both epistemologi-
cal and ontological levels. According to Zapffe, there is one dizzy (svim-
lende) feeling of emptiness, which can be explained with the stance that all 
empirical objects are weighted and easily found (Ibid: 123). As a last asy-
lum, fantasy goes beyond life’s boundary, which is the outermost conse-
quence of organism’s capability to look for optimum in the environment 
(Ibid). In its distress and homelessness, this thought can cling to the oppor-
tunities’ protoplasm, which history’s flames have not “hardened” into a law 
yet (endnu ikke har hærdet til lov) (Ibid). Regarding the role of the existen-
tial capacities, it means that man’s sense of safety is inevitably questioned, 
which in turn may provoke catastrophic consequences181.  
Why is the cosmic feeling of panic a crucial condition for understanding 
Zapffe’s existential philosophy? I draw the conclusion that when the plain 
satisfaction is defined by revealing the impossibility of identifying home 
with a given place, it raises the fear of empty space (terror vacui), which is 
based on the normative validity of the feeling that there is nowhere to go. 
Furthermore, the recognition of the mode of homelessness leads to justify-
ing the cosmic feeling of panic as a matter of a metaphysical fear since re-
                                           
181 In this context, Zapffe’s main argument displayed in his early essay The Last Messiah (Den sid-
ste Messias) (1933) was that all different fixation mechanisms cannot lead to eradicating the feeling 
of cosmic panic, which escalates when catastrophes crash into man’s life (Zapffe 1941: 250, 254). 
According to Zapffe, by catastrophe we understand “a qualified type of accident” (en kvalificert 
ulykke) (Ibid: 250). The word means “upheaval, revolution” (omveltning), which illustrates how 
one complex of interests has been completely destroyed or violently replaced with another one 
(Ibid).  
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vealing the transparence of the initial impossibility of being situated in the 
world is beyond the potential of man’s experience. 
According to Zapffe, it concerns the genealogy of so-called last problems of 
being (Zapffe 1992: 161). They include issues such as world’s and life’s be-
ing, origin, future and meaning (Ibid). He claims that besides these ques-
tions, we find the ones regarding so-called questions of last fixations (de 
“siste fiksationsspørsmål”) (Ibid), which are examined in the light of a giv-
en evaluation. Not every single life’s meaning and world’s nature seem to 
be equally good for us, we only learn this to know (Ibid). That is why there 
is one general and continuous tension between our needs regarding trace-
able contact, goodness and/or justice and meaning (acceptable intention) in 
our connection with the universe, and “the answer” (“svaret”), which is in-
terpreted in the light of experience as marked with a total indifference 
(Ibid). The indifference itself could be described not as a lack of interest 
with a capital letter, i.e. this answer to be recognized as an autotelic one, but 
rather as indifference, which only one fate can show to individual’s destiny 
in Zapffe’s sense. 
He argues that facing this double-bind difficulty, people try to help them-
selves partly with fantasy’s transformation of the given (“omformning av 
det givne”) (Ibid) (without always to discern it from the process of interpret-
ing), and partly, with the ability to a deliberate fixation (Ibid). In this con-
text, he draws the conclusion that most people take their inner history with 
themselves in grave, where all histories are the same (Ibid: 168). Only the 
few ones who have gained (“won”) (har vundet) the imagination (den form-
skapende evne) in the process of the lottery of reproduction, can make re-
cipient’s stream of his/her life go to one new knowledge and new being; a 
happily expansion of the dark and sparkling awareness (den tidrende bevis-
sthet) of what it means to be born as a human being on Earth (Ibid). Judging 
by Zapffe’s investigations, I point out that we do not have to contradict fan-
tasy’s transformative function and deliberate fixation since it is the intro-
duction of the concept of imaginative rationality that makes ‘deliberate’ and 
‘fantasy’ be put in one and the same sentence in a non-contradictory way. 
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2.4.2. The Role of Fixation Mechanisms 
In turn, the problem of fixations as such has much to do with the scale of in-
terests I already talked about. Zapffe emphasizes that due to this scale of in-
terests, we can lay a scale of abilities (evner) (Zapffe 1941: 619), which is 
defined as “a specific group among the one of units” (in this case, among 
the group of organisms’ qualities) (Ibid). This scale of abilities is specially 
coupled with a group of interests, which is called a group of development – 
or realization interests (Ibid). Due to the help of the abilities, the bearer con-
sciously looks for realizing his/her interests (Ibid). These abilities can be 
“partly enough” (dels strække til) (i.e. be sufficient) (sufficiens), partly in-
sufficient (deficiency) (underskudd), and there partly can be a surplus of 
ability (et overskudd i evne), together with this, which is required by the 
task or the situation (Ibid). Besides, the surplus can give advantages (kan gi 
fordele), to be irrelevant to the task’s solution or to provoke bad conse-
quences (Ibid).  
When a given ability can demonstrate itself in few or in only one functional 
variant, then it is called fixed (fiksert) (Ibid). If the ability is extended with 
variability, eventually, with an unlimited choice of the way of use, then it is 
called unfixed (ufiksert) (Ibid: 619-620). Zapffe points out that there is a 
scale between these two extremes (Ibid: 620). One unsuccessful fixation, 
compared with another one, which is assumed to be more successful one, is 
called wrong fixation (feilfiksation): in turn, the variants of this wrong fixa-
tion include an over-fixation (overfiksationen), when the ability is too much 
fixated, and under-fixation (underfiksationen), when the ability is too lose 
(Ibid). By contrast to them, the ‘normal’ and fully valid satisfaction of inter-
est is indicated as a real solution (realløsning) of the task, which existed 
(forelaa) before the satisfaction took place (Ibid). 
The surplus of abilities can be described as a ‘positive’ phenomenon (e.g. as 
giving methodological advantages) when we go back to the relationship be-
tween surplus of abilities in Zapffe’s sense and expressibility. That is why I 
argue that having more abilities than the ones, which are required for one to 
fulfill a task, is beneficial in the sense of revealing the potential of expressi-
bility. In this context, it is important to outline that the surplus of abilities 
and over-fixation are not set in a corresponding relationship alone, namely, 
the surplus of abilities to provoke by default over-fixation because other-
wise, the surplus would not have led to bad consequences, as Zapffe sug-
gests. Another concern is that the surplus of abilities also presumes having 
abilities, which might not be required by the task. That is why if the ability 
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can demonstrate itself in many varieties, it would mean that due to the 
unlimited choice of the way of use, it would correspond to what Zapffe de-
fined as ‘unfixed’. Then, we face the contradiction of the surplus of ability 
and the over-fixation since the latter presumes the ability to be too much 
fixed. 
On the other hand, another problem arises from the concerns about the fur-
ther elaboration of the degree of fixing ability, in its full realization, when a 
real solution takes place, namely, when the fully satisfied interest is a result 
of adopting one fixed ability. In this context, the problem is to measure the 
risks of avoiding this ‘relatively’ fixed ability to turn into too fixed ability in 
time, i.e. the real solution to deteriorate due to extrapolating the functions of 
a wrong (over)-fixation. The ambiguous definitions themselves derive from 
ambiguously extrapolating the elements of the definitions whose crossing 
point is the process of specifying whether the ability can fulfill the task un-
der given circumstances (taking into account the qualities of the given ob-
jects) for the purposes of providing a real or unreal solution. 
Zapffe himself does not specify at this stage what kind of solutions the 
wrong fixation as such provides, namely, whether and under what circum-
stances wrong fixations can provoke unreal solutions alone. I draw the con-
clusion that the aforementioned difficulties derive not only from Zapffe’s 
difficulties in clearly outlining which solutions come from what abilities 
that are mediated by different types of fixations, but also from the fact that 
that he is aware that even if we somehow explicitly state which abilities are 
‘over’ and which are ‘less’ regarding the fulfillment of a given task, from 
that it does not follow that we can unquestionably discern between imagi-
nary fixation and real solutions as well as between imaginary and real ac-
tions respectively. An illuminative illustration in this respect is Zapffe’s 
statement that compensation, which is considered as a real solution, has un-
clear boundaries with the surrogates and the one that imaginary fixation 
may be a result of a ‘real anchoring’. 
Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I draw the conclusion that 
regarding different types of fixation as well as the deficiency and surplus of 
abilities correspond but are not restricted to individuals’ over- and under-
equipment since both over- and under-fixations are provoked by the com-
plexity of satisfying different biological, social, autotelic and metaphysical 
needs. 
Furthermore, referring the scale of abilities to the degrees of fixation raises 
the following question. What can we understand by unsuccessful wrong fix-
ation? Due to the principle of negation, we should presume the existence of 
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‘right’ fixation as well as what would be the reasons to rely on the ambigu-
ous assumption that there is a “more successful” fixation without specifying 
in what terms it is a successful fixation indeed.  
Furthermore, Zapffe argues that for the purposes of understanding the gene-
alogy of fixations182, we should divide five groups according to which the 
categories of abilities, or capacities and fixation relationships to be taken in-
to account (Ibid: 165-166). The first group consists of biological, social, au-
totelic, metaphysical, inter-frontal and multi-frontal environment. However, 
we should keep in mind that the distinction between the last two concepts is 
not clearly stated by Zapffe. In turn, the second group entails the possibili-
ties of sympathetic, indifferent, hostile (satanic) environment. The third 
group entails different abilities such as perceptiveness (Sansning), intellect, 
memory, fantasy, feeling, expressibility (Uttryksevner). The forth group 
concerns the different types of equipment and fixations, namely, under-
equipment, over-equipment, under-fixation, over and wrong fixations. In the 
last, fifth group, Zapffe places the real and surrogate solutions (Ibid). 
One of the problems regarding this classification is that both abilities and 
fixations are examined by Zapffe as an environment being set without fur-
ther explanation in different groups. Regarding the classification in ques-
tion, I argue that by environment Zapffe understands both interests (as dis-
played in the first group) and environment recognized as a matter of inter-
personal interactions (as represented in the second group). In this context, 
most methodological concerns are about the third and fourth groups since 
Zapffe does not explicitly reveal why the abilities as such should be exam-
ined in a separate group, while they are referred to fixations. All abilities in 
the third group can be explored in terms of having surplus or lack, which in 
turn raises the different types of fixation, as displayed in fourth group. Fur-
thermore, one of the main issues concerns the role of fixations as such. If 
over- and under-fixations are subgroups of a wrong fixation, does it mean 
that first, under- and over-fixation are always ‘wrong’, and second, if so, 
why are they defined in the forth group in a different manner since under 
and over-fixations are no longer examined as sub-groups but rather as be-
longing to the rank of fixations which are not necessarily wrong? 
                                           
182 However, we should keep in mind that Zapffe makes a distinction between the processes of dif-
ferentiation and fixation outlining that they are not inextricably connected (Ibid: 43). He refers to 
Uexküll’s theory saying that differentiation is not concerned with the first step (med det første 
skridt) alone, it continues through changing forms as long as cells are grounded (har rester) in un-
used protoplasm in condition, still possessing creative (skapende) reserve supplies (Ibid). 
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In this context, Zapffe discusses the role of compensation183 as a means: it 
signifies that one replaces the defective ability (den defekte evne) with an-
other one so that man still to prove oneself through the unifying result 
(Ibid). If the under-equipment is localized in only one sense, it happens so 
that the organism itself makes compensation work (Ibid). In turn, with the 
help of technological fantasy, one can cause nature’s powers to perform the 
work one cannot manage to do by himself/herself due to physical weakness 
(Ibid). Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I argue that it is im-
portant to specify why under-equipment requires compensation or wrong 
fixation (over-fixation) under different circumstances. In other words, the 
difference should be traced back to whether the work of the only one sense 
is defined as the relevant ability or as a matter of under-equipment. Thus we 
can outline how under-equipment, in so far as the ability is fixed in only one 
variance, makes the boundary with the surrogate unclear while provoking 
the need of justifying a well-adapted fixation. The ambiguity itself derives 
from the disability of specifying under what circumstances the work of the 
only one sense is justified as a physical weakness, which should be com-
pensated. 
However, it is problematic to equate the specification of one ability as con-
centrated in one sense with the defectiveness of this ability. Furthermore, 
the boundary with the surrogate is unclear because performing the result is 
reconsidered by default as a real objective, which might be embodied in dif-
ferent types of solutions, which, regardless of the fact whether they are im-
aginary or not, should not put the realness of the objective as such at stake. 
That is why Zapffe talks about good and bad surrogates in terms of how 
well they prove the ‘real’ need of elaborating some mechanisms of a suc-
cessful performance. Furthermore, it is the idea of successfulness that 
should determine one surrogate to be better anticipated under given circum-
stances than a certain compensation. 
One of the starting points regarding the role of fixation mechanisms, which 
is emphasized by Zapffe, is that by rule, the fictive behavior is built, when 
the real solution goes beyond the capability, or if it is excluded for some 
other reasons: when it is associated with discomfort or when it is underrated 
                                           
183 Referring to the works of Norwegian philosopher Harald Schjelderup (his monograph Psychol-
ogy (Psykologi) (1927) in particular), Zapffe argues that compensation and over-compensation are 
well-known and well-appreciated means, which can be used “in real” (Ibid: 168). 
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as an insufficient one (Ibid: 164). This in turn would mean that ‘surrogate’ 
solutions184 and real ones cannot exist simultaneously  
Elaborating the aforementioned conclusions on the level of solutions re-
quires adopting the mode of ‘or’, namely, it is determined as a matter of ei-
ther introducing compensatory solutions, or surrogate ones. It is due to the 
fact that they concern proving the realness of the objective by tracing its 
embodiments in the individual behavior. That is why the process of evalua-
tion no longer depends on specifying real and unreal alone, but also on how 
the multi-frontal engagements affect the anticipation of the result as such. 
An illuminative example in this respect is including the criteria of sufficient 
and insufficient, which have not only epistemological but also existential 
and ontological connotations. Thus a real solution, which is evaluated as re-
al but insufficient, might be substituted with unreal but sufficient solution. 
This in turn presumes that disenchanting and rejecting the role of real does 
not have to be an objective in itself, but it should be done when the individ-
ual has the capability of elaborating an alternative solution due to having the 
potential to go beyond the one, which might be reached by adopting a given 
ability. Zapffe, however, is aware that we do not have to argue in favor of a 
fictive counter balance because entirely losing the idea of real would mean 
to question the intrinsic value of abilities as such. 
Later in his monograph On the tragic, Zapffe claims that underestimation 
can also be realistically grounded (være realt begrundet), but then it as-
sumes surplus (Ibid: 167). On the other hand, one widespread form of a fic-
tive counter balance due to a deficiency means that one underrates the given 
object or the whole environment (projection) (Ibid). That is why if we want 
to clarify the complexity of the impossibility mode in Zapffe’s sense as ir-
reducible to the real-unreal distinction, we should examine the genealogy of 
the compensation mechanisms. 
Regarding this issue, Zapffe argues that the formation of so-called work or 
desire pictures185 is not the only one applicable tactic (Ibid: 235) because 
isolation is also one of the tactics left (Ibid). Sublimation is defined as hav-
ing high value for the cultural strive/aspiration: it is a process due to which 
the problem of bounded energy (hvorved den av problemet bundne energi) 
would be released by a roundabout method (Ibid). Since such a cultural em-
                                           
184 In turn, the surrogate solutions can be both successful and unsuccessful ones. 
185 Two important functions of the two pictures will be examined in the chapter on Zapffe’s moral-
ity. 
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ployment of power in what happens is arranged as an unquestionable real 
solution of autotelic surplus186 (som utvilsom realløsning av det autoteliske 
overskudd)187, we see this employment as a metaphysical way out if real sat-
isfactory meaning can be disputed (Ibid). Furthermore, when the view of 
sublimation is replaced with the one of distraction, one is guided from these 
“more qualified cases” down (fra disse mere kvalificerte tilfælde) to cultur-
ally indifferent or even harmful forms of distraction if the task is only to 
turn the attention from the painful metaphysical questions (Ibid). 
According to Zapffe, imaginary anchoring (en imaginær forankring) often 
originates from a real anchoring (realforankring), which thins out more and 
more until the foundation is already gone (Ibid: 172). On the other hand, he 
relevantly points out that there are also many imaginary forms, which do 
not function as fixations. The multiple aspects of the problem are strength-
ened by the fact that the formation of fixations has a different impact in 
time. The individual can be dependent, to a bigger or smaller extent, on 
his/her anchoring: he/she can have a bigger or smaller fixation and safety 
behavior (fiksations- og tryghetsbehov) to brood or spend his/her anchoring 
goods, as Zapffe points out (Ibid: 174). In turn, some other imaginary fixa-
tion’s impulses, which resemble guild’s ones (laugets), partly collective, 
partly more individualized, lay in the prolongation of some real attributes 
such as nature, race etc. (Ibid: 188-189). 
Simplifying the problem to a distinction between imaginary fixation and a 
real one would also mean to neglect the complex net of relationships be-
tween underrating and overrating the normative validity of the process of 
                                           
186 Examining heroism’s social position and psychological opaqueness, Zapffe argues that one could 
say that autotelic optimal development has sometime played a role of metaphysical surrogate (Ibid: 
232). The tip of the iceberg (the peak ascent) (tindebestigningen) is that in some central European 
countries, especially nowadays, has been an asylum of the sacrificers and the ones looking for death 
(Ibid). 
187 Zapffe examines the transformation of compensation into anchoring giving some examples of 
over-compensation (Ibid: 185). The latter examples, however, concern the transfer to real anchoring. 
One of those is when the shy person (Det generte) constructs a bragging disposition in order to cover 
his/her uncertainty. The simulated disposition can eventually ceases being a habit and being “natu-
ral” (til “natur”) respectively so that one hardly can suspect whether one does not know how the 
“character” (“karakter-trækket”) has been functioning (Ibid: 185-186). On the other hand, imaginary 
anchoring displays a varied picture (Ibid: 186). The grounding illusion itself is of a constantly 
changing nature; in turn, the method after which the self leans to the illusion, using it in its fight for 
assertion, is also a different one (Zapffe takes into account anchoring’s substantial (“substantielle”) 
and its functional (“funktionelle”) peculiarity) (Ibid). 
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compensation. On the other hand, it would have led to underrating the proc-
ess of sublimation and especially the implications of its autotelic surplus.  
Zapffe’s analysis raises some other concerns as well. It is problematic to ar-
gue that the feeling of biological, social and autotelic deficiencies, which 
involve unfavorable characteristics, are interpreted in the field of religion as 
an original sin (“arvesynd”), as a metaphysical wrong fixation (Ibid: 204). 
Zapffe himself does not clarify whether the latter displays over-fixation or 
under-fixation, i.e. whether the aforementioned deficiencies should be in-
terpreted as too fixed or too loose. Judging by his definitions, we may talk 
about over-fixation since at least the biological and social abilities can be 
understood as too fixed for showing the genealogy of the original sin in 
Zapffe’s sense. In this context, it would be problematic to examine biologi-
cal, social and autotelic deficiencies as equally unproductive because they 
interact in different ways with the metaphysical needs and second, because 
what is defined as deficient in one front (e.g. being defined as a heterotelic 
need) is sufficient in another one (i.e. as an autotelic need).  
Extrapolating his investigations, I argue that over-fixation regarding mor-
ally wrong fixation can be defined as driven by a certain kind of a high 
autotelic value in Zapffe’s sense. Otherwise, every single autotelic value 
(both low and high ones) would have been provoking a common type of 
over-fixation. This in turn raises the concern that high autotelic values trig-
ger wrong fixations. Furthermore, if we presume that wrong fixation is 
driven by low values alone, does it mean that low values in Zapffe’s sense 
inflict merely wrong fixations and if so, under what circumstances? 
His statement that wrong fixation is a fixation easily implicating both a feel-
ing of a lower dignity and a need of a new formation of fixation (Ibid: 182) 
raises a question that remains unanswered by Zapffe, namely, what exactly 
is a low autotelic value? Does it mean that it is provoked by a heterotelic 
need alone presuming that low value is not a self-sufficient one being de-
fined in respect with some ‘higher’ values? Furthermore, does it mean that 
over-fixation and under-fixation contradict each other as motivated by 
‘high’ and ‘low’ values respectively? The embodiments of the aforemen-
tioned two types of fixation make the things even more complicated be-
cause it should have meant that the stubbornness and ossification character-
izing over-fixation, as Zapffe suggests, are dominated by high autotelic val-
ues alone. 
Another problem takes place if we assume that the typical for a condition of 
surplus in an autotelic state of readiness (en tilstand av overskudd i auto-
telisk beredskap) is that one ability, or yearning, search for an object for the 
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sake of the realization itself188 (Ibid: 190). Then it would mean that the 
‘higher’ values mainly affect the self-sufficiency of the realization as such. 
Regarding the definitions of fixation, it would mean that either is over-
fixation a wrong fixation based on high autotelic values, or that we should 
end up with a certain kind of moral naturalism concerning the speculations 
with some natural values in themselves. Related issue is that if we follow 
Zapffe’s definition of autotelic engagement (Ibid), which is focused on the 
use of time and power, we should also pay attention to the complex origin 
of the motivational factors. According to Zapffe, the engagement in ques-
tion can be interpreted as a waste of opportunities when it is framed in the 
searchlight of one metaphysical question, namely, how can you use your 
time and power? (Ibid).  
Regarding the discussions about the mechanism of under-fixation as aiming 
to solve real and imaginary anchoring (Ibid: 171-172), we face again the 
difficulty to refer a wrong type of fixation in Zapffe’s sense to providing 
both real and unreal anchoring, which to be normatively valid. On the other 
hand, the concern whether we are able to discern between when we talk 
about ‘pure imagination’ (or what might be called connotations without de-
notations) and ‘relevant imagination’ (understood as a given projection of 
connotation-denotation relationship) takes place. Since the real anchoring is 
described by Zapffe as a matter of building safety units (Tryghets-enheter) 
(Ibid: 171) such as when among children we witness a fragmental construc-
tion of a reliable arrangement (“If I do this and this, it will go well”), which 
is illustrated with the example of the ship navigation189, the imaginary an-
choring is described in a double-bind way. The crossing point is the hero 
worship, which is determined as often ‘catching” (griper) real and imagi-
                                           
188 The statement is based on Zapffe’s assumption that the subject is reached beyond (naadd ut over) 
the first, quite unfixed condition of indeterminate infatuations and loss as well as that he/she has had 
a fairly secure feeling regarding which direction one’s state of readiness goes to (Ibid: 190). As for 
the surplus in general, Zapffe argues that one of the ways is to look up for a surrogate object (Ibid). 
He specifies that to a certain extent daydream and sleeping dream are maybe the main providers 
(hovedleverandøren) of such surrogates (Ibid). 
189 The ship is anchored so that to avoid breaking a drift and reverting whatever (Ibid). Thus the re-
sults of experience work together (in a different way) with the approach of inherited fixation (Ibid). 
In this context, Zapffe emphasizes that in the prolongation of the more practical formation of charac-
ter, which aims at biological-social and partly at autotelic safety of reaction, lies the elaboration of 
one attitude towards life understood as a general, determining behavioral instance that is often de-
fined on a metaphysical basis (Ibid). Thus he reaches the conclusion that in the need of fixation, as a 
rule, admiration to heroic quantitative greatness meddles in (Ibid). 
 174
nary fixation’s models as inseparable from each other (Ibid). In turn, the gist 
of imaginary anchoring is explained as an assumption, belief, one convic-
tion of the bearer that one or another thing in the environment, or something 
in the individual, or some other relation “behave” (forholder seg) (Ibid: 
172) such and such as well as that this absolutely secure (“absolute sikre”) 
condition of the things has a meaning as a guarantee, which is a guarantee 
of one’s choice of behavior, in general or in particular (Ibid). Zapffe speci-
fies that the aforementioned feature concerns all anchoring. The circum-
stance that the conviction should be “insane” (“gal”) for one “objective” 
(“objektiv”) trial of something else, without, however, to lose its subjective 
value for the bearer, is defined by the adjective “imaginary” (imaginær) 
(Ibid). As one of the main problems, Zapffe outlines that environment has 
too little constancy (Ibid). In turn, both real and imaginary anchoring are 
unlimitedly big in terms of both number and types (arter) (Ibid).  
On a macro methodological level, Zapffe’s distinction between heterotelic 
and autotelic activities of fantasy also concerns the conception of what a 
goal in itself is, as well as to what extent intentionality can be defined as 
substitutable with the goals. Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I 
argue that we should go beyond Zapffe’s distinction of subjective and ob-
jective values because otherwise, it would have meant that imaginary an-
choring would not have had any normative validity whatsoever. Such a con-
clusion brings to light two significant consequences: first, imaginary an-
choring to be interpreted as an object of pure epistemological relativism, 
which in turn would lead to the second consequence, namely, imaginary an-
choring to be irrelevant to the real one. In turn, hero worship in Zapffe’s 
sense is an illuminative example of why imaginary anchoring becomes un-
derstandable by referring to the concept of imaginary rationality. Due to the 
latter, the normative validity has different embodimentsaccording to which 
the subjective is recognized as intrinsically connected with objective. Oth-
erwise, there would have been no difference between imaginary and real 
anchoring. 
According to Zapffe, we find in our souls a yearning for fixations’ peace of 
maximum development, but not for the fixation itself (Ibid: 102); a strive, 
which is driven by the willingness to have a safe world in order (Ibid: 109). 
In other words, we have implicitly embodied the possibility of the mode of 
fixation, but without possessing it, or reducing it to a given set of fixations. 
That is why I argue that ontological potential, which concerns the mode 
what it means to be in progress affects the rehabilitation of the potentiality 
as something more than just a lack of ontological power. It makes the possi-
bility of choosing irreducible to the particular choices, albeit thus it shows 
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how the (non)fixation has an unquestionable normative validity by being 
focused on producing surrogate objects190. Furthermore, Zapffe points out 
that due to the entire unfixed lifestyle, we experience a choice, namely, we 
can follow an autotelic impulse or elaborate it, and replace it at the expense 
of a heterotelic consideration, taking into account that not all autotelic ten-
dencies are incompatible with the life’s necessary ones191 (Ibid: 102). If 
autotelic tendencies were coinciding with the life’s necessary ones, how-
ever, it would have signified that choosing is a matter of defining a set of 
predetermined choices. In turn, missing the metaphysical component would 
have meant that the act of choosing would have been irrelevant to the ques-
tion of what man’s life is (recognized as a mode of becoming). 
Going back to the question of the itself mode that concerns autotelic activity 
of fantasy, I claim that the universal behavior in Zapffe’s sense could be in-
terpreted as ‘open’ to the world’s feeling-mode, which is a mode in itself 
because it presumes inflicting an experiential behavior on side of the sub-
ject, which is not under his/her control192.  
                                           
190 The autotelic activity of fantasy has a normative validity regardless of the particular embodi-
ments of the surrogate objects it produces.  
191 The lack of full incompatibility derives from the fact that some of life’s necessary goals are a part 
of world’s plan and as such, they have an autotelic origin.  
192 Regarding human behavior, we face a heterotelic activity of metaphysical phantasy. 
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2.4.3. Biosophy and/as Ontological Ethics? 
2.4.3.1. The Role of Zapffe’s Yes and No 
Zapffe introduces the topic of morality in his attempt at examining the ways 
of overcoming the indifference of environment. According to him, against 
nature’s indifference, we design a society, which is presumably built on the 
opposite, namely, on the common nouns regarding all crossing interests, 
which are called morality, “the ethical yes and no” (Zapffe 1992: 162). In 
turn, education also provides a fixation help. In this context, the one who 
breaks morality is defined by Zapffe as collaborating with indifference, and 
consequently as “being one pest or one conscious enemy of human kind”193 
(Ibid).  
Furthermore, he argues that if man was not indignant at the “rarely met, 
meaningless destructions of value” (“slumpetræffets meningsløse 
værdiødelæggelser”) etc., i.e. if the fixation was adjusted to the environ-
ment, there would have been no depriving of power tension between human 
mind and nature (Ibid). This also shows in time that an ethically more indif-
ferent character is more capable of living, having a richer outer life and big-
ger spontaneous joy of life respectively than people with emotional, (“in 
poor health/sick”) (“skranten”) intelligence: either is now this intelligence 
religious, or it is a “human-ethical” one, (“human-etisk”) (Ibid).  
In turn, justifying the ‘yes’ and ‘no’ decisions explored against the back-
ground of so-called cultural paradox194 (Zapffe 1941: 144) raises indiffer-
                                           
193 Similarly, we show solidarity with one shipwrecked crew: “one symbol of betrayal is the conduct 
to fill up the vessel with salty water, in order to hide the betrayal”, as well as to avoid being judged 
by the formulated principles (in a given situation) (Ibid). 
194 Zapffe argues that the cultural paradox is formulated in the end of chapter five in On the tragic 
(Ibid: 178). According to him, there are two types of culture, namely, collective and individual ones 
(Ibid: 136). Collective culture should be considered as exterior, group-determined, historically trace-
able (efterviselige), generally recognized forms and contents of man’s life development (Ibid). In 
turn, individual one concerns the personal manifestations displayed in the light of consideration’s 
evaluation (Ibid). In this context, Zapffe outlines that unfortunately, we cannot find a reliable 
grounding of evaluation of a cultural contribution either (Ibid: 137). Generally speaking, one uses 
the development of the biologically provided evaluation: the bigger competence is, the bigger life’s 
strength is, but this norm is supported by autotelic view points as well as by timely and spatially de-
termined social and metaphysical components (Ibid). 
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ence towards nature as well as the need of extrapolating Zapffe’s theory of 
energies. On the one hand, both the more developed spiritual and mental 
equipments and the unfixibility mechanisms give possibilities of a rich outer 
and inner life (culture) (Ibid). However, they also create “a jungle of con-
flicts, problems and controversies”, both collective and individual ones as 
well as a permanent pressure of life, similarly to the one the deep water 
pressure has on diver’s helmet (Zapffe 1992a: 270). 
Going back to the idea of culture, Zapffe points out that we should talk 
about changing the biological-social conditions of the given cultural per-
sonality under the retention (bibeholdet) of the collective cultural ideal or 
under the one of the recognition of some individual varieties (Zapffe 1941: 
150). This change of conditions can be eventually examined in respect with 
the development of medicine that secured the abnormal against (som sikret 
det abnorme) some harmful to health side effects in both body and soul 
(Ibid). Sometime biological regeneration makes necessary “relaxing” 
(avkobling) from the critique as well as reducing consciousness to a mini-
mum, which requires a collective biological intention to be adopted (Ibid: 
178). Similarly to the individuals, a nation can be inclined to take a “cul-
tural break” (en “kulturpause”) in order to strengthen the elementary basis 
without which there is no life, and thereby nor is any culture whatsoever 
(Ibid). A new collective anchoring as a positive factor (explicated in the 
slogans) is supported by the isolation mechanism as a negative one (in the 
public life, it takes the form of censorship) (Ibid). Furthermore, Zapffe ar-
gues that a cultural unity can be based on more or less rounded off system 
of anchoring, which is built on carrying out some ground beams, i.e. the 
fundamental cultural thoughts195 (Ibid: 179). In this context, he outlines that 
many people consider the imaginary anchoring as the most meaningful fixa-
tion surrogate, i.e. as a universal means (Ibid). 
                                                                                         
On the other hand, Zapffe examines how cultural and pathological can stay in different relationships 
in respect with each other (Ibid: 135) arguing that psychiatric position to higher cultural forms is not 
so clear (Ibid: 140). Another important specification is the definition of greatness of anti-cultural 
type (av kulturfiendtlig art), which should also contain a “positive kernel” (en “positiv kjerne”) 
(Ibid: 344). The greatness can be determined as such in respect with the following three factors, 
namely, in respect with the type and degree of fixation (“static fixation”), due to the type of devel-
opment (“dynamic fixation”) and in respect with the degree of development (capacity) (Ibid). 
195 This idea of fundamental cultural thoughts as grounding beams is defined for the first time in 
Zapffe’s essay The Last Messiah. 
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Judging by the aforementioned investigations, we may trace how Zapffe 
avoids both biological and cultural relativism and absolutism outlining that 
biological evolution is only one of the necessary conditions of having a cul-
tural evaluation as such. On a macro methodological level, it turns out that 
cultural break is as important as the biological one for the purposes of re-
vealing the genealogy of the complex relationships between man and na-
ture. As an illuminative embodiment of the aforementioned complexity, I 
point out Zapffe’s example of the shipwrecked cats, which shows how the 
internal connections between biological and cultural breaks are driven by 
the arising tension between autotelic and heterotelic needs that function to-
gether on a day life level. Furthermore, it is their contradiction that makes 
referring imaginary to real anchoring more desired than ever since the ques-
tion of what meaningful life is has more than one answer available. It is eas-
ier to find the answer merely in a biological environment, which, however, 
requires a biological break to take place when a question is posed by the 
representatives of humankind. In turn, cultural break becomes a ‘natural’ re-
sult of having too many answers, i.e. it becomes a natural reaction to pre-
serving the normative validity of the question as such.  
Zapffe gives the example with a ship full of cats, which is abandoned by the 
crew and shipwrecked at a desert island, whereafter cats jumped on the 
land. The only living beings on the island were some lively (bouncing) 
(sprætne) but uneatable beetles, which made it looks like that the fate of the 
cats is sealed (Ibid: 158). Then, one discovered that the soft clay along the 
beach contains fat and palatable (delicious) shells, which can easily be 
opened (Ibid). Zapffe argues that from an autotelic point of view, it is far 
less tempting for the cats to dig in the clay than to make a tiger jump on the 
ground beetles (Ibid: 159). However, only the last is the life that is worthy 
for cats (Ibid). To choose this is an expression of an idealist life-stance, 
which is highly-valuable and deadly at once (Ibid). Therefore, life-giving is 
defined by Zapffe as another, atrocious occupation (en anden avskyelig 
syssel), which no one decent cat would condescend to (Ibid). 
With this illustration, Zapffe explicitly gives a preference to the autotelic 
needs due to the fact that their fulfillment is a dreadful one. However, the 
preference is explained with the fact that under extreme circumstances, the 
choice is between being and becoming, and more precisely, it is between 
satisfying heterotelic needs or autotelic ones. Thus the contrast between 
life’s meaning and meaning of different lives becomes more apparent. On 
the other hand, we should keep in mind that here Zapffe discusses the bio-
logical needs from the perspective of the ideal hero worship, which makes 
autotelic be understood in respect with heterotelic via adopting the versus 
 179
mode. It is due to the fact that it concerns not the survival of the fittest and 
luckiest, but rather the mode of survival as such. 
Zapffe claims that individuals, which to the highest extent represent the 
cat’s form (katteformen) in its distinctive life style, would have had difficul-
ties to participate in the shell digging and that is why, under the given con-
ditions, they are biologically inferior (Ibid). In this context, optimism comes 
to cover the feeling of guilt and humiliation: cats notice nothing about such 
scruples196, nor are the scruples established (reckoned) for the cats (er de 
heller ikke for katter at regne) (Ibid). Soon they should further build their 
defense: land cats would be called neurotic and psychopaths (Ibid). In turn, 
water cats would triumph, but also would do the others finding out that the 
explanation (it is described as a “resistance to be cured”, which makes the 
diagnosis be ‘fear of water’) is a relevant one; they would accept it because 
they know what lies behind197 (Ibid). 
On the other hand, the hunting cats could be described as pessimists198: not 
because of such evil things, which the others attach great importance to: i.e. 
to be soar and hungry, to brief with difficulties and to freeze, but because 
these cats have found themselves to be placed in a world, which does not 
have conditions for the sacred formula in their hearts (Ibid). Zapffe empha-
sizes that gaining such knowledge, these cats stop breeding. However, 
“soon among them some prophets appeared and they taught them the art of 
hope (haabets kunst)” (Ibid). 
Elaborating the contradictions regarding the ideas of cultural and biological 
breaks requires giving some arguments against defining Zapffe’s anthropol-
ogy as a purely pessimist one. Næss interprets Zapffe’s no as being associ-
ated with suffering rather than with joy, i.e. as a matter of one “fundamental 
no” (Næss 1992: 274). However, we should take into account that the mean-
ing of pain in Zapffe’s sense is not the premise making life meaningless, 
                                           
196 Zapffe outlines that others, showing a bigger indifference to cats’ standard, will lay all the day in 
the mud and will only stuff (gorge) themselves (mæske seg) and breed (Ibid). Periodically, they 
would raise a countenance, which is driven by dirt and would squint (myser) against the snobs on 
the land; mockery and satire would be replaced with a burning hate because the land cats remind 
them of their betrayal against family’s most precious possession (Ibid).  
197 This example can be examined as an embodiment of what I would call ascribing pathological to 
some higher cultural forms in Zapffe’s sense. 
198 This is an example of so-called surplus pessimism, which will be discussed in detail in the chap-
ter on Zapffe’s pessimism. 
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namely, life to be understood as having no meaning. On the contrary, Zap-
ffe’s meaninglessness concerns the surplus of meaning, which corresponds 
to the surplus of being, as I already showed. That is why Zapffe’s no regard-
ing vital needs can be defined as a conditio sine qua non199.  
Næss also claims that man’s vital interests are an unbreakable connection 
between tragedy and high dignity, when we talk about experience (Ibid: 
269). His conclusion is that not every single form of high value (høyver-
dighet) predetermines catastrophic development: biological or any other 
type of destruction (Næss 1992: 266). However, from that it does not follow 
that anthropological yes can be restricted to the non-catastrophic living po-
tential of man alone either. A life centered on increased experience is not 
frightened by some catastrophe that is provoked by the process of experi-
ence itself (Ibid: 271). But the product is evaluated due to what has hap-
pened (skapes), not due to this, which determined the result200 (Ibid). 
In this context, we can outline the differences between Næss (1992: 280) 
and Zapffe concerning the ontological groundings of yes and no standpoints 
as a matter of giving priority to different types of frameworks they should 
be discussed in. Despite the fact that it is not explicitly articulated neither by 
Næss nor by Zapffe, in both cases it is the implicit role of ethics that con-
tributes to justifying the normative validity of one’s experiential gestalt. A 
significant proof in favor of ethical premises can be found in one of the ba-
sic assumptions of Zapffe’s ontology, which is also taken into consideration 
by Næss, namely that both man and life have gestalts (Ibid: 281).  
                                           
199 If we underrate the ontological groundings of Zapffe’s conception as well as if we presume that 
its determinism is equivalent to objective naturalism, we would simplify Zapffe’s theory and its im-
plementations. It would mean that examining Zapffe’s conception as a determinist one is possible 
only if we neglect his theory of man as a bearer of different interests, which shape one’s complex 
behavior.  
200 On the other hand, discussing the concerns regarding Zapffe’s yes and no, Næss does not men-
tion that Zapffe outlines the role of empathy and solidarity with all living forms as the only one way 
of living with the cosmic feeling of panic, which is ineradicable. 
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2.4.3.1.1. The Role of Moral Experiential Gestalt and the Feeling of 
Cosmic Panic 
Extrapolating Zapffe’s conception, I argue that the cosmic feeling of panic de-
termines man’s experiential gestalt to be interpreted as what I called moral ex-
periential gestalt: gestalt that contributes the process of self-realization to be 
guaranteed regardless of the initial weak position of man in the universe. By 
showing respect and solidarity with all living beings one can make a step further 
in coping with terror vacui.  
What I defined as a moral experiential gestalt becomes a necessary condition for 
the realization of both man and nature providing the justification of the problem 
of normative validity on two levels: on the one of mankind as well as on the one 
of biosphere. Similarly to Zapffe, Næss argues that regarding both mankind and 
universe, man is nonetheless merely a flake whose life lasts only a second (Ibid: 
280). In this context, the idea of gestalt can be extrapolated to Zapffe’s theory, 
taking into account that one’s unity is dependent on the unity of the universe, 
albeit being irreducible to the latter. However, we should emphasize the specifi-
cation that unity is not equivalent to the gestalt itself201 because the gestalt rep-
resents the structured experience of a person, or a given form of being. That is 
why I draw the conclusion that unity is a necessary but not sufficient condition 
for discussing man’s identity regardless of the fact that it can be applied to the 
one of nature. Furthermore, we can agree with Næss’s statement that gestalts are 
the same (Ibid: 281) merely in the sense that we can outline the genealogical 
similarities in the way unities of man and nature are constructed. When we ana-
lyze the rank of unities, as Næss suggests, namely, the ones of man, life and 
everything, they should be considered from a “gestalt-theoretical” (“gestalt-
teoretisk”) perspective (Ibid: 282) because otherwise, we could deal with some 
incomplete (atomized) descriptions that display only given parts of the afore-
mentioned entities. 
It is human kind that can cultivate its sensitivity towards otherness if it wants to 
rehabilitate its initial connection with nature, which is a point shared by both 
Zapffe and Næss. Judging by these investigations, I claim that the origin of hu-
man solidarity cannot be explained by adopting biologically grounded argu-
ments, assuming that human beings are the only moral discussants. Further-
more, referring to Zapffe’s theory, I draw the conclusion that we cannot define 
solidarity in ethical sense, unless it is determined as a prototype characteristic of 
man’s experiential gestalt, which gives us reasons to talk about moral experien-
tial gestalt as such202. 
                                           
201 Næss also outlines the differences between universal and gestalt (Næss 2005y: 461-466). 
202 I introduce the concept of experiential morality as based on rehabilitating the role of moral ex-
perience by reviving the normative validity of our feelings and emotions in respect with clarifying 
both the complexity of moral motivation and the decision-making process. 
 182
2.4.3.2. The Way to Morality203 
Examining the implications of Zapffe’s theory, Kvaløy specifies that ac-
cording to Zapffe, man is recognized as an aware (full of understanding) 
living being (erkjennelsesmessig) as well as that his conception of morality 
can be defined as “over-equipped” in respect with the environment it has to 
function in (Kvaløy 1992: 255).  
In turn, the connection between metaphysical interest front and morality in 
Zapffe’s sense is a complex one since morality requires metaphysical be-
havior to be differently formulated when we discuss so-called morality of 
world order (“verdensordenens” moralitet)204, autotelic-morality etc. (Zap-
ffe 1941: 66). Zapffe argues that the question of life’s meaning presumes 
metaphysical need of a heterotelic meaning of life to be clarified unless this 
question is posed as one about life “as it is”, when we ask about life “for the 
sake of life itself” (Ibid). On the other hand, morality of world order re-
quires the metaphysical need to be defined (Ibid: 66-67). Due to this order, 
everything has a plan and meaning: if it is necessary, suffering is caused by 
following an economic principle according to which everything goes fairly 
well in respect with the evaluation of every single man, or in respect with an 
evaluation regarding the fact that all can “raise themselves up” (“hæve sig 
op til”) with their own help (Ibid: 67). In this context, Zapffe makes the im-
portant comment that if justice cannot make the necessary, love does the 
rest and thus the metaphysical environment should be strengthened by a 
sympathetic disposition (Ibid). 
Analyzing Zapffe’s example, we could specify the role of morality of world 
order205 as based on metaphysical behavior that has both autotelic and het-
                                           
203 Zapffe argues that morality has a meaning only in respect with a norm, which should (bør) be 
fulfilled (Ibid: 30). 
204 Fløistad argues that it is the need of a world’s moral order that is recognized by Zapffe as a sign 
of what it means to be a human being (Fløistad 1989: 15). This need takes place against the back-
ground of one “collision between the power of human and the world this power is set in” (Ibid). 
That is why Fløistad draws the conclusion that due to such a misconception people can experience 
tragic by their own living (Ibid). Furthermore, he also examines how this moral order is a general 
condition of every big development of capacity, together with the comprehension of capability’s de-
velopment understood as a matter of surplus in Zapffe’s sense (Ibid: 66) 
205 Zapffe outlines that this is the “need of perfectibility as a way of confirming life” that is blocked 
due to the tragic constellations of the course of real solutions as well as by being referred to false so-
lutions or destruction (Ibid). 
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erotelic aspects (needs). From the perspective of the world as such, it should 
be defined as a certain type of autotelic-metaphysical morality, which is 
grounded in achieving fairness per se by reducing the role of morality to the 
one of world’s justice. However, from the perspective of man’s needs, it can 
be described as a metaphysical need having a heterotelic aspect: otherwise, 
the role of love would have been neglected. Zapffe himself is aware of this 
problem saying that if we talk about one who has a “need of a moral world 
order” (Ibid), we should make the following specification. The need of find-
ing life’s meaning is not identical with the ones of loving God or believing 
in life after death206 (Ibid). It has much to do with the fact that humans are 
bearers of interests. At some point, they may show solidarity with other 
people and even with all living beings because “we assert the principle that 
all interest bearers have a claim on destiny that is relevant to the interest” 
(Ibid). 
                                           
206 Zapffe argues that if the need of meaning could have been satisfied in a different way, it would 
have been the most important issue: then, we could have thought about giving up on God and im-
mortality. But such a decision would have caused us troubles: that is why we hold the idea of meta-
physical salvation, which is entailed in the probability of analogy anyway (Ibid: 67). Zapffe points 
out that many people confuse their metaphysical need with the religious one (Ibid: 68). 
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3. WHY DO NOT WE CALL ZAPFFE 
A NIHILIST? ON THE GENEALOGY 
OF ZAPFFE’S MORALITY 
Zapffe’s theory of solving the existential problems by introducing noncontradic-
tory morality, which to be closely tied with the practical experience is among 
the strongest arguments against defining him as a nihilist. However, maybe one 
of the most puzzling issues is what Zapffe calls biological morality. Within the 
framework of the latter, he introduces a set of problematic concepts such as bio-
logical value and biological responsibility that become a methodological obsta-
cle even for his own analysis, while he aims at justifying the need of showing 
love and compassion for other living beings. On a practical level, so-called by 
Zapffe biological justice207 (Ibid: 33) turns out to be something more than a pro-
jection of a biological veto (Ibid), albeit, as Zapffe relevantly claims, the ques-
tion of biological hubris is not limited to the one of safety208.  
Some implicit arguments that support the establishment of a certain kind of ex-
periential morality can be found in Zapffe interpretation of Johannes Müller’s 
conception209 of ‘Erfüllung’ (‘fulfillment’). According to Zapffe, the one who 
                                           
207 According to Zapffe, both morality and justice presume a certain kind of “developed conscious-
ness” (utviklet bevissthet) to be adopted (which again questions the role of biological morality and 
the status of its bearers) as well as a given degree of non-fixation that does not have to lead to rela-
tivism but rather to avoiding absolutism to be presumed. However, thinking about morality and jus-
tice by adopting oppositions, on the principle A-not A, contributes merely to showing that they are 
not absolute categories, which can be justified by employing certain imperatives, as Zapffe suggests. 
208 Furthermore, he provides well-grounded arguments in distinguishing biological hubris from her-
oism, which represents in a conflict situation the quantitative, more dynamic (active) idealism in 
contrast to the qualitative static one, which can appear in all combinations (Ibid: 223). 
209 Johannes Müller (1801-1858) is referred to as the father of experimental physiology. In his mon-
ograph Handbook of Man’s Physiology. Lectures (Handbuch der Physiologie des Menschen: für 
Vorlesungen) (1834-1840), Müller argued that physiology and psychology are to be subsumed un-
der a broader philosophy of nature. According to Macleod, his philosophical views show the influ-
ence of the German metaphysical idealists, but he “might be more properly classed as an Aristote-
lian in his conception of nature, and his approach to science was very close to that of Goethe” (Mac-
leod: 1968).   
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looks for a confirmation of the way of perfection “can say to oneself in one’s 
own heart: “This landscape, this man talks to something in me, which answers. I 
will allow this thing in me to answer and to be one whole with my answer. I 
have an experiential readiness (oplevelsesberedskap): it is as rare as the inalien-
able opportunity to fulfill it, to give a meaning to that side of my life” (Ibid: 
103). That definition corresponds to a certain extent to what I call experiential 
morality in so far as it is based on the normative validity of the dialogue due to 
which the response is considered as a responsibility to learn both to hear and to 
be heard. Through the process of communication, the meaningfulness is deter-
mined as embodied in different meanings that expand the idea of experiencing 
and experientiality as such. It is a given type of responsiveness irreducible to the 
response itself, albeit it has the latter as its necessary condition since experien-
tiality reveals what it means to think globally (stort)’210 (Ibid: 104), as Zapffe 
suggests, in non-quantitative terms. 
In this context, some parallels can be drawn between Zapffe’s theory of empa-
thy and Schopenhauer’s conception of compassion who argues that just person 
and good person can be distinguished due to the compassion they show211. Ac-
cording to Schopenhauer, the good person aims at alleviating the suffering of 
the others, which may culminate in the willingness to sacrifice his/her own 
well-being for the sake of the others (Schopenhauer 2007: §67). In turn, this eth-
ical conduct corresponds to the embodiment of sacrifice in the conduct of hero-
ism, as displayed by Zapffe (Zapffe 1941: 403-404). 
The understanding of man’s meaning of life posed as a question about his/her 
destiny has much to do with the one of the normative validity of his/her situat-
edness into the world, where being is not a goal in itself because it is not equiva-
lent to the mode of becoming. That is why we may claim that what Zapffe calls 
historical responsibility (Ibid: 111) is a heterotelic responsibility212, while 
world’s responsibility213 is an autotelic-metaphysical one due to which the 
metaphysical meaning of life concerns life’s plan as such base don dominating 
autotelic needs.  
                                           
210 Zapffe argues that one does not want to think for a long time (længe), but to think globally (Ibid). 
211 This idea is gradually elaborated in Schopenhauer’s writings (most explicitly in The World as 
Will and Representation (1818/1819), §67). 
212 According to Zapffe, autotelic experience can be detached from all connections with life in gen-
eral as well as to appear as discontinuing in respect with the grounding biological-social strive inas-
much it has an indicator of sterility (Ibid: 62). 
213 Zapffe argues that world’s responsibility is the optimal expression of “man’s awareness of act-
ing”, which requires a moral norm having a similar validity: “one norm, which encompasses and 
supplies all the partial norms we know from the given interest fronts” (Ibid: 111-112). 
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It is not by chance that world’s responsibility, defined as both “response for and 
response to the world itself”, is described by Zapffe as the optimal expression of 
awareness of deeds (Ibid: 111-112, Note 19). This expression has an “encom-
passing and thrilling validity” (Ibid). It is encompassing because it determines 
the role of the derived norms in all four intersecting interest fronts. Zapffe also 
argues that the “developing” personhood first inflicts “pressure of responsibil-
ity”, and then “increasing metaphysical perplexity” (Ibid: 112). His analysis ex-
plains why the metaphysical restlessness is irreducible to the biological dissatis-
faction, which, on a macro methodological level, shows why the aforemen-
tioned awareness does not lead to imposing certain moral absolutism regardless 
of its autotelic projections. 
The moral choice is driven by a high-value norm214, while competing with 
some impulses of more luring norms, which are less “full of value” by nature 
(Ibid: 30). Such an interpretation brings us back to the issue whether we can 
correctly interpret the distinction between ‘more’ and ‘less’ valuable avoiding 
moral objectivism, which is grounded in a certain kind of naturalism. Remain-
ing on the level of applied biology, it would mean to equate values with facts, or 
even worse, to argue that values are ‘natural’ facts if we assume that they are 
valuable by nature. One of the main methodological disadvantages of adopting 
                                           
214 Zapffe introduces so-called metaphysical-moral scruple (den metafysisk-moralske anfegtelse) 
(Ibid: 124). According to him, the one who is sensitive to morality feels oneself also responsible for 
the consequences of actions, which cannot be predicted (Ibid: 125). One knows that one’s “prima 
causa”, which is carried out from now until the end of the world, is something no one can have a no-
tion of (Ibid). That is why there is something repulsive in the requirement to stop the work on moti-
vation (Ibid). Analyzing the aforementioned theory, I argue that such an interpretation leads to justi-
fying autotelic-metaphysical morality, which in turn would affect the establishment of a certain type 
of moral absolutism. In turn, putting in question the role of moral motivation would cause morality 
to be misconceptualized as a form of fatalism.  
Regarding the status of the moral subject, it would mean that the complexity of interests would neg-
atively affect one’s moral motivation, which in turn would make the latter entail contradicting fac-
tors having different normative validity. According to Zapffe, the highly moral person chooses be-
tween, on the one hand, violence against reason: a negligence of the “finest, deepest, and most ‘sa-
cred’ in his /her being”, which is a betrayal of human in him/her and a refusal of the relevant “bio-
logical, social or autotelic” action, on the other one (Ibid: 126). One of the contradictions in this con-
text is that Zapffe reduces morality to autotelic-metaphysical morality as well as gives priority to an 
autotelic action, which is a micro-embodiment of this order indeed. Zapffe also provides the prob-
lematic interpretation of the autotelic in so far as he contradicts the autotelic-metaphysical engage-
ments and the autotelic interest, which is supposed to have a higher normative validity. 
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such an interpretation is that we should accept by default that the more devel-
oped (in a biological sense) forms have a higher moral potential215. 
Regarding the biological perspective, another problem derives from evaluat-
ing the metaphysical moral need as a “prolongation, as an interpellation of 
the development from unconscious reflex to responsible choices of action 
made on a broad basis” (Ibid: 121). Zapffe himself is aware of the difficul-
ties regarding such a ‘biologized” (“biologistisk”) interpretation arguing 
that it is in tune with the one concerning distress reactions (reaktions-
nød)216 (Ibid), which arise from man’s knowledge of death – “the last and 
the bitterest fruit of knowledge” (Ibid). Extrapolating Zapffe’s analysis, I 
reach the conclusion that the aforementioned biologization of morality can 
lead to reducing it to a certain form of moral behaviorism due to which 
moral responsibility to be examined from the perspective of stimulus-
reaction paradigm. Not less problematic is another statement made by Zap-
ffe, namely, that we should keep in mind that moral guilt can take place in 
the biological as well as in the social, autotelic and metaphysical fields of 
interests (Ibid: 308). On the other hand, if we agree with him that in an ethi-
cal trial, we do not have to measure the “technical correctness” (den tek-
niske rigtighet) with the factual result, but with one’s good will, which is 
described as one’s subjective understanding of the deeds (Ibid: 309), it 
would mean to favor both the instrumentalization of morality and a certain 
type of ungrounded moral relativism. 
                                           
215 This is a statement revealing Zapffe’s conception how animals try to overcome pain. However, 
he poses arguments against when one replaces a fact with a value by claiming that people have sub-
stantially ‘higher’ moral values. Such an interpretation would lead us to denying that the must-mode 
has a different normative validity compared to the ethical and biological points of view. Otherwise, 
it would mean to favor a certain form of ethical speciesism. 
216 Zapffe points out that the transition to the moral need is not something new. Most of the meta-
physically aware individuals examine their biological-social environment as a part of their meta-
physical environment; as the only one field where it is possible to gain an experience and do a trial 
(Ibid: 127). That is why they used to practice their metaphysical morality as well as to elaborate a 
universal life’s course throughout some partial courses (Ibid). 
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3.1. The Role of Social Morality 
Another questionable issue is how to interpret Zapffe’s definition of social 
morality217. Undoubtedly, so-called social environment, which does not 
overlap with social behavior, is based on understanding the interests of the 
others rather than on merely being focused on one’s self-understanding. 
However, referring to such an approach does not contribute yet to clarifying 
how to determine the origin and the function of the values as having un-
questionable ethical validity. Zapffe discusses the role of social or ‘abso-
lute’ values adopted by so-called moral geniuses, and possibly by religious 
and technological geniuses (Ibid: 230), without explicitly revealing what the 
moral aspects of these values are.  
Related contradictions arise from Zapffe’s definition of duty, which is ex-
amined by the idealists not only from the perspective of the presumed supe-
riority of moral idea, but also, to a bigger extent, from the one of ‘feeling of 
duty’ (ut fra en følelse av “pligt”) (Ibid). Judging by the latter definition, I 
argue that examining the heterotelic aspect of duty means to explore it 
against the background of consequentialist rather than deontological ethics 
since it is determined as a strive for avoiding unpleasant consequences 
(Ibid). On the other hand, Zapffe justifies this interpretation by referring to 
arguments of ethical gradualism as well as by elaborating a precise defini-
tion of autotelic validity of the duty itself (Ibid). On a macro methodologi-
cal level, it leads to reviving the role of duty by combining definitions, 
which characterize some contradicting ethical paradigms. 
                                           
217 The first definition of social morality in On the tragic takes place as a footnote (Ibid: 53, Note 1). 
Zapffe argues that the word morality is used in the sense of “social morality” in contrast to juridi-
cally relevant conduct (Ibid). Furthermore, he points out that such an interpretation, which is wide-
spread in both everyday language and ethical literature, raises some “unnecessary difficulties” 
(Ibid). All the questions become simpler when one goes through the following way of thinking: The 
concept of morality is used regardless of interest fronts’ nature. In turn, social morality also entails 
the juridically relevant behavior. That is why one can make a distinction by using the expression ‘ju-
ridical ethics’ (Ibid). The parallels are drawn on the level of the variability of juridical directives and 
ethical norms, which change with time and place (Ibid: 55) by clarifying that the moral rules can be 
incorporated in the process of law giving (Ibid: 56). Later on in the monograph, Zapffe provides a 
more specific distinction between morality and law arguing that we have ethical justice and ethical 
injustice (Ibid: 77). However, this specification is a result of the way he examines the multi-frontal 
engagements rather than finding some reasons within the framework of morality by specifying why 
it is irreducible to the field of law. 
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Furthermore, investigating Zapffe’s theory of so-called social morality rais-
es the problem that we should either wrongly postulate the existence of a 
certain asocial morality (if the social morality is only one among many dif-
ferent types of morality, as he suggests), or if we accept it, we should am-
biguously interpret (Ibid: 53, Note 1) juridical and ethical categories as on-
tologically interchangeable ones. I emphasize that we have more arguments 
in favor of immoral society rather than asocial morality, which would put in 
question the normative validity of morality as such since it presumes count-
ing the interpersonal relationships as a necessary condition for discussing 
morality in general. 
If we recognize a given type of consequentialist morality in Zapffe’s sense, 
it would lead to misleadingly equating social and moral motivation as well 
as neglecting the premises and the impact of the egoistic and altruistic de-
mands218. Referring to Zapffe’s definition of demand (Ibid: 52, Note 1), I 
argue that it is discussable whether we can determine the satisfaction of the 
egoistic need as a direct process (in so far as its object is the self him-
self/herself) in contrast to the altruistic one, as Zapffe suggests. Further-
more, from the fact that altruism is directed to the others, it does not follow 
that it has a secondary normative validity. Otherwise, the indifference 
would have had a higher value compared to altruism.  
In turn, it would mean to deny the role of autotelic-metaphysical morality in 
Zapffe’s sense by simplifying its role to the absolutization of the survival 
instinct. The other alternative is to investigate the genealogy of the norms 
and their practical application as determined within the framework of utili-
tarian ethics, which supports the questionable recognition of what Zapffe 
calls biological morality. Thus egoism and altruism would have been quan-
titatively defined depending on whether they affect one or many individu-
als, while the qualitative aspects of the definition would have been em-
ployed, as Zapffe suggests, in respect with the level of interference between 
so-called desire for happiness and desire for cooperation with others in so-
ciety (Ibid: 242). In this context, it is important to emphasize that merely in 
a sympathetic environment in Zapffe’s sense, the other can be described as 
a bearer of similar or different interests in a noncontradictory way. 
Defining social morality in respect ith juridical ethics219, Zapffe assumes 
that discussing social morality is not necessarily relying on different argu-
                                           
218 See also Schopenhauer 1965: 150-158. 
219 See Ibid: 242, Note 114. 
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ments (Ibid: 53, Note 1). Examining his theory, I point out that moral rules 
can be adopted while formulating juridical judgments, but from that, how-
ever, it does not follow that these rules can replace the judgments in ques-
tion. Furthermore, from the fact that both moral and juridical rules benefit 
formulating social sanctions and social veto in Zapffe’s sense, it does not 
follow that they affect the rehabilitation of the complex multifrontal en-
gagements.  
Zapffe outlines that metaphysical environment should be determined as 
strengthened by a sympathetic disposition220 (Ibid: 67), and as such, it 
should affect the humankind alone because the objective is no longer to get 
the gist of the world and life themselves, but to understand man’s presence 
into the world. Regarding man’s search for existential meaning, one should 
stress the idea of searching as such in order to compare and contrast its em-
bodiments in the different fronts. Concerning morality, Zapffe defines this 
behavior as “valuable” (vurderingsmæssig) (Ibid: 69). The fight for finding 
a real metaphysical solution takes into account that the differences stem 
from the metaphysical morality, which depends on the way one should 
serve one’s metaphysical interests (Ibid: 197). 
                                           
220 According to Zapffe, sympathetic environment is closely tied with the metaphysical tragic since 
the indifferent environment gives more room to the chance, while within the sympathetic environ-
ment, tragic should be evoked by misunderstandings, mistakes and ignorance (Ibid: 365). He also 
argues that we should make a distinction between sympathy concerned with the interest of greatness 
and some other interests of the bearer (Ibid). 
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4. THE GENEALOGY OF EXISTENTIAL 
PESSIMISM 
4.1. Experiencing Pain, or How ‘Painful’ Can Be 
Zapffe’s Pessimism? 
Zapffe’s understanding of the internalization of pain221 is regarded as based on the 
biological predispositions of the individual (Ibid: 89). Similarly, analyzing the 
principle of pleasure is done from the perspective of ‘stimulus-reaction’, i.e. from 
the one of ‘natural’ causality, which is defined as presumably overlapping with 
the logical causality. One of the main methodological concerns about this interpre-
tation, however, derives from the simplification of the normative validity of ex-
perience. If we accept such an interpretation as a noncontradictory one, it would 
mean that tragic in Zapffe’s sense would be explored as driven by physical pain 
alone, which contradicts his own theory, namely, it would mean surplus pessi-
mism to be reduced to what Zapffe calls deficient pessimism. While it was mainly 
the character, which was examined in respect with the essence of man’s fixation 
culture regarding some biological and cultural norms, the word personality was 
directed against the quantitative conditions, against the capacity as such (Ibid: 
107). 
In turn, the growing capacity of the individual affects the strive for developing 
more complex nets of fixations and surrogate objects due to the arising need of 
overcoming substantial deficiencies; a stage of development that makes pain and 
suffering irreducible to each other. As Zapffe outlines, suffering “widens” person-
ality regardless of expansion’s usefulness (tjenlighet) (Ibid: 109).  
A similar point is made by Schopenhauer who argues that the essence of existence 
is suffering, which is most apparent in the life of human beings due to their intel-
                                           
221Zapffe argues that the issues of pain and suffering (spiritual suffering in particular) are examined 
in detail in chapter sixth in On the tragic. They are defined as a possible means of achieving high 
autotelic, social and moral, and metaphysical objectives (Ibid: 85). 
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lectual capacities (Schopenhauer 2004: 1-10). However, the latter is not a tool for 
relieving the suffering, but it rather makes it more apparent in human lives since 
human beings cannot overcome it. This understanding of the initial deficiency of 
humankind is comparable with Zapffe’s ontological groundings of cosmic feeling 
of panic as well as with his analysis of the impotence of elaborating mechanisms 
of fixation. While Zapffe discerns between fate and destiny, Schopenhauer finds 
the reason of the ineradicable suffering in the blind will, which reveals the defi-
ciency of existence as a result of the impossibility of will’s fulfillment (Schopen-
hauer 2007). 
According to Zapffe, (emotional) depression and (intellectual) pessimism brought 
by humankind’s historical misery lose nevertheless their ground when evil reasons 
are defeated and disenchanted as a deficiency phenomenon or a wrong fixation 
(Zapffe 1941: 157). Zapffe argues that there is no principal obstacle to disregard 
Schopenhauer’s, Hartmann’s and Leopardi’s theories222 of evil as well as the re-
maining influence (de gjenværendes indvirkning) on the common well-being to 
be reduced to a minimum, albeit the practical difficulties look considerably bigger 
(Ibid). In turn, the metaphysical value pessimism, which deprives its bearer of all 
gifts of consolation, provides a maximum of experiential pressure and moral sen-
sitivity at once (Ibid). In this context, Zapffe describes so-called human qualities 
(one expression, which is vaguely defined) as mainly referring to the autotelic-
metaphysical surplus of consciousness (det autotelisk-metafysiske bevis-
sthetsoverskudd) (Ibid), which is characterized with a powerful requirement for 
confirmation urged to expanding as well as with an interest contact, meaning and 
connection (Ibid). This consciousness represents the will to shape not only a house 
and a landscape, but the whole universe after human ideals, to radiate eternity and 
endlessness by love and spirit (Ibid). 
                                           
222 In Studies in Pessimism, Schopenhauer argued that one of the greatest absurdities regarding phi-
losophical systems is that they declare evil “to be negative in its character” (Schopenhauer 2004: 1). 
However, it is positive because it makes “its own existence felt” (Ibid). Since Zapffe mentioned only 
the last name, he might have meant Schopenhauer’s student Eduard von Hartmann (1842-1906) and 
his three stages of illusion (Zapffe 1941: 553), which ground the tragic. Referring to Freud, Hart-
mann advocated the theory of the necessary conflict between happiness and culture (Ibid). Regard-
less of the lack of a detailed examination, Hartmann is described as contributing to the “Renais-
sance” after the idealistic optimism concerning the “tragic dark time” (“tragiske mørketid”) disap-
peared (Ibid). The last reference is to the Italian poet and philosopher Giacomo Leopardi and his 
theory of pleasure saying that everything is evil because the purpose of the universe is evil (Leopardi 
2013). 
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Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I draw the conclusion that such an 
analysis stems from Zapffe’s attempt to clarify the origin of the axiological con-
flicts embodied in the complex nature of pessimism. However, it does not mean 
that Schopenhauer’s pessimism can be explored as deprived of normative validity, 
taking into account that Schopenhauer himself looks for finding normatively valid 
means for living with pessimism by cultivating sensitivity towards otherness.  
On the other hand, as Zapffe points out, the axiological implications of pessimism 
do not exclude the role of so-called new, social orientations as well as the one of 
“technological triumphs” (Ibid). Otherwise, it would have meant to underrate one 
of Zapffe’s main principles, namely, the mutual ontological dependence of the dif-
ferent interest fronts. In this context, I conclude that we cannot talk about casually 
simplified pessimism223, and then, about metaphysical one. It would lead to rec-
ognizing the latter as a connotation without denotation, namely, to justify meta-
physical pessimism as independent of its factual premises, being determined as a 
form of ‘unreal’ pessimism, which satisfies autotelic needs in Zapffe’s sense.  
He argues that the clearer the interest is formulated, the better (more precisely) the 
environment is described (Ibid: 220). That is why what we can call a ‘higher’ type 
of pessimism’224 is defined by Zapffe as a value pessimism, which is not based on 
the prevailing role of evil, but rather on the idea that good cannot be extended 
(Ibid: 411). For one to be a bearer of suffering of the highest order (lidelsesbaerer 
av høieste orden) means his/her heart to be full not only of hunger and frost, hav-
ing holes in the tissue, but also of divine desperation, of choice’s difficulty; thus 
one “gets” the issue, which he/she calls free will (Ibid: 239). Zapffe emphasizes 
that this is the only one door, which life allowed to stay open behind its prisoner in 
order he/she to keep the hope and the inspiration regarding the thought of libera-
tion alive (Ibid). The only one thing, which life has given, as one feels it now, is 
will (being confident that life’s drive is tied) (Ibid).  
Regardless of the contradictions deriving from his definition of biological value, 
Zapffe’s methodological contribution concerns the reconsideration of the univer-
sal pessimistic point of view as intrinsically connected with already examined idea 
of morality of world order. The latter embodies the principle that all the destinies 
of the interest bearers should have a meaning “both in the big and small things” 
                                           
223 See Zapffe 1941: 220-221. 
224 According to Zapffe, one can work with a scale, which has two poles, namely, the “factual” 
(“saklig”) pole, on the right side, and the “neurotic” (“nevrotisk”) pole, on the left side (Ibid: 220). 
Thus a given case of pessimism can be placed on the right or on the left side depending on the cir-
cumstances (Ibid). 
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(Ibid: 411). It presumes that we have already set up the demand for the moral 
world order (characterized by Zapffe as a matter of metaphysical justice). It is de-
fined as a dispensable sign of what the culturally relevant view regarding whole-
man (hel-menneske) is, as interpreted from a humanist perspective (Ibid).  
There is a particular opinion that it is the metaphysical interest dominating the 
metaphysical front that makes the pessimistic views of life take place under the 
supposed cosmic conditions (Ibid: 220). On a micro methodological level, pessi-
mism is characterized by Zapffe as provoked by the lacking belief in the opportu-
nity of interest realization (Ibid: 410).  
On a macro methodological level, the nature of Zapffe’s surplus pessimism can be 
revealed by exploring it as intrinsically connected to the one of metaphysical mo-
rality225 in so far as they both have their origin in the autotelic-metaphysical front. 
The autotelic component of pessimism derives from one’s conviction, which has a 
high positive value because, according to Zapffe, it justifies his/her higher intellec-
tual honesty (wholeness)226. The concrete representations of the autotelic-
metaphysical engagement can be seen in the internalized tension (due to the func-
tioning of consciousness as self-consciousness) between real and desired in Zap-
ffe’s sense, which in turn is strengthened by the distinction between desirably real 
and necessarily fictive (det ønskelig-reale og det nødvendig-fiktive) (Ibid: 163)227. 
Such a complex understanding of the ontological tension is another proof in favor 
of the thesis that not only objective tragic, but also suffering as such are irreduci-
ble to the biologically verifiable pain, albeit the latter might be their necessary 
condition. 
                                           
225 According to Zapffe, for the purposes of giving real help in life, the idea of the entity of meta-
physical environment should be “supplied” with a moral learning (morallære), which connects the 
organic (organisk) with the experience picture, the desire picture, or the work picture (Ibid: 221). In 
turn, morality of experience picture provides a future metaphysical perspective, which neither would 
change the character of the picture itself nor would it bring some changes in the morality (Ibid: 222). 
By contrast, the work picture (with its flexibility) may provoke more varying diversity (mere broget 
mangfoldighet) of moral rules than the one displayed by religions (Ibid). 
226 The word redelighet in Norwegian has two meanings (‘honesty’ and ‘integrity’), which, can be 
used as ontologically interchangeable in Zapffe’s theory of pessimism since the latter concerns the 
existential wholeness of the individual. One is recognized in the process of development of his/her 
intellectual capabilities that are inseparable from his/her emotions and feelings. 
227 Such a distinction requires going beyond the genealogy of the principles of overcompensation. 
(Ibid: 207). Due to the desire picture (ønskebilledet), the metaphysical matter is “tightened in the 
contours” and reduced to a partly manageable task (Ibid).  
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4.1.1. The Role of Surplus and Deficient Pessimism 
Adopting the distinction between factual and principal has some other im-
plications such as defining objective and subjective tragic in Zapffe’s sense. 
According to him, objective tragic is the one that can easily be determined 
as a destruction of the principal possibility for fight (Ibid: 336). It more ap-
parently illustrates how autotelic and metaphysical interests are intercon-
nected. Thus the impossibility of realizing the autotelic need of life’s power 
and complexity, when the subject faces its embodied representations, is 
considered as an objective one in so far as it affects the understanding of the 
life mode as presumably non-achievable by the developing existential mode 
of the subject228. In turn, the autotelic deficiency regarding the process of 
self-realization provokes metaphysical insecurity, which is not a form of 
pure subjectivism. That is why man’s veto breaking his/her trust in life 
down comes not from the subject, but from life itself displaying the impos-
sibility the latter to be dialectically examined as a possibility for itself.  
On a meta-methodological level, it is the issue of normative validity that 
can make us understand Zapffe’s explanation of so-called tragic destiny of 
tree229, which misses both the opportunity to choose and the strive for per-
fection (fuldkommenhetslængsel) (Ibid: 337). The projections of tragic’s 
                                           
228 Zapffe argues that in the foreground, we have the ‘personal’ tragic, where the interest bearer is an 
individual. In this case, collective interest is experienced as a personally grounded one (Ibid: 341). 
229 Zapffe discusses the case of the apple tree, which is examined regardless of man’s understanding 
(Ibid: 336). He argues that from tree’s point of view, there is nothing dissatisfying every single year 
it to get the same number of relevant big apples, with a periodical variation of what average is (Ibid: 
336-337). Since the tree does not have the ability to choose and the strive for perfection (from the 
point of view of unrealized substrates and inherited tendencies of fixation), it is deprived (avskaaret) 
of the possibility to experience a tragic destiny (Ibid). Everything changes if the tree or the bunches 
of trees combine a value with the current growth and for that reason, it feels a stimulus or finds a 
reason to strive for, or recognizes it and is proud of it, when it (the tree) appears of itself (Ibid). Ac-
cording to Zapffe, the alarming point is first the situation, when the new value starts to compete with 
the continuity’s consideration (Ibid). In the process of production of more and big enough apples, 
the tree sees the only one meaning of its existence. Zapffe emphasizes that with the new value, a 
new catastrophe and a new perspective take place (Ibid) quoting E. Berggrav that the tree becomes 
tragic when man projects on it his/her own need of confirmation, his/her urge for perfection, his/her 
strive for endlessness, his/her tendency for going beyond borders (“grænseoverskridende tendens”) 
(Ibid). Such a need for affiliation is not triggered by the principle of ontological participation (i.e. by 
a physical analogy), but rather by providing a normative analogy, which is defined as justifying the 
metaphysical interests as such. 
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normative validity affect the opportunity to recognize and question the im-
possibility of realization not as a fact, but rather as a mode that in turn in-
cludes not only the awareness of unrealizable, but also the one of inaccom-
plishability of the possible fixations and surrogates. 
In this context, Zapffe’s distinction between ‘deficient’ and ‘surplus’ pessi-
mism (en underskuddets og en overskuddets pessimisme) has to be clarified 
(Ibid: 221). The tension arises from the comparison of the normative valid-
ity of the ‘fulfillability’ of the tasks with the one of the impossibility be-
cause both of them are driven by autotelic needs of specifying what fulfill-
ment is, whose confrontation is grounded in the differences regarding the 
ontological premises230. According to Zapffe, due to deficient pessimism, 
the bearer has lost hope and belief because he/she is not adequate (ikke 
strækker til): the task is both clear enough and its solution brings salvation, 
but he/she is unable to perform it (Ibid). In turn, due to surplus pessimism, 
the lack of confidence is a result of the understanding that none of the tasks 
one can engage with could give what one innermost strives for and cannot 
give up, albeit the tasks were solved to perfection (Ibid). It takes place 
against the background of the misunderstood distinction between objec-
tively and normatively valid whose most puzzling aspect derives from the 
presumption that ontological validity is a necessary and sufficient condition 
for defining the normative one. It leads to evaluating Zapffe’s pessimism on 
the principle A or not-A, where A is the category of hope231. 
Regarding surplus pessimism, the explicitly stated lack of both ontological 
and normative validity of the possibility (i.e. of the possibility in itself) does 
not stem from the sum of the different kinds of impossibility (such as the 
ones concerning the means). Furthermore, it is the understanding of the ex-
periential incapability for itself that has a positively defined normative va-
lidity, albeit it is practically unrealizable as fulfilling given experience by 
adopting the corresponding means.  
                                           
230 Extrapolating Zapffe’s statement, I argue that the confrontation is a result of the clash of real and 
unreal autotelic interests. 
231 Zapffe discusses the role of factual and principal hope since the latter functions as a nonfactual 
hope grounding the ‘surplus’ pessimism (Ibid). He also examines the impact of hope in respect with 
the definition of tragic pointing out that in the tragic course, the destruction of hope’s way is embod-
ied (Ibid: 410). Thus the tragic finds its place on the way between hope and no hope since in the be-
ginning of the tragic course, there should be also some hope available, which to be killed in the end 
(Ibid). 
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Going back to Zapffe’s definition that deficiency pessimism takes place 
when the person has lost his/her hope and belief because he/she cannot ex-
tend them (Ibid), I argue that the ontological lack is considered as reducing 
the impossibility to a physical lack of possibilities rather than to a possibil-
ity for itself. On the other hand, it is the impossibility understood as a lack 
of potential on man’s side who cannot reach the goal by adopting the means 
he/she has. 
According to Zapffe, the ‘more real’ pessimism (Den “mere egte” pessi-
misme) should be considered as a function of animals’ pure biological pes-
simism232, when the conditions and chances are sufficiently plain (Ibid: 
220). Zapffe refers to Schopenhauer’s theory finding a proof of it in 
Kowalewski’s monograph Studies in Psychology of Pessimism233 by arguing 
that Kowalewski “confirms” Schopenhauer’s conception (Ibid, Note 1). 
However, another crucial issue arises again from Zapffe’s simplification of 
the aims of Schopenhauer’s pessimism reducing the latter to some basic 
biological representations, without taking into account some of Schopen-
hauer’s works, which examine the interpersonal relationships. Otherwise, it 
would mean to talk about a specific type of pessimism, which can be com-
pared with Zapffe’s theory of deficient pessimism, but does not characterize 
Schopenhauer’s one at all.  
In turn, ‘unreal’ pessimism (“Uegte pessimism”) (Ibid: 221) is defined as 
pessimism, which is a matter of building a desire picture, i.e. a result of 
world’s underestimation, which has a ‘neurotic’ origin (Ibid). According to 
Zapffe, the pessimist “takes revenge on life” (Ibid) because something has 
gone wrong with him/her in one or another partial front (Ibid). 
However, it is problematic to claim that the desire picture in Zapffe’s sense 
is based on underestimating the world rather than on the lack of providing a 
relevant evaluation due to the incapability of approaching the world in its 
transperspectivity. Furthermore, the underestimation is a projection of neu-
roticism, but it does not concern the gist of the unreal pessimism as such. 
Otherwise, pessimism would have been just another name of neuroticism. 
                                           
232 However, even if we adopt Zapffe’s own arguments regarding animals’ biological pessimism as 
a form of simple pessimism, it raises the following question. How can we discern pessimism from 
the purely physical states of animals’ immediate suffering? 
233Arnold Christian Felix Kowalewski (1973-1945) was a professor in philosophy in Köningsberg. 
Except his monograph Studies in Psychology of Pessimism (Studien zur Psychologie des Pessimis-
mus) (1904), he has published several works on Kant’s and Schopenhauer’s philosophical theories. 
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On the other hand, the important role of all values, which are not under-
stood as strictly ethical ones, is determined by Zapffe in a contradictory 
way. One of the first concerns arises from the affirmation of life achieved in 
contrast to its partial embodiments. Value of life becomes understandable as 
placed in the metaphysical front, which does not exclude the biological, so-
cial, autotelic interests and their interaction due to the fact that the meta-

















III.1.HERE I STAND. METHODOLOGICAL 
CHALLENGES OF LEGITIMIZING 
DEEP ECOLOGY. INTRODUCTION 
TO ECOSOPHY T 
1.1. An Overview of the Topic 
In 1972 Arne Næss participated in a conference in Bucharest, which was 
devoted to the problems of the future development of the third world coun-
tries (Third World Future Research Conference). At the conference, he dis-
cussed the role of ethics reconsidering the common attitudes towards nature 
in respect with the principles of bioegalitarianism. Next year Næss pub-
lished an article in the journal Inquiry called The Shallow and the Deep, 
Long-range Ecology Movement in which he introduced the term ‘deep ecol-
ogy movement’.  
In turn, conceptualizing deep ecology was driven by the impossibility to 
solve ecological problems by adopting ecological ‘means’ alone. The latter 
is a necessary but not sufficient condition for fulfilling the requirements of 
meta-ecology since it is irreducible to ecology being one of the many natu-
ral sciences available. In this context, I argue that deep ecology is focused 
on revealing the philosophical gist of ecology understood as a ‘science of 
home’, as a way man to find his/her ‘natural’ place in the biosphere and 
thus to avoid facing the problems of ecocrisis. 
According to Næss, we should provide a distinction between the deep ecol-
ogy movement searching for solutions in a long-term perspective and so-
called shallow ecology one, which is focused on solving problems in short 
terms. Referring to his explanation, I claim that the differences between 
both movements derive from two different modes of thinking, namely, from 
the problem-solving mode and the one of decision-making thinking. While 
shallow ecology movement aims at restricting the overexposed anthropo-
centrism in general, since it questions the balance between man and bio-
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sphere, the deep ecology movement strives for preventing further problems 
by rethinking the normative validity of the whole frame. In other words, if 
shallow ecology movement relies on an inductive way of restricting the side 
effects of anthropocentric paradigm to both nature and society, the deep one 
functions the other way around, i.e. as deductively justifying bioegalitarian-
sim for the purposes of avoiding the possible ecological concerns as side ef-
fects of humankind’s development. The philosophical implications concern 
not only the ontological prerequisites, but also the ethical premises of envi-
ronmental problematizing because Næss outlines that deep ecology move-
ment aims not only at achieving planet’s good in the name of man, but also 
in the name of nature itself (Næss 1973: 95-100). 
On a macro methodological level, Næss’s deep ecology is grounded in two 
main principles: in the interrelatedness of all ecosystems presuming the re-
consideration of the anthropocentric perspective as one of the many possible 
perspectives as well as in the requirement the process of self-realization to 
be examined as an act of identifying with different living forms, which to 
lead to the identification with the whole ecosphere234. Since the living or-
ganisms are recognized as ‘knots in the biospherical net’ (Ibid), Næss offers 
a system of eight principles whose incorporation into a platform illustrates 
different levels of a genealogical analysis. The principles grounding so-
called deep ecology platform are the following: 
1. The well-being and flourishing of human and nonhuman Life 
on Earth have value in themselves (synonyms: intrinsic value, 
inherent value). These values are independent of the useful-
ness of the nonhuman world for human purposes. 
2. Richness and diversity of life forms contribute to the realiza-
tions of these values and are also values in themselves. 
3. Humans have no right to reduce this richness and diversity ex-
cept to satisfy vital human needs. 
4. The flourishing of human life and cultures is compatible with 
a substantial decrease of human population. The flourishing of 
nonhuman life requires such a decrease. 
5. Present human interference with the nonhuman world is ex-
cessive, and the situation is widely worsening. 
                                           
234 According to Næss, we should learn not to corrupt our planet as we have learnt not to cut our 
fingers (Næss 1973: 95-100). 
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6. Politics must therefore be changed. These policies affect basic 
economic, technological, and ideological structures. The re-
sulting state of affairs will be deeply different from the pre-
sent. 
7. The ideological change is mainly that of appreciating life qual-
ity (dwelling in situations of inherent value) rather than adher-
ing to an increasingly higher status of living. There will be a 
profound awareness of the difference between big and great. 
8. Those who subscribe to the foregoing points have an obliga-
tion to directly or indirectly try to implement the necessary 
changes235 (Næss 1989: 29). 
As one of the first implications of the aforementioned platform, I outline the 
problematiziation of anthropocentrism, which is built on implicit utilitarian 
ethics. Furthermore, I argue that a significant proof of the need of reconsid-
ering the platform in question within the framework of ontological ethics is 
the way the idea of intrinsic value is introduced. It is the latter that contrib-
utes the internal relationships between human and nonhuman world to be 
justified outside of the paradigm of moral objectivism. In this context, I 
draw the conclusion that if we keep recognizing this interrelatedness as a 
form of moral objectivism, it would mean either to keep supporting anthro-
pocentrism, or to fall into the trap of radical bioegalitarianism, which in turn 
would become an obstacle for adopting the methodological benefits of ethi-
cal gradualism. The need of implying the latter is formulated in point three 
of the deep ecology platform236, albeit it still requires further clarification 
what ‘vital human need’ is as well as how it can be applied to the other spe-
cies. 
                                           
235 The platform is represented in its later version composed after the discussions and the exchange 
of papers between Stan Rowe and Næss were accomplished. For the first publication of the platform 
in Trumpeter (1996), Nr. 13 (1) and the way it was contextualized in the work of B. Devall and G. 
Sessions, see Drengson’s article Ecophilosophy, Ecosophy and the Deep Ecology Movement: An 
Overview (1999) (See also Drengson and Inoue 1995: 5). In turn, A. Drengson and Y. Inoue pro-
posed a deliberately simplified version of Næss’s platform due to which to clarify the methodologi-
cal need of introducing a personal ecophilosophy, namely, so-called by Næss Ecosophy T (Næss 
1995: 10-12). The platform is also illuminative for how, through adopting a genealogical analysis, 
the universal values are introduced as well as how they contribute to legitimizing given practices. 
236 All the points will be examined in detail in the chapter on deep ecology platform. 
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Another reason for examining why introducing ethical gradualism is impor-
tant for rethinking not only the role of ethical anthropocentrism, but also the 
one of radical biocentrism, is the one that the intrinsic value of nature237 de-
rives from the diversity of life as such, i.e. from the uncountable living 
forms that cannot exist in themselves if they are not related to each other. 
Adopting ethical gradualism can reveal how the idea of a high status is re-
placed with the one of normative validity, which explains why ‘big’ is not 
interchangeable with ‘great’238. In turn, within deep ecology, the role of 
ecopolitics determined as a process of a ‘positive’ interference with nature 
that should inflict change, is declared as having an obligation. It explains 
why the ideology regarding the appreciation of human life has to be defined 
as a positive change of both thinking and acting perspectives. 
On the other hand, Næss’s deep ecology platform can be characterized as 
providing a view on meta-ecology (requiring also an ecosophy to be adopt-
ed)239 by which justifying the long-term perspective as an aim is based on 
implementing environmental philosophy, which provides a specific type of 
ontological ethics. The latter can be legitimized by adopting an ontological 
analysis oriented towards clarifying the values (and moral motivation re-
spectively) while solving given ecological conflicts. In this context, I argue 
                                           
237 In the current research, I will try to prove that one of the main difficulties in defining the role of 
intrinsic value of nature against the background of the non-contradictory justification of vital needs 
and vital interests is Næss’s problems in avoiding the pitfalls of radical biocentrism by narrowing 
the role of morality. 
238 On the other hand, all attempts to conceptualize and reduce the side effects of technocratization 
imposed by the development of culture through a possible decrease of population, as Næss suggests, 
are a discard in a direction to moral objectivism, which provides simplified solutions to long-lasting 
problems. Analyzing Næss’s theory, I claim that reducing the number of people would not affect the 
restricted use of natural sources by default since the growing consumption is provoked not only by 
the growing population, but also by the increasing consumption of insufficient goods. The problem 
of population reduction will be examined in the chapter on Næss’s environmental politics. 
239 In the current research, special attention will be paid to Næss’s arguments why narrowing moral-
ity to moralization at the expense of gestalt ontology requires adopting ontological ethics indeed. In 
turn, due to Næss’s theory, Ecosophy T does not have to be equated with deep ecology platform 
since it is placed on the level one of so-called by him Apron diagram, while the deep ecology plat-
form is defined on level two of the diagram in question. The Apron diagram itself consists of four 
levels: the one of fundamental premises including Christianity, Taoism, Ecosophy T, level two, 
which is the level of agreement entailing deep ecology platform, level three regarding policy strate-
gies and level four concerning the decision making process. 
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that it is the genealogical analysis that contributes Næss’s ecosophy to be 
recognized as having strong prognostic functions in the sense of predicting 
what changes should be prescribed, i.e. not only to reveal the reasons of 
choosing one value over another concerned with the decision-making proc-
ess in the scope of ecology, but also to ‘foresee’ how the negative conse-
quences in ecopolitics regarding both vital needs and vital interests to be 
avoided in a long-term perspective. Such a prognostic function, which is 
axiologically-loaded, should be defined as an ethical task reflecting upon 
the cultivation of positive rational attitudes without negating the normative 
validity of feelings.  
In turn, so-called shallow ecology movement is characterized by Næss as 
proposing solutions on the level of ecology. He argues that sometime the 
solutions promote “technological fixes” (Drengson and Inoue 1995: 1) 
alone, which are based on the same consumption-oriented values and meth-
ods of industrial economy that bring them to light (Ibid). Thus the practical 
tasks concerned with the fight against pollution and exemption of natural 
sources mainly aim at improving health and well-being of people in the 
third world countries. 
Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I draw the conclusion that 
while so-called shallow ecology movement is oriented towards looking for 
solutions in the field of ecology, examining the ecological concerns as be-
longing to the scope of natural sciences, the deep ecology movement gives 
the opportunity of recognizing different ecosophies as equally fundamental 
ones, in the normative sense of the word. Adopting such philosophies 
means to cultivate man’s sensitivity towards his/her own initial relatedness 
with nature through a genealogical analysis of what intrinsic value is and 
how it should function respectively. It is also important to clarify that re-
considering the category of value, which refers not only to the productive 
activity of man, but also to the creative functions of nature, affects the reali-
zation of Næss’s ecosophy. Such an understanding of value implicitly en-
courages a form of ontological ethics to be adopted, albeit Næss himself 
prefers to define it as a given type of gestalt ontology. 
The Norwegian philosopher claims that the preservation and the develop-
ment of the ecosystems is a value in itself. That theory reveals why the 
principle of holism turns into a guiding one regarding gestalt ontology. In 
this context, I argue that the hypothesis that reconsidering the role of intrin-
sic value corresponds to the tasks of gestalt ontology inflicts the need of 
recognizing the status of Ecosophy T. 
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1.2. Ecosophy’s Wisdom to Feel at Home 
in the Biosphere 
1.2.1. Ecosophy T as a Mountain Ecosophy 
Næss’s Ecosophy T, named after his cabin Tvergastein, which is determined as 
one of the many individual ecosophies, can be described, among its many other 
functions, as a certain type of mountain ecosophy. It is a life philosophy in which 
the gestalt of the mountain becomes a significant premise for understanding wis-
dom needed for reviving the normative validity of the harmony between man and 
nature. Thus we can rehabilitate the normative validity of the bioequilibrium rec-
ognized as a main goal of this life’s philosophy. An important feature of the latter 
is the reconsideration of the role of identification as something more than a strive 
for finding direct (physical) correspondences. It provokes a given type of imagina-
tion, which in turn determines man’s self-realization as intrinsically concerned 
with nature’s one. 
Næss talks about Tvergastein’s metaphysics, which concerns the feeling of being 
locked up and lost as a vital one (Næss and Haukeland 2008c: 73). The metaphys-
ics in question contributes to seeing the mountain as a shelter, as a home, as a 
symbol (as a personified mountain), as well as a concrete physical phenomenon 
(Ibid: 75). In this context, I argue that the feeling of being integrated is inseparable 
from the one of being lost because both of them benefit internalizing the implica-
tions of the macro cosmos as inseparable from the ones of the micro cosmos. This 
relation is not analogous to the ones between a big elephant and a small mouse, as 
Næss points out (Ibid: 177), since the micro cosmos is essential for the realization 
of the macro cosmos and vice versa. It is due to the fact that the realization should 
be understood as gained in a qualitatively different sense, namely, in connection 
with the catalogization of the other, qualitatively different living beings (Ibid). 
That is why the human role is defined by Næss as grounded in the aforementioned 
metaphysics, illustrating how perfecting the cosmic role we have (Ibid: 311) can 
help us to fulfill the ideal of ecological sustainability in time if it is ‘decoded’ in 
the right way. 
What are the practical implications of Ecosophy T as a mountain philosophy? I 
argue that one of its prototype characteristics concerns ‘thinking like a mountain’ 
mode in Næss’s sense. The imaginary identification presumes something more 
than simply relying on the methods of animism. If the mode ‘to think link a 
mountain’ is interpreted as Watson does, namely, as merely driven by the fact that 
people imagine mountains as thinking entities (Watson 1999: 117), it would mean 
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to underrate the ontological potential of the mode itself. Næss defines the moun-
tain as full of life and friendly atmosphere in so far as it is a place of rebirth (Reed 
and Rothenberg 1993: 203). Furthermore, the mountain Tseringma is described as 
a holly mountain, which is a “combination” of awe and identification (Ibid) giving 
us the opportunity to “sense what something is” by stimulating our imagination 
(Næss 1995: 72, 73). The latter statement elucidates one more important issue: 
how can the mode of thinking like a mountain have an unquestionable normative 
validity within the field of epistemology? In other words, how can the intuition for 
the sacred be referred to a given type of knowledge as well as to what extent can 
feelings and emotions be recognized as having normative validity similar to the 
one of pure cognitive knowledge? 
Næss also argues that we should examine the mountain as a symbol in so far as 
such an examination can help us to reveal the meaning of life by clarifying the one 
of our interconnectedness with nature. According to him, all things with forms 
have a symbolic function and the “non-forms” are often human ones (Ibid: 78). 
How can we interpret the mountain symbol and the one of the ocean then? Næss 
claims that regardless of having something in common, they are not the same. The 
commonly shared characteristics are majesty, timeless, self-reliance (i-seg-selv-
nok-het)240 (Ibid: 81). Næss deliberately denies presenting a theoretical vision 
(Ibid), which is in tune with his understanding that knowledge is a necessary but 
not sufficient condition for understanding. The common origin concerns this in-
eradicable sense of belonging to the world of nature, which has a value in itself. In 
other words, one can succeed in mastering mountain and/or ocean, without fully 
conquering them, albeit one equally belongs to both of them, namely, one is 
equally connected to nature, regardless of the different embodiments of these con-
nections. Thus man can be better in climbing than in sailing, but he/she belongs in 
a similar manner to both mountain and ocean due to the fact that both of them are 
parts of nature.  
                                           
240 Despite the fact that technology has reduced, again to a certain extent, the roles of the mountain 
and ocean, the strong need of them has partly the same origin in our materially rich society. How-
ever, in contrast to the lack of control over the ocean, one partly can “master the mountain” (mestre 
fjellet) (Ibid). 
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1.2.1.1. Mountain as a Home Gestalt 
Ecosophy T (as a philosophy of life) can be explored as embodying the idea 
of homeness’s gestalt, whose prototype characteristic is the wisdom about 
the oikos, i.e. wisdom, which is irreducible to the contemporary scientifica-
tion of the idea of logos. It can be described as experiential wisdom, which 
is achievable by adopting imaginative rationality that helps to understand 
life’s philosophy in Næss’s sense241. 
On a macro methodological level, Ecosophy T as a mountain ecosophy can 
be described as requiring the cultivation of sensitivity to the state ‘to feel 
like at home’ in the biosphere in a non-anthropocentric way; or as Næss 
himself outlines, to learn how to feel at home in life because the landscape 
of opportunities is endless, taking into account that everything can happen 
during the way (Næss 2008b: 103). Cultivating such a sensitivity contrib-
utes to avoiding Fromm’s dilemma ‘to be or to have’ guaranteeing that the 
feeling would be evaluated from the perspective of ‘to be’ rather than from 
the one of ‘to have’. Furthermore, we should keep in mind that ‘to feel like 
at home’ in the mountain and nature in general means to live in an ecologi-
cally responsible way. 
Næss defines the sense of situatedness as a matter of developing sensitivity 
towards a given place as a home against the background of the corrosive 
processes in the global space. On the other hand, the sense of situatedness in 
the contemporary society can be described as deteriorating in so far as it is 
reduced to the multiplication of places none of which can be called home. It 
is not the case that there are no places to live in, but rather that it is more 
and more difficult to develop a sense of belonging to a given place due to 
replacing the idea of mapping with the one of a new topography, which is 
introduced with the idea of sustainable development. The growing mobility, 
which is accompanied with both rapid urbanization and centralization as 
well as with an increasing dependence on goods and technologies, affected 
the declining structural complexity and the destruction of the sense of be-
longing, as Næss alarmed (Ibid). The sad conclusion is that there is no long-
er a place where one to belong (Ibid) since the sense of belonging has no 
longer a value as such. That is why I draw the conclusion that one could 
come back, but he/she she could not ‘visit home’ again because home is not 
                                           
241 Drengson and Inoue characterize Næss’s interest in the pursuit of wisdom and wondering as a 
significant part of his Pyrrhonist attitudes (Drengson and Inoue 1995: 19). 
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a place to visit but rather an anchor in life, which makes staying with an 
open face to the world possible. 
Home is recognized due to the fact that there is a distinction between ‘to be 
at place’ and ‘to have a place’, which is erased in the technocratic societies 
whose main aim is to make each and every to feel at home wherever he/she 
is. In turn, the place itself is determined depending on whether the self will 
stay longer or shorter before going somewhere else. Næss himself provides 
the relevant argument that situatedness in question should not be interpreted 
as a matter of finding a location, but rather of developing an orientation 
(Reed and Rothenberg 1993: 262). Otherwise, the dimension of elaborating 
‘my space’ would lose its symbolic capital of attaching and thus will lose 
what Næss calls mythogenic mountain. 
The methodological connection with the changed paradigm of knowledge 
can be also traced on the level of how to find new gestalt ontology in 
Næss’s sense. Furthermore, it raises the question how can we interpret 
Næss’s own statement that ecosophy requires the word magic to be adopted 
(Næss 2008d: 172), namely, whether his appeal for learning both science 
and magic does not lead to establishing a certain type of mysticism? Næss 
claims that understanding is a three-stage process, which includes the role 
of imagination, building positive feelings and learning (Ibid: 72)242, or so-
called inducation (Ibid: 139) in so far as we not only learn, but also un-
learn243 (Ibid: 145). Thus so-called amateur research becomes a pillar of the 
ecophilosophical education (Næss 2008: 62), consisting mainly in develop-
ing the taste and the appreciation of “what is this there, which is enough of” 
(Ibid).  
The next question, which arises is, how do we have to reconsider the role of 
what is enough indeed? Regarding the development of Næss’s Ecosophy T, 
I argue that it elucidates what it means to feel at home in life. In turn, life is 
                                           
242 A ‘negative’ version of imaginative rationality can be found in Hjalmar Hegge’s reference to 
Marcuse’s definition of “irrational rationality”, which, however, is specified in respect with indus-
trial society. In this context, rationality is coined as a mixture of technological rationality and irra-
tional consequences (Hegge 1974a: 79). 
243 Næss argues in favor of the “un-learning of mythopoetical pictures” saying that environment 
where people grow up does not promote self-confidence when the fantasy is available (Ibid: 146), 
i.e. he remains aware of the process of constructing images as a process irreducible to pure irration-
ality. “In Tvergastein, when I saw the microscopic beings in one drop, I did not like that the drop 
dried up” (Næss and Haukeland 2008c: 61). 
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recognized by Næss as an open landscape (Næss 2008d: 1) because it is a 
traveling through a landscape with both easy and broken terrains, as well as 
light and dark places for the sake of experiencing big and small encounters 
(Ibid). Therefore, to feel at home in life requires both moving towards a 
goal and simply being. Life itself can be achieved by going through what 
Næss calls a “critical choice of path”, a vital challenge in listening to rea-
sons and emotions. In this context, I reach the conclusion that it is a part of 
Self’s (with a capital S) responsibility to justify the sense of home as a feel-
ing showing what the difference between activity and activeness is. On a 
practical level, the task is how to turn the negative feelings into a positive 
direction. 
Epistemologically speaking, the answer should be sought in how to listen to 
both reason and emotions at once, while, from a pedagogical point of view, 
it raises the concern about how to cultivate the aforementioned transforma-
tion in order to enhance the quality of life for all beings and yield genuine 
happiness (Ibid: XIX). I argue that referring to ontological ethics, we may 
provide a relevant answer to Næss’s interpretation of the question How do 
you feel yourself in the world? (Ibid: 20).  
On the level of ethics, it would mean that what Næss calls goal-oriented and 
sensible choice is based on a choice of values, which is always grounded in 
the positive feelings, as Næss claims (Ibid: 7). On a macro methodological 
level, what he defines as a prevailing emotional tone has a value in itself, 
based on the need of building a more complex vision of comprehending due 
to which wisdom to be determined as a result of understanding that provides 
respect, love and care. That is why what I defined as a moral experiential 
gestalt can be referred to what Næss coins as a life-compass, namely, as a 
‘compass’ that helps us on the way to greater freedom, by pointing the path 
along which we to continue (Ibid: 86). 
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1.2.2. The Sense of Belonging. How Can We Feel 
at Home in Life? 
Regarding the understanding of Ecosophy T as a mountain ecosophy, I ar-
gue that it is not just the importance of places themselves, as Drengson 
claim (Drengson and Inoue 1995: VIII), but rather the one of situatedness 
and its normative validity, namely, it is not ‘this’ or ‘that’ mountain, but ra-
ther the mountain as a landscape. In this context, I claim that it is the onto-
logical dependence of man’s self-realization on mountain’s/nature’s realiza-
tion and vice versa that makes evaluating life’s philosophy through gestalt 
thinking in Næss’s sense possible. 
Gratefulness to life is what makes people feel at home in life in so far as it 
contributes to triggering the reduction of living standard if necessary to the 
quality of life due to which the way of living is defined as an environmen-
tally friendly one shared with the other living beings. According to Næss, to 
feel at home in nature means that I am something, which is not isolated, but 
achieved through the constant interaction of environment and organism 
(Næss 2008b: 140). Invading mountains as such is characterized as a proc-
ess of taming the wild, which makes not only ‘great’ to be reduced to ‘big’, 
but also wild to become a subject to unlimited cultivation, i.e. wild to lose 
its intrinsic value in time. All these investigations concern the understand-
ing of the idea of habitat. Referring to Reed and Rothenberg’s statement 
saying that we do not choose our habitat (Reed and Rothenberg 1993), I ar-
gue that the latter benefits developing a particular sense of belonging since 
its naturalness gives us the opportunity to internalize it as a feeling at home. 
Furthermore, the aforementioned sense of feeling at home is closely tied 
with the being of the mountain in so far as the latter is not a topos but an 
arena of becoming for the self. In other words, if the place itself can be jus-
tified as a place of being, the home functions as a topos of becoming, where 
the individual turns into a person by cultivating his/her sensitivity towards 
the holistic character of nature. Næss emphasizes that one can feel at home 
at a given place, but from that it does not follow, as I argued above that eve-
ry single place, where he/she lives in is his/her home place. Thus expres-
sions such as man “was” at home, he/she “left” home (reiste hjemmefra), 
he/she “came” home (Næss 1995: 102) illustrate that home is not the build-
ing itself (Ibid) but it is rather the place where one belonged to (hørte til) 
(Ibid). 
What are the concrete projections of this sense of belonging? Næss claims 
that it is “a part of the self” constituting an ecological entity with a rich in-
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ternal character, or even better, relations to what today is called environ-
ment (Ibid). As he argues, it is of crucial importance to understand what it 
means to ‘feel at home’ against the background of the statement Here I 
stand (Diehm 2004: 6). It is the latter statement that benefits recognizing the 
sense of belonging as intrinsically connected with the need of countering 
the uncontrollably growing mobility by choosing a given place as a home. It 
reveals how one chooses to determine life’s possibilities as a mode of be-
coming due to which to cultivate one’s unique sense of belonging that can 
always be commonly shared. On a macro methodological level, I draw the 
conclusion that the statement Here I stand implies the one of Here is my 
home in so far as the others have the same right to have a home, and to in-
sist on the recognition of this right as a vital one respectively.  
Within the framework of the classical theory of understanding, as Næss 
himself claims, home is determined in a geographical sense, as a birth place, 
and only later it becomes a Place with a capital letter (Ibid). It is the external 
exemplification of the internalized sense of belonging that has the geo-
graphical place merely as a necessary condition. On a macro methodologi-
cal level, it is the Place that makes Naess’s statement Here I stand! recog-
nizable as Here I feel at home!.  
Some arguments in favor of the latter conclusion can be found in Næss’s 
saying that it is important those, who have experienced and preserved the 
process of belonging to tell us how it is possible because thus they can help 
others to strengthen their own motivation (Næss 1995: 103). Regarding the 
better motivation, he claims that most of the supporters of the deep ecology 
movement are people who feel the urbanization impact with their bodies, 
“something, which in fact furthers this issue to be examined on a global lev-
el” (Ibid). 
Judging by the aforementioned arguments, I draw the conclusion that culti-
vating the need of choosing a home for the sake of developing a sense of 
belonging not only to the place in particular, but also to nature as a home for 
all beings, presumes eco-logy to be interpreted as an understanding of what 
our home in nature is due to adopting moral imagination. The latter is a 
necessary condition because this act of choosing is always an axiologically 
determined one. It concerns the worldview stance by which one achieves an 
optimal openness of oneself to the world one lives in. 
On a macro methodological level, the cultivation of the sense in question is 
defined as a necessary condition for building profound eco-consciousness in 
so far as choosing a given place as a home in nature, the individual pre-
sumably chooses to recognize nature as everybody’s home, and thus to rees-
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tablish the role of ecosophy as giving not only knowledge, but also an emo-
tional affiliation and evaluation, which have an existential value. Such an 
affiliation is implicitly embodied in the justification of the normative valid-
ity of the body language, as Næss suggests, due to which the language is ex-
tended to the understanding of the body speaking with all its covering (Ibid: 
109). In turn, knowledge is defined as an absorbing one because it initiates 
revealing a new type of process knowledge, which is irreducible to cogni-
tive algorithms. According to Næss, with the body language, we can lead 
the others in a direction, so that they to experience the same thing as we do 
(Ibid). 
However, Næss’s conception of the role of language requires further elabo-
rations. If we presume that the language follows already structured gestalts 
making them understandable, as Næss outlines, it would mean to restrict the 
creative functions of this language as well as to narrow the idea of commu-
nication itself. That is why I argue that the language, as a part of a given 
culture, benefits both having culturally common gestalts and their internali-
zation in the social life.  
Strengthening the process of communication contributes to supplying the 
criterion of what home is with strong axiological connotations. Næss’s 
question What can we learn from each other? (Ibid: 107) can be transformed 
into the one How can we learn from each other due to sharing one and the 
same idea of home? 
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1.2.2.1. T Like Tvergastein. Why Does Gestalt Ontology 
Have a Future as Ontological Ethics? 
What is gestalt ontology about and why is it so important for reconsidering 
the role of ecosophy as based on a specific type of ontological ethics? Næss 
emphasizes that it is not merely a matter of rehabilitating our “spontaneous” 
gestalt experience244, but also of clarifying its unquestionable axiological 
validity. This statement is stressed more than once by Næss, which gives me 
grounds to examine his theory of gestalt ontology as comparable with a 
form of ontological ethics, albeit he explicitly neglects the role of ecological 
ethics at the expense of gestalt ontology (Næss 1989: 235-236). 
The prerequisites of developing such a hypothesis can be found in some key 
statements made by Næss. When he talks about the methodological impor-
tance of gestalt ontology, Næss argues that values are a crucial part of real-
ity, which we experience, i.e. they determine ‘the profile’ of a given gestalt. 
In turn, ontology initiates solving ecological conflicts so that the intrinsic 
value of nature to be reconsidered through so-called gestalt shifts. The latter 
make possible the coherence of man’s experience be achieved by rethinking 
the value of nature in its diversity. In other words, values are recognized as 
a part of reality in a sense that does not provide an interpretation within the 
framework of moral objectivism.  
According to Næss, our whole experience is a result of perceptions. That is 
why its value is inherent to the one of reality itself, which contributes to 
achieving the coherence of man’s experience by the act of perception (Ibid: 
25). In turn, this conception questions so-called Galilean ontology based on 
the distinction between primary and secondary qualities245. By contrast to 
Galilean ontology, Næss presumes that the secondary qualities are also part 
of reality. It is important to emphasize that the thesis of the Norwegian phi-
losopher does not lead to ontological relativism since the secondary quali-
                                           
244 See Diehm 2006: 23.  
245 Diehm argues that Næss’s ontology is “most easily understood” as a response to the theories that 
provide a distinction between reality determined as independent of our experience and reality recog-
nized as inseparable from our anticipations respectively (Diehm 2006: 23). This fundamental dis-
tinction, which relies on two different thinking modes, represents two different modes of being, 
namely, the things “for us” and the things “in themselves”. It becomes a prototype characteristic of a 
broad range of theories described by Næss as “Galilean” ones (Ibid).  
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ties are not determined as coming from the subject alone, but rather as de-
riving from the normative validity of the act of perception. 
On a macro methodological level, justifying ontological ethics as preceded 
by a ‘new ontology’ putting both the ethics in question and the practical ac-
tivities of man “at place”, as Næss suggests (Ibid: 2), would negatively af-
fect so-called by him ecosophic ontology whose main principle is to en-
courage an individual ecological Self.  
Some implicit reasons of recognizing gestalt ontology as a specific type of 
ontological ethics can also be found in the process of cultivating ecological 
consciousness as an important condition for justifying bioegalitarianism. 
Only by introducing such a presumption, regarding the environmental pro-
tection, a given type of non-egoistic motivation in Næss’s sense can be jus-
tified. Thus Erik Katz’s criticism that Næss’s gestalt ontology is still domi-
nated by anthropocentric values can be overcome246. 
                                           
246 See also Katz’s interpretation of Næss’s conception of the secondary and tertiary qualities, which 
are understood as real in the relational field (Katz 2000: 30). 
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1.2.2. 1.1. The Sense of Belonging to a Home Gestalt 
Næss argues that when a child grows up, the dominating home gestalts seri-
ously change, albeit they remain the same in their essence (Næss and Hauke-
land 2008c: 145). It is this essence that contributes to constructing the sense of 
home belonging as an inter-woven, diverse gestalt, with the outermost, strong 
symbolic value (Ibid). In this context, one of the main questions, which arises is 
Shall we move, or shall we stay where we feel at home? According to Næss, 
leaving the landslide area (rasområdet) would mean one to lose an essential part 
of oneself, namely, of the gestalts, which include one’s own entity (ens eget), 
“my/our environment” because it is impossible to form the most fundamental 
gestalts and symbols again (Ibid). 
Regarding the relevance of gestalt thinking to the conceptualization of the sense 
of belonging, Næss examines also the status of the one who feels at home in the 
forest, which is not only a calm environment, but also a “hard world of snow, 
dangerous abysses, meaningless mountain’s widths” (Ibid: 151). Over the trees’ 
border, it is cold and inhospitable, while below it, it is warm and friendly (Ibid). 
In turn, this statement shows how the contrast has some apparent metaphysical 
dimensions247 (Ibid). Judging by these investigations, Næss makes the ques-
tionable statement that by not feeling at home at a given place, we are biologi-
cally inclined to feel at home everywhere (by everybody), having an under-
standing for all, more specialized living forms (Ibid: 155). However, I point out 
that there is no obligatory normative connection between the two parts of 
Næss’s statement. An illuminative example in this respect is the industrial type 
of man who may not recognize a given place as a home, but at the same time, 
he/she does not feel empathy with other beings.  
On a gestalt level, I argue that the sense of belonging becomes understandable 
by changing the subordinate gestalts in Næss’s sense248, but not the main ones. 
He also claims that this sense has a value in itself because it is grounded in the 
culturally shaped gestalt way of thinking. On the other hand, the process of 
shaping does not necessarily coincide with what Næss determines as an essen-
tial part of everybody in so far as within the aforementioned way of thinking, it 
is difficult to discern what a matter of specifically cultural way of behaving is, 
as well as how far the individual characteristics in the process of embodiment 
go. 
                                           
247 However, it remains problematic to keep talking about positive and negative gestalts, as Næss 
does. We may rather argue in favor of “positive” and “negative” contents or representations of the 
gestalts in question because the connotations derive from the process of internalization on side of the 
individual and his/her specificities.  
248 See Næss 2005ii: 119-121. 
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2. THE ROLE OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
ETHICS IN NÆSS’S WRITINGS 
Examining Næss’s theories of deep ecology and ecosophy, I argue that the 
main problem in Næss’s writings concerns the way he underrates the role of 
ethics, which is simplified to a certain kind of moralization. Næss also dis-
cusses the role of genuine ethics of conservation, which, in my point of 
view meets the requirements of ontological ethics since the requirements in 
question can benefit understanding how living beings are examined as genu-
ine fellows. In turn, distinguishing between ethical relativism and ethical re-
lationalism, as Næss suggests (Næss 2008: 137), would not necessarily help 
us in clarifying the issue either (Ibid: 100). On a macro methodological 
level, the aforementioned difficulty is also driven by the ambiguous defini-
tion of so-called moral intuition249. As one of the main methodological 
concerns in this context, I point out Næss’s statement that confronting intui-
tions is a part of the process of development itself because it is not always 
the case when we talk about contradicting moral intuitions. The origin of 
this problem can be traced to the fact that in Næss’s system, moral intuition 
is something more than having a value, it somehow precedes the latter, both 
ontologically and ethically, in a way that is not clearly specified by Næss 
himself. 
                                           
249 The methodological connection between knowledge and intuition, which is crucial for under-
standing the implications of the environmental crisis in Næss’s sense, is also emphasized by another 
prominent Norwegian philosopher Knut Tranøy. According to him, the difficulties derive from the 
moral and philosophical reactions to the paradox of our time, namely that “environmental crisis’ 
threat is against one livable and sustainable world being an unintentional “side effect” (“bivirkning”) 
of an energetic striving for creating better living circumstances” (Tranøy 1991: 47). On a macro 
methodological level, it means that adopting theory in order to improve practice, we should adopt 
the principles of “our time’s normative ethics” (Ibid: 46) for the sake of overcoming environmental 
crisis. However, Tranøy’s criticism to Næss’s conception of ethics concerns what Tranøy calls 
“Norwegian specialty to prolong the strong and clear standpoints” (Ibid), namely, to overrate the 
epistemological verification at the expense of the validity of norms. 
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According to him, the idea that all living beings have the right to live de-
rives from an intuition (Næss 2005g: 67). However, there are at least two 
main concerns stemming from his thesis. First, there is no necessary and 
sufficient condition intuitions to contradict morals by default (Næss 2008: 
93), as Næss suggests, since they function either as moral intuitions in prac-
tice, or as a certain kind of epistemological ones, which brings us back to 
the question whether we should give priority to the criterion of verification 
(and somehow to refer those intuitions to it) over the one of normative va-
lidity. Second, arguing that some other intuitions, with unclear normative 
validity, can change a norm (Ibid: 109), is also a highly questionable state-
ment. Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I claim that the prob-
lems derive from Næss’s willingness to justify that the ‘I feel’ mode has a 
normative validity by default. Furthermore, the paradox comes from the fact 
that on a macro methodological level, he unilaterally equates morality with 
moralization, while on a micro one, the intuition should work both as a 
moral intuition and something “initially higher” (according to his own 
words) than the intuition in question250. 
Referring to such a vague intuitionism does not contribute to overcoming 
the critics posed on side of some social ecologists251 saying that Næss pays 
more attention to non-human beings than to human ones. That is why I ar-
gue that denying the role of ethics Næss does not succeed in providing rele-
vant grounds of ethical gradualism. According to him, a tiger should be 
killed when a hungry child should be nurtured, so that in some confronting 
situations, “humans might yield” (French 1999: 129-130), albeit people do 
not have the right to reduce richness of life (Ibid). On the other hand, nar-
rowing morality to moralization raises the problematic issue, which is ne-
glected by Næss while commenting on Zapffe’s theory of the role of justice, 
namely, how does Næss’s own lower sensitivity to injustice make him unre-
ceptive to the intrinsic value of nature (Næss 2008d: 164)252? The concrete 
consequences of narrowing morality to moralization also affect the under-
standing of duty in so far as Næss considers it as an important issue moving 
                                           
250 Another methodological difficulty stems from Næss’s attempts to verbalize intuition. He makes 
the relevant stance that we cannot talk about degrees of intuition or inherent values, but from that it 
does not follow that we can cultivate our environmental responsibility. 
251 See the critical comments made by M. Bookchin. 
252 This is another proof in favor of questioning the internal connection between deep ecology 
movement and the justice one. 
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from “ethics to ontology and back” (Næss 2008: 77). He points out that 
clarifying the differences in ontology may contribute to revealing the func-
tion of different policies and their ethical basis253. One of the first prob-
lems, which arises is that so-called by him ontology of the contents is not a 
sufficient argument in denying the relativism of sensualism since the way of 
feeling is also axiologically determined. Another questionable issue is 
Næss’s difficulties in explaining how spontaneous experience is irreducible 
to a form of sense experience (Ibid: 201). That is why I argue that in his at-
tempts to identify the world with a set of contents (not with structures), 
which to be conceived as contents of gestalts, Næss underrates the transition 
from ontology to ethics and the other way around remaining focused on 
specifying the embodiments of the ontological level alone.   
Furthermore, I claim that relying on what Næss calls intuition is only a nec-
essary condition for justifying the role of moral choices, albeit I agree with 
him that moral intuition is irreducible to the moral duty as such as well as 
that cultural setting is important for how we define the felt closeness to dif-
ferent living beings254. Duty itself is determined as relational rather than 
relative, as I already showed (Næss 2005k: 125), but this definition does not 
benefit understanding why acting from inclination should be ‘superior’ to 
acting from duty. The latter is a problematic statement because it does not 
take into account the significant role of the normative validity of ethics, 
which is crucial for giving us grounds to talk about any ethical discourse 
whatsoever. In turn, it would not be effective to postulate an ethical system 
based on superior and inferior relations since it would lead to determining 
the system in question as a matter of reviving moral objectivism. 
What is Næss’s suggestion of avoiding the pitfalls of deontological ethics and is 
this a constructive solution at all? He discusses the need of reconsidering the 
role of so-called by Kant beautiful actions. Thus we can provide arguments 
against Kant’s deontological ethics, which is described as an illuminative ex-
ample of moralization. In this context, I argue that rejecting the role of deonto-
logical ethics stems from Næss’s ambiguous understanding of duty as a ‘main 
motive’ of moral action, as well as from simplifying the role of duty in the strive 
                                           
253 Analyzing the discussion, which starts with examining fact-value dichotomy, we can outline the 
influence of Vienna circle on Næss’s theory regarding the status of ethics, albeit he aims at justify-
ing particular moral behaviorism. 
254 Næss relevantly points out that it is better to talk about living beings than organisms (Næss 
2005g: 69). 
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for achieving so-called deepened realism, which is grounded in the recognition 
of environmental ontology at the expense of environmental ethics (Næss 
2005bb: 527), (Næss 2008: 93). 
Næss talks about “supremacy” of environmental onotology and realism over 
environmental ethics, which comes from “nature” and man’s natural ability 
to act beautifully (Ibid). If we follow his line of thoughts, however, the ethi-
cal model he provides would fulfill the requirements of moral objectivism, 
which in turn would not meet the ones of ecosophy, but rather the require-
ments of a self-sufficient form of radical biocentrism that is as questionable 
as narrow moralization is.  
Næss emphasizes the role of Kant’s theory of beautiful actions as benevolent 
ones (Næss 2005k: 122), but from the fact that one action is benevolent, it does 
not follow that there is no conflict of feelings involved. Such an interpretation 
still raises the problem how to evaluate two contradicting beautiful (benevolent) 
actions, in Næss’s sense, if both of them are driven by pure benevolence, but are 
motivated by two contradicting in their contents motives.  
Another ambiguous argument of Næss’s theory is how can the moral action 
be transformed into a beautiful one255 (Næss 2008: 136) especially through 
its habitualization, which is supposed to make the moral action ‘morally 
natural’? He misleadingly identifies habitualization with the process of in-
ternalization by evoking again the very problematic act of ‘feeling natural’. 
On the other hand, according to Næss, it is of crucial importance we still to 
have an inclination that comes ‘directly’, namely, in a ‘natural’ way256 (Ibid). 
If we accept such an interpretation, then every habit can be misrecognized 
as having a moral value by default, provoking certain actions. On a macro 
methodological level, it would mean that by extending the normative valid-
ity of the concept of beautiful actions, more and more desires would be eas-
ily habitualized as vital needs. 
If these beautiful actions are moral by default, how can we compare and 
evaluate their normative validity? Furthermore, if they embody two contra-
dicting intuitions, how can we judge ‘whose normative validity’ matters 
                                           
255 According to him, if a moral action forms a habit, it starts feeling natural and inclination occurs. 
Thus the moral action glides into a beautiful one. 
256 See also Næss 2005a: 5. 
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more257? It would be also problematic to accept the three different strate-
gies proposed by Næss (French 1999: 132), namely, to talk about usefulness 
of ecologically positive actions, moral obligations and inclinations, recog-
nized as three separate spheres of life (Næss 2008: 135). 
In turn, it is also questionable to argue that experienced reality can also become 
a crucial factor of environmental ontology, which should presumably help us to 
avoid the traps of ontological relativism. In this context, there are some signifi-
cant issues that arise, namely, how to claim that every single subject objectively 
experiences the objective content of reality. And if so, how can we recognize 
the self-realization as a top norm in Næss’s sense? If we all naturally produce 
‘beautiful actions’, how does the cultivation of the intuition in question derive 
from the reality itself? Judging by Næss’s explanations, I point out that it also 
remains unclear what a ‘strict’ environmental ethics and ‘strict’ egalitarianism 
in his sense is. The understanding of the process of transformation from being in 
the world to being in nature does not contribute to explaining how nature is 
“outside of the world”, especially if it is a matter of transformation from being 
in this world (Ibid: 93). We should keep in mind that the world itself is recog-
nized as a net of ecosystems. 
On the other hand, eco-impartiality, which is defined by Næss as a choice of 
interests that are conceptualized as intrinsic opportunities (regarding the de-
cision-making process), affects both blurring the definition of vital needs 
and making the clarification of moral engagement within ontological ethics 
more difficult. In this context, I argue that another aspect of the problem de-
rives from Næss’s literal interpretation of what an intrinsic value is because 
thus a certain form of reductionism regarding moral objectivism is intro-
duced258. 
                                           
257 Analyzing Næss’s theory of Ecosophy T, Glasser outlines as a serious problem his idea of nor-
mative validity. He poses the question how can we be sure that “the right intuition” will supersede 
the other interests and obligations (Glasser 1999: 380)? Presuming that this intuition has a higher 
normative validity than any wrong obligation is a statement that can be valid within the framework 
of moral objectivism alone, namely, if we presume an unquestionable universalizability of poten-
tials’ realization.  
258 Some researchers go even deeper in their evaluations saying that Næss’s ontology of deep ecol-
ogy raises many questions due to the fact that it differs from the contemporary liberal accounts of 
morality (See M. Humphrey), i.e. that the misunderstandings stem from the contradiction of a given 
ontology and a given type of morality. However, these researchers do not develop their statements 
about the origin of the problem, namely, how the latter arises from contradicting ontological ethics 
and a form of moral relativism, which is typical for the postmodern culture. 
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2.1. Whose Ethics? Which Gradualism? 
The Challenges of Ethical Gradualism 
In this context, I argue that Næss’s idea of equal share does not significantly 
benefit the interpretation of the idea of intrinsic value259 in so far as it 
brings us back to the debate about ‘more’ or ‘less’ values depending on the 
capabilities of the different species. If we interpret the view ‘equal share’ in 
the sense of processing intrinsic value ‘by nature’, then the next question is 
how can we justify the ‘sameness’ beyond the reduction to its quantitative 
or qualitative projections?  
My suggestion regarding Næss’s definition is that ‘the same’ can be inter-
preted as a generic term260 since it is intrinsic, but not one and the same in 
terms of its qualitative embodiments. Otherwise, humans should have been 
birds, animals, etc., i.e. this criterion would have had no normative validity 
at all. Furthermore, I argue that human beings have the ‘same value’ as liv-
ing beings, which provides an equal universal right to live and blossom261, 
but this would not give us a hint how to interpret what an equal value is 
while two rights are at stake. On a macro methodological level, it signifies 
                                           
259 Another argument in favor of this interpretation can be seen in Næss’s claim that right is not an 
unconditional norm but rather a guideline (French 1999: 130). Næss approves the idea of value as 
deserving equal concern (Ibid: 131), but the latter does not say something new in terms of clarifying 
the issue of equal share. 
260The idea of interpreting the value in itself as a generic term comes from Wetlesen (Wetlesen 
1999: 406) presuming that ‘intrinsic’ and ‘inherent’ should be considered as its specifications. Ac-
cording to him, ‘intrinsic value’ could be referred to certain “states or achievements of living be-
ings” as understood within teleological ethics, while “inherent value” could be applied to these beins 
as interpreted due to deonotological ethics (Ibid). In this context, inherent value is justified as con-
cerning moral subjects towards whom moral agents have directed moral duties.  
261 Before specifying why ‘equal in worth’ is determined by ‘under what circumstances’ mode as a 
necessary but not sufficient condition, we should explore how the idea of intrinsic value grounds the 
one of the universal right to live and blossom. As French points out, this specification remains on a 
theoretical level (on the one of principles), but it is not applied in practice. Against the background 
of Næss’s investigations of the principle of equal rights of all beings, which is recognized as only 
one norm among others (French 1999: 130), French argues (referring to Taylor) that moral weight 
can be examined as an “equal share” (Ibid: 135). However, claiming that a value is the same for all, 
which does not require excluding the possibility of additional arguments for respect and protection 
(Ibid: 133), does not contribute much to clarifying the aforementioned definition of equal share.  
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that equality concerns the role of rights, while sameness regards the one of 
values, taking into account that ‘equal’ and ‘same’ are not ontological syno-
nyms.  
Secondly, the problem with Næss’s skepticism to ethical gradualism also af-
fects the recognition of the connection between right, norm and guideline 
(French 1999: 130-131) by stressing the process of relativisation of the ‘un-
der which circumstances’ mode. As a crossing point of the terms, he justi-
fies the role of mutual agreement in order to keep the principle untouched. 
However, the implicit regret in Næss’s sense can be treated as a sufficient 
condition because the motivation for it can have nothing to do with the 
principles of deep ecology. Another concern about the normative validity of 
the regret is that we are tempted to feel stronger regret to the ones who are 
“nearer to us” (Ibid: 132)262, i.e. we are used to be affected not only by the 
motives of feeling regret, but also by the affiliations with the other subjects 
and the subjective feeling of proximity. 
On the other hand, a serious methodological concern derives from the inter-
ference of the universal right with the principle of equality. Even if we take 
this principle as a guiding light, it would not help us to avoid the hoax be-
tween theory and practice, as Næss insists. Furthermore, to be guided by so-
called realistic egalitarian attitude does not mean to be necessarily moti-
vated by a moral behavior. Referring to Næss’s example, I emphasize that 
discussing the spirit of a bear is not realistic at all, nor does the regret is a 
guarantee of showing a ‘real’ attitude, as he suggests. 
What is the influence of these speculations on the justification of ethical 
gradualism in Næss’s writings? The attempts to examine biospherical egali-
tarianism as a “qualified realistic egalitarianism” (Ibid: 131) would be a 
successful endeavor only if the egalitarianism in question is explored as a 
form of ethical gradualism. Such an interpretation, however, cannot be re-
duced to the specification of the vital needs understood as basic or row ones 
                                           
262 French also questions this approach (Ibid). 
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because thus we cannot clarify their normative validity without contradic-
tions263.  
French relevantly claims that deep ecology is normatively inconsistent in so 
far as moral principles cannot be separated from moral practice. Otherwise, 
the strict egalitarianism as an abstract ideal may turn into a justification of 
wrong actions, as Næss himself is aware (Ibid: 132). However, rejecting the 
ranking system does not obligatory lead to a loss of regret, so that the prob-
lem is whether the latter provokes the agents to try to develop alternative 
ways of avoiding similar situations in the future. In this context, French 
makes the statement that without moral ranking of the various vital inter-
ests, in a conflict situation we simply have a ranking of assertion of power 
(Ibid), which also increases the impossibility to apply this principle to tragic 
situations. On the other hand, without a notion of species’ ranking, it would 
also be impossible to ground Næss’s position, as French argues.  
On a macro methodological level, it means that clarifying the connection 
between the intrinsic value of all living forms and the universal right pre-
sumes to analyze what a valued interest in Næss’s sense is (Ibid: 135) as 
well as whether the latter can be defined beyond the framework of utilitar-
ian ethics. The principle of minimum wrong is the one of calculations that 
does not change the anthropocentric perspective determining which interests 
are basic and which ones are not (Ibid). The interests, which are basic 
should have ‘moral weight’ regardless of whether they are human interests 
or not. Another important point in French’s interpretation of Taylor’s theory 
is that Næss at least outlines that his form of biospherical egalitarianism still 
accepts that vital human interests outweigh nonhuman ones, while for Tay-
lor, humans may kill animals and destory planet out of necessity (Ibid). 
However, the problem is that we still need to emphasize that the idea of re-
spect (even the one to nature) is a concept elaborated by humans.  
Furthermore, we should keep in mind that not only animals’ basic needs, 
but also human needs can be neglected. A significant problem, which arises 
                                           
263 P. Taylor supports the distinction between basic interests of animals and plants and non-basic in-
terests of humans arguing that the principle of minimum wrong covers only these cases in which the 
norm is basic (Ibid: 134-135). But even if we imply a certain principle of correspondence, it does 
not guarantee yet that the change can be initiated by relying on a purely moral motivation. An illu-
minative example in this respect is replacing vital needs with vital interests as well as the assertion 
of so-called row power. The examination of the latter can also be seen in French’s attempts at speci-
fying the role of harm to non-humans as well as that human interests are “not intrinsically incom-
patible with respect for nature” (Ibid: 135-136). 
 223
is how to provide one and the same classification deriving from the pre-
sumption that not all the species have duty because accepting the latter may 
lead to imposing either radical biocentrism, or radical anthropocentrism. On 
the other hand, it may also turn out, as French points out, that highly valued 
but non-basic interests can be ascribed “greater moral weight” than the ba-
sic interests of animals and plants. Since humans are the ones who can be 
defined as moral agents264, the principle of self-defense in Taylor’s sense 
(Ibid: 136) can be used as an excuse for imposing non-vital needs as vital 
ones. However, if some ‘non-basic’ interests outweigh more than some ba-
sic ones, why are not the former classified as basic interests as well? This 
problem takes place against the background of the questionable definition of 
so-called high level of a civilized life265 (Ibid).  
The same problem derives from the premise that not all the interests are 
‘equivalent’. That is why we should accept that under given circumstances, 
some one’s life would be preserved at the expense of someone else’s one. 
On the other hand, the explanation of this decision is not necessarily an evo-
lutionary one, albeit it does not deny a certain form of biological gradualism 
to be adopted, as Skirbekk suggests. In turn, the definition of value recog-
nized due to finding apparent proofs of rationality, or other ‘higher’ capa-
bilities of living, brings us back to the question how can we justify the vital 
interests of living beings, when we cannot find clear evidence of their con-
sciousness? If we keep talking about sentience ‘in proportion to their inter-
ests’, it would mean that we refract the principle of distributive justice 
through the lens of objective naturalism. This, however, makes the genuine 
respect to the ‘interests of well-being of all living beings’ be a subject to 
theoretical speculations alone266.  
Related problems arise if we give preference to so-called additional need 
over moral value in so far as the former cannot be a sufficient criterion of 
moral evaluation. On a macro-methodological level, it means that a com-
parative normative claim is not a result of a greater development and com-
                                           
264 Taylor argues, however, that it does not necessarily entail that only humans are moral agents 
(Ibid: 136). 
265 The other alternative, namely, clarifying under what circumstances some non-vital interests can 
be transformed into vital ones, would be examined in detail in the chapter on Skirbekk. 
266 In turn, distinguishing between moral consideration and moral significance does not provoke a 
vicious circle (Ibid: 139) if we keep the idea of “different moral importance” untouched (Ibid: 140). 
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plexity, as French argues, while analyzing Johnson’s conception (Ibid: 141) 
because we still face the problem how to discern between big and great267. 
Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I draw the conclusion that 
ethical gradualism should take into account not only the complex relation-
ships between basic and non-basic needs, interests etc., but also the ones be-
tween the subjects they are applied to. Ethical gradualism requires a certain 
principle of moral differentiation (e.g. between moral subjects, moral agents 
and moral discussants) to be taken into account as a guiding rule. In this 
context, the problem of how equality has a normative validity, which cannot 
be solved by examining basic and non-basic needs as well as human and 
non-human capabilities, derives from the fact that they are defined on the 
principle of contaminated vessels. In turn, introducing concepts such as the 
ones of equal concern and consideration does not help much, when the idea 
of ‘actual duty’ is at stake (Ross in French 1999: 138). 
According to Næss, adopting so-called ethics of ecosystems, or environ-
mental ethics, means to accept the philosophy of Natural Right (Næss 
2005w: 388-389). However, he does not specify how to understand the lat-
ter in order to avoid the speculations with moral objectivism, namely, how 
to avoid identifying ‘natural’ with ‘intrinsic’, nor does he clarify the poten-
tial ‘dependence’ of natural right on the law of nature in so far as natural 
right should be examined as the one of living and blossoming. In this con-
text, another issue is how to define the universalizability of the vital needs 
(Næss 2008: 294) whose solution is found by Næss in prioritizing ‘what 
serves the vital needs of humanity’, when special ethical obligations to fel-
low beings are made. The double bind implications of the formulation in 
question arise from Næss’s hesitation to practically apply ethical gradualism 
to preserving the biospherical equilibrium without underrating human vital 
needs at once. 
Furthermore, Næss introduces some norms, which should guide the success-
ful realization of mixed communities. He presumes grounding a long-range 
global concern requiring long-range “global norms” (A3) (Næss 2005u: 
310). One of the main methodological problems in this respect is how to de-
                                           
267 Even if we accept Callicott’s idea of seeing ranking as the greatest risk of potential vulnerability, 
which is based on commitment to responsible choice and action as well as Aldo Leopold’s stance on 
talking about community-sensitive respect rather than biocentric egalitarianism (Callicott 1999: 
152), we still face the problem how the understanding of what ‘greater’ is can be noncontradictory 
recognized in normative terms. 
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fine the ultimate norms by “stopping somewhere”, as Næss insists (Ibid: 
311). If stopping somewhere is a random procedure, it would mean that the 
latter would have no normative validity at all.  
By providing A4 norm268, Næss aims to divert the utilitarian argument of 
suffering, albeit the probability is used to be examined in a vague way, 
which makes it a subject to misinterpretations. The probability that a greater 
number of animals will suffer is explored as taken ‘pari passu’ (Ibid: 313). 
Such an interpretation, however, still leaves the question ‘Whose justice? 
Which rationality?’ open, especially while defining the measure of ‘greater’ 
suffering. The quality, the degrees of intensity and the idea of simple pain 
itself require normative evaluation, which is not outlined as a measure by 
Næss. On the other hand, he makes some relevant statements regarding the 
number and the type of suffering as clarified by the idea of experienced suf-
fering (Ibid: 314) as well as that suffering is not something “additive” 
(Ibid). Furthermore, Næss comments on the ethical implications of suffering 
stressing that “beauty and intelligence” are completely irrelevant to suffer-
ing (Ibid), albeit he still adopts many of the utilitarian arguments regarding 
the sentience as a guiding criterion in measuring suffering. 
Discussing A6 norm269, Næss aims at clarifying both the reasons of the po-
litical conceptualization of A3 one and the role of the distribution of respon-
sibility in particular. The A6 norm concerns the willingness of central au-
thorities to arrange a “fair and swift compensation” (Ibid: 317). However, it 
does not contribute to finding solutions for overcoming the problems of two 
or more species living in one and the same area. Decentralization and cen-
tralization concern merely humans as political subjects. That is why eco-
politics cannot be explored on the level of evaluating the probabilities of co-
habitance alone. For example, sheep holders will not agree to change their 
area because it would lead to depriving people of their initial income. On 
the other hand, Næss relevantly claims that the norms of protection do not 
follow from the hypotheses about scarcity. The normative “vagueness” of 
the practical solutions is also apparent on the level of A7 norm, (Ibid: 318-
319), where the reference to the principle of blossoming in general is not 
                                           
268 If of two decisions, the first is more likely to contribute to the probability that a greater number of 
animals will suffer, then the second one is to be taken pari passu (Ibid: 313). 
269If a traditional sheep area is considered by degree of authorities as an area in which the wolves are 
protected, it depends on the authorities to arrange proper compensations for losses, or financial sup-
port for hiring shepherds (Ibid: 317). 
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grounded in solutions of the scope of ethical gradualism. Otherwise, it 
would remain unclear how the value strategies in Næss’s sense should guide 
our behavior (Ibid: 320). 
What would like some of the arguments against Næss’s conception? Testing 
his theory of mixed communities, B. Norton examines the problems of deep 
ecology as a social movement while building environmental policy, which 
is not more successful than a broad and long-sighted anthropocentric view-
point (Norton 1999: 394). According to Norton, deep ecology makes sense 
merely against “the backdrop of empirical beliefs about environmentalists 
and their actions” implying so-called Divergence Theory of Environment 
(Ibid). The question is not simply whether we can define a philosophical 
distinction between anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric value systems, 
but whether it can be successfully applied to deep ecology.  
Norton claims that divergence theory “represents not just an indirect expres-
sion of a false empirical hypothesis”, but it also implies some destructive 
heuristic assumptions (Ibid: 396) saying that these policies, which are good 
for people, are bad for nature (Ibid). Furthermore, Norton points out that he 
prefers so-called convergence theory, which is better for both humans and 
nature (Ibid). Since anthropocentrists articulate broadly and long-term based 
policies, the latter will converge with the ones of deep ecology and the other 
forms of non-anthropocentrism. If the divergence hypothesis is correct, it 
could be possible to describe given policies including Næss’s and some an-
thropocentrist ones as ‘sufficiently distinctive’. However, if one finds com-
promise positions for both anthropocentrists and non-anthropocentrists, 
then, Næss’s example with the policy towards wolves and bears conforms 
the convergence hypothesis (Ibid: 397). While summarizing Næss and Mys-
terud’s theory about discerning some areas as agricultural and some others 
as nonagricultural ones respectively, Norton disagree with their interpreta-
tion of the international law because losses cannot be compensated (due to a 
special designation) “across borders or across generations” (Ibid).  
In turn, the compromise policies, which aim to make wolves be as little dis-
ruptive for established human communities as possible, can also be  sup-
ported by some anthropocentrists, as Norton claims, who approves Næss’s 
emphasis on the sensitivities of traditional communities, while examining 
policy towards wolves (Ibid: 398). The sensitivities in question are justified 
as encouraging the recognition of multigenerational communities and cul-
tural institutions, which are focused on creating sustainable societies (Ibid). 
In this context, the change should not be grounded in justifying equality of 
species, but rather in the importance of holding opportunities for the future. 
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Norton also claims that Næss’s position on policy towards wolves con-
verges with a certain long-sighted anthropocentrism. The foundations of this 
conception are not in the revolutionary theory of intrinsic value, but in the 
concerns about sustainable communities due to the wisdom of local cultures 
(Ibid: 399). 
In this context, at least two main questions arise. First, how can we guaran-
tee that the intergenerational perspective is a necessary and sufficient condi-
tion for establishing sustainable communities, especially, taking into ac-
count that the role of local communities is inseparable from the one of the 
unsustainable (big) ones? Furthermore, how can we guarantee that the prin-
ciple of preservation will not be distorted due to what Næss calls docta ig-
norantia, or due to the impossibility (in the ideal case) to reasonably count 
the results of a possible intervention, i.e. to presume that the value of future 
generations is ‘higher’ (by default) than the one of nature? Secondly, defin-
ing sustainable community for species is done from a man’s perspective 
since humans, as I already specified, are the only ones who can be moral 
discussants and moral agents. Then, the question is what would restrict the 
idea of sustainability not to be replaced (deliberately or due to the lack of 
knowledge) with the one of unsustainability disguised as sustainability with 
a capital letter in the name of future generations? Otherwise, the latter 
would bring us back to the vicious circle of ethical speciesism because the 
rest living beings have generations as well. 
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2.1.1. Who Suffers Most? The Measurement of Suffering 
2.1. 1.1. The Impact of Ethical Gradualism on Mixed Communities 
Despite the fact that ethics is not considered as having high priority in 
Næss’s writings, its role is explicitly stated in respect with the life in mixed 
communities in so far as it concerns the establishment of a successful sym-
biosis of different species. Næss’s main concern is how to achieve the latter 
against the background of the principles of natural selection since the one of 
survival dominates species’ behavior. According to him, predation is not the 
most important factor because so-called struggle for life, struggle against 
enemies and survival of the fittest do not describe the most important fac-
tors of evolution among most animals (Næss 2005l: 136). They rather show 
its complication to the extent that violent death is a part of animals’ life 
since the less the chances of getting killed are, the less is the pressure of 
having as many descendents as possible270 (Ibid).  
In this context, maturity of the self is seen by Naess as consisting of three 
stages, namely, of the ones of ego, social self and metaphysical self. He also 
explores the development of the ecological self in the mixed communities, 
where the possibility for conflicts leading to annihilation is much higher, 
having more irreversible consequences. Even at this stage, one of the main 
methodological concerns derives from the fact that Næss does not consider 
ranking “wholly on ethical affairs” because the ‘sameness’ of an inherent 
value (shared by all species) does not necessarily exclude the opportunity of 
introducing a consideration of rank271. He sees the solution in examining 
the intrinsic values by stressing the slogan of the ultimate unity of all life 
(Næss 2008: 131). According to him, it does not mean that the big fish eats 
the small one, but rather reveals their profound interdependence (Ibid). 
Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I draw the conclusion that 
according to Næss, a statement about the fishes would mean to ignore the 
impact of the criterion of natural selection, when it does not meet the re-
quirements of promoting symbiosis. However, from that it does not follow 
that we will automatically establish symbiosis unless we try to recognize an 
                                           
270 This statement raises the concern to what extent the possibility of offspring is the only one neces-
sary and sufficient condition of facing violent death: e.g. it raises the question of hunger as a factor. 
271 It is one illustration of the difficulties he faces while applying the principles of ethical gradualism 
in practice presuming that the rank is always equivalent to introducing hierarchy. 
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uncontradictory view on how ethical gradualism could be applied. Further-
more, I claim that the feeling of identification is a necessary but not suffi-
cient condition in establishing the symbiosis in question even if we presume 
that it is always ‘there’, as Næss does. Otherwise, we should follow a line of 
arguments, which is based on the presumption that all the other living forms 
are potentially sentient as we are. Referring to Næss’s statement that the 
role of the “immediately experienced world” (defined as a sphere of self-
realization) is not a sufficient one, I argue that it does not provide a solution 
when two, or more, immediately experienced worlds contradict in practice. 
Another methodological concern is how to restrict the “necessary” killing of 
animals for food. It should be admitted by introducing special hypotheses 
and norms, while all these implementations should be made due to the pre-
sumption that we cannot reach an agreement on how to establish a norm 
against inflicting “unnecessary pain”, as Næss argues (Ibid: 178). The prob-
lem with his interpretation is that he still faces difficulties in clarifying the 
term “unnecessary” against the background of the questionable definition of 
what a natural right is (Ibid). 
The need of introducing a certain kind of ethical gradualism takes place, 
when Næss appeals for solving the problems in the mixed communities, es-
pecially in the ones of sheep and wolves, by claiming that we have not only 
a brain, but also a heart (Næss 1999b: 122). In this context, it is also impor-
tant to discuss his understanding of so-called primacy of wilderness within 
the framework of ‘the intuitions of organic wholeness’ regarding the princi-
ple to live and blossom. On a macro methodological level, the concern is 
how the animals can evaluate their initial ‘right’ to have an intrinsic val-
ue272 in order to avoid giving preference to the criteria of natural selection 
at the expense of ethical rules. 
Claiming that the intrinsic value presumes that no being has a priority in 
principle in respect with its potential (Næss 2005v: 291), i.e. that the value 
in question is a value in Kant’s sense. It still raises the issue that the evalua-
tion is possible merely on side of the rational and moral beings. Another 
problem derives from Næss’s ambiguous view that his reception theoreti-
cally leaves room for justifying ethical gradualism by providing experi-
ments in mixed communities, albeit he implicitly mixes different visions of 
‘priority in principle’ at once. On a macro methodological level, there is no 
                                           
272 Næss relevantly argues that modus vivendi is culturally determined by the vital right of every liv-
ing being to have an equal right to live and blossom. 
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priority in principle (understood as an abstract concept) because otherwise, 
we should go back to what Næss denies, namely, to one vague and abstract 
understanding of life. Elaborating the idea of right by adding ‘equal’, as 
Næss does (Ibid: 292), brings us back to the presumption that the equal right 
in question is both understood and accepted by default by the subjects hav-
ing rational and moral capacities for that273. 
Only then, the appeal for ‘Maximal complexity!’ in Næss’s sense (Ibid: 
293) can be understood as a norm in so far as it is derived from the basic 
norm of maximizing diversity (Ibid). Næss argues that maximizing diversity 
implies maximizing complexity, but such a derivation would mean that di-
versity ‘precedes’ complexity, while they appear simultaneously. In the on-
tological sense of the word, diversity is complexity. On a micro methodo-
logical level, it illustrates what is to “act out of its own particular conatus” 
since the key to a successful symbiosis is the potentialities for realization of 
different species such as wolves, sheep, bears and human beings274 to be 
anticipated in their maximal complexity (Ibid: 295-299)275.  
                                           
273 Næss ignores the criticism of McCloskey who argues that animals should have relevant moral 
capacities in order to have rights (Ibid: 299-300). 
274 Næss defines this approach as “more a posteriori and less elitist” compared to the one of Regan 
saying that it is probably wiser to introduce the concept of ‘right’ in the codification of norms cover-
ing animal-human interaction (Ibid: 298). It is relevant to claim that sometimes it is important to 
keep the words of human and animal behavior apart, but it is “never wise to try to eradicate the wid-
er ones” (Ibid: 299). Practically speaking, it shows how to ascribe different meanings to one and the 
same concept, while referring to human and animals respectively. 
275In this context, dependence should be understood as a dependence on complexity, which is em-
bodied as a matter of how to co-exist without contradictions. 
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2.2. What Goes Around, Comes Around. 
Some Critiques of Deep Ecology and the Role 
of Ontological Ethics 
Næss’s attempts to define the preference to gestalt ontology over environ-
mental ethics raise strong criticism due to the fact that underrating the nor-
mative validity of morality leaves many questions regarding deep ecology 
unanswered. Espen Gamlund emphasizes two main concerns arguing that it 
is unclear how deep ecology’s focus on the processes of identification and 
self-realization is dissociated from anthropocentrism, which they do not 
want to associate with (Gamlund 2012: 236). According to him, the ideas of 
identification and self-realization are anthropocentric in their nature (Ibid). 
Gamlund’s second argument is provoked by the fact that identifying with 
nature and feeling deep concern about all living beings do not necessarily 
lead to self-realization and happiness (Ibid). People do not experience that 
this understanding of happiness or good life appeals to them because such a 
life is not anticipated as a good one, or the best one, by all of them (Ibid: 
236-237). 
Starting with the first argument, I argue that even if we accept that the con-
cepts of identification and self-realization are anthropocentric ones, it does 
not question the way they contribute to rehabilitating the intrinsic value of 
nature, especially if these concepts are incorporated into the process of cul-
tivating sensitivity towards others due to the principles of ethical gradual-
ism. On a macro methodological level, it means that certain types of biocen-
trism do not necessarily exclude all forms of anthropocentrism. In turn, eth-
ical gradualism shows why we should avoid the extremes of both radical an-
thropocentrism and radical biocentrism while striving to cultivate our sensi-
tivity to both ourselves and other living beings. In other words, if we face 
some problems in this context, they are connected with being unaware that 
we should avoid reducing ethical gradualism to ethical anthropocentrism ra-
ther than talking about the disadvantages of treating identification and self-
realization as anthropocentric concepts. 
Regarding the second critical argument, before asking a question about 
what a good life is, we should make a certain distinction between quality of 
life and living standard. If these concepts remain synonyms, then persuad-
ing people to identify with nature may not necessarily provoke changing at-
titudes, as Gamlund argues. Thus the question of good life would not be un-
derstood as a normative question.  
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The origin of most of the aforementioned contradictions can be found in 
what Gamlund defines as Næss’s obsession with environmental ontology 
rather than environmental ethics (Ibid: 239). Gamlund’s arguments against 
reducing ethics to gestalt ontology again concern the issues deriving from 
the lack of clarifying morality’s normative validity. According to Gamlund, 
gestalt theory leads to “subjective relativism”, which is impossible to be 
used as a firm grounding of environmental ethics276 (Ibid). One of the rea-
sons is that Næss’s gestalt theory cannot be justified as a normative theory 
since none of us “can make a mistake”277 due to it (Ibid: 240). In this con-
text, the second critical argument refers to the impossibility of solving the 
conflicts of interests between man and nature unless environmental ethics is 
based on a critical moral way of thinking (Ibid: 240-241). 
I agree with Gamlund that even if we do not have ‘wrong’ gestalt experi-
ence, from that it does not follow that the latter is unquestionably valid in 
normative terms because the criterion of verification cannot be equated with 
the one of normative validity. I also agree with his second statement in so 
far as the process of solving conflicts from the perspective of ‘Whose jus-
tice? Which rationality?’ does not lead to satisfactory explanations278. Fur-
thermore, the methodological connection between ontology and ethics can-
not be defined by adopting the hypothetic-deductive method279 alone either 
due to which ‘first’ to ‘second’ refers as ‘reason’ to ‘consequence’. Ontol-
ogy is not a premise for ethics in the sense that the latter comes ‘next’ be-
cause then, there would be ethics without ontology and vice versa: it would 
be unnecessary ontology to have axiological connotations. If so, the follow-
ing question arises: which ontology provides whose ethics? 
                                           
276 Gamlund refers to E. Katz’s skepticism of basing ethical obligation to protect nature on favorable 
natural experience (Ibid: 240). 
277 He gives the example with the mountain’s characteristics. The mountain has characteristics x and 
y in relation to man, while the same mountain is recognized as having characteristics z and æ in rela-
tion to the cabin constructor (Ibid).  
278 The problem becomes of crucial importance especially when some vital needs are at stake. 
279 Gamlund argues that according to Næss, ‘should’ and ‘must’ do not have to be interpreted as an 
ethical order, but rather as a hypothetical imperative in Kant’s sense (Ibid: 235). But if we consider 
them as a form of hypothetical imperative, it would mean that we can keep proceeding only from 
the perspective of our own intrinsic value as a value in itself. On a macro methodological level, tak-
ing such a stance would lead to developing egoism, which is against Naess’s principles as well.  
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To a certain extent, Næss’s skepticism to ethics can be defined as coming 
from some unsolved problems regarding Sylvan’s land ethics, which is an 
object of criticism on Næss’s side. Sylvan’s ethics280 is focused on denying 
the role of ontology at the expense of the one of ethics claiming that values 
depend on the existence of the choice-making preferences281. Another as-
pect of the problem is that the ranks in question do not solve the concerns 
about the definition of so-called ‘nature’s way’ whose first and most appar-
ent representation is that we simply may be wrong what is good for the 
planet (Watson 1999: 116). In turn, such a concern raises another one re-
garding the definition of what is good in itself and if so, what would be the 
normative validity of the latter? Some difficulties that bring us back to the 
extrapolation of ethical anthropocentrism to an ideology based on the prin-
ciples of polarization. 
Against the background of the aforementioned investigations, I conclude 
that there is one more ‘dangerous’ prerequisite, which could lead us again to 
the paradigm of ethical anthropocentrism. It is the idea of conceptualizing 
the ontological stance on impartiality (eco-impartiality in particular) as 
moral neutrality in Næss’s sense. This crucial issue provokes another con-
tradictory conception, namely, the normative validity of moral engagements 
to be simplified to choosing between different types of interests, which 
should guide people in the process of interaction. Last but not least, I em-
phasize that it is the theory of moral neutrality that supports the ideology of 
evolution within the framework of moral objectivism, which is dominated 
by the understanding that the biological development is in tune with moral 
cultivation. 
Regarding Næss’s critics of ethics in favor of gestalt ontology, I argue that 
his definition of the latter implicitly meets the requirements of ontological 
ethics, which can be described as based on horizontal relatedness282, mak-
ing possible to talk about holism of man’s experience. Holism is recognized 
by the Norwegian philosopher through adopting a set of already discussed 
gestalt shifts due to the fact that they are incorporated in what I called moral 
                                           
280 The pitfalls of Sylvan’s conception are already emphasized by Grey who argues that a principle 
that affirms that all living things are of equal value is of no help in establishing preference-ranks 
(Grey 2000: 49). In other words, the axiological approach can be defined as a necessary but not suf-
ficient condition for justifying the need of adopting ethical gradualism. 
281 See Grey’s comments on Sylvan’s axiology (Ibid: 48). 
282 Næss also talks about a certain kind of horizontal relatedness.  
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experiential gestalts283. These shifts contribute to understanding how 
through cultivating sensitivity towards Otherness, man’s self-realization is 
inseparable from nature’s realization284.  
Regardless of the different visions on how the critics of deep ecology can be 
overcome, most researchers285 see the pitfalls in what I called a problem of 
normative validity, i.e. how the ethical commitment to the biosphere can be 
justified through clarifying so-called by E. Katz ontological commitment. 
He points out that the extension of the principles of deep ecology means to 
expand the idea of ontological commitment, which in turn has much to do 
with extending the visions of environmental ethics (Katz 2000: 28). Another 
crucial benefit of adopting his statement in terms of revealing the role of 
deep ecology is that Katz also sees the main methodological advantage of 
the latter in respect with the socio-political context (Ibid: IX). 
On the other hand, the thesis that the theory of deep ecology has not suc-
ceeded in eliminating ethics, but rather in distinguishing its assumptions as 
psychological ones (Reed and Rothenberg 1993: 70) can also be accepted 
merely to a certain extent since it would have meant to contradict psychol-
ogy and ethics. Næss himself still gives some positive definitions of ethics, 
but they mainly concern its practical role, i.e. it is determined as a given 
type of ‘supplementary’ “instrumentarium” cleaning the ground for the es-
tablishment of gestalt ontology. He argues that it is the ontological frame-
                                           
283 Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I reach the conclusion that finding an explanation 
in favor of ontological ethics rather than moral objectivism is concerned with examining the norma-
tive validity of the question ‘What does it mean for a living being to have a value ‘by nature?’. If the 
latter is literally understood, we should establish a certain form of moral objectivism as an explana-
tory paradigm.  
284 Otherwise, man’s gestalt would be simplified to the number of given experiential actions pre-
suming that the coherence is a result of the sum of the aforementioned actions. Thus the process of 
man’s self-realization would be justified as a self-sufficient one, which strengthens the anthropocen-
tric mode of thinking.  
285 According to V. Plumwood, Næss’s treatment of ethics is strongly influenced by his positivist 
background. That is why he aims to show that “nonextensional and nonhierarchical ethics” is possi-
ble (Plumwood 1999: 206). We may speculate to what extent we can refer this examination to so-
called hierarchical and non-hierarchical ethics (Ibid) since the positivists do not support such a dis-
tinction, nor do they give preference to one of them over the other. It is also similarly problematic to 
discuss extensional and non-extensional ethics (Ibid). The latter have rather an instructive function 
showing the general line of Næss’s theory, namely, that deep ecology should be introduced as reha-
bilitating the principles of bioegalitariansim.  
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work that is a container in which we make our ethically based choices286 
(Næss 1999: 142).  
In this context, I draw the conclusion that Næss recognizes the role of ethics 
to the extent to which he presumes that the process of identification depends 
on the variations of the intensity of subject’s affection. If we remain on the 
level of affection, however, it would mean the whole process to be reduced 
to a behaviorist ‘stimulus-reaction’ model, which in turn might also serve 
the purposes of the egoist self. That is why I argue that only the moral expe-
riential gestalt can “widen and deepen the effect of identification” in Næss’s 
sense (Næss 2005y: 466) as well as enrich the concrete contents of experi-
ence because it justifies the normative validity of ‘to make me see’ mode. 
I also argue that what I called moral experiential gestalt has much to do with 
Naess’s gestalts of action, or gestalt units constituting the problem-solving 
processes (Næss 2005aa: 508). The first question which arises is whether 
every single unit is equivalent to gestalt. We can examine them as ontologi-
cal synonyms, but only to a certain extent due to the fact that they both con-
trast the process of fragmentarization. Every single gestalt presumes a form 
of unity because it is based on a given, subjectable to structuring experi-
ence. However, from that it does not follow that every single unit is a ge-
stalt.  
Gestalts can rather be described as what Næss calls “greater wholes of ac-
tion and living” (Ibid). Furthermore, they can be characterized as such be-
cause the commitment to life comes from nature itself. Thus the commit-
ment in question can be examined as a moral one only if it does not provide 
the establishment of moral objectivism. In turn, Næss provides arguments, 
which make the contradictions become even more complicated. He argues 
that two opponents may share the same ethical prescriptions, but to disagree 
about a decision of environmental character because the object of moral at-
                                           
286 A proof of his thesis is that the norms of the ethically responsible communication are the ones of 
the effective communication (Næss 2000: 49). In this context, one of the main methodological risks 
that arises is that it is quite problematic to evaluate moral responsibility due to the criterion of effec-
tiveness.  
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tention is perceived through relying on radically different ontologies287 
(Cavazza 2014: 24).  
This, however, would mean that the ‘access’ to different paths can be evalu-
ated as deriving from the one regarding ontologies in question rather than 
ethics. Concerning the issue of different realities, the term ‘furthest’ applies 
to signify whether we will experience a certain reality as one or another. It 
has much to do with the specification whether the experience is considered 
as having a value in itself or value for itself, which is also an argument in 
favor of the thesis that ontology is inseparable from ethics. Regarding onto-
logical differences, we should first clarify why some people can have simi-
lar views on different things, i.e. on seeing different realities, as Naess sug-
gests. That is why it is important to emphasize the risk of simplifying ontol-
ogy if we reduce it to a way of seeing reality in so far as it provides the co-
herence of the latter288. 
                                           
287 Næss’s misconception of the knowledge about ethics derives from his claim that people have an 
“access” to different parts of reality due to the specificities of their different background. If so, it 
would mean to revive the subject-object dualism as well as the reduction of ontological to social rel-
ativism.  
288 Related difficulty is the one of defining value as an objective one (Cavazza 2014: 40), i.e. value 
to be understood as being entangled with emotional tones (Ibid). However, from the fact that “objec-
tivity is loaded with value” (Ibid), it does not follow that the value itself is objective, nor does it 
mean that values as such are naturally colored with so-called emotional tones. 
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2.2.1. The Role of Altruism, Empathy and Compassion 
I suggest interpreting Næss’s definition of altruism within the framework of 
ontological ethics since increasing the identification with others does not 
have to be understood as a process of full identification. Furthermore, the 
process of increasing does not have to be considered in quantitative terms, 
but as a qualitative transformation, i.e. as a process of gaining maturity. On-
ly in this case, it can be analyzed as inescapable, taking into account that the 
Self is irreducible to a narrow ego in so far as the self-realization is charac-
terized by Næss as an ecological approach to being in the world (Næss 
2008: 81).  
An important specification in this context is how Næss describes the proc-
ess of identification as one of finding something about the other in yourself 
by relying on feelings (Næss 2008d: 114). The problem is that such recogni-
tion can have a normative validity if the moral imagination is adopted be-
cause people’s ability for “easy identification” (Ibid) is merely a necessary 
condition even when feelings are involved. Otherwise, so-called extended 
understanding would have been determined as a result of imposing moral 
objectivism, which in turn would lead to the question why are not all people 
equally empathic? On a macro methodological level, it would mean that we 
cannot justify a line of thoughts in favor of normative validity on the level 
of genuine feelings in Næss’s sense. 
Maybe one of the most illuminative illustrations of Næss’s problems in 
overcoming the restrictions of anthropocentric paradigm can be seen in the 
way he interprets the role of empathy and compassion, which become un-
derstandable if we contextualize his explanations within the paradigm of on-
tological ethics. According to the Norwegian philosopher, empathy is a pro-
cess of identification – it is a vital power, it can be defined as seeing in oth-
ers part of God that exists in every single being (Ibid), and which is showed 
to the most suffering beings.  
On the basis of the aforementioned investigations, I reach the conclusion 
that it is the ontological potential of imaginative rationality that helps com-
passion to be oriented towards a broader group of addressees. At the same 
time, Næss’s theory leaves some significant questions unanswered. For ex-
ample, the Self cannot be a Self form the very beginning: he/she should ra-
ther become such a one. However, values are not a part of the nature itself, 
unless we presume a certain moral objectivism to be adopted. 
According to Diehm, Næss does not clarify what the particular ways of 
identifying with other beings would be so that the respect to their specifici-
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ties to be preserved (Diehm 2006: 34-35). Another issue, which also raises 
some questions, is concerned with the particular ability of identifying with 
others by taking care, while the criteria of recognizing the normative valid-
ity of the different ecosophies still remain unclear.  
Næss himself introduces the concept of comprehensive maturity (Næss 
2005bb: 515-516). The latter is described as a process regarding the fulfill-
ment of Self’s potentials289 in others. If natural was literally interpreted, 
then the Self would have annihilated the others290 and thus would have re-
mained obsessed with his/her own narrow ego (Ibid). In the process of be-
coming, however, the self cannot escape from contributing to the fulfillment 
of life’s manifestations (Næss 2008: 196). The specification of “being ma-
ture in all major relationships” is not a sufficient argument either because it 
raises the question how both to evaluate these relationships and to discern 
them from so-called ‘minor’ ones. In turn, the specification of the poten-
tials’ fulfillment, which is the main objective of the self-realization, is rec-
ognized by Næss as a fulfillment of life in its meaning through experiencing 
joy. In this context, he makes again the ambiguous statement that we should 
rely on acting beautifully than on acting dutifully facing difficulties to show 
how we can avoid moral relativism. On a meta-methodological level, to an-
swer the question Why is it ‘inescapable’ to “see ourselves in other”? as a 
“part” of the increasing maturity (Næss 2005bb: 516) presumes that moral 
commitment is initially grounded in so-called enlightened self-interest.  
                                           
289 Examining the Selves as process ones is under the influence of Mahayana Buddhism. Næss out-
lines the role of Buddhist view that there are no entities, which are not characterized as processes. 
“To realize oneself” means to “follow the path” (Næss 2008: 198). He also emphasizes that the 
Buddhist conception of the realization of so-called Great Self does not correspond to Hindu idea of 
realizing the absolute Atman (Ibid: 135). In this context, Næss outlines the role of Sanskrit phrase 
“realizing svamarga”, which means to “realize one’s own way” (Ibid). The latter also helps us see-
ing how so-called Great Self is interpreted as deeply involved in the realization of the aforemen-
tioned way. Referring to some concepts of Mahayana Buddhism, Næss distinguishes the self in 
small letters from the self with a capital one. 
290 However, Næss avoids the contradiction by referring to Erich Fromm’s vision of persons’ love 
arguing that ecosophers find a broader meaning of this concept in respect with other beings (Næss 
2005bb: 518). 
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2.3. Næss’s Reception of Spinoza’s Ethics 
On a macro methodological level, the influence291 of Spinoza on Næss can be 
traced in three main directions at least, namely, in recognizing and rehabilitating 
the role of joy by specifying the functions of pleasure, happiness and perfection 
(Næss 2008: 304), in analyzing the possible misuse of emotions as well as in 
exploring the origin of maturity of feelings while solving conflicts, which corre-
sponds to another illuminative source of inspiration for Næss, namely, to Gan-
dhi’s ethics of non-violence. 
According to Næss, Spinoza’s theory292 furnishes an excellent basis of the deep 
ecology concept of identification with every living being, emphasizing that self-
preservation is not a fundamental term in his system, nor is any other concept a 
fundamental one. Furthermore, Næss is aware of the distinction between Spino-
za’s conception of self-preservation (to be and to act in suo esse) and self-
realization (Ibid: 246). According to Spinoza, to preserve in one’s being means 
not to preserve in someone else’s essence (Ibid: 247), which in turn leads to the 
relevant statement that altruism is not to jump into the essence of somebody 
else, albeit he does not specify why the self-preservation, as defined, does not 
have moral connotations. 
In turn, the fundamental norm of self-realization in Spinoza’s theory contributes 
to clarifying how “one to preserve oneself by expressing oneself”, i.e. how one 
to achieve a self-fulfillment by realizing one’s potential. In this context, I draw 
the conclusion that Næss does not reveal how preservation in suo esso provides 
a basis of a comparison with the process of self-realization in normative terms, 
while, on the other hand, the preservation in question is characterized by him as 
a non-Spinozist term. Regarding the issue how to relate the concept of self-
preservation to the one of self-realization, I argue that Spinoza’s conception of 
                                           
291 However, Næss explains that many supporters of deep ecology movement do not appreciate the 
works of Spinoza because of the way he underrates the value of animals’ life (Næss 2008: 249). 
292 In his earlier writings, Næss summarizes twenty points due to which we can recognize Spinoza 
as an ecophilosopher. Among them, he outlines some characteristics of Spinoza’s conception such 
as the lack of duality, the dynamic thinking, the role of democracy and freedom within the system 
thinking, the impact of joy on the relevant understanding etc. (Næss 1974: 1-4). 
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self-preservation293 refers to the one of self-realization as activity refers to ac-
tiveness (Næss 2005jj: 389). We should keep in mind that we cannot replace the 
concept of self-preservation with the one of self-realization in so far as the pro-
totype characteristic of the latter is the performative activeness triggering the 
self-fulfillment to be recognized as intrinsically connected with the fulfillment 
of the others. 
Another issue is whether preserving one’s essence is always a guarantee of pre-
serving one’s being. That is why the difference between the modes of self-
preservation and self-realization can be defined as a difference between the 
mode of ‘to be’, as Næss himself clarifies in respect with Spinoza’s conception 
of preservation, and what I called the mode of ‘to become’ presuming active-
ness, which is irreducible to a set of given activities. As Næss argues, we can be 
involved in all kinds of activities without being in a state of activeness294.  
In turn, he claims that two of his main sources of inspiration were Askeladden 
and Spinoza emphasizing that the inspiration should be sought in decoding the 
slogan of the symbiosis with the other beings, namely, to find an answer to the 
question how to have both meaningful and joyful life in our nature, in a non-
naturalistic sense of the word (Næss 1999: 9). Extrapolating Næss’s theory, I 
argue that experiential learning can be justified by outlining the role of personal 
choice as a life’s choice due to which the individual chooses how to make 
his/her personal commitment to nature’s process of harmonization. In this con-
text, so-called essential man’s nature (Ibid) does not have to be interpreted as a 
strive for imposing a form of moral naturalism, but rather as a way of rehabili-
tating the intrinsic value of nature and thus the one of man’s role in the bio-
sphere. 
As one of the main reasons of adopting Spinoza’s ethics, Næss points out Spi-
noza’s understanding of what a total view is, namely, his theory saying that we 
rely on our thinking about ourselves and reality we are part of, which Spinoza 
applies to concrete situations (Næss 2008: 234). It concerns the recognition of a 
certain kind of derivation, which to be subjectable to verification on every sin-
                                           
293 Regarding Spinoza’s theory of self-preservation, its connection with the concept of cupiditas is 
brought to light. It would illustrate how to understand the relationship between the mode of in suo 
esse and freedom. Spinoza provides a hint in this direction saying that he does not discern between 
joy and joyful (Næss 1999: 48). 
294 This statement is extrapolated for the purposes of better understanding Gandhi’s ethics of non-
violence not as a ‘passive’ resistance, but rather as an impossibility to reduce activeness to a given 
set of concrete activities. 
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gle level of its development avoiding the possibility for falsification, as Spinoza 
does, by structuring ethics as based on hypotheses, theorems and conclusions. 
However, there are some crucial aspects of Spinoza’s theory and his ethics in 
particular, which illustrate why he cannot be described as a proto-
ecophilosopher, as Næss’s suggests295. Spinoza’s ethics as such is oriented to-
wards the other human beings rather than the living beings in general. Spinoza’s 
suggestion of reaching a symbiosis concerns the establishment of “circles of 
friends”, which are examined as extending the feelings of joy towards the others 
(Næss 1999: 9-10). It is the normative validity of the initial feeling of fulfill-
ment recognized as a feeling of self-identification that would be achieved by the 
identification with others. This makes necessary the transformation of what 
Spinoza calls passive affects. 
In turn, the transformation of negative to positive emotions can be defined as 
one of ontological deficiency to ontological sufficiency, while the transforma-
tion (in the sense of cultivation) of the self with a small letter to the one with a 
capital letter (namely, the ecological Self) can be determined as a transforma-
tion from an ‘undeveloped’ moral commitment to a ‘developed’ one. However, 
the latter cannot be defined as a transformation based on the transition from 
‘less’ to ‘more’ because then, the process of self-realization would not have 
been justified as a top norm in Næss’s sense. This conclusion is also grounded 
in the fact that maturity is not equivalent to the process of physical develop-
ment. Otherwise, there would not have been such an initial possibility for a 
complex fulfillment, or a rehabilitation of so-called by Naess affective engage-
ment296 (Ibid: 43) in so far as the complex understanding presumes already 
specified cultivation of activeness to be internalized. 
By relying on Spinoza’s theory of transforming the negative feelings into posi-
tive ones, Næss outlines the role of the latter for the choice of values, which in 
turn contribute to establishing what he calls “goal-oriented and sensible choice” 
(Næss 2008d: 7). Næss refers to Spinoza’s statement that emotions make us 
something we appreciate being (Ibid: 8-9). On a macro methodological level, 
reconsidering the role of emotions within the decision-making process is impor-
tant for realizing that moral progress is irreducible to the scientific one. It pro-
                                           
295 Næss explains that many supporters of the deep ecology movement do not appreciate the works 
of Spinoza because of the way he underrates the value of animals’ life (Næss 2008: 249). 
296 Reason is helpless unless it is not in harmony with an affect (Ibid: 43). Then, an incoherent point 
would be that the progress, which is rationally determined, would presuppose an affective engage-
ment (Ibid). 
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vokes searching for life’s meaning, which requires taking moral responsibility 
because meaningfulness as such is inseparable from the idea of intrinsic value. 
Secondly, self-realization is interpreted as a matter of a goal-oriented becoming 
through showing love and care to all living beings, which activates our ‘whole’ 
nature. One process that is possible due to the fact that the activity in question 
derives from nature’s activeness.  
Why do we need to explore the transformation from passive to active affects 
and the one from activity to activeness respectively, taking into account Næss’s 
statement that environment movement could help us to form concepts that fuse 
insight and emotion (Ibid: 85)? Maturity of emotional life, in so far as Spinoza 
talks about active and passive feelings (Næss 1999: 9), is reached only when 
others’ happiness releases happiness in ourselves (Ibid: 76). According to Spi-
noza, we should give preference to active feelings because they promote the 
feeling of community and the one of moral conduct, as a consequence of natural 
causes (Ibid: 80). However, in order to avoid moral objectivism, we would ra-
ther claim that these are causes, which have an intrinsic value in themselves. 
Exploring the role of emotions in Spinoza’s writings, Næss refers to the term of 
prevailing emotional tone (Ibid: 33), while focusing on how to avoid emptiness 
as a prevailing emotional tone, i.e. how to justify the rehabilitation of ‘to be-
come’ mode since a possible distinction from the one of ‘to be’ would provoke 
two different feelings: the ones of being lived and living (Ibid). In this context, I 
draw the conclusion that the feeling of being lived is the prevailing tone of the 
‘narrow’ ecological self in Næss’s sense, while the one of living concerns the 
ecological Self with a capital letter297. 
                                           
297Regarding the role of ethics, I draw the conclusion that Næss’s references to Spinoza contribute 
to introducing the role of intuitionism and the one of inner voice. As a prototype characteristic of 
this new ecology, we can point out so-called reasonable sensitivity (Ibid: 44). 
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2.3.1. The Inspiration of Spinoza’s Theory of Joy 
Spinoza defines joy against the background of the distinction between 
pleasure, happiness and perfection since it provides a transition from a low-
er to a higher degree of perfection (Næss 2008d: 92). In turn, Næss argues 
that Spinoza’s philosophy of joy298 is a “great inspiration” because it is fo-
cused on joy as a process rather than a fleeting emotion (Ibid: 171). Fur-
thermore, he claims that it is the intuition of the living beings that grounds 
the feeling of joy and its different representations. On a macro methodo-
logical level, the problem is whether intuitionism, understood as a third kind 
of knowledge in Spinoza’s sense, is recognized by Næss as a type of knowl-
edge, which does not need further clarifications. And if so, how can we jus-
tify a certain ethical gradualism in this context? 
Borrowing the concept of perfectionism from Spinoza is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for understanding the process of self-realization be-
cause, as Næss relevantly argues, perfection and perfectionism are not 
equivalent to each other (Næss 1999: 42). Perfectionism contributes to de-
fining the different embodiments of joy, namely, the ones of titillation (titi-
latio), or so-called restricted joy, and hilarity (hilaritas), encompassing all 
the parts of nature (Ibid). According to Næss, Spinoza’s hilaritias is a joy of 
which it can never be too much since it is a prevailing emotional tone (Næss 
2008d: 172) 299. Regarding Næss’s own writings, the reception of Spinoza’s 
joy is crucial for his understanding of the performative power of self-
realization as inseparable from the one of nature in so far as the fulfillment 
of life’s meaning triggers a positive prevailing emotional tone.  
In turn, the recognition of this second type of joy is also one of Næss’s ar-
guments against Zapffe’s existential pessimism. Næss emphasizes that ‘hi-
laritas’ is the love that fulfills the whole soul (Næss 1999: 108) so that we 
are completely absorbed with joy (Ibid). This fulfillment is an illuminative 
example of why its ‘naturalness’ is understandable as having normative va-
lidity within ontological ethics since love should not be interpreted from the 
perspective of objective naturalism. Otherwise, it would have been impossi-
ble one to fulfill one’s potential unless reaching a given stage of fulfillment. 
                                           
298 See Næss 1999. 
299 In turn, Amor intellectualis in Spinoza’s sense as well as Buddha’s smiling status are described 
by Næss as a type of hilaritas (Ibid) to the extent they are based “on that unavoidable, in the sense of 
all encompassing, form of love” (Ibid). 
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Furthermore, it would have caused the self-realization to be underrated from 
a process to a state.  
The latter concerns the need of rehabilitating a certain type of experiential 
joy within Spinoza’s theory of process experience of joy in the world. Ac-
cording to Næss, this experience is irreducible to a momentous one (Ibid: 
110), which makes me claim that ‘spontaneous’300 is not determined as a 
temporal characteristic, but as an existential one concerning life’s quality in 
non-absolutist terms. In this context, I argue that Næss’s reception of Spi-
noza’s theory gives grounds to discuss the issue of normative validity of 
imaginative rationality in so far as he distinguishes between playfulness and 
play, taking into account that the former is irreducible to a set of rules (Ibid: 
113)301.  
One of the main methodological concerns in Næss’s explanation, however, 
is how to recognize joy as having a value by contrast to sadness, which is 
defined as deprived of such a one. Referring to Spinoza, Næss argues that 
Spinoza describes sadness (tristitia), fulfilling the whole person under the 
guise of a melancholia, which is a state having no value (Ibid: 109). On a 
textual level, it remains highly questionable how as well as to what extent 
Spinoza’s virtue lacks the moral atmosphere of arête, taking into account 
that Spinoza discusses the role of conatus in part five of Ethics as instruc-
tive, i.e. as concerning the things due to the third way of cognition (Næss 
2008: 248). If the lack of intrinsic value is recognized in instrumental terms, 
namely, in respect with the principle of deprivation, it would mean to equate 
virtues with values. However, virtues cannot be equated with values, even if 
we agree with him that the common feature of Spinoza and deep ecologists 
is the recognition of nature’s perfection in itself, which is amoral. 
Another concern derives from the contradiction regarding so-called com-
plete differences in nature (Næss 1999a: 95). Næss commented upon Spino-
za’s fragment IVP29 saying that it may not be intended to cover relations to 
animals (Ibid). He extrapolates Spinoza’s statement that someone’s joy “dif-
fers in nature” from the joy of another person because the essence of the 
former is not equivalent to the essence of the latter (Ibid). Despite the fact 
that merely people discern between hilaritas and letitia, these ‘qualitatively’ 
                                           
300 Spontaneity does not have to be interpreted as a matter of pure improvisation, nor as a form of 
epistemological relativism. 
301 In Norwegian, the difference is defined as the one between ‘lek’ and ‘spill’. According to Næss, 
playfulness can, however, easily lead to a condition close to hilaritas (Ibid). 
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different types of joy are misleadingly ‘quantified’ by presuming that the 
differences in nature are of a lower rank than the ones in essence. An argu-
ment in favor of the thesis can be implicitly found in Næss’s statement that 
“perhaps not their natures are completely different” (Ibid).  
In this context, at least two methodological questions arise, namely, how to 
analyze the role of perfection when applied to nature and man respectively 
as well as how to understand Næss’s theory that the intrinsic value of nature 
is irrelevant to morality by default. The first concern is about the presump-
tion of intuitive coherent knowledge and imperfect, fragmentary one of or-
der, but not about the entity of nature itself. Næss does not go into detail 
why the imperfection in question is not a result of knowledge of order itself, 
but rather of the fact that this knowledge pretends to encompass the one of 
nature. In other words, the aforementioned imperfection could be inter-
preted not as provoked by the premise that we are not able to know the 
common order of nature, but rather from the pretention that such a knowl-
edge derived from nature as such. Furthermore, instead of examining the 
ethical projections of this issue, Næss remains on the level of investigating 
the distinction between perfect and imperfect knowledge302. 
                                           
302 This distinction can be examined by referring to Næss’s reception of the two types of perfection 
introduced by Spinoza, namely, so-called P1 and P2. The first type of perfection is intuitively con-
ceived as achieving completeness and realness (Næss 2005w: 387). We may develop Næss’s inves-
tigation saying that the perfection in question is something already accomplished. Næss relevantly 
describes it as related to the concept of “mature ecosystem” in so far as it concerns the ontological 
climax of diversity. That is why the ‘maximum’ mode does not have to be interpreted as an accom-
plishment, but rather as a dialectical completeness having the dynamic equilibrium as its prototype 
characteristic. In turn, the second type of perfection can be described as a strive for completion 
whose ontological potential consists in the strive itself, namely, the latter to be recognized as a form 
of orientation. That is why if it is considered as per-factum, we should deny the initial strive for per-
fection and then, the self-realization as a form of maturity, i.e. to deny what Næss calls enlightened 
gradualism. 
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2.3.2. Some Comments on Næss’s Reception of Spinoza’s 
Ethics 
Regarding Næss’s reception of Spinoza’s ethics, Lloyd argues that Spinoza 
combines “a strong rejection of anthropocentric perception with an equally 
strong affirmation of a man-centered morality” (Lloyd 1999: 74)303. It is the 
morally significant common nature of men that is expressed in the strive for 
collaborating through the cultivation of reason (Ibid: 82). Spinoza’s ethical 
system is determined as centered on the process of self-preservation as well 
as on the survival of human beings, being incompatible with G. Sessions’s 
interpretation that both Leopold and Spinoza examine the total systems of 
nature as “ethically fundamental” ones (Ibid: 83). 
To these speculations, Næss raises the argument that Spinoza does not use 
the word ‘morale’, ‘moralis’, namely, that what we recognize as moral is 
closest to what Spinoza defines as pietas, i.e. to the desire to do good (Næss 
1999a: 92). In this context, we can witness again the double bind narrowing 
of morality to moralization as well as the need the definition of “the desire 
to do good” to be specified in ethical terms as having a relevant normative 
validity. Næss makes the questionable conclusion that Spinoza’s ethics is 
about generosity and love rather than morality saying that finding satisfying 
metaphors of environment is not necessarily concerned with moralization. 
Despite the fact that he gives some arguments for the latter, from that it 
does not follow that generosity, love and morality are initially contradicting  
On a macro methodological level, Næss’s main argument against Llyod is 
that she makes Spinoza look “too much like Hobbes” in so far as she intel-
lectualizes too much his amor Dei
304 (Ibid: 91). Regardless of the fact that 
Næss poses relevant concerns about the lack of distinction between moral 
                                           
303 In turn, Clark argues that Lloyd is wrong in interpreting morality as a constraint for the moral 
agent (Clark 1999: 104). 
304 The ‘constructive’ role of imagination can be examined by referring to Spinoza’s three forms of 
understanding (Næss 2008: 84) since so-called Amor Intellectualis to God does not imply a distinc-
tion between feelings and reason. It is a matter of a “unified emotional understanding” (Ibid) in 
which love is based on the creative force of nature. Næss argues that experiencing the third kind of 
knowledge should be done from the perspective of God because we are not fully able to understand 
the “common order of nature” (Næss 2005w: 386). In turn, this knowledge is not only ‘unified’ but 
also unifying in so far as it does not encompass but rather activates the potential of all living beings.  
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and natural right in Spinoza’s writings305 (Ibid: 93), he emphasizes the role 
of ‘power over’ rather than the one of ‘power to’306 (Ibid). Judging by the 
aforementioned investigations, I claim that Næss misinterprets the idea that 
there is no abyss between men and beasts, so that it is always unprofitable 
for humans to “associate” with beasts (Ibid: 95). Furthermore, I argue that 
Næss introduces an incomplete induction based on Spinoza’s IVP37S say-
ing that horses and men are filled with a desire of procreation as well as that 
men and insects have “lusts and appetites” in common. At the same time, 
Næss claims that Spinoza never specifies this desire (Ibid). On the basis of 
the vague similarity of horses and men, he jumps to the conclusion that hu-
mans can associate with beasts. It is possible due to the presumption that it 
is the desire that makes us aware of their common traits. 
In this context, I conclude that ‘moral’ does not have to be understood as 
being presumably ‘good’ or ‘bad’, i.e. the good/bad connotations do not 
correspond to the god/bad matter in Spinoza’s sense. However, from that it 
does not follow that talking about self-realization of the ecological Self 
within the paradigm of ethics is a form of narrow moralization. In other 
words, accepting that in the state of nature there is nothing good or bad by 
default, namely, something, which to be defined as ‘substantially’ good or 
bad, it does not follow that man cannot evaluate his/her nature as good un-
der given circumstances. Næss describes this state as Spinoza’s paradox 
(Næss 1999: 71), which, on the other hand, might be recognized as a para-
dox merely within the paradigm of moral objectivism due to which the 
normative validity is equated with the criterion of verification. 
                                           
305 According to him, humans have “much more rights” in relation to the animals than they have in 
relation to humans. 
306 On the basis of the definitions two and three of emotions in Part three of Spinoza’s Ethics, Næss 
claims that animal may increase or decrease in perfection (Ibid: 95). 
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2.3.3. The Role of Amor Dei Intellectualis 
In this context, ratio shows us to what extent the direction taken by making 
a decision affects the complex understanding being in harmony with the na-
ture of human beings and thereby with natura naturans (Næss 2008d: 87). 
On the other hand, even if we accept that ratio is the starting point of realiz-
ing the commitment to the wholeness, it does not underrate in any way 
whatsoever the role of morality for the transformation in question. Further-
more, if sadness is provoked from the knowledge about one’s suffering 
(Næss 1999: 64), the eradication of the latter never stems from the knowl-
edge alone, as Spinoza suggests, because the transformation comes from the 
cultivated sensitivity towards otherness, recognized as a form of commit-
ment to someone else’s suffering. Thus the transformation is initiated by re-
habilitating understanding as irreducible to pure rationality, as I already 
claimed.  
Næss also specifies that Spinoza’s theory of love to God (conatus) is not in-
terpreted against the background of a given hedonistic psychology, which 
takes pleasure and pain as starting points (Ibid: 37). On the other hand, the 
presumption that connatus is not a “servant of the third way” is a necessary 
but not sufficient condition in realizing the complex understanding, nor is it 
a means, which is more elaborated than the intuition itself. Furthermore, if 
we accept that reason is just a ‘servant’, how can we define the process of 
self-realization as “the logically deepest principle” (Næss 2008d: 113) in 
Næss’s sense? That is why I argue that Spinoza’s three types of knowledge 
can be applied to the aims of deep ecology if they are examined as dia-
chronically connected rather than hierarchically ordered307.  
Referring Næss’ reception of Spinoza, two significant points should be em-
phasized, namely, that Spinoza’s system is not a speciesist one, albeit he is 
personally what we call a speciesist today. However, this is not because it is 
based on a strict premise-conclusion model. It rather concerns the lack of 
such a thinkable distinction in his theory. Judging by the aforementioned 
investigations, I agree with Næss’s criticism that we need not“ say that to-
day man’s relationship with the non-human world is immoral” is “going too 
far from Spinoza’s propositions” (Næss 1999a: 99). It is enough to say that 
it lacks generosity (Ibid). 
                                           
307 Otherwise, adopting such a hierarchy would mean reason to be examined as having ‘less’ epis-
temological validity than intuition. 
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In this context, the contribution of Spinoza to developing ecological think-
ing can be sought on the level of what Clarck (using Næss’s terminology) 
calls ‘deep’ level of questioning of our concepts of humanity, namely, on 
the one of adopting a similar approach such as the one of deep ecology 
(Clarck 1999: 103). However, we should still be aware of the fact that moral 
experientalism is not equivalent to ethical gradualism as such. 
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2.4. Næss’s Reception of Gandhi’s Ethics 
of Non-violence 
The definition of ethics of non-violence corresponds to the way Næss de-
fines ecophilosophical pluralism308 (Næss 2005x: 421) since every system-
atic ethics is examined as containing a general norm against violence. One 
of the specifications that should be made is that such pluralism covers not 
only the physical violence (Ibid: 425). That is why the concept of ecophi-
losophical pluralism does not have to be left vague, as he suggests.  
In this context, we should examine the ontological internal relations of goals 
and means in Gandhi’s sense, which is a crucial premise for understanding 
Næss’s theory of deep ecology movement. I argue that we can interpret 
Næss’s statement that “means are all on last instance” (Næss 2000: 60) 
avoiding the methodological concern about recognizing them as an implicit 
reference to Machiavellianism. Despite the fact that there are no clear dif-
ferences between means and goals (Ibid) in respect with the normative va-
lidity of common goal, from that it does not follow that the means can re-
place the goals themselves. According to Næss, the key solution is provid-
ing a different type of evaluation for the means and goals respectively, 
namely, the former should be evaluated separately from the latter (Ibid: 30). 
He finds a positive answer to this question in Gandhi’s ethics (Ibid)309, 
which is explored against the background of the concerns about Lenin’s un-
critical use of means and the one of Western economic liberalism (Ibid). On 
the other hand, a good specification made by Næss affects the clarified con-
nection between achieving goals and informed consent of all parts, which 
should affect both mind and heart (Ibid: 33). It benefits avoiding ethics of 
non-violence to be questioned by the criterion of effectiveness in moral 
                                           
308 Næss points out that Spinoza does not develop a special theory about the origin of evil, but also 
argues that his categories of good and bad apply to the doers and not to the deeds themselves. This 
argument is compared with Gandhi’s ones in favor of ethics of non-violence. Furthermore, Næss 
claims that we should be particular about the way Spinoza interferes the role of the deeds with their 
consequences. In this context, I argue that Gandhi’s theory of exploring enemies as potential friends 
cannot be uncontradictory referred to Spinoza’s conception of friends’ circles in so far as it would 
require the initial distinction between so-called good doer and wrong doings to be specified.  
309 This way of a separate evaluation, however, contradicts the one proposed in Næss’s later writ-
ings. 
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practice. This is one of the few cases in which Næss does not give unques-
tionable priority to feelings in the process of understanding since they can 
inflict hate under given circumstances. 
Furthermore, I claim that communication in Næss’s sense (as influenced by 
Gandhi’s theory) is important for overcoming some generalizations (i.e. the 
possibility to impose speciesism within ecophilosophy) at the expense of 
rehabilitating the principle of differentiation as well as recognizing its nor-
mative validity as a means of revealing the concept of intrinsic value. In 
turn, justifying non-violence as a new type of activeness, which is irreduci-
ble to a given set of activities, leads to rehabilitating the concept of passive-
ness as a possibility for realization that provides one’s potential to be ful-
filled in a process, rather than to be stigmatized as a lack of potential. 
Therefore, the new types of activeness do not have to be examined as unde-
veloped passiveness, but as activeness whose ontological potential triggers a 
new form of ethically grounded activism. Thus we can reconsider responsi-
bility as a key premise for defining non-violence as a top norm310 in Næss’s 
sense; a norm, which has a status in his system that is similar to the one of 
self-realization.  
According to J. Galtung, who is a co-author of some of the most illumina-
tive publications of Næss on Gandhi, Næss’s interest in Gandhi’s life and 
works is intrinsically connected with two of his lifelong projects, namely, 
with the justification of non-violence and the world philosophy (Galtung 
2011: 31). The “challenge to engage explicitly with Gandhi” (Ibid) came in 
the early 1960s when the Norwegian government started a project on the 
technological assistance for fisheries in Southern India (in Kerala) (Ibid). In 
this context, Galtung outlines the development of Næss’s ideas showing the 
way they have been elaborated from targeting the general audience to be-
coming more philosophically specialized in time. Thus he clarifies why the 
                                           
310 We can justify such a hypothesis in so far as in both cases, in the ones of non-violence and self-
realization, the opponents are presumably examined as cooperators (Næss 2000: 45) (Ibid: 53) in 
their strive for counteracting the norm of isolation (Ibid: 48). 
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first investigations of Gandhi’s heritage311 took place against the back-
ground of the need of reconsidering the dilemmas of the post-war situation 
in Europe312. 
One of Næss’s main reasons for adopting Gandhi’s ethics of non-violence is 
his attempt at finding the conflict centre as well as discerning between topic 
and person while attacking the deeds rather than the doer (Næss 2005ll: 
423), (Næss 2000: 7). Næss’s significant argument for adopting Gandhi’s 
ethics concerns showing how solving conflicts by distinguishing between 
deeds and doer is a crucial representation of what it means to have a rich 
life with simple means.  
According to Næss, if the average people are content during the leadership 
process with reporting their intuitive conclusions and these conclusions are 
contradicting to each other, the chances for a common initiative become 
much lower (Galtung and Næss 1955: 22). Such a difficulty can be avoided 
if the leaders provide a relatively firm and explicit normative system, which 
they to refer their conclusions to, namely, a reference framework which 
their actions to be formed in (Ibid). This system of norms can never replace 
a practical judgment and reasonable considerations because there is no rea-
son to want this. That is why we do not have to take up only main norms 
(and a part of sub-norms of a second order), but also many norms on levels 
                                           
311 In this context, a significant problem arises from Gandhi’s definition of non-violence (ahimsa). 
Gandhi himself allowed many exceptions to ahimsa (in his early writings) that scandalized Hindus 
and Jains arguing that “all killing is not himsa” (Gier 1996: 87). Due to the fact that Gandhi’s ahim-
sa is described as reactive and flexible, not as passive and absolute (Ibid), he accepts that some ti-
gers, snakes, and rabid dogs might have to be killed if they threaten human life. Then, the question 
which arises is how can we compare Gandhi’s implicit ethical gradualism with Næss’s one? Ahimsa 
in Gandhi’s sense is personal and refers to everybody. Only a perfect yogi should pacify danger an-
imals. However, Gandhi does not exclude the possibility to sacrifice nonviolence for the sake of 
truth. That is why I argue that within Gandhi’s ethics of non-violence, truth is justified as the highest 
value since it is a value in itself, which is irreducible to Næss’s epistemological truth. 
312 Galtung argues that the book Gandhi and the Nuclear Age (1965) displays “Næss’s peace studies 
program: as Gandhi studies”312 (Ibid), taking into account that the definition of the international con-
flict in the 1950s was still referred to the traumas of the Nazi occupation. One of the most crucial 
questions at that time was Can non-violent defense replace military defense?; a question, which was 
answered by Næss in his program (Ibid). While Gandhi’s Political Ethics (1956) was written to sat-
isfy the interest of the general audience Gandhi and the Nuclear Age is described by Galtung as both 
being “at a much deeper theoretical level” and today’s key source for Næss’s work on Gandhi 
(Ibid). 
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three and four (Ibid). In the end, we will have a certain type of a complete 
teaching about all life’s connections, which are relevant for the political eth-
ics (Ibid). In turn, the reduction of the intuitive conclusions is done not as a 
process of complete annihilation, but rather for the purposes of providing a 
dissection of the normative validity.  
Presuming that “descriptive-constitutive research” needs different helping 
means such as historical psychology, Næss claims that albeit intuition313 
and pure practical judgments play a significant role, there would be more 
achievements if one looks for a logical and analytically elaborated form of 
work (Ibid: 25). The preference to normative validity over intuition contrib-
utes to clarifying the positive connotations of so-called ethical validity314 
(etisk gyldighet) (Ibid). However, it looks like that the validity in question is 
“at its place” to classify the main “descriptive-constructive work with po-
litical ethics as a research”, despite the fact that it includes statements of 
ethical validity (Ibid). According to Næss, when these statements are justi-
fied (by discussing their consequences), it would mean to complying them 
with the possibility to break the norm (Ibid).  
In this context, I argue that the double bind understanding of the concept of 
ethical validity derives from Næss’s attempt to rehabilitate the role of ethics 
in building ethics of non-violence in Gandhi’s sense as well as from his in-
tention to define the aforementioned descriptive and normative components 
as a matter of a hypothetic-deductive set of procedures. Rehabilitating nor-
mative validity of ethics would lead to avoiding the specification that the 
aforementioned grounding norms should be ethical ones rather than state-
ments having ethical validity. The latter is an influence of Næss’s interest in 
semantics at the expense of ethics, especially when he argues that some il-
luminative ethical categories are not ethical ones since we can use the dif-
ferent meanings of the words while defining them. 
                                           
313 Regardless of this statement, Næss keeps the vague definition of the normative validity of intui-
tion. He disenchants the speculations that a teaching, established by a “son of the East” such as 
Gandhi, is not accessible to the one who uses analytical methods. That is why Gandhi’s teaching 
should be captured by intuition (Ibid: 31). However, as Næss shows, Gandhi builds a very struc-
tured, in a logical sense, system of norms, which to guide our non-violent behavior. 
314 Næss emphasizes that political ethicians should propose something, which is ethically valid: “It 
should be building sentences, which introduce something as a first normative joint in the ethical 
groundings” (Ibid). He claims that we can discuss whether such an ethical validity is a part of the re-
search itself (Ibid). 
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2.4.1. Gandhi’s Conception of Truth (Satyagraha) 
As one of the most important contributions of Gandhi’s ethics, we can out-
line his psychology of so-called way of truth (satyagraha). The absolute 
truth is not a category, but an eternal principle, i.e. God, as Næss points out 
(Næss 2000:59). Ahimsa is not only non-violence, but also a whole world of 
meanings: that is why we cannot discern ethics from the search of meaning. 
On the other hand, from the fact that Gandhi exercises non-violence with 
‘scientific preciseness’, it does not follow that truth in the sense of ahimsa 
(non-violence) is achievable by epistemological means alone. According to 
Næss, if truth is not related to the process of self-realization, then, the ex-
perience of non-violence would turn into an empty dream (Ibid) 315. A 
proof in favor of this theory can be found in Næss’s interpretation of Gan-
dhi’s statement that truth is an engagement, which can be adopted by the 
non-believer as well (Ibid: 69) because it (satya) implicates love and solid-
ness (graham) (Ibid: 77). In this context, Næss suggests to distinguish be-
tween essential, practically political and essential ethical foundations (Ibid: 
75) claiming that the meaning of the political arguments in Gandhi’s theory 
comes from the restrictiveness of the ethical ones. Adopting such a classifi-
cation, however, does not explain how we can evaluate the opponent’s 
whole situation, unless our imagination is involved, which to guarantee the 
process of empathizing. 
One of the most significant projections of the ethics of non-violence is that 
it changes the understanding of victory as a goal-oriented win. The new 
type of victory is based on the premise that to win the opponent is not done 
for the sake of the win, but rather for the sake of the cause as such (Ibid: 
39). That issue is also relevant to the aims of deep ecology movement while 
trying to impose ecopolitics, especially when the latter aims at avoiding the 
degeneration of radical biocentrism. 
In this context, I argue that the systematization of Gandhi’s theory is deter-
mined by the idea of self-realization, which, as developed in Næss’s writ-
ings, is more Næssian than Gandhistic (as Galtung also points out), espe-
cially in terms of recognizing what it means to clarify the role of truth. A 
crucial problem of Næss’s interpretation is that the feeling of friendship is 
left aside of the normative system as something, which is supposed ‘to 
                                           
315 Næss talks about Gandhi’s search for the core of the conflicts by demanding a matter-of-factness 
in its ethical meaning (Ibid: 103). 
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come naturally’ (Ibid). Such a premise leads to one even more questionable 
conclusion, namely, that there is no normative obligation in the “search for 
truth” and the realization of non-violence respectively (Ibid: 56). Næss ar-
gues that the most difficult thing in Gandhi’s ethics is to understand his 
norms rather than how violence should be ‘read’ as a moral problem (Ibid: 
64). If we follow Næss’s logic, it would mean that in the best possible case, 
we can define a certain type of informed consent, which would be applied in 
an epistemologically successful way. However, it would be done regardless 
of the specificities of the target groups, namely, regardless of the unique-
ness of the moral commitments that should be made in the socio-political 
discourse. 
Judging by the aforementioned arguments, I claim that both Gandhi’s and 
Næss’s theories are based on justifying a particular type of holism whose 
prototype characteristic is the integrity of the people involved since people 
is understood as a collective subject, whose integrity depends on, albeit it is 
irreducible to the integrity of the given individuals. Integrity itself derives 
from clarifying the presumption that every single subject is always a par-
ticipant and addressant of interaction316.  
Comparing Næss’s and Kvaløy’s receptions of Gandhi’s ethics, I draw the 
conclusion that Kvaløy provides more complex classification in terms of 
analyzing Gandhi’s principles of satyagraha. Næss only points out that the 
norms regarding the grasp of truth contribute to understanding the groups 
and the opponents (Ibid: 80-82), but he does not clarify how the sensitivity 
towards otherness can be cultivated in order the premise of judging one’s 
deeds alone to be recognized as a normative premise. In turn, Næss refers to 
Kvaløy who stresses that ecological conflicts can be solved from ‘beneath’, 
namely, by increasing the sensitivity towards ecological conflicts as such 
(Ibid: 84). 
                                           
316 Regarding the integrity in question, it is important to both justify and specify the image of so-
called mass man in social psychology (Ibid: 26-29). Ethics of non-violence can be adopted by the 
collective subject as well as by given individuals, albeit the process does not have quantitative as-
pects alone (i.e. to proceed in the process of evaluation starting from one to many), but also qualita-
tive ones. He extrapolates Gandhi’s theory that one can exert non-violence since every single subject 
is not only a participant, but also a spectator (Ibid: 26). 
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3. HOW ‘DEEP’ ARE DEEP ECOLOGY, 
ONTOLOGY AND DEEP ECOLOGY 
MOVEMENT? AN OVERVIEW 
Most of the contemporary debates on environmental politics took place 
against the background of the arising challenges concerned with the global 
environmental crisis. Næss opens his illuminative book Ecology, Society 
and Lifestyle (Økologi, samfunn og livsstil) (1973) with a chapter on the se-
riousness of the situation clarifying the role of the ecocrisis by describing 
the situation as such (Næss and Haukeland 2008c: 1). While in his previous 
writings he has been arguing in favor of living in harmony or in favor of liv-
ing in equilibrium with nature, later on he started to talk about ‘balance’ 
(Ibid: 32). In this context, Næss claims that a significant part of the afore-
mentioned crisis is that we have made ourselves dependent on the situation, 
which decouples us from ourselves as ecological beings (Ibid). He points 
out that the problem is similar to the one in war, i.e. it is no longer How 
much can we afford?, but How much is needed?317 (Ibid: 278). 
According to Næss, environmental crisis brings not only negative conse-
quences, but also positive ones making us aware about the possibility of in-
troducing a new criterion of progress and rationality by giving “a new start, 
new social forms of commonly shared life” (Ibid: 35). Thus the quality of 
life would begin to include not only what one has, but rather what he/she 
feels, which in turn presumes some minimum regarding what makes one be 
together with the others (Ibid: 36). 
However, rehabilitating the role of situational thinking does not mean that 
Næss advocates a certain kind of situationist ethics to be adopted, but that 
the reconsideration of the idea of cognitive rationality reflects upon the un-
                                           
317 This statement, however, is accompanied with the problematic clarification that one of the most 
dangerous ways of thinking about the environmental crisis is to think about it as carrying a consen-
sus between the big countries (Ibid). The latter might be a problem if the consensus in question un-
derrates the voices of the other countries, which want to speak with their own voice. 
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derstanding of the situationism itself by rethinking its normative validity. 
Then, within the framework of the latter, the concept of balance would be-
come irreducible to the one of harmony. In a similar way, the concept of in-
tuitionism would be irreducible to the concept of irrationality as such. Judg-
ing by the aforementioned investigations, I argue that the understanding of 
environmental crisis in Næss’s sense is driven by the collapse between two 
different modes of dependence on the situation, namely, between the ones 
of living standard and quality of life.  
However, Næss pays special attention not only to the negative conse-
quences of ecopolitical desirability, but also to the positive ones318, i.e. how 
can we overcome the environmental crisis by building politics and a way of 
living so that to preserve as much as possible of Earth’s richness as well as 
the diversity of living forms including the human ones (Ibid: 238)? The so-
lution is seen in justifying meaningful, intensive connections with them in 
so far as the objective to achieve the preservation of the deep cultural, hu-
man living forms (Ibid). 
On a macro methodological level, the ‘positive’ aspects concern both the 
philosophical reconsideration of rationality including normatively valid in-
tuitionism and the goals of ecopolitics, namely, that the deep ecology’s role 
refuses the metaphor of man-in-the environment giving priority to the ones 
of man-in-the ecosystems and politics-in-the ecosystems (Ibid: 231). Fur-
thermore, one of the advantages of adopting such a politics affects the gen-
eralization of most ecopolitical questions, i.e. the transformation of the ones 
of resources, quality of life and consumption to the questions of resources, 
quality of life and consumption ‘for’ (for) somebody including not only 
humans but also other living beings (Ibid). 
In turn, the impact of deep ecology on ecopolitics in Næss’s sense is based 
on revising the normative connections between means and goals in so far as 
the means are no longer recognized as instrumental tools, but rather as dia-
lectically referring to the successful fulfillment of the goals as such. Ac-
cording to Næss, we should ask ourselves what are the means and what are 
                                           
318 However, some concerns arise from his statement that in global politics, which strives for achiev-
ing an ecological harmony, we should strictly discern between this, which is needed and this, which 
is desired understood in the sense of something that is not directly connected with what is needed 
(Ibid: 181). Such a definition is rather focused on the negative aspects of the desired described as a 
surplus, which does not necessarily concern the vital needs and vital interests respectively. On the 
other hand, it is desirability that helps the neglected role of the interests in question to be reconsid-
ered, so that we cannot presume that what is desired has negative connotations alone.  
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the goals in the political fight respectively, striving for establishing respon-
sible environmental politics, which to be a criterion for environmentally re-
sponsible politics (Ibid: 232). As a main criterion, he outlines the need of 
introducing a long-term local, district-sensitive (distriktsmessig) regional, 
national and global ecological sustainability (Ibid). Judging by his investi-
gations, I conclude that it is the latter that can positively affect the debate on 
environmental protection versus industrial development. 
Distinguishing between so-called deep and shallow ecology movements, 
Næss claims that we should talk about supporters rather than members of 
(or participants in) the deep ecology movement (Næss 2005i: 87) because 
the concept of deep concerns the ecophilosophical aspect of the movement 
(Ibid: 89). If we equate deep ecology with deep ecology movement, it raises 
the risk the supporters of deep ecology to be restricted to the ones who sup-
port the movement in question. It is also important to clarify that Næss does 
not equate deep ecology with Ecosophy T arguing that the latter is only one 
of the many possible personal ecosophies, while one of the aspects of the 
deep ecology approach is associated with the joyful acceptance of the rela-
tionship with nature (Næss 2005c: 14). In turn, referring ecology’s approach 
to Gandhi’s ethics of non-violence by presuming that we should judge peo-
ple’s actions and not people themselves (Ibid), Næss specifies that deep and 
shallow concern the argumentative patterns rather than the evaluation of the 
supporters as such. 
According to Gamlund, deep ecology and deep ecology movement are often 
defined as synonyms in the environmental literature (Gamlund 2012: 230). 
In addition, the concept of deep ecology is interpreted in a narrower sense 
for the purposes of realizing a philosophy due to which Næss’s deep ecol-
ogy platform319 and deep ecology movement to come to life (Ibid). In this 
context, Gamlund argues that we have one concept with a double bind 
meaning referring to both the philosophy in question and its historic back-
ground (Ibid: 231). He emphasizes that Næss is very careful using these two 
concepts, adopting the one of deep ecology movement for the broadly de-
termined ecological grassroots movement, which strives for a political 
grounding on environmental principles and holist way of thinking (Ibid). In 
                                           
319 Gamlund finds an analog of Næss’s deep ecology platform in Rawlsian model regarding com-
mon morality in a multicultural society. This model is determined by norms and values that are ac-
cepted with an overlapping agreement by all sides (Ibid). However, such a consensus concerns only 
a given societal type, while Næss’s one appeals for a broader societal network, which means that 
Rawlsian consensus can be referred rather to level four than to level two of Næss’s Apron diagram. 
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turn, the concept of deep ecology is mainly referred to clarifying the one of 
Ecosophy T (Ibid). 
The differences between deep ecology movement and shallow ecology one 
are examined by comparing the ethical and ecopolitical effects regarding the 
development of environmental issues in space and time, namely, where, 
how and to what extent they can be used for the purposes of building one 
constructive ecopolitical program. While the principles of deep ecology 
movement can contribute to formulating such a program, the ones of shal-
low ecology movement cannot since they provide a certain degree of frag-
mentarization in Næss’s sense, which stems from the discrepancy of ethical, 
ecological and political principles in a long-term perspective. One of the 
main methodological problems concerning Næss’s analysis of shallow ecol-
ogy movement is that looking from a human perspective does not necessar-
ily lead to strong anthropocentrism in so far as even the ‘shallow’ move-
ment can successfully cooperate with the one of social justice. However, 
Næss claims that only deep ecology movement asks what kind of society 
should be the best one for maintaining a particular ecosystem. It is defined 
as a question of value thinking for politics and ethics (Ibid: Note 215), but 
from that it does not follow that shallow movement’s solutions deny the role 
of politics and ethics as such. On the contrary, I argue that both deep ecol-
ogy and shallow ecology movements address the social transformations as a 
desired objective, but merely the addressing from an ethical perspective 
provides radical changes320. 
Some arguments in favor of this thesis can be seen in Næss’s explanation 
how nature’s sources are examined as resources by the representatives of 
shallow ecology movement. However, the emphasis on using some re-
sources does not necessarily lead to a wrong exploitation of them on side of 
human beings. Furthermore, the habitat of all living beings, which is kept 
for their own sake, does not contradict the need of exploiting nature’s 
sources in some border line cases. The contradiction arises if the exploita-
tion is justified by presuming the unquestionable normative validity of ‘at 
                                           
320 Due to W. Fox’s interpretation, the distinction between deep and shallow is explored from the 
perspective of transpersonal ecology against the background of the anthropocentric attitude towards 
conservation (Fox 1999: 153). Regarding deep ecology, its influence is found in replacing the fig-
ure/ground boundaries with a holistic (or a gestalt) view, i.e. the latter is recognized as a certain “to-
tal field conception” (Ibid: 153-154). In turn, the shallow ecology movement is characterized in G. 
Sessions’s theory as implying “discrete entity metaphysics” (Ibid) due to which “the dominant met-
aphysics of mechanistic materialism” provides a total isolation of ethics. 
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the expense’ mode, i.e. some sources, which are turned into resources, to be 
always explored as a result of an axiologically negative process. It is prob-
lematic to claim that introducing ethical gradualism for the aims of ecopoli-
tics is a matter of contradicting choices of value priorities, which in turn 
would lead to contradicting man’s well-being and nature’s one. 
Another comparison is the one concerning the connection of deep and shal-
low ecology movements with the idea of growth. In this context, I argue 
that while the shallow ecology movement accepts the ideology of economic 
growth (so-called resource management, or resource conservation), the deep 
one aims (according to Næss) at replacing the ideology in question with the 
one of ecological sustainability (Fox 1999: 155). In this context, the objec-
tive regarding the process of rehabilitation is how to live in a given place 
developing a sense of belonging as well as how to dwell and care for the 
place itself321. 
Some other important ideas concerning the need of partly contradicting 
deep ecology and shallow ecology movements can be seen in the conceptu-
alization of the ideas of progress and cultural diversity (Næss 2005e: 44-45) 
since Næss relevantly describes the unifying Western perspective as a uni-
lateral one by giving priority to cultural anthropology. 
However, we should give priority not only to cultural anthropology, but also 
to ethics in education, with a special emphasis on education in environ-
mental ethics. A good example in this direction can be found in what Næss 
claims about education and scientific enterprise, which shows how cultivat-
ing increased sensitivity is inevitably concerned with rehabilitating the idea 
of distributive justice, albeit Næss does not precisely formulate it in that 
way. He keeps talking about the role of education in providing non-
consumptive goods as well as about such consumables from which we have 
enough for all, understood as a way of implementing sane ecological poli-
tics (Ibid: 45).  
Regarding the level of normativity, as explained by Næss, the preference to 
deep ecology movement should be done for the sake of encouraging the de-
velopment of fundamental normative orientation by contrast to the shallow 
                                           
321 In this context, Fox emphasizes Næss’s specification that many who can be characterized as ad-
herents to the principles of deep ecology do not necessarily describe themselves as supporters of the 
philosophy in question. Næss prefers to talk about supporters of deep ecology movement, or even 
about supporters of other movements who agree about the deep ecology platform, without being 
necessarily engaged with the tasks of the deep ecology movement as such.  
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ecology movement, which either stops before reaching the fundamental 
stage, or jumps directly from the fundamental premises to the particular de-
cisions (from level one to level four of the Apron diagram)322 (Ibid: 49).  
In turn, the definition of deep ecology movement as preserving the bio-
spheric equality, since the principle of living and blossoming is “an intui-
tively obvious axiom” (Næss and Haukeland 2008c: 50), raises the question 
whether it is relevant to adopt some of Næss’s concepts such as ‘intuitive 
value axiom’ (or axiom anticipated on the principle of intuition)323. Taking 
into account that intuition as such contradicts the concept of axiom, the only 
option is to refer its functioning to the one of practical wisdom in Næss’s 
sense, as it is defined in Ecosophy T.  
Furthermore, presuming that deep ecology is justified through the process 
of deep questioning, I argue that the latter benefits understanding the equal 
right of the organisms to live and blossom ‘from within’, as grounded in so-
called by Næss ‘obvious value axiom’ (Næss 2005b: 8). Coming back to the 
axiom issue, I claim that the axiom in question becomes understandable 
since it is based on two principles, which are outlined by Næss, namely, on 
the ones of self-regulating diversity and symbiosis embodied in Næss’s 
formula “Live and let live!” (Ibid). In this context, I draw the conclusion 
that the latter is a mode of being, which grounds the normative validity of 
every single realization of the organisms as a formula for self-realization. 
                                           
322 If so, however, the latter stance contradicts Næss’s statement that shallow ecology movement 
finds solutions within the existing policy alone without looking for new ones. This issue will be ex-
amined in detail in the chapter on Apron Diagram. 
323 The notion of axiom does not presume any intuitive knowledge whatsoever.  
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3.1. Normative vs. Deductive Aspects of Ecosophy 
and Deep Ecology Movement 
Furthermore, it is the normative validity of deep ecology that prevents deep 
ecology movement to be justified by induction from its principles as well as 
ecosophy to be recognized as a philosophy of wisdom whose prototype 
characteristic is keeping ecological equilibrium untouched (Ibid: 11)324. In 
turn, the differences cannot be explored as differences in facts alone, but al-
so as ones regarding the priority of values, which would benefit justifying 
the process of derivation as one of the main principles supporting Næss’s 
formula ‘Live and let live!’. One of the significant problems regarding 
ecosophy is how can we ground the normative validity of the different 
ecosophies, when their value priorities are not only different but also con-
tradict to each other, providing different views on how wisdom is embod-
ied? 
In this context, I argue that an important common feature of deep ecology 
and ecosophy is that they both rely on a certain type of “rough approxima-
tions of global systematization”, which means that they should be a subject 
to a common type of verbalization, as Næss suggests (Ibid: 12). Similarly to 
the distinction between so-called hard and soft technologies, Næss provides 
the one between hard and soft methodologies (Næss 2008d: 167). In the di-
agram showing the systematization of Ecosophy T, Næss points out that it is 
inspired by empathy (Ibid), albeit he also argues that there is no room for 
the ethical and normative priority in this scheme (Ibid: 169). The problem 
derives from the fact that he contradicts again the processes of logical and 
axiological derivation equating the idea of normative validity with the one 
of generalization. If it was merely a process of transformation from more 
general to less general statements, then every single norm should have been 
justifiable by logical procedures alone. In turn, the definition of logical, 
which is determined by Næss, in a fairly wide sense, would have easily 
been subjected to misinterpretations325; for example, self-realization would 
have been defined as the “logically deepest principle”, as he argues (Næss 
2008d: 113) rather than as a normative process. The misrecognition stems 
                                           
324 It is summarized by the formula “Self-realization for all beings!” (Ibid). 
325 Næss supports the deliberate use of vagueness and ambiguity to achieve multiple interpretations 
(Næss 2008: 169). 
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from Næss’s statement that the basic views on values are neither less, nor 
more justifiable than the basic rules of logic and science (Næss 2005m: 
181), which in turn affects the simplification of the top norms due to the 
logical need “to stop somewhere” (Ibid: 182), as I already showed. On a 
macro methodological level, the potential recognition of ethics as a part of a 
total premise-conclusion pyramid, as Næss suggests, would lead to reducing 
it to a causal system, where normative validity is discredited to outlining 
that the logical connections do not necessarily imply ethical relationships. 
Related argument is that from the fact that various interpretations are need-
ed, it does not follow that we have to encourage ambiguity, as Næss claims, 
especially when we have to question the framework of anthropocentrism by 
examining concepts such as vital needs and vital rights, which have obvious 
ethical implications. Furthermore, another serious concern derives from 
Næss’s conception to prescribe a higher validity to “non-normative” than to 
normative as such in so far as there is a preponderance of non-normative in 
a normative system (Næss 2008: 175). According to him, the validity of de-
rived norms depends on the validity of the non-normative assumptions 
(Ibid). However, the hypothetical character of the derived norms does not 
question the need of adopting norms. On the contrary, it contributes to re-
vealing why we can talk about a noncontradictory process of derivation in 
normative terms rather than about supporting a methodology with absolute 
norms. 
Deep ecology system itself is described as grounded in some premise-
conclusion chains for which the depth of the premises is of crucial impor-
tance (Næss 2005d: 21). According to Næss, deep questioning is described 
as a process of problematizing that is also illuminative for Ecosophy T 
(Ibid: 22). However, I argue that from the perspective of ‘whys’ and ‘hows’ 
characterizing deep questioning, it does not follow that the normative valid-
ity and performativity are set in a noncontradictory relationship, namely, 
that every single sentence about normative issues has a clear normative va-
lidity. Such a double bind interpretation of the connection between norma-
tive and non-normative would lead to misrecognizing the descriptive as 
normative. Næss presumes certain closeness between deep ecology ques-
tions and the silly ones. By silly326 he means questions, which seem to look 
silly only at first sight, while in the process of deep questioning, they have 
an intrinsic value as well as a creative function (Ibid: 24). On the other 
                                           
326 It is described as being on ‘millimeters’ away from ‘trivial’ and ‘conventional’ (Ibid). 
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hand, since deep ecology is determined as grounded in a derivational system 
(Næss 2005e: 48), Næss relevantly claims that this pyramidal model shares 
only few features with the hypothetical-deductive system. One of the main 
problems of such an interpretation is that he does not specify what the ethi-
cal implications of the aforementioned system are. 
Instead of discussing the role of sentences about the process of communica-
tion, it would be more relevant to discuss norms (including top norms) and 
their verbalization. We should also keep in mind that we do not move from 
‘is’ to ‘ought to’ mode, as Næss suggests (Ibid). Otherwise, deep ecology 
would not have been based on deep questioning having uncontradictory 
normative validity. Another methodological question is why the obligation 
to take part in an action to challenge policies327 (Ibid: 48-49) can be exam-
ined as an obligation at all, in the sense of asserting that life is considered as 
having a higher priority (in normative terms) than the policies’ changes. 
Similar concern is that the process of derivation in Næss’s sense is explored 
in purely quantitative terms, i.e. from unity to multiplicity, in so far as in-
tensifying the principles of variety is a statement with a very low rank, as he 
suggests; a statement, which, however, contradicts the one of keeping diver-
sity unattached (Ibid). There are few propositions on the top of the pyramid, 
a great variety on the middle level, and innumerable recommendations at 
the bottom (Ibid: 49). 
In turn, Ecosophy T is defined as based on two hypothetical assumptions. 
Due to the first one, there is no level on which living beings to be unable to 
reach the realization of their highest potential, while due to the second as-
sumption, there is no limit in the development of the symbiosis as such 
(Næss 2005l: 134). According to Næss, life and nature with a capital letter 
do not exist independently of the living beings. Preserving richness and di-
versity of life can be recognized as a top norm, which presumes to cultivate 
moral intuitions in so far as the complexity of the ‘web of life’ requires 
Ecosophy T to release extreme suffering within the framework of culture328 
(Ibid: 135). The practical implications of the latter concern the maximum 
realization of some other living forms, which is important to the extent to 
                                           
327 In logical terms, it is considered to be at the lowest level of derivation because it is derivable 
from principles, which are ‘higher up’ in the pyramid (Ibid). 
328 In this context, an important point made by Næss is that the principle of universalizability can be 
kept merely by addressing suffering within a given cultural framework, or frameworks (Ibid: 135).  
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which we should keep in mind the distinction between diversity and plural-
ity (Næss 2005ff: 592).  
On a macro methodological level, the aforementioned investigations affect 
the way Næss determines self-realization as a top norm as well as how he 
grounds the hypothesis that the higher the level of self-realization is, the bigger 
increase of others’ self-realization we can witness (Næss 2005l: 137).  
What are the epistemological aspects of ecosophy as extending the boundaries 
of the knowledge as such? Næss suggests distinguishing between three con-
cepts, between T1 (ego triggering the process of realization), T2 (the one of 
self-realization), and T3 (concerning the self-realization with a capital letter) 
(Næss 2008b). Judging by Næss’s arguments, I claim that ecosophy is supposed 
to question the normative validity of knowledge by developing our intuition 
about reality in order to understand the enormous complexity of the planet as 
well as the one of ourselves since we need a new type of knowledge329. That is 
why I claim that only if we presume that the intuition has a certain normative 
validity, we can determine in a non-controversary way ecosophy’s wisdom as 
related to practice. Næss characterizes wisdom in question as wisdom, which 
does not have an exclusively ecological foundation that presumes the unity of 
all living beings in so far as ecology does not specify the aspects of conserva-
tion” (Næss 2008d: 100). 
The main reason for announcing that “I feel at home in Ecosophy T” is de-
fined by Næss as both didactic and dialectic (Næss 2005e: 52). Thus the 
methodological connection with deep ecology can be described as deriving 
from the feeling of situatedness, which contributes to better understanding 
the knowledge about biosphere as a home. However, I also point out that it 
is more relevant to talk about ‘ethical’ rather than ‘didactic’ reason for the 
purposes of showing more explicitly that the grounding of normative valid-
ity is related to the process of ethical evaluation. That is why Næss adopts 
Socratic approach in raising ecological issues as well as using Ecosophy T 
as a foil (Ibid). In Næss’s chart, self-realization is justified as a fundamental 
norm (Ibid: 52-53)330 because keeping the plurality of living potentials is 
crucial for retaining biospherical equilibrium. In this context, an important 
note should be made for the purposes of clarifying whether Næss considers 
                                           
329 However, the main problem is still how to uncontradictory define the normative validity of this 
intuition, taking into account that Næss determines its functioning as both moral and a-moral, as I al-
ready showed. 
330 In Fayerabend’s terminology, Ecosophy T is defined as “Gedankenlaborat” (Næss 2005aa: 505). 
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‘systematical’ as (non)equivalent to ‘collective’, which to be understood 
within the framework of life’s manifestations embodying performative po-
tential. He proposes the term of collectivity, when he has to choose between 
maximum self-realization and maximum symbiosis. If the process of self-
realization is interpreted in favor of producing so-called colossal ego trips, 
the symbiosis is examined as an elimination of individuality in favor of col-
lectivity (Ibid: 52). In the next sentence, Næss argues that it is “viewed sys-
tematically”, not individually (Ibid), which raises the question whether both 
terms are adopted as interchangeable ones331.  
The symbiosis itself has much to do with defining another top norm, name-
ly, the one of Diversity! (Ibid: 53). According to Næss, the latter should 
function as a norm, which is “more fundamental” than the one “Self-
realization for every being!”(Ibid). Then, the norm “Maximum symbiosis!” 
can be characterized as deriving from the presumption that maximum diver-
sity implies maximum symbiosis. The aforementioned “more fundamental” 
norm of Diversity! is recognized due to the fact that it has performative 
power per se, while the one of self-realization for all beings is accepted by 
anticipation (Ibid). That is why I emphasize that we should rely on the role 
of moral commitment and cultivation of becoming in respect with others if 
we want to refer to Næss’s imperative Diversity!, Self-realization!, Symbio-
sis!, and skip the maximizing part of it332 (Næss 2005cc: 533-534, Note 9). 
On the other hand, we could reveal that the concept of symbiosis333 does 
not question the one of complexity. However, there are some internal rela-
tionships that do not support the process of self-realization, as Næss claims. 
Otherwise, if we examine complexity as a simple sum of mutual relation-
ships, it would mean to go back to the question which ones are more impor-
tant than the rest. Furthermore, defining the connection between complexity 
                                           
331 This use can raise many questions regarding the performative power of the aforementioned sym-
biosis, e.g. the latter to be misrecognized as a maximization of well-being. 
332 Complexity alone cannot yield an increase in self-realization. It is Ecosophy T that makes com-
plexity opposed to complication. 
333 An interesting specification on a social level is that complexity and symbiosis maximizing diver-
sity are “on the common ground” with classless society (Ibid) since the latter also depends on the 
self-realization of all beings guided by the principle of non-exploitation. In turn, I argue that “the ex-
treme appreciation of diversity” (Ibid) is not definable as an ‘extreme’ one in both qualitative and 
quantitative terms, but rather in the ones of intersubjectivity whose aim is to support cultural diver-
sity in the future.  
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and diversity is possible if we avoid the disadvantages of reducing the quali-
tative evaluation to a system of preferences made on a quantitative basis. 
In this context, Glasser discusses so-called depth metaphor claiming that the 
difference between deep and shallow can be outlined as deriving from 
Næss’s empirical semantics and communication theory (Glasser 1999: 362). 
One of the main aims of deep ecology is described as articulating the gen-
eral level of argumentation accompanied by one’s willingness to consider a 
wide range of policy alternatives (so-called general TO-sentences and the 
derivation itself) (Ibid: 362-363). In turn, the metaphor of shallow is charac-
terized as treating the symptoms and not the causes being grounded in the 
technological optimism and economic efficiency, by contrast to deep ap-
proaches, which involve people in the process of systematical questioning 
(Ibid: 365). However, it remains unclear to what extent the “healthy skepti-
cism of technological optimism” (Ibid) can trigger social transformation 
merely in the process of deep questioning. That is why I argue that we can 
accept the semantic criterion of preciseness, understood as being always 
context dependent (Ibid: 367), but only as a necessary condition when the 
misunderstandings might arise as a consequence of the possibility of “as-
cribing different statements to the same expression”, as Næss argues (Ibid). 
The contradictions can be semantically conceptualized, but they rather rep-
resent conflicts having ethical or socio-political origin due to which the way 
of verbalization is only a way of making them visible334. 
                                           
334 Glasser’s own arguments regarding the lack of such a derivation (from logical to normative one) 
concern the way of problematizing deep ecology as well as the role of policy in Næss’s writings. He 
also emphasizes that “it does not logically follow that particular policies advocated by the opposing 
approaches will always be in opposition” (Ibid: 368). Furthermore, Glasser relevantly outlines that 
Næss underscores the attempts to motivate a response to the ecological crisis solely through ethical 
appeals (Ibid: 369). In this context, one of the main arguments against Næss’s scientism is that so-
called ‘objective’ science cannot impose principles and ecologically responsible policies by itself 
because the calls for action require some normative premises to be justified.  
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3.2. Næss’s Definitions of Vital Need, Vital Interest 
and Vital Right 
Another serious problem regarding the simplified version of moralization is 
how ethical gradualism to be contextualized in environmental politics. In 
the field of the latter, a certain gradualism mainly affects the issue how to 
define which vital interests are “more”/”less” vital against the background 
of the intuition that all the individuals have the same right to live, as Næss 
claims (Næss 2005g: 67). However, discussing this issue by adopting the 
distinction of ‘more’/’less’ leaves us trapped within the paradigm of quanti-
tative instead of qualitative evaluation. In turn, remaining on the level of 
examining economic status provokes some methodological difficulties be-
cause then the debates in question would be explored as restricted to the 
contradictions between industrial and nonindustrial communities. Adopting 
such an approach does not benefit understanding how the developed coun-
tries would be convinced to give priority to ‘the real vital needs’ of the de-
veloping ones in Næss’s sense. Extrapolating the concerns about this inter-
pretation raises again at least two main difficulties, namely, how would the 
subjects be recognized as subjects having vital needs as well as how can we 
avoid examining the needs in question beyond the paradigm of objective 
naturalism335? Furthermore, how can we behave in a morally relevant way, 
when we should compare and contrast different types of needs including 
both vital and non-vital ones? 
Vital needs themselves are defined by Næss in respect with having mini-
mum conditions for self-realization in so far as the minimum is recognized 
in terms of biological, environmental and social needs (Næss and Hauke-
land 2008c: 182). Another puzzling interpretation, which indirectly follows 
from Næss’s ambiguous presumption of leaving vital needs deliberately 
vague (Næss 2005l: 39), is the one of unquestionable ‘application’ of intui-
tion while justifying the connection between intrinsic values and basic 
                                           
335Næss presumes that the “right” subject is the one of the nonindustrial community whose vital 
needs should be evaluated as a criterion of defining others’ needs as ‘more’ or ‘less’ vital outlining 
the reference to local, regional and national particularities (Næss 2005ee: 568-569). However, he 
does not examine the cases when the members of the aforementioned communities are also inclined 
to exert inappropriate practices such as the ones, which are not driven by the need of satisfying vital 
needs (for some culturally determined purposes), but which provoke the conflicts by the invasion of 
the vital needs of industrial communities.  
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rights. According to Næss, the concepts of own value and right are adopted 
to describe an intuition and inclination towards life’s intrinsic value under-
stood in the light of belonging to the world (Ibid: 184). Due to this intuitive 
understanding, all the individuals have the right to live; our closest vital in-
terests have equal priority, which in turn explains why the interest conflicts 
concern the issues of vitality and closeness (Ibid: 185). 
Even if we accept the definition of the aforementioned minimum, it does 
not explain yet what we should do if/when two different ‘minimums’ con-
tradict, which would lead, on a practical level, to the accomplishment of a 
given self-realization at the expense of another one336. On the other hand, if 
both intrinsic value and basic right are intuitively examined, it would mean 
that they are ontologically substitutable, which raises many problems as 
well. One of the most apparent concerns would be that such a definition 
brings us back to a vicious circle. We would neglect the fact that both vital 
and non-vital needs and vital and non-vital interests determine the sense of 
belonging, which, however, does not men that can we examine them as a 
part of a situationist ethics.  
                                           
336 I claim that the hypothetic-deductive mechanism does not have a normative validity by default. 
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3.2.1. The Definition of Right in the Deep Ecology Platform 
3.2.1.1. Some Receptions of Næss’s Definitions 
of Environmental Value and Environmental Right 
According to Tom Regan, rights should be interpreted from the perspective 
of preservation principle, which means that the latter should be regarded as 
a moral imperative of non-interference and non-meddling (Regan in Watson 
1999: 110). Næss himself anticipates such a definition of non-interference 
as a passive one, but also as applicable to the every-day life (Næss 1999: 
125), i.e. as a practice related definition. Adopting the definition, however, 
does not contribute to minimizing the risks of substituting natural rights 
with the ones by nature. Such a risk is pointed out by G. Sessions who re-
veals another important aspect of the problem, namely, the one of initial de-
termination of ‘is-ought’ distinction as a crucial premise for the obstacles, 
which ecosystem ethics faces while relying on utilitarian grounds or 
grounds, concerned with rights and obligations (Sessions in Watson 1999: 
111). Extrapolating Sessions’s statement about the implications of the 
Commoner’s third law ‘Nature knows best!’, I argue that it is important to 
outline the genealogy of interfering what is right with what a natural right is 
(Ibid: 110). His analysis throws light on how ‘it is right’ mode, which bene-
fits preserving integrity, stability and beauty of the biotic community, turns 
into a main principle of the being mode337.  
Judging by these investigations, I claim that the problem of rights in Næss’s 
sense is intrinsically connected with the one of activeness, which is irre-
ducible to a set of given activities in so far as the preservation of nature is a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for the process of self-realization. 
Furthermore, I argue that it remains unclear how natural right can inflict 
justice since it is based on redefining the concepts of same/equal rights 
within a complex matrix, where justice is not both ontologically and epis-
temologically dependent on natural rights. Otherwise, it would have meant 
                                           
337 Among many critical arguments, the ones of Watson should also be examined in detail. Explor-
ing Næss’s theory of rights, he focuses on the five principles of anti-anthropomorphic biocentrism 
(Ibid: 113-114). The moral imperative of ecosophy is that human beings do not have the right to al-
ter the equilibrium. However, the imperative in question functions as an ethical rule rather than an 
ethical imperative. Another ambiguous aspect of Næss’s theory is that the process of non-
interference is literally understood without presuming the possibility of transforming the idea of 
non-interference as such. 
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that the question of normative validity of natural rights338 can be recognized 
by adopting the principle of extended analogy with the human rights. Thus 
we would have faced already mentioned difficulty in ascribing rights to all 
living beings339 regardless of their rational, moral and legal capabilities340. 
Another alternative is to examine natural rights as independent of justice, 
but then, it would lead to problematizing the idea of right as such. 
In turn, the concerns regarding the aforementioned law of nature are deter-
mined by Næss as stemming from the misconception of the pre-established 
moral order (Næss 2005w: 387). That is why the law is interpreted in con-
trast to what is written about human justice. According to Næss, the latter is 
irreducible to the law of nature, but the way of examination is a vague one 
recognizing environmental justice as a “long-range issue” (Næss 2005gg: 
598-599). Furthermore, he claims that increasing environmental justice de-
pends on how the sufferers define the status of what a ‘satisfactory’ envi-
ronmental justice is (Ibid: 604). However, if we want to inflict a certain 
change, the idea of exerting injustice would also change. Striving for eradi-
cating the latter, Næss goes back to the concept of vital needs simplifying it 
to the ideal presumption that desires can be benevolently reduced at the ex-
pense of rehabilitating the needs in question, which is possible if we rely on 
one presumably pure intuition. At the same time, Næss claims that justice is 
important to outline the role of enlightened self-interests of both humans 
and animals (Næss 2005bb: 516-517), without specifying how we can actu-
ally avoid defining the latter from the perspective of moral relativism.  
Related crucial point, which negatively affects Næss’s understanding of the 
concept of right against the background of adopting general principles to 
new moral perceptions, is the one of misleading egalitarianism in applied 
                                           
338 If Næss had explicitly recognized gestalt ontology as ontological ethics, his contradictory expres-
sion of “being normative by nature” (Ibid) would have been substitutable with the one of “intrinsi-
cally normative”. Thus we could have clarified why we should talk about “value priority system” as 
an ecosophical rather than ecological system.  
339 A good specification can be found in Reed and Rothenberg’s critical remarks upon Næss’s the-
ory of interests. They argue that the analysis in terms of establishing interest identity would not 
make us able to dispense the differences because solidarity and respect cannot be understood as 
processes of eliminating otherness (Reed and Rothenberg 1993). Reed and Rothenberg claim that 
we need a concept of other, which to be justified as interrelated to the one of self, but also the latter 
to be recognized as a separate being in his/her own right (Ibid).  
340 Some alternatives in this respect are formulated by G. Skirbekk, which will be discussed in the 
chapter on his environmental philosophy. 
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ethics, namely, that everyone in general and no one in particular can bring 
moral perceptions, as he points out (Næss 2005r: 241)341. In this context, 
one of the main problems concerns the overexposed potential of the concept 
of moral responsibility due to which the number of the people involved, and 
not the moral motivation342 as such, is justified as a criterion for the norma-
tive validity of the responsibility itself. Thus the effect to reach a moral con-
sistency is recognized as only one fragment of ethical reflection (Ibid: 242). 
Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I argue that most concerns 
arise not only from Næss’s vague definition of what a vital need is, but also 
from the unclear justification of the concept of right. The latter is contradic-
tory determined by Næss due to the fact that right is recognized as “to do 
what is in one’s power” (Næss 2005w: 389). This statement can easily lead 
to establishing an authoritarian type of society, where the power is exerted 
as a right of the ones who have more power to dominate over the less pow-
erful ones.  
In turn, French relevantly criticizes the evaluation of the interests from a 
deep ecology’s point of view. The latter derives from the inconsistencies of 
ethical idealism in theory and ethical gradualism in practice, which, how-
ever, is dominated by power and raw necessity (French 1999: 128). I argue 
that this contradiction stems from the lack of justified normative validity of 
vital needs and their embodiments on both levels of Næss’s theory. French 
himself discusses the separation of moral principles from practice (in the 
field of biospherical egalitarianism), which is done at the expense of some 
‘utopian abstractions’ that “exert no decisive normative weight” (Ibid). The 
decisiveness, however, does not necessarily mean an unquestionable defini-
tion of normative validity to be adopted in so far as the latter is irreducible 
to the criteria of verification, namely, to whether one criterion is true or not. 
It can be true, but still deprived of the necessary normative validity it needs. 
In this context, French defines biospherical egalitarian ethics as a utopian 
one since it fails to provide normative guidance in decision and action 
(Ibid). Emphasizing the ambiguity of Næss’s writings, he suggests avoiding 
                                           
341 He refers to E.C. Hargrove’s statement (Ibid). 
342 In this context, he reaches the contradictory conclusion that altruism is primarily motivated by 
duty as well as that ethics is reducible to a certain type of thinking (Næss 2005dd: 549). 
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talks about ‘moral differences’ in value, while Devall and Sessions argue 
that the latter can be interpreted as “equal in intrinsic worth”343.  
On the other hand, the question is whether the definition of ‘no moral dif-
ferences in value’ can be automatically interpreted as ‘equal in intrinsic 
worth’. R. Taylor provides a hint in this direction claiming that we should 
talk about the same inherent worth (Taylor in French 1999: 133), but the lat-
ter should be analyzed within the equality paradigm. This interpretation 
raises the problem whether ‘the same inherent worth’ would be quantita-
tively or qualitatively analyzed since the idea of equality has different em-
bodiments depending on the choice of ethical and socio-political paradigm. 
However, accepting a line of thoughts based on the recognition of what fac-
tual property is raises the risk to go back to the point that human beings are 
‘factually’ more developed than other species. Thus the analysis of the con-
cept of inherent (intrinsic) value can tacitly turn into specifications of one 
generic term due to the fact that we can find living beings for which it is dif-
ficult to say whether they have a value in themselves (e.g. one-cell organ-
isms). On the other hand, accepting this speculation would mean that we re-
ly on a wrong induction since from the fact that some living beings cannot 
be morally engaged, it does not follow that they do not have an intrinsic 
value at all, albeit the value in question might not be a matter to reflection 
on their side.  
                                           
343 An alternative interpretation can be seen in Jon Wetlesen’s thesis who claims that we should dis-
cuss whether to talk about intrinsic, inherent value or instrumental one (Wetlesen 1999: 405). He de-
fines the problem as deriving from whether things are valued due to their states or achievements, i.e. 
due to what they have rather than what they are, which favors teleological rather than deontological 
ethics (Ibid). Wetlesen defines two types of teleological ethics – one consequentialist and one holis-
tic. While the former denies, the latter affirms that actions or persons may be ascribed an intrinsic 
value as a matter of their own right (Ibid: 410). The intrinsic value within holistic teleological ethics 
is based on the assumption of the highest good and final end of human actions (Ibid: 411). As 
Wetlesen claims, and we can agree with him, one weakness of holistic ethics is that it easily invites 
accusations of authoritarianism (Ibid: 414). In this context, he argues that the holistic aspects of deep 
ecology should be incorporated as a “supplementary ethical consideration” (Ibid: 414-415). Refer-
ring to Wetlesen’s interpretation, I argue that providing a distinction between moral person and 
moral agent (Ibid: 409) requires further elaboration in so far as this criterion revives again the idea of 
factual property. Wetlesen states that humans and non-humans have a value in themselves because 
their states of well-being and flourishing also have values in themselves (Næss 1999f: 418). In turn, 
Næss accepts the definition of values in themselves, albeit he disagrees with Wetlesen’s specifica-
tion of intrinsic and inherent values. On the other hand, Næss agrees with Wetlesen about the role of 
deontological and teleological ethics stating that we may direct duties towards animals. 
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Even if we presume the ideal case, namely, that one species is a subject to 
moral treatment on side of another one due to the hypothetical sentience of 
the latter, we cannot guarantee that the species in question would exert this 
capability even when it does not ‘lack’ it. Furthermore, even if we presume 
that a class of moral agents is a sub-class of moral persons, as Taylor sug-
gests (Ibid), we cannot define the status of the rest without contradictions, 
i.e. we do not have unquestionable criteria of justifying what it means to be 
a ‘potential moral subject’.  
A related problem is that the principle of exclusion does not lead to avoid-
ing speciesism in so far as it is based on an incomplete induction. Excluding 
some species does not contribute to expanding the scope of the moral per-
sons344 in Taylor’s sense to the other species. On a macro methodological 
level, it does not solve the problem of ‘Whose justice? Which rationality?’ 
in the process of evaluation. That is why providing an extrapolation by 
analogy from human to non-human beings in Wetlesen’s sense345 (Wetle-
sen 1999: 415) should be taken seriously into consideration because the 
non-humans can never become moral discussants nor can they become 
moral agents.  
                                           
344In this context, I argue that Wetlesen interferes the idea of right to live and blossom with the one 
of intrinsic value, as Næss does in so far as value itself is not a synonym of right, but a necessary 
condition for defending the latter. Furthermore, we should clarify that the value of well-being and 
flourishing is irreducible to an instrumental value, but, on the other hand, we cannot justify the val-
ues in themselves by ascribing them to some self-sufficient states either. If hedonism has had such a 
value, it would have put in question the idea of inherent value, as understood by Wetlesen. On a 
macro methodological level, one of the main concerns arises from the fact that neither does Næss’s 
conception of deontological ethics contribute to clarifying the problem, nor does Wetlesen’s theory 
provide more convincing arguments by favoring teleological ethics. That is why I conclude that 
Næss faces serious difficulties in both introducing and recognizing the role of ethical gradualism be-
cause including other species as moral subjects does not benefit revealing the normative validity of 
the value in question, nor does it favor deontological ethics at all. 
345 The extension in question is recognized as a basis of both internal and inherent values but in two 
different ways (Ibid). 
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3.3. Is Næss a Bio-fascist? Deep Ecology 
and the Problem of Population Reduction 
In this context, the problem of population reduction, as examined by Næss, rais-
es some serious difficulties in terms of rehabilitating the connection between the 
exploitation of nature’s sources as resources and the requirement to go beyond 
the framework of the deep and shallow ecology movements for the purposes of 
questioning radical biocentrism. According to Næss, reviving the issue of con-
trolling the population reduction is a necessary step for preserving nature346 
emphasizing that the problem of the increased population is proportional to the 
choice of technologies. That is why the bigger the population is, the softer the 
adopted technologies should be (Næss 2005i: 85) 347. 
While according to the ideology of the shallow ecology movement, the inevita-
ble evil is interpreted as exertable on the other living beings, due to the theory of 
deep ecology movement, the focus is put on the fact that it comes on man’s 
side, which raises the need of elaborating a long-time prevention policy. Re-
garding time and space, however, evil is defined by Næss as inevitable. Fur-
thermore, in both cases it is recognized as deriving from one and the same as-
pect of the industrial society, namely, from the one of economic profit, albeit 
Næss does not go into detail about the embodiment of its mechanisms in the in-
dustrial society by outlining how prevention can contribute to cultivating collec-
tive socio-political responsibility. 
According to Næss, population reduction should be considered as a result of 
liberating habitats (Næss and Haukeland 2008c: 199). He prefers to examine it 
                                           
346 While Næss provides vague solutions to how the problem should be treated, Wetlesen introduces 
a mathematical scheme of calculating the number of the “constant optimal population” (Wetlesen 
1974: 126). One of the main methodological problems, which arise from his interpretation, is that he 
interferes the descriptive with normative premises, albeit he generally supports their distinction. The 
result is that Wetlesen appeals for planning in politics, which to be built on descriptive resources and 
population accounts, keeping in mind (minne ut) the normative resources and the population budg-
ets by relying on a statistical mapping (Ibid: 129). However, I argue that it is not obligatory the ge-
ometrical progression, based on descriptive calculations, uncontradictory to lead to a normative one, 
which to imply the population to be restricted to a constant number. On a macro methodological 
level, it means that the normative validity of ‘optimal’ is not necessarily both derived and referred to 
the notion of ‘constant’, especially taking into account that the humankind cannot be examined as a 
simple sum of limited, or unlimited, number of individuals. 
347 The issue of population reduction is examined within both deep ecology and shallow ecology 
movements, albeit it has been contextualized in a different manner. 
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as reaching an optimal population arguing that we should fight against the “fu-
ture imperialism” (fremtidsimperialismen) (Ibid: 206) built on the overcon-
sumption of resources as well as on the growing process of annihilating nature. 
In this context, Næss emphasizes the difference between deep ecology and the 
Greens as one regarding the impact of the population on the rich countries say-
ing that we should admit to ourselves that the gradual reduction of population is 
necessary from an ecological point of view (Ibid: 236). 
Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I draw the conclusion that there 
is no objective goal of reaching a given number of living beings that may de-
pend on the existence of five billion of them, as Næss claims. It is another proof 
in favor of the thesis that the quantity cannot be used as an argument in inflict-
ing reduction. Extrapolating Næss’s investigations348, I argue that it is better to 
affirm a certain type of constructive pessimism (or provocative pessimism in 
von Wright’s sense) rather than supporting morally ungrounded optimism. Even 
if we adopt the ‘act now’ mode and try to ground it in a long-term perspective, it 
does not mean that this mode should be ethically justified. In other words, there 
is no basic contradiction between the number of human population and the one 
of the other living beings, nor is there a correspondence in exact numbers that 
should be reached. We also cannot rely on Næss’s stance that nature is more di-
verse than human species due to the presumption that the latter is a single spe-
cies (Næss 2005r: 231). The next question that comes out following from such a 
line of arguing is why should we protect biodiversity at the expense of the hu-
man kind, which is also a part of it? 
I draw the conclusion that the strategies, which ecological colonialism is based 
on, as stated by Næss, inflict a change in the quality of life that does not neces-
sarily presume population reduction. If the exploitation of nature’s resources is 
examined as a matter of reducing the living standard for the sake of raising the 
quality of life, then we do not need to talk about population stabilization, which 
to require reduction in numbers. Furthermore, if the issue of stabilization is ex-
plored within a broader framework, which to be focused not only on preserving 
the number of the other living beings, but also on the socio-economic, cultural, 
and last but not least, ethical aspects of the stabilization in question, then the 
change in the habitat would no longer be recognized as the only one necessary 
and sufficient condition for the aforementioned reduction. 
                                           
348 Næss argues that the optimum population could not be defined in respect with humankind alone 
(Ibid: 241), which, however, does not mean that the minimum human population should be merely 
anticipated in quantitative terms. 
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3.3.1. The Anti-fascist Character of Deep Ecology 
and Cultural Pluralism 
In turn, it is important to clarify that Næss’s theory of population reduction 
is not an appeal for introducing biofascism349 or ecobrutalism, as some rep-
resentatives of social ecology (such as M. Bookchin) claim. Næss defines 
the anti-fascist character of deep ecology for the purposes of avoiding the 
strong to prevail over the weak ones (Næss 2005j: 93). He provides some 
arguments against attributing a supreme value to a given ecosystem. In this 
context, Næss claims that point one of the deep ecology platform, regarding 
the intrinsic value of nature, is an anti-fascist position (Ibid: 95). He rele-
vantly outlines that ‘every’ is not equivalent to ‘all’, so that by reducing the 
preference to only one ecosystem, we cannot necessarily avoid the wrong 
justification of speciesism. Judging by these investigations, I draw the con-
clusion that the question of relative importance is not similar to the one of 
intrinsic value because they concern different ontological and axiological 
projections350. 
From an epistemological point of view, Næss faces some difficulties in dis-
enchanting the priority of one ecosystem supporting the recognition of radi-
cal bioegalitarianism. He refuses to rely on the distinction between anthro-
pocentric and non-anthropocentric leaving it deliberately vague in order to 
overcome the accusations that he gives priority to non-humans alone. 
Referring to Kant’s imperative351, Næss stresses that no living being should 
be treated merely as a means (Ibid: 97). In this context, we should justify 
not only how we should avoid using others as means, but also how we 
should avoid treating them as means for the sake of someone’s self-
realization. For the purposes of overcoming the risks of introducing a cer-
tain speciesism, we go back to the idea of cultural diversity in Næss’s sense, 
                                           
349 I also claim that the ambiguity of the question regarding population reduction is seriously af-
fected by Næss’s willingness to leave point six of the deep ecology platform, i.e. the one of vital 
needs “purposely vague” (Næss 2005m: 170). Adopting his approach does not explain what can 
provoke the “change in the attitudes” Næss talks about if we want to achieve an optimistic vision for 
the future (Ibid). 
350 Furthermore, I argue that the anti-fascist character of deep ecology becomes apparent on level 
four of Næss’s Apron diagram, where the decision-making pluralism is unquestionably manifested 
(Ibid: 96). 
351 This statement contradicts his general views on deontological ethics while criticizing Kant. 
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which should be ascribed to so-called first order commands specified while 
discussing point two of the deep ecology platform (Ibid: 99). The main con-
cern, as Næss himself argues, is that some cultures have a basic intolerance 
towards others (Ibid). Even if examine the problem on the level of the first 
order commands, it remains unclear how to normatively discern these cul-
tures from the ones supporting equality and diversity as well as how to un-
contradictory interpret and apply the idea of intolerance as a ‘basic feature’ 
of a culture since, as he insists, culture is not something static. 
Related concern is driven by Næss’s thesis that there is a necessary corre-
spondence between the population reduction and the increasing natu-
ral/cultural diversity (Næss 1999d: 223). He adopts a different rhetoric, 
namely, the one of population stabilization, which, however, does not con-
tribute to seeing the issue in a less questionable way. 
Dispersing moral responsibility while making such decisions follows the 
same logic like the one of achieving ecological sustainability in Næss’s 
sense. That is why I claim that in both cases we talk about utopian scenarios 
since population reduction is determined by Næss as prolonged in time, 
when the big number indicating far future is used as an excuse for blurring 
the responsibility for making moral decisions. Næss argues that a new kind 
of sustainability can be achieved in minimum five hundred years (sometime 
in the 21st century) (Ibid: 224). On the other hand, he points out that reach-
ing this stage is a utopian project, but if so, how could we justify such a rad-
ical moral choice, keeping in mind that Næss distributes the vagueness of 
vital needs to the one of the cross-generational change? 
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3.4. The Deep Ecology Platform 
An important specification is that all points of Næss’s deep platform can be 
examined as derivatively connected to the principle of ethics of responsibil-
ity, which, according to Næss, discerns deep ecology movement from the 
shallow one (Næss 2005b: 9). However, we should keep in mind that intro-
ducing responsibility as a criterion does not mean that shallow ecology 
movement is irresponsible; it rather means that a complex responsibility 
may trigger long-lasting ecopolitical changes only if it is interpreted within 
the paradigm of ethical gradualism.  
According to Næss, the eight-point platform (that seems to be accepted by 
all supporters of deep ecology movement) is a set of “fairly general and ab-
stract statements” (Næss 2005f: 58). It is explained in the process of ver-
balization, namely, by putting words to views that people always had, but 
had not expressed (Ibid). These statements represent an attempt at empha-
sizing something, which can be accepted by most supporters of the deep 
ecology movement on a general or abstract level352 (Næss and Haukeland 
2008c: 219). Næss calls his points “tentative formulations” for protecting 
the planet (Næss 2008: 100), but not principles (Ibid: 105).  
However, Fox argues that justifying this platform is not a matter of intro-
ducing a deductive or inductive system because it is a matter of a general 
worldview systematization (Fox 1999a: 171-172). Furthermore, from the 
process of logical derivation it does not follow that the formulations could 
be automatically anticipated. It is also necessary to outline that the platform 
has been a subject to numerous revisions in time, also by Næss himself, 
which illustrates why understanding the genealogy of the aforementioned 
formulations requires the development of their normative validity to be in-
vestigated. 
At a later stage of his research, Næss sent the eight-point program to differ-
                                           
352 He does not specify what the difference between general and abstract is. 
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ent people353 such as scientists, journalists, politicians, who to help him in 
clarifying the intrinsic value of biosphere (Næss 2005m: 151-153). If we 
accept point one, speculating whether the intrinsic value of nature is a value 
in itself, or a narrow human concern, it would mean we to remain trapped in 
the discussions about giving preference to big over great. Then, we could 
argue that human concerns are ‘big’, but not necessarily ‘great’. Otherwise, 
there would be an increasing risk to support a questionable version of ethi-
cal anthropocentrism354.  
In this context, I argue that one of the contradictory definitions is the defini-
tion of ‘narrow’ in point one. Næss clarifies it by examining how mature 
human beings should rejoice in the wholesome treatment of other beings 
(Ibid: 159). His comments accompany Ødegaard’s thesis who points out 
that we should talk about value for human beings rather than value inde-
pendent of them (Ibid: 158). Going back to the discussions about big versus 
great, I claim that exploiting while utilizing nature can be characterized as 
‘great’, if the exploitation in question is determined as having value in itself, 
i.e. if it is presumed as being ‘big’ in terms of value. A hint in this direction 
can be also seen in Næss’s writings, who specifies that the only good sup-
plement is when we distinguish between means satisfying the need and the 
need itself (Næss 2008: 113). 
Furthermore, he outlines that the clarification of human need as specified by 
J. Tveit requires to problematizing the employment of the term demand ra-
ther than the one of need (Næss 2005m: 160). However, the idea of life 
cannot be used as an argument in this respectbecause not every single de-
                                           
353 According to Glasser, deep ecology approach focuses on transforming environmental policy by 
helping the individuals to develop more reasonable, well-informed and consistent policy positions 
(Glasser 1999: 361). He outlines six points in the deep ecology approach, which would be discussed 
below, namely, the stress on the total views recognized as broad, all encompassing philosophical 
systems that incorporate ontology, epistemology, semantics, ethics and social philosophy. Glasser 
also emphasizes the role of normative-derivational systems, certain type of deep questioning, “loose 
derivation”, the use of particular ultimate premises for a “wide identification” as well as the deep 
ecology platform (Ibid: 361-362). Furthermore, Glasser argues that it is the focus on praxis includ-
ing reasons and actions that separated deep ecology platform from the more traditional and descrip-
tive inquires into ecophilosophy. 
354 One of Næss’s arguments against blurring the boundaries of this discussion is that talking about 
ecosphere instead of biosphere (for showing that we are not concerned about forms of life in a nar-
row sense) is not a better immunization against narrowing the role of value as such (Næss 2008: 
112). 
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mand is based on a vital need. Næss also emphasizes that in green econom-
ics, there is a distinction between need and demand on the market (Næss 
2005p: 206). 
Regarding point two355, which concerns the intrinsic value of richness and 
diversity of forms of life (Næss 2005j: 99), Naess provides the relevant 
conclusion that they do not have to be understood in terms of contents alone 
because the philosophy of conservation also represents a certain type of 
ecophilosophy, namely, one that develops attachment to a place as a home. 
As Næss argues, maintaining both species’ communities and their tradi-
tional places presumes understanding ‘traditional’ in the sense of habitats 
(Næss 2005m: 153).  
Concerning point three, some of the main questions, which are formulated 
by Næss, are the following: What can be done there? and What can be used 
there? (Ibid: 162). I argue that regardless of the fact that these questions are 
not of a similar rank, they do not contradict by default. What can be done? 
can be interpreted as a question that is provoked by appreciating the need of 
exerting a policy of conservation. Introducing the aforementioned questions 
as separate ones, we can merely show that they have a different performa-
tive potential. On the other hand, relying on such a comparison does not 
contribute to revealing the differences in the normativity validity356. 
The definition of the term ‘right’357 in point three of the deep ecology plat-
form (Næss 2005m: 163-4) concerns so-called “intuitive response to the 
ethical aspect of natural law”. According to Næss, this acceptance on based 
on the analysis of the expression of ‘right to’ (Ibid: 164). In this context, re-
laying on the vague normative validity of the aforementioned response is 
strengthened by Næss’s statement that we should connect the rights and in-
terests, which in turn would mean to accept for granted that the “mature 
                                           
355 Point two addresses the role of cultural diversity and so-called first order comments (Næss 2005l: 
99). 
356 In turn, point five is scarcely discussed. Næss does not outline some objections, but he also does 
not provide suggestions in showing how to solve the environmental problems on the level of eco-
politics (Ibid: 168).   
357 Regarding the definition of right, Watson argues that Næss goes back to Spinoza’s theory look-
ing for arguments in favor of his statement that every being may have the right to do what is in its 
power (Watson 1999: 111–112). Judging by the latter, Næss provides the interpretation that it is 
‘right’ to express your own nature “as clearly and extensively as natural conditions permit” (Ibid). In 
this context, claiming that rights are a part of a separate moral order is a fiction (Ibid). 
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members’ deepest interests are not destructive” ones (Næss 2005n: 187). A 
statement that would bring us back again to defining the concept of deep in 
respect with the one of vital needs. That is why I claim that recognizing 
such a connection is possible if we presume that deep interests are satisfying 
vital needs alone. 
On a macro methodological level, the crucial importance of specifying the 
problem of rights derives from the need of clarifying what French finds 
problematic in Næss’s biospheric egalitarian approach while talking about 
“equally inherent moral value” (French 1999: 127). Instead of introducing 
the ranking procedure of interests proposed by French, I argue in favor of 
ethical gradualism in order to reveal the significant role of vital needs in 
practice. Næss claims that biocentrism does not imply any devaluation of 
human beings (Næss 1999e: 230), but such a development becomes a fact if 
the moral issues are used to be examined from an epistemological point of 
view. 
On the other hand, the question to what extent we can interpret the concept 
of ‘same’ right as one of ‘equal’ right is relevantly posed by Næss. How-
ever, he does not find a satisfactory answer in his writings. Næss empha-
sizes that we should be particular in specifying under what circumstances 
lifeæs richness is possible in general (Ibid), but he does not go into detail 
what are both the ontological and epistemological differences in fact358. 
Differences, which would give us grounds to avoid replacing ‘equal’ with 
‘same’ right because specifying the problem of rights has a significant in-
fluence on defining the role of environmental ethics by going beyond the 
frame of anthropocentrism359. 
                                           
358 Næss’s preference to the use of the concept ‘same’ over the one of ‘equal’ in the 1990sis also 
justified in a quite vague way too (Næss 1999c: 146). 
359 On the other hand, Næss does not take into account a significant argument, which is well expli-
cated by Watson, namely, that if we want to question anthropocentrism by isolating human species, 
it would mean to justify radical biocentrism that does not differ too much from anthropocentrism, 
giving priority to a given species alone. Watson argues that if we absolutize the problem with same-
ness, we should presume that being worse, man is not like the others (Watson 1999:115), and thus 
we will end up with a new kind of speciesism. Furthermore, we should be aware of what Tyler Mil-
ler calls the task “to give up our fantasies of omnipotence” (Ibid: 110). 
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3.5. The Apron Diagram 
According to Næss, within the framework of Apron diagram, the fundamen-
tal premises and ecosophies represent a rich diversity of fundamental views, 
which are compatible with the platform of deep ecology movement (Næss 
2005h: 75). That is why Christianity, Buddhism, Taoism and Ecosophy T 
are placed on one and the same fundamental level (on level one) of the dia-
gram, albeit they substantially differ in the worldviews they support (Næss 
2008: 105). In this context, I draw the conclusion that the lack of a common 
ethical presumption, which to be explicitly stated as a fundamental one, in-
evitably leads to ethical pluralism in the sense of relativism on the level of 
ecopolitical decisions (on level four of the diagram in question). However, 
from the latter it does not follow that all ecopolitical solutions would be en-
vironmentally friendly, nor would the environmentally unfriendly ones be 
immediately recognized and excluded from what successful ecopolitics 
should look like, if there is even the slightest chance pluralism to be inter-
preted as imposing relativism. 
In turn, the clarification of deep ecology platform on level two is important 
for outlining the process of transition from the fundamental premises to the 
decision-making procedures. According to Næss, the eight-point platform 
does not have to be misconceptualized with the process of establishing ul-
timate premises (Ibid) in so far as the supporters of deep ecology movement 
are supposed to be motivated by their philosophical and religious beliefs 
from which, however, does not follow that their decisions are determined by 
the platform360 (Næss 2005j: 98). As Næss points out, the diversity on level 
one is a strength since there are no deep cultural differences without diver-
sity on the level in question (Næss 2005h: 79). 
A serious concern, however, arises from Næss’s theory that the explanation 
of the Apron diagram follows logical, and not genetic relations, between 
terms, which are based on articulated relationships between premises and 
conclusions361 (Ibid: 75). On a macro methodological level, one of the main 
                                           
360 Næss claims that the eight points are never meant to describe the core of deep ecology (Reed and 
Rothenberg 1993) because they should illustrate the functioning of “some other movements” as well 
(Ibid). 
361 The relationship in question is more precisely defined by Jon Wetlesen as a relation between 
normative premises and normative conclusions, which cannot be derived from the ones of scientific 
ecology (Wetlesen 1974: 92-93).  
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problems derives again from the difficulties how to prove that the differ-
ences in the fundamental premises (on level one) do not trigger contradic-
tions on the level of so-called general policies as well as how to prevent the 
decisions (and the consequences respectively) (on level four) to be inconsis-
tent because it would lead to questioning the process of derivation as such. 
If unity is merely determined on level two (Ibid: 77), as Næss argues, it 
would mean that this unity has a higher normative validity than the funda-
mental premises, which are different from each other. Therefore, we should 
claim that the potential lack of normative validity does not concern the mu-
tual inconsistency of the premises, but rather their embodiments in different 
contexts, which support different worldviews. On a macro methodological 
level, the problem is how to avoid the inconsistencies’ deviation to support-
ing uncontrollable disagreement on level two as well as on the levels three 
and four362. 
Remaining on the level of derivation, it would mean that the deductive ap-
proach to ethics helps merely the ‘clear’ connections between the different 
levels to be outlined by skipping the ones that presume the contradictions to 
be constructively anticipated for the sake of rehabilitating the concept of di-
versity. In other words, following the epistemological derivation, we would 
miss the point that what is considered as noncontradictory in logical terms 
may turn out to be contradictory in ethical ones, as I already argued. Fur-
thermore, if the process of derivation does not presume a measurement of 
value priorities, as Næss suggests (Næss 2008: 110), then, how can the 
normative validity on level two be considered as uncontradictory determin-
ing the actions on level four? Referring to some ‘intuitive norms’ in Næss’s 
sense is not a solution either. If we presume that the process of derivation is 
grounded in some intuitive norms, a new question arises, namely, how can 
we justify the logical transition from top norms to the rest? If the process is 
based on our intuition, it would mean that we may face serious disagree-
ments not only on levels three and four, but also on level two. On the other 
hand, if the logical derivation only partly (or only sometime) coincides with 
the ethical one, then we cannot argue that there is an unquestionable (in the 
sense of being normatively noncontradictory) decision-making process on 
level four. 
                                           
362 Furthermore, if we remain within the paradigm of logical deduction, how can we recognize the 
agreement about the beliefs on level two as based on the ones on level one, and at the same time, to 
postulate diversity on level one and unity on level two, taking into account that deriving from di-
verse premises would lead to recognizing diverse conclusions? 
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According to Næss, an important specification concerns not only the onto-
logical lack of contradictions on level one, but also the agreement that we 
cannot jump from level two to level four because the normative validity of the 
latter should be mediated by the facets of level three (Næss 2005h: 79). How-
ever, I argue that the normative connection between the diversity of the prem-
ises on level one and the cultural diversity on level four is not necessarily 
based on the process of derivation. This connection is a necessary but not suf-
ficient condition especially in terms of deriving the premises-conclusions 
pyramid, a fact, which is also stressed by Næss (Ibid: 81). 
Another methodological problem regarding the process of derivation is pro-
voked by Næss’s statement that providing such a logical derivation from 
levels one to four is accompanied with a motivational one following from 
levels four to one (Næss and Haukeland 2008c: 222). Næss gives the exam-
ple that we can make a decision, which is not fully conscious, emphasizing 
that the two ways of connecting, namely, the logical and motivational ones, 
can be explained as interconnected “with the help of a mandala” (Ibid). On 
the other hand, the statement about their dialectical interrelatedness contra-
dicts the next one in which Næss excludes the role of so-called genetic rela-
tions at the expense of the logical ones (Ibid). On a macro methodological 
level, it would mean that the more basic the logical groundings are, the less 
motivational they are, and the other way around. The more motivational 
groundings should be justified as less logical and abstract363.  
In turn, the requirement of having level three between level two and level 
four is another proof in favor of the thesis that Næss implicitly looks for a 
normative derivation, which has the logical determination only as its neces-
sary but not sufficient condition. Næss claims that level three is the only one 
that can be skipped in some rare cases, albeit it plays an important role in 
mediating between levels two and four (Ibid: 227). However, even if the 
adopters are also focused on levels three and four, as Næss suggests (Ibid: 
228), can we be sure that they would not absolutize their engagements on 
levels one and two? Næss himself does not take into account these risks 
presuming an ideal case in which all the levels are available, as well as that 
normative derivation coincides with the logical one. 
                                           
363 Introducing the idea of mandala as an explanatory mechanism remains without clarification. Re-
garding the scheme provided by Næss, it corresponds to Heraclites’s theory of the two ways, but 
here we have two ontologically different perspectives, which cannot be transformed into each other. 
Otherwise, it would have meant that at given stages, they have different normative validity. 
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Furthermore, the problem is extrapolated to the one arising from Næss’s 
statement that we may have disagreements on levels three and four. Then, 
he claims that the most “remarkable similarities” are seen again on these 
levels (Næss 2008: 111). However, if shallow and deep ecology movements 
sometime reach an agreement on level two, and then the differences come 
out merely on levels three and four respectively, what would be the status of 
their ultimate premises? There are two possibilities. The first one is that the 
ultimate premises of the shallow ecology movement are not similar to the 
ones of deep ecology movement, but then, it would be impossible to specify 
under what circumstances we can reach an agreement on level two. The se-
cond option is that that deep and shallow ecology movements derive from 
similar fundamental grounds, but then the question is how can ‘shallow-
ness’ be defined as justifiable on level two? In turn, it would mean that we 
cannot define the process of deep questioning as a fundamentally different 
one.  
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3.5.1. The Modifications of Gandhi’s Scheme 
in the Apron Diagram 
Aiming to reveal the genealogy of Gandhi’s ethics of non-violence by 
referring to his teaching and life, Næss makes a schematic representa-
tion of the connection between the different sides of the teaching in 
question and some other corresponding systems (Galtung and Næss 
1955: 28). At first sight, this scheme represents levels, which are later 
seen in the Apron diagram. Since the reception of Gandhi’s ethics of 
non-violence is not one of the main objectives of the current research, I 
will focus only on two aspects of Næss’s scheme. On level A, we find 
all the teachings, or all the people who can follow Gandhi from level 
two to level three (i.e. from his general statement of politics to his spe-
cial instructions for acting) (Ibid), but who cannot accept his back-
ground as well as his deep premises. As an example in this respect, 
Næss points out many Western pacifists.  
However, Gandhi’s background examined on the first level of the Sat-
yagraha column (Ibid) cannot automatically be referred to level one of 
the Apron diagram, albeit it might be considered as corresponding to 
Næss’s Ecosophy T. Otherwise, two main questions arise. First, do we 
have good arguments to call Gandhi’s philosophy an ecosophy in 
Næss’s sense? And second, what would be the criteria for calling every 
single vision a personal philosophy, and if so, how can we justify the 
normative validity of the latter?  
In turn, level B “covers” the ones who still consider themselves as fol-
lowing Gandhi’s concrete instructions, but who previously disagreed 
with, or were indifferent to the attempt to ground them by adopting a 
normative system (Ibid). Næss gives an example with India’s fight for 
freedom claiming that the political leaders can accept the situationally 
determined statement of a political and ethical kind, without recognizing 
themselves as Gandhi’s students (Ibid). According to Næss, political 
leaders can do so since they see satyagraha as the only one technique, 
which can be imposed over the Brits (Ibid). In this context, I argue that 
there are some concerns regarding the example as well. If the political 
leaders accept satyagraha not as a principle, in a normative sense, but 
only as a strategy, it would mean that we have a consensus on level 
three, and not on level two (if we extrapolate the main principles of the 
Apron diagram), which is crucial for Næss. Thus, in the case with India, 
we face consensus on level three defined regardless of the consensus on 
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level two, which provokes similar actions on level four. Judging by the 
aforementioned investigations, I do not encourage making direct paral-
lels between this scheme and the Apron diagram regardless of the fact 
that the scheme as such is useful in a sense that it shows the normative 
way of derivation, namely, how Næss’s thinking has been developed in 
time in terms of specifying the issue of normative dependence. 
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4. THE ROLE OF GESTALT ONTOLOGY. 
THE THREAT OF BIOCENTRISM 
WITHOUT ETHICS 
4.1. Næss’s Definition of Gestalt. Some 
Methodological Specifications  
Analyzing Næss’s theory of gestalt ontology is of crucial importance for 
understanding his biocentrism, namely, why one of the advantages of adopt-
ing gestalt ontology is to show how ontology supports the complexity rather 
than complication in Kvaløy’s sense364. In this context, it is necessary to 
analyze what Næss means by saying that deep ecology emphasizes com-
plexity (Næss 2005b: 9). I argue that complication also has a gestalt and that 
is why it is so easy to wrongly replace it with the gestalt of complexity. Ac-
cording to Næss, we should explore why gestalt is irreducible to the concept 
of pattern (Ibid) in so far as it determines the way of living including both 
the modes of continuity and discontinuity of the selves. That is why I claim 
                                           
364 On a macro methodological level, rehabilitating the role of responsibility would affect encourag-
ing the broader perspective on understanding complexity, namely, it would affect deep ecology 
movement revealing the processes of complexity rather than the ones of complication in Kvaløy’s 
sense. Extrapolating Kvaløy’s theory of complication in respect with complexity, as understood by 
Næss, would mean that the principles of ethics grounding deep ecology movement could be inter-
preted as based on the rehabilitation of the intrinsic values of natural rhythm and organic coherence, 
while the ones of shallow ecological movement could not be uncontradictory referred to the princi-
ples regarding accelerated industrial tempo and technological coherence. The lack of explicit ethical 
principles in Næss’s theory, however, may lead to imposing the model of complication since the 
prognostic functions would be limited to accomplishing non-vital interests in the fast run race.  
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that by relying on gestalt ontology365, Næss justifies the global character of 
the ecosystems without making them abstract since the use of gestalts im-
plies the principle of universalizability to be adopted.  
On a macro methodological level, gestalt ontology in Naess’s sense con-
tributes to uncontradictory introducing the idea of deep ecology as a total 
view. In turn, the understanding of total view is described as a premise, as 
Næss suggests, that can be provided by engaging with deep ecology move-
ment as a response to environmental crisis366 (Næss 2008: 25). Judging by 
the aforementioned investigations, I argue that the concept of ‘total view’ 
displays Næss’s attempts to compromise ‘good’ with ‘big’ modes whose 
crossing point should be the policy of building sustainability, or what later 
is called by Næss gestalts of living and acing.  
In turn, the word ‘total’ can be considered as synonymous to ‘gestalt’, when 
we need to indicate the coherence of the experience of the subject, the ob-
ject and the mediation for the purposes of outlining the objective character 
                                           
365Næss emphasizes the role of Spinoza’s holism, which he adopts for the purposes of his own the-
ory of gestalt thinking. It is the thinking in question that is recognized by Næss as a necessary condi-
tion for outlining the similarities between Spinoza and the research in ecology (Næss 2005w: 393). 
However, Næss is also aware of the problem that how man to reach symbiosis with all living beings 
is not one of Spinoza’s main goals. Focusing on the idea of realizing symbiosis, Næss points out that 
the better understanding of the right “to live and blossom” presumes the reconsideration of some ge-
stalt relations as well as the role of intuitive interaction to be taken into account (Næss 1999:143). 
Thus the crossing point between Spinoza and deep ecologists could be sought in the mechanisms of 
elaborating the gestalt maxima “all things hang together”. However, Næss leaves the question why 
we cannot predict the long-term effects of a particular action (if this slogan is a gestalt slogan) open 
(Næss 2005w: 386) relying on Spinoza’s theory that man is unable to understand the “common or-
der” of Nature (Ibid). 
366 It still appears together with concepts such as ‘broader view’ based on a deep questioning. 
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of experience, which comes from nature367 as well as due to the require-
ment of avoiding misleading subjective interpretations, while discussing the 
experience of gestalts (Ibid: 76). On the other hand, we should take into ac-
count that the view in question embodies some ultimate premises concern-
ing the principle of ‘unity in diversity’, which is adopted for the sake of per-
forming already examined formula ‘Live and let live!’. The latter is defined 
by Næss against the background of Gaia theory as a basic unit in which eve-
ry living being has an intrinsic value (Næss 2005c: 18). In this context, 
Næss’s gestalt ontology can also function as giving a general orientation, as 
Cavazza suggests, namely, as a general orientation with concrete applica-
tions that provide a frame of consistency to our world (Cavazza 2014: 30). 
                                           
367 Næss refers to Spinoza’s definition of Deus sive natura (Næss 2005w: 383), an expression, 
which occurs twice in the preface of part four of Spinoza’s Ethics. The process of identification can 
be outlined by extending God’s influence, which would mean to reinvest nature with perfection, 
value and holiness in so far as the two roles of God or Nature are equally basic, namely, the ones of 
being infinite and non-explicable (Ibid). In this context, the implications of gestalt thinking can be 
outlined on the level of understanding: the more we understand particular things, the more we un-
derstand nature, as Næss suggests (Diehm 2006: 24). Within the framework of these investigations, 
holist way of thinking can be interpreted as establishing gestalt ontology if we examine how the in-
terconnectedness of the parts and whole can be achieved, i.e. how the process can be accomplished 
by the strive for being in harmony with the dictate of reason as well as in tune with the love of na-
ture determined as the highest good (Næss 2005w: 384).  
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4.2. The Role of Gestalt Thinking. Main and 
Subordinate Gestalts 
It is ontology due to which the primary properties are considered as enta ra-
tionis: they are recognized by Næss as characteristics of abstract structures, 
without being interpreted as contents of reality. He also emphasizes that in 
the process of gestalt thinking, we should talk about subordinate gestalts, 
not about parts of gestalt, which is a qualitatively different issue (Næss 
2005ii: 120). Næss’s interest in this way of thinking is driven by the need of 
evaluating the normative validity of spontaneous experience (Ibid: 125). 
That is why gestalt thinking is defined by him as concerning the way of 
conceptualizing spontaneous experience in principle, which is irreducible to 
the given contents of spontaneous moments (Næss 2005y: 461). Næss 
points out that gestalt appreciation is different from the gestalt perception in 
so far as it affects the better functioning and understanding of the holistic 
system thinking. On the level of verbalization, the methodological complex-
ity of the gestalts in question is represented as a structured experience, 
which is “without a full stop”368 (Næss 2005ii: 122). 
According to Næss, gestalt ontology is based on three main aspects. First, 
the subjective, the objective and the mediational should be examined as as-
pects rather than subunits (Næss 2005y: 462). Second, the contents of real-
ity are indivisible, they are merely separated in the discourse and third, the 
gestalts are more or less comprehensive (Ibid). Extrapolating his statements, 
I argue that the third point is crucial for outlining the differences between 
                                           
368 He discusses the need of adopting exclamation marks saying that the latter indicate ‘imperative 
announcements’ However, we should keep in mind that not all the structured experience can be ex-
pressed by adopting a performative mode. Næss adds (in his ambiguous way of arguing) that there 
are other kinds of exclamations without specifying what they are going to be used for (Næss 2005ii: 
122). The point is that Næss wants to emphasize the normative validity of the statements regarding 
gestalt experiences, but due to neglecting the role of normative validity as such, he vaguely justifies 
the reduction of the validity in question to a set of verbalized sentences. On a macro methodological 
level, Næss reaches the problematic conclusion that from the fact that gestalts as experienced reali-
ties “have appeal”, it follows that they are not neutral (Ibid: 122-123). This speculation leads us 
back to the problem of reconsidering the normative validity within the paradigm of ontological eth-
ics. 
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the gestalts of complexity and complication369. In the turn, there is an in-
creasing risk in the industrial societies the gestalt of complication to be de-
fined as a gestalt with a capital letter due to the misleading presumption of 
implying higher-order gestalts in Næss’s sense.  
Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I draw the conclusion that the 
gestalts, as defined by Næss, make up reality since they guarantee the nor-
mative validity of the contents, which are neither a set of things, nor a state 
of affairs.  
                                           
369 However, Næss argues that the ontological “emancipation” of tertiary qualities does not neces-
sarily imply a positive evaluation of the natural phenomena (Næss 2008: 79). 
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4.2.1. The Different Types of Qualities 
Starting with a rejection of the ‘absolutist conception’ of ding an sich, Næss 
argues that concrete contents and abstract structures build reality, as it is in 
fact (Næss 2008: 73). This turns out to be a result not only of rehabilitating 
the role of the secondary and tertiary qualities, but also of the reconsidera-
tion of so-called primary ones. That is why Næss argues that it is the con-
figuration of the tertiary qualities that gives us grounds to talk about gestalts 
as contents of reality, which are irreducible to the representations of the 
contents themselves as well as about nature that is irreducible to a bleak 
consisting of primary qualities alone (Ibid). Otherwise, we should have 
looked at the biosphere as a resource of exploitation alone370. On the level 
of primary qualities, the things in themselves retain their unquestionable en-
tity despite of the bewildering diversity of the secondary and tertiary ones. 
According to Næss, in the process of development of the Western natural 
sciences, Galilean days are exceptional, but among the costs we paid for 
them, it is widely experienced, subjectivised “de-ontologisation” that is rec-
ognized within the axiological way of thinking (Næss 1974a: 85). Further-
more, he argues that in our culture, there is a recent tendency of objectifying 
the models of natural sciences as well as subjectifying both the diversity, 
which we know by our sense and the diversity of evaluation (Ibid). The ten-
dency is strengthened by the ideology of political economy and the one of 
everyday considerations (Ibid: 86)371. 
In this context, we should also pay attention to Næss’s understanding of the 
internal structural relations in the world, which are different from the ab-
stract structures of science (Næss 2008: 78). The difference between ge-
stalts and abstract structures can be examined as one between internal struc-
tural relations and invented ones (ones, which are imposed by science). On 
a macro methodological level, the question is to what extent the abstract 
structures of science both correspond and display the internal structural rela-
tionships between gestalts. Næss merely claims that the concept of ecosys-
                                           
370 In this context, I argue that gestalts in Næss’s sense can be called experiential ones, having ex-
perientiality as its prototype characteristic.  
371According to Næss, Galilean traditions confuse the instrumental excellence of the mechanistic 
worldview with the one of holistic philosophy (Næss 2008: 128). The cleavage into the two worlds 
can be overcome by putting joy, as Spinoza does, as well as by putting other subjective phenomena 
into the “unified, total field of realities” (Ibid). Thus the latter refers to gestalt ontology understood 
as an arena of rehabilitated connections between many gestalts. 
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tem is used to describe abstract structures and that is why the work of deep 
ecology consists in examining them. However, he does not clarify that the 
problem with the ecosystems takes place when the abstract structures substi-
tute the gestalts due to the wrong presumption that they are one and the 
same. The contents are units, which can be filled with different elements 
making possible the embodiment of the structural experience as such, by 
avoiding the reduction to the aforementioned representations.  
Næss claims that gestalt ontology has an adequate framework, which is not 
the only one giving uncontradictory philosophical grounding for the deep 
ecology movement (Ibid: 80). However, his vague idea of methodological 
pluralism is not supported by providing some other alternatives, and second, 
it is followed by the contradictory statement that he “knows no better frame 
of reference” (Ibid). Regarding the principle of systematization, Næss intro-
duces another confusing statement, which requires further elaboration, 
namely, gestalt ontology does not put in question “the importance of ab-
stract structures such as ecosystems” (Ibid). He neglects the difference be-
tween the concept of ecosystem and the ecosystem itself, which also has a 
gestalt character in so far as it represents a certain kind of structured experi-
ence (having secondary and tertiary characteristics)372. Furthermore, re-
gardless of clarifying that abstract structures are timeless and merely reason 
employs them for a long or short time (Ibid: 195), Næss often underrates the 
fact that the ecosystems can also change in time not only in terms of their 
concrete contents (Ibid). 
There are also some arguments against the instrumental understanding of 
gestalts, namely, that we can locate them, but cannot dissect them. It is the 
rehabilitation of the secondary and tertiary characteristics that contributes to 
uncontradictory defining gestalts as contents of reality. Næss recognizes the 
gestalt conception as helping to go even further, i.e. to reconsider not only 
the role of secondary, but also the one of tertiary qualities as “genuinely re-
al” (Næss 2005y: 464). In this context, Næss’s contribution can be seen in 
the way he determines what I called experiential gestalts. It is characterized 
as belonging to a lower or higher order merely via mental dissection, name-
ly, by exerting gestalt thinking, not by finding distinctions in the gestalts as 
such. 
                                           
372 As another similarity with non-dualism in Buddhism, Næss points out that in Zen poetry we do 
not need a subject, mind, nor do we need a consciousness in the form of container (Ibid: 200). 
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However, it is quite unclear what Næss’s reason of specifying the relation 
between ‘opplevelse’ and ‘erfahrung’ is, because they are understood as two 
types of experience (Light 2009: 218). Another point, which is rarely em-
phasized, is the one that we can influence the stream373, namely, that we 
can anticipate the experienced spontaneity as such, which makes one antici-
pating the gestalt structures. It is due to the fact that gestalt experience has 
certain sovereignty since it is not a sum of different experiences. On the 
other hand, D. Rothenberg outlines that Næss does not specify the gestalt 
perspective (Ibid: 220), i.e. he does not provide an alternative how the em-
bodiment of the mode of experiential spontaneity not to be considered as 
both methodological and epistemological paradox.  
Furthermore, I argue that gestalt character entails the spontaneous experien-
tiality making possible not only man to interact with nature, but also the 
other way around. Thus creativity consists in the ontological dependence of 
gestalt’s richness on nature’s complexity and vice versa. That is why it is 
the dialectics of contents that contributes to seeing gestalt ontology in a 
non-positivist way, namely, to reveal its process character due to which 
even if we see a patch of yellow and a round shape (to elaborate Naess’s 
conception), it is a thing that is not a thing in itself.  
Extrapolating Næss’s theory, I conclude that it is gestalt thinking that makes 
the normative validity of the premise-conclusion chain possible, by contrast 
to the patterns that merely ground its logical derivation, which in turn illus-
trates what the difference between deep questioning as problematizing374 
and questioning as such is. In this context, I argue that the differences be-
tween the gestalts of complexity and complication can be called differences 
between the gestalts of ‘greatness’ and ‘bigness’. On a practical level, the 
object of complexity gestalt thinking is complexity of the web of life in 
Næss’s (Næss 2005l: 135), which is indirectly connected with human ability 
to create “general norms about equal rights” (Næss 2005n: 186)375.  
Another argument in favor of introducing moral experiential gestalts is that 
it does not merely mirror a superior structure. The mirroring is the initial 
                                           
373 On a micro methodological level, it shows how the stream has a normative validity, which corre-
sponds to Kvaløy’s conception of so-called river time. The latter will be examined in detail in the 
chapter on Kvaløy. 
374 Næss refers to the methods of the Pyrrhonist inquiry.  
375 One of the most illuminative examples of complexity gestalts is the gestalt of the mountain Gauri 
Shankar. 
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process of an ontological participation of every single living being into the 
net of biosphere. It shows how the quantitative projections are implemented 
on the level of qualitative ones so that the small wholes are examined as re-
sembling the big ones. In turn, the logic of replacing bigness with greatness 
derives from the presumption that something is ‘great’ as a part of supreme 
wholes in Næss’s sense (Næss 2005cc: 532). 
His statement that the micro-cosmos is essential for the existence of macro-
cosmos merely displays the epistemological diversity of the principle men-
tioned above, namely, that big is big not only because it is a part of the su-
preme, but also the other way around. Supreme can be considered as su-
preme since it is ontologically dependent on the internal connections be-
tween many big fragments remaining irreducible to their sum. Referring to 
Næss’s own specifications, I argue that gestalt ontology justifies the process 
of logical derivation. If the latter was normatively sufficient, it would have 
meant that there would not be a difference between “Complete realization!” 
and “Maximum self-realization!” (Ibid). Næss appeals for replacing self-
realization with these two formulas in order to provide more positive evalu-
ations in respect with increasing the potentials’ realization (Ibid). On the 
other hand, completeness and maximum self-realization can be used as on-
tological synonyms only if self-realization is recognized as a form of moral 
commitment to the others.  
Another important feature of understanding the complexity of gestalts is the 
role of unity and totality. Many philosophical systems are determined by 
Næss as a structured experience of total views (Næss 2008: 145). They ar-
ticulate the deepest insights by structuring them as ultimate premises sub-
jectable to derivation. In all systems, Næss aims at outlining the approach 
emphasized in the Apron diagram, in order to show that the premises in 
question represent total views whose crucial importance can be explicated 
by elaborating higher-order skepticism376 against docta ignorantia (Ibid: 
145-148). However, the problem is that he sees docta ignorantia as an epis-
temological concern without axiological projections, i.e. as a moral disinter-
est, which can be countered by explicating fundamental or total frames. The 
higher-order skepticism should guarantee keeping the unity of diversity. 
Furthermore, it aims at causing an epistemological turn in systematic think-
ing, namely, to turn the immediate into a premise of achieving the highest 
                                           
376 Skepticism is a key issue in Næss’s writings, which is briefly explored here. 
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kind of knowledge. Naess is aware of the paradoxes accompanying the pro-
cessing of total views (Ibid: 155), but he still refers to that principle.  
Næss argues that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts (Næss 2005ii: 
119) because it is a matter of ontological influence irreducible to a certain 
type of calculations. The projections of experiential gestalt in his sense can 
be outlined by analyzing the role of gestalt thinking as bringing poetry and 
science close together (Ibid: 122) in so far as the world view presumes peo-
ple to make the world subjectable to their experience without making it rela-
tive. He argues that the whole of nature is alive and one individuum (gestalt) 
(Næss 2005w: 388), a statement, which still needs to be clarified. Næss re-
fers to the Latin meaning of the word individuum (in-divisible), which is a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for having a gestalt. 
In this context, I draw the conclusion that the un-divided represents the pat-
tern-stage of the gestalt without necessarily to contribute to its explanation. 
Nature as such is recognized as a whole and it is un-divided to the extent 
that it cannot be divided by anything belonging to its entity, nor could it be 
divided by something external. Every single division regarding nature’s en-
tity should be provoked by something ‘un-natural’ then. On the other hand, 
it is important to emphasize Næss’s specification of what a definition ‘in a 
limited sense’ is since nature is unity in diversity, where the latter is deter-
mined through the potentiality of dividing, i.e. nature has a being for itself, 
which is inseparable from the being in itself. 
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5. WHAT SHOULD ‘DEEP’ ECOPOLITICS 
LOOK LIKE? THE MISSION OF DEEP 
ECOLOGY MOVEMENT 
Anker describes Næss’s definition of deep ecology platform as a Pyrrhonist 
one regarding how to ask deeper questions about human relation to the 
world from a skeptical standpoint (Anker 1999: 434). According to him, 
deep ecology interacted with the English-speaking community, transform-
ing questions about ecologically sustainable life into principles for living 
such a life (Ibid: 431)377. Discussing so-called depth of questioning and the 
connection with deep ecology movement, Næss emphasizes the role of Pyr-
rhonist aspiration, when he asks questions about self-realization (Ibid: 435), 
i.e. about being a “seeker on the path” (Ibid: 432).  
Regarding Næss’s reception of skepticism, which is also embodied in his 
Ecophilosophy T, we should take into consideration that he insists on the 
skeptical way of formulating deep ecology as an open philosophy. On the 
other hand, if we absolutize openness, how can we ground its normative va-
lidity, especially when we discuss some principles of derivation and norms? 
Finding a certain truth is not a dogmatic endeavor by default, nor can the 
criterion of verification automatically be equated with the one of normative 
validity, as I already showed.  
Anker characterizes Næss’s optimism as one of Ragnarok kind insisting that 
evil in the 21st century is a necessary condition for the sake of having to-
morrow (Ibid: 440). In turn, he claims that Næss remains silent whether “we 
will have to morally submit to ecological laws” in order to cope with the 
crisis, i.e. whether intuition and ecological empathy can be a basis against 
crimes (Ibid). 
Næss’s main argument against Anker’s interpretation concerns the way of 
formulating, namely, the need of keeping in mind the distinction between a 
                                           
377 Næss describes that explanation as a simplification (Ibid: 448). 
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definition of a term and a descriptive formulation of the essence of some-
thing as well as how to avoid the reduction of the process of problematizing 
to a naïve form of asking378 (Næss 1999g: 445). Furthermore, Næss, how-
ever, disagrees with Anker that Pyrrhonist skepticism can contribute to as-
sociating deep ecology movement with a social movement denying Anker’s 
idea that evil is necessary (Ibid: 446, 449). On a macro methodological lev-
el, it would mean that we should examine not only the political implications 
of deep ecology movement as such, but also to explore how the contradic-
tions derive from the lack of awareness of the role of ethical gradualism and 
the differences with other movements aiming at social and political trans-
formation respectively. 
                                           
378 The deep ecology movement is not defined by asking deep questions alone because, as Næss ar-
gues, it would have been naïve to claim such a thing (Ibid). 
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5.1. Ecological Sustainability Scenarios: Between 
Utopias and Dystopias 
Næss’s critics of Witoszek are explicated in his theory of so-called Green 
utopia of 2084379. He argues that the elimination of the crisis, which is a 
negative goal, requires optimism to be treated not as a goal, but rather to be 
examined from the perspective of decreasing ecological unsustainability 
(Næss 1999h: 469). 
Næss discusses the development of four possible scenarios about ecological 
sustainability in the long run. Due to the first one, there is no big move con-
cerning environmental politics, or global poverty in so far as the introduced 
measures may be considered as undemocratic ones since they are motivated 
by the dramatic situation they occur in (Næss and Haukeland 2008c: 276). 
The second scenario partly follows the first one apart from the big changes 
in the poor countries, where one experiences considerable economic growth 
of a Western type. Thus it would mean that five times more people will 
have a life style, which is not sustainable (Ibid). The development will be 
sharply stopped by an ecological breakdown providing a sustainable life 
style, which will make it more difficult to fight the chaos (Ibid). According 
to the third scenario, the crisis is followed by a shift to achieving a sustain-
able life style, but only after a complex ecological destruction takes place 
(Ibid). Last but not least, due to the fourth scenario we should make a step 
to an ecologically enlightening time characterized by one more realistic 
evaluation of the drastic reduction of the quality of life, which derives from 
the unsustainable development (Ibid). This scenario may take place in the 
future, i.e. in 2101 (Ibid). The positive evaluation of the latter can be seen in 
                                           
379 Næss’s green utopia is built on three main premises, namely, all living beings have one and the 
same right to live and blossom, all of them have an own value and that is why they do not have to be 
used as means as well as the power, which has been exerted by the politicians and school people to 
secure the richest life for as many as possible, should derive from the deepest values and most pos-
sible means (Næss and Tschudi 2007: 124). In brief, green utopia presumes an ideal connection be-
tween ethical and political distinctions of means and ends to be established so that ends can never, 
ethically or politically, be reduced to means. Otherwise, the latter should be a result of replacing the 
epistemologically based derivation with the idea of normative derivation due to which both the in-
trinsic value and intrinsic right, which is related to the law of nature, to provide the uncontradictory 
justification of certain top norms: the same right for life and development, and the same intrinsic 
value, which may have different embodiments. 
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Næss’s description of what the ecologically sustainable society should look 
like, namely, as a versatile society defined within an ecologically sustain-
able framework, which concerns not what realistic is, but rather what is pos-
sible (Ibid: 288). Furthermore, we should outline that Næss does not define 
ecological development by adopting a given plan economy, but by encour-
aging so-called mixed economy (blandingsøkonomi), which can tolerate 
one limited framework (Ibid: 301). 
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5.1.1. The Roles of Quality of Life and Living Standard 
within the Framework of Ecological Sustainability 
Scenarios 
On a macro methodological level, the lack of specifying the normative va-
lidity of vital needs as influencing the vagueness of understanding what a 
necessary means is has an impact on the problematization of one of Næss’s 
key concepts, namely, the one of quality of life understood as irreducible to 
the concept of living standard. According to Næss, every supporter of deep 
ecology movement feels and sees the possibilities of changing the course of 
the world (Næss 2008d: 7). Analyzing his conception of the connection be-
tween deep ecology and environmentally sustainable life style, I draw the 
conclusion that choosing simple means for achieving rich life should be 
based on cultivating sensitivity towards otherness as a prototype character-
istic. On a practical level, dwelling into situations means to appreciate di-
versity (both cultural and natural ones) as well as to be morally engaged 
with sacrificing the living standard for the sake of increasing the quality of 
life for the ones who need it. The ethical aspect, never to treat any living 
form whatsoever as means, becomes understandable if we explore it within 
the paradigm of ethical gradualism, which gives us grounds to use some 
sources as resources without looking at the other beings as means in them-
selves. In this context, if we introduce ethical gradualism, we may have 
good reasons to adopt the principle of universal protection that is much ap-
preciated, especially in conflict situations, where mutual commitment and 
respect embodied in non-violent actions are required. 
Regarding social dynamics, it is understood as a sacrifice of so-called mean-
ingful work (Næss and Haukeland 2008c: 143), the one, which determines 
the living standard and quality of life to become comparable in positive 
terms. In this respect, Næss’s theory corresponds to the one outlined by 
Kvaløy, which concerns the sensitivity to children (Ibid: 298) and their life. 
According to Næss, a key characteristic regarding the development of labor 
division in respect with work’s fragmentarization (Ibid: 143). In the field of 
industry, it means a reduction of the over-ordered gestalts (super-ordinary 
gestalts), of the meaningful things, which are an important class of antici-
pated gestalts (Ibid). When the same attention is not projected to one ab-
stracted gestalt, all understanding is acquired. Furthermore, it means that its 
units are anticipated gestalts: they are neither elements of perception, nor 
are intellectual elements since facts and values are different areas (Ibid). 
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Thus the lifestyle based on a free choice would automatically lead to obtain-
ing a high quality of life which cannot be associated with the living stan-
dard380 by default. Otherwise, it would mean that work as a goal would be 
simplified to a means of striving for a higher living standard. On a macro 
methodological level, it would signify that consumerism underrates the 
quality of life by imposing politics, which overrates the role of the many 
non-ecological specificities in the local communities, as Næss argues. His 
suggestion of reducing the living standard for the sake of increasing quality 
of life (Næss 2005c: 19) follows some of the arguments provided by 
Kvaløy, namely, rehabilitating the role of hand work without eradicating in-
dustry as well as encouraging people to work together. The main idea be-
hind these implementations is to support so-called mixed economy, which 
in turn would benefit the functioning of the democratic structures adopted 
by the local societies. Facing the challenge to choose between the adver-
tisement expert knowledge and natural competence to enjoy stars, people 
should ignore the illusion that by exaggerating the faith in the complicated 
means, they would accomplish complex goals. 
In this context, he argues that full ecological sustainability381 should be 
reached until 2050 (Næss 2008: 280), but it does not explain what gives him 
grounds to believe that the reduction of energy can be overcome exactly due 
to then, so that to avoid the justification of the next utopian scenario. On the 
other hand, talking about ecological sustainability and ecological unsustain-
ability, Næss draws the relevant conclusion that in terms of development, 
the industrial countries can be defined as overdeveloped ones, taking into 
                                           
380 An important point is what Næss calls a new Romanticism, namely, the scenario when the 
adopters of consumerism, (who dislike most animals, hate outdoor life and appeal for the lost ‘con-
sumerist’ life in an ecologically sustainable society) would be described as new Romanticists. They 
are characterized as people who try to revive the strive for the distant past as a reason for transgress-
ing the real ‘romantic’ image. 
381 According to Næss, Brundtland’s report defines development in respect with the economic pro-
gress in developing countries, which, however, does not mean that ecological sustainability is not a 
necessary condition (Næss and Haukeland 2008c: 233). On a micro methodological level, ecologi-
cal development is consistent with the maintenance of life’s richness and diversity on Earth (Ibid: 
234). Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I argue that rethinking the concept of sustain-
ability in Næss’s sense reveals that it is irreducible to the one of development: it is reducible rather 
to the concept of growth since ecological growth is supported by so-called by Næss ecological cul-
ture. 
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account that they are ecologically underdeveloped 382 (Næss 2005gg: 595). 
However, Næss outlines that the term developing country “should either be 
avoided or applied to rich countries as well as to poor” since every country 
today is “developing in a way that is ecologically unsustainable”383 (Næss 
2005ee: 564). 
He also provides a clear distinction outlining the symbiosis of sustainability 
and unsustainability within different societies discerning three classes. The 
latter include societies with unsustainability below the average level, ones 
with roughly an average level (Næss 2005o: 195) as well as societies with 
unsustainability above the average level. An important argument in this 
context is the role of political speculation with the idea of permissible poli-
cies ‘near the average level’ of sustainability, i.e. the ones, which follow a 
norm of a forced status quo in terms of their degree of unsustainability384. 
Næss aims at releasing the fear of the third world countries that deep ecol-
ogy is a new form of colonialism (Næss 2005s: 251). However, he does not 
succeed in clarifying what would be the common ground of guaranteeing 
the normative validity of mutual trust while arguing that a criterion of wil-
der sustainability should be imposed. On a macro methodological level, I 
claim that the problem with ecological unsustainability stems from what he 
calls narrow ecological sustainability (Ibid: 257).  
 
                                           
382 On the other hand, Næss questions the role of rehabilitating a ‘genuine’ economic process (Næss 
2005s: 262), which is also a simplified explanation that might bring us back to the frame of moral 
objectivism.  
383 However, it does not mean that he is a zealous supporter of zero growth. Næss relevantly empha-
sizes the need of talking about societies with industries rather than industrial societies (Næss 1999h: 
471).  
384 This issue will be examined in comparison with Skirbekk’s theory of sustainability in the chapter 
on Skirbekk. 
 306
5.2. Deep Ecology Movement, Social Justice 
Movement and Peace Movement through 
the Lens of Næss’s Biocentrism 
Næss discusses three main social movements: deep ecology movement, the 
one of social justice, and the movement of peace (Næss 2005r: 236). His 
main concern is that they may merge into one quasi-green movement (Ibid) 
because their potential convergence would lead to a certain type of a self-
destruction (Næss 2008: 99). According to Næss, all three movements are 
important but the ecological crisis deepens in years; that is why the latter 
should be given a certain priority (Light 2009: 77-78). In this context, I ar-
gue that the same situation refers to the need of encouraging justice and re-
ducing poverty in so far as so-called exponential growth is not a self-
sufficient factor, but it is dependent on the complex relationships between 
distributive justice, effective environmental politics and controllable sus-
tainable development. Against Næss’s other argument, namely, that deep 
ecology movement is the only one dealing with the intergenerational transi-
tion385, I raise the thesis that the complex engagement with the aforemen-
tioned movements presumes people with different background and from dif-
ferent generations to be involved for the sake of achieving long-lasting re-
sults. 
On a practical level, the ontological requirement of comparing and contrast-
ing deep ecology movement and the ones of peace and social justice would 
cause the potential change of politics as aiming to appreciate the quality of 
life rather than the increasing standard of living. Extrapolating Kvaløy’s 
model, I draw the conclusion that such a change is seen by Næss in the ap-
peal for rehabilitating two key points, namely, that humans have “no right to 
reduce diversity” unless vital needs are involved as well as cultural diversity 
should be justified by analogy to natural diversity (Næss 2005c: 18-19). 
                                           
385 In another writing, Næss stresses the fact that the deep ecology movement also considers the role 
of generations in time (Næss 2008:104). 
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5.2.1. Is Biospherical Democracy an Oxymoron? 
Næss argues that the maxima ‘to live and let live’ points out to a classless 
society in the biosphere, namely, to a certain kind of democracy (Næss 
2008b: 146), which in turn is comparable with Kvaløy’s conception that 
natural interdependence grounds the political one. One of the main issues 
which arise is how to avoid the speculations with the status of natural inter-
dependence while determining so-called biospherical democracy. Regarding 
natural order, we cannot talk about democracy in the full sense of the word 
because the latter is based on egalitarian attitudes and practices initiated by 
conscious, politically and morally engaged subjects. Furthermore, we do not 
have to forget that ‘natural’ equality can be (in the best possible way) only a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for having a democratic order. Oth-
erwise, we should have reduced democracy to a law of nature neglecting the 
role of political will as well as the common delegation of rights and duties 
in solving political problems. 
In ecopolitics, the first derived norm is to live due to the principles of a 
maximum symbiosis whose concrete projections are to live with others 
without minimizing their opportunities for a self-realization. However, from 
the fact that Næss defines such a ‘symbiotic imperative’, it does not neces-
sarily follow biospherical democracy to be established since this imperative 
presumes the interconnectedness between all living beings to be achieved 
by encouraging joy and love. By contrast, democracy itself is built not on 
joy and love, but rather on commonly distributed responsibilities and rights. 
In this context, biospherical democracy in Næss’s sense can be understood 
if we examine how, according to him, life’s embodiments depend on the 
different ideological frameworks, which the given societies are grounded in.  
Næss claims that life’s democracy has “realistic egalitarianism” as a proto-
type characteristic (Næss and Haukeland 2008c: 133). According to him, 
the belief that we do not possess the forest is a belief shared by many so-
called primitive societies386 (Ibid), which illustrates the similarity of all 
creatures and the meaning of circulation and connection to nature. This con-
ception is defined by Næss as realistic egalitarianism because, as it was al-
ready mentioned, “one does not hunt his/her friends” (Ibid: 134). Only by 
                                           
386 Næss explores the functioning of life’s democracy in the primitive societies arguing that property 
ideology has no place in a philosophy, which underlies ecology. Norway’s people do not possess 
Norway, so that in the same sense, world’s sources are not people’s one (Ibid). 
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work, playing and understanding, a long-lasting and deep identification is 
developed, which can determine society’s living conditions and ideology 
(Ibid). The egalitarian realism is a feature that also has an impact on the re-
quirements of what economics should best serve life’s democracy. The lat-
ter requires distinguishing between two main types of “scarcity society” 
(knapphetssamfunn): the first type is the society, where deprivation domi-
nates while the second type is the one, where dissatisfaction with what we 
have and the indifference to what we are prevail (Ibid: 265). I argue that 
within the framework of life’s democracy, the ‘positive’ scarcity has to be 
understood as one regarding the satisfaction of some vital needs for the sake 
of every single living being to have the same right for manifesting its intrin-
sic value. 
What are the main implications of building relevant environmental politics 
in this context? One of the reasons for introducing the concept of life’s de-
mocracy is the ‘naturalness’ of being in continuity in Næss’s sense, which is 
irreducible to the one of harmony. 
On the other hand, this specificity has an impact on the justification of the 
biospherical egalitarianism and its normative validity since ‘natural’ de-
pendence is not equivalent to the one established by man on nature. How-
ever, from that it does not follow that life’s democracy neglects what Næss 
calls main and subordinate gestalts. On the contrary, they are examined as 
intrinsically connected in a way that does not presume hierarchical forms of 
control to be adopted. 
In turn, realistic egalitarianism387 is not realistic in the objective sense of 
the word because otherwise, it would mean to examine life’s democracy 
within the framework of moral objectivism and thus to neglect Næss’s the-
ory of classless society on a political level. Going back to his example with 
the reasons against hunting friends, I agree that it is not just a statement, but 
rather a normative prescription. Friends are recognized as such due to the 
fact that we accept their intrinsic value, which is as ‘intrinsic’ as our own is. 
It presupposes the process of recognition to be based on a certain type of 
                                           
387 On a macro methodological level, I argue that Næss’s understanding of biospheric egalitarianism 
as a realistic one goes beyond the paradigm of moral objectivism only if the process of identification 
is interpreted as one of cultivating solidarity. According to Næss, biospheric egalitarianism is a mat-
ter of fight against human self-destructive dissociation from the other living forms. He claims that 
people’s hubris and their complex of superiority can be overcome by the process of solidarization, 
which imposes ‘I-You’ relationship with nature at the expense of ‘I-It’ one (Ibid: 209). 
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identification, which in turn presumes a given kind of solidarity to be 
adopted.  
Regarding political changes, it is important to see how adopting two contra-
dictory principles, the ones of complexity and complication can contribute 
to overcoming the problems in industrial and non-industrial states in Næss’s 
sense as well as the ones regarding the use of so-called by him soft and hard 
technologies (Næss 2005i: 85). The crucial point is that talking about poli-
cies, Næss introduces two types of ecological sustainability and unsustain-
ability shifting the focus from life’s democracy to sustainable development. 
In this context, I argue that one of the main concerns regarding Næss’s in-
terpretation of democracy is that he presumably sees the deep ecology as 
both incomparable with a given working social model and corresponding 
partly to the goals of Green society. He insists on the claim that there is no 
such a thing as “deep ecology society” because deep ecology society pro-
vides “wide ecological sustainability” than the green one (Næss 2005f: 
65)388. 
What are the concrete embodiments of the ecological sustainability accord-
ing to Næss? He outlines that one of the main aims to provide relevant eco-
politics is based on supporting a full, long-range regional and global eco-
logical sustainability389 (Næss 2005o: 193), which implies biodiversity and 
abundance of living forms since avoiding the threats of extinction “is not 
enough”. On a micro methodological level, it means that it is necessary to 
justify the politics of conservation as a prototype characteristic of imple-
menting ecologically sustainable politics. 
Undoubtedly, ecopolitics and ecological crisis are intrinsically connected in 
so far as ecological problems are ineradicable unless they are examined as 
                                           
388 Glasser outlines the origin of this inconsistency as deriving from people’s inability to communi-
cate in Næss’s sense (Glasser 1999: 366), which, however, is only one of the reasons in so far as 
Næss aims at promoting radical bioegalitarianism. 
389 Jon Wetlesen describes Næss’s investigations as optimist ones since Næss interprets the ecologi-
cal challenges as a matter of a logical problem, namely, as being impossible to provide complete 
prognostics of the “development” in time (Wetlesen 1974: 90). In turn, Wetlesen emphasizes that 
ecological challenges should be explored separately because they differ from the ones we witness in 
the pragmatic and instrumental way/mode of thinking (Ibid: 92). On a macro methodological level, 
he advocates making a distinction between the special ecopolitics, on the one hand, and the reformu-
lation and the new way of thinking, when we talk about “normal, political ways of stating”, on the 
other one (Ibid: 87). However, such a distinction would lead us back to the risk of neglecting envi-
ronmental politics by giving it in the hands of narrow specialists. 
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“questions of policy” (Ibid: 191), as Næss suggests390. It is also reasonable 
to elaborate his thesis that it is important to make a difference between poli-
tics and politicizing, albeit the arguments he provides are as questionable as 
the ones concerning the difference between morality and moralization. Such 
an interpretation may be explored against the background of investigating 
how ecologically sustainable policies can be contextualized as well as to 
what extent this process differs from the one provided by so-called green 
society. 
However, a serious concern arises from Næss’s definition of deep ecology 
movement as aiming at centralization, while encouraging different forms of 
decentralization. In this context, it is problematic to support the thesis that 
the flourishing of human life and cultures requires population reduction. On 
the other hand, it is relevant to accept his statement that the transformation 
of the ideal of progress from growth to development still leaves room for 
connecting the former with the establishment of “human development” 
(Næss 2005ee: 563). In turn, Næss’s theory of ecological sustainability can 
be explained by analyzing his principle “Maximize biodiversity!”, which 
embodies so-called fairly sustainable agreement guaranteeing relevant eco-
politics to be justified. Despite the fact that there is no green-party’s politi-
cal program derivable from the adopters of deep ecology movement, as 
Næss suggests (Næss 2005o: 194-195), from that it does not follow that the 
greens do not provide conceptions of relevant ecopolitics. 
Judging by the aforementioned specifications, I conclude that Næss’s theory 
of remaining on the level of system ethics restricted to the norms regarding 
ecosystems’ destruction (Næss 2005v: 294) leads to underrating the func-
tion of informed consent in the process of moral engagement, which in turn 
affects both the concept and the practice of so-called substantial mobiliza-
tion. As Næss points out, we cannot revive the values of cultures belonging 
to the past and thus to question industrial development, but we can find a 
way back to ecological sustainability (Næss 2008: 290). One of the main 
problems lies in the fact that there is no normative requirement for inflicting 
societal changes if we revive the values alone, without being able to trace 
their embodiment in relevant ecopolitical models. Related issue is that it 
remains ambiguous how starting with the interest in other people’s prob-
lems, we can provoke “general talks” rather than “small narratives”, as 
                                           
390 This is one of the few cases, when he analyzes the eradication of ecological problems by re-
evaluating the socio-political conditions, which lead to them. 
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Næss claims (Ibid: 279) in so far as this is a matter of evaluating moral con-
cern that raises moral commitment. Furthermore, regarding cultural diver-
sity, it is common local people of industrial countries also to disrespect their 
own culture, as Næss proves more than once while describing the Sherpa 
who wanted to turn the sacred mountain Tseringma into a tourist area for 
commercial reasons (Ibid: 282).  
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5.2.2. The Burden of Suffering and Compassion. 
Who Cares about Ecological Sustainability? 
Even if we assume that it makes sense to ascribe rights to bears without at-
tributing moral capabilities to them, we cannot argue that the right to live 
and blossom depends merely on one norm. On a macro methodological lev-
el, species’ egalitarianism ‘in principle’ concerns many different types of 
mixed communities. Næss provides relevant arguments in favor of substitut-
ing the criterion of similarity with the one of sameness in so far as thus he 
qualitatively extends the target group. However, the idea of outlining simi-
larities is a necessary but not sufficient condition since as Næss himself ar-
gues, the identification needs not result in love by itself (Næss 2005u: 303). 
As I already emphasized, the main problem is how and when we can culti-
vate sensitivity towards otherness391 for the purposes of justifying the con-
nection between identification and love as a necessary one from a normative 
point of view. In this context, it is one of the few cases when Ecosophy T is 
defined in respect with the eradication of suffering (Ibid: 308-309). If all 
suffering is defined as negative, this would mean that it has an intrinsic neg-
ative value in Næss’s sense.  
On the other hand, leaving the concept of rights deliberately vague affects 
the understanding of responsibility, which turns the process of distribution 
of justice into a vague process as well. One definition, which is determined 
from the perspective of utilitarian ethics. In turn, from this, it does not fol-
low that the obligation is necessarily driven by a moral motivation, and sec-
ond, that the objectivity of so-called severe suffering can be uncontradictory 
proved392. 
Before going into detail about the need of rehabilitating the role of ecologi-
cal sustainability, the contextualization of the problem of suffering has to be 
examined. According to Næss, it is impossible to deny or underestimate suf-
fering in nature (Næss 2008: 245). It is defined as a “good name for a class 
of gestalts” (Ibid: 199) due to which the directedness of subjective apprecia-
tion of pain is recognized as a main criterion in so far as compassion aided 
                                           
391 Næss claims that human beings have an obligation to avoid exposing the domestic animals to a 
risk of severe suffering (Ibid: 310). 
392 Norton illustrates why it is more complicated than just deciding what has an intrinsic value if we 
determine that suffering of both sheep and wolves as intrinsically bad. The latter does not tell us 
what to do (Norton 1999: 398). 
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by the brain encompasses everything capable of pain (Ibid: 296). In this 
context, Næss’s ethics can be examined as influenced by Gandhi’s one of 
non-violence, but even such a comparison cannot fully benefit the clarifica-
tion of two main problems, namely, how, if it is the ethics of minimal inter-
ference that presumes a certain peaceful cooperation (in the minimum 
sense) to be adopted (Næss 2005x: 437), we can justify and inflict change 
regarding suffering. Another crucial concern is who and how to measure 
who suffers most in order to help him/her first, as Næss suggests.  
Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I argue that Næss adopts 
some principles of utilitarian ethics while evaluating suffering since he 
promotes intensity as a criterion of verification (Næss 2005t: 287). The 
comparison of so-called degrees of pain is made on the bases of measuring 
the ‘felt pain’ (Ibid). Within this framework, the subjective experience of 
pain is determined by default as objectively measurable and thus as an ob-
jective criterion of an evaluation affecting the presumption that it is the by-
stander who can objectively evaluate someone else’s experience of pain. 
Relying on such a presumption is rather an ideal case in so far as in most 
cases, it benefits supporting the definition of quantitative criteria of pain 
measurement by being tempted, as Næss himself states, “to let numbers de-
cide” (Ibid). 
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5.2.3. The Role of Solidarity for Environmental Politics 
Analyzing Næss’s theory of environmental sustainability, I draw the con-
clusion that if we remain within the paradigm of moral objectivism, it 
would mean to be unable to avoid equating the process of identification and 
solidarity in the field of environmental politics in so far as identification in 
Næss’s sense does not necessarily presume certain changes in the moral be-
havior to be made if the rights of the objects of identification are somehow 
corrupted. Furthermore, if the process of identification is spontaneous, as 
Næss suggests, how can we be ‘equally spontaneous’ to all other beings’ in-
terests393?  
Extrapolating Næss’s theory, I argue that it is morality that makes possible 
solidarity and identification be put in a dialectical relationship as mutually 
dependent factors. Despite the fact that solidarity strengthens the identifica-
tion, the other way around is not necessarily realizable. If morality is re-
duced to ‘natural’ identification, then we would be able to recognize, by 
‘feeling’ solidarity, mainly the other representatives of the human species, 
which would cause, in the best way, the justification of ethical anthropocen-
trism rather than the one of ethical gradualism.  
If the process of identification is not a matter of gaining moral value, then at 
least three main problems arise. First, the spontaneous recognition would be 
deprived of normative validity. Second, even if spontaneous recognition is 
defined as a natural state, it would not explain how we end up with a certain 
form of anthropocentrism, and not one of biocentrism in Næss’s sense. And 
third, we cannot rely on the criteria of degree and recognition, as Næss sug-
gests. Otherwise, we would keep facing the risk of adopting ethical anthro-
pocentrism as well as examining the moral consequences from the perspec-
tive of Hume’s dilemma regarding the connection between cause and effect, 
namely, to presume that what comes next is intrinsically dependent on what 
precedes it, in both moral and ontological sense. 
Further concerns are also raised by Næss’s thesis that spontaneity of identi-
fication should be understood as a non-rational process due to which we re-
act to another being’s interest (Næss and Haukeland 2008c: 159). Except al-
ready discussed implications of the lack of normative validity of spontaneity 
itself, I argue that such an interpretation brings us back to the debate about 
                                           
393 Some implicit premises of avoiding this discrepancy can be also found in Næss’s writings, when 
he discusses the projections of ‘egalitarianism’ in so-called super-ordinary meaningful gestalts. 
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the status of moral subjects, namely, what would be the criteria of defining 
one living being as a moral subject if we refuse the criteria of morality and 
rationality? Does it mean then that every living being is a moral subject and 
if so, how would this vague way of speaking contribute to avoiding the jus-
tification of ungrounded biocentrism? 
Næss’s attempts to use the criteria of degree and intensity as supporting eth-
ical gradualism merely reveal the superficial aspects of the functioning of 
the latter, namely that there are specifications, which make us talk about 
gradualism, but leave the question why these specifications should be treat-
ed as axiological ones untouched394. 
                                           
394 Næss argues that we should develop ethics that to take over itself (a ta inn over seg) the differ-
ences between the non-human living beings (Ibid: 187-191). Arguing that identification depends on 
both culture and economics makes it also, both directly and indirectly, dependent on morality. How-
ever, refusing the role of normative validity of ethics by default, he makes the problematic statement 
that such ethics should be a form of deeper realism and therapy (Ibid: 191).  
 316
5.3. Distinguishing Gandhi from Pacifism. Some 
New Perspectives on Norwegian Environmentalism 
Næss analyzes the origin of the distinction between Gandhists (whom he 
identifies with) and so-called pacifists. The difference is outlined as coming 
from the pacifists’ lack of search for conflict’s center. That is why Næss ar-
gues that while pacifists395 do not look for the latter, Gandhists396 do so 
(Næss 2000: 57). Against the background of this problematic thesis, Næss 
defines his behavior during the Second World War as a behavior of a “Gan-
dhist without a weapon” (Ibid: 104). A similar phrase is used, when he dis-
cussed his participation in the environmental demonstrations in Mardøla 
(1973) and Alta (1981) (Ibid: 62). Regarding his experience, Næss claimed 
that as a Gandhist, he has been looking for the conflict’s center, which con-
cerns the intrinsic values (Ibid). 
In this context, I argue that some of the main methodological problems in 
Næss’s reception of Gandhi derive from the vague definitions of both what 
a conflict’s center is as well as what are the prototype characteristics of the 
center in question that make Gandhists unique. On the other hand, Næss 
does not specify the implications of the normative validity of the slogan ‘to 
                                           
395 In turn, there is also serious criticism in the field of peace studies to Næss’s attempts to reduce 
the complex aims and methods of the studies in question, while elaborating strategies for solving al-
ready available group-conflicts. Galtung claims that Næss’s work on Gandhi is “limited and even 
limiting as a general conflictology-praxiology” (Galtung 2011) since Næss saw non-violence as an 
alternative to nuclearism and to violent behavior in group conflict in general (Ibid). Galtung argues 
that there is an explicandum in Næss’s works on Gandhi, namely, something to be explained, and 
this is Gandhi’s political ethics. Næss’s method of explaining itself reveals the connection between 
Gandhi’s action and speech, and the layers of Gandhi’s thought. In this context, there are two modes 
of investigating: the one of extension of Gandhi’s political ethics by referring it to a set of action re-
ports and a set of sentences respectively, and the one of intension, which concerns the meaning, i.e. 
the justification starting from the first and deep principles (Ibid). 
396 According to Galtung, Næss’s survey on Gandhi is very precise in terms of reviving the image of 
Gandhi’s world (Ibid). However, he outlines that “As a guide for conflict resolution and peace work, 
it is rather limiting” (Ibid). Galtung claims that Næss’s assumption built on the presumption that 
normative power stems from the first principles along the lines of deduction of norms and actions, 
makes the whole system vulnerable because if we have problems with the first principles, then we 
cannot talk about the unquestionable normative validity of the rest (Ibid). Furthermore, Galtung 
makes the relevant conclusion that Næss’s deductivism is both his strength and weakness (Ibid).  
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fight without weapons’ as well as why this fight would be more successful 
than the traditional forms of struggle397.  
According to Næss, ethics of non-violence presumes a certain type of coop-
eration to be developed. He also explicates his concerns about the role of 
human rights embodied in Gandhi’s saying that human beings have obliga-
tions, not rights (Ibid: 96) pointing out that Gandhi’s obligations are ex-
plained through the idea of rights398 indeed.  
On the other hand, a relevant point in Næss’s interpretation of Gandhi’s phi-
losophy is that he describes the cult to ecosystems as being as dangerous as 
the one to people. However, the problem is that questioning speciesism does 
not contribute to justifying the non-acceptance of given human rights. On a 
macro methodological level, it means that disenchanting speciesism is a 
necessary but not sufficient condition in clarifying the problem of justice 
within the framework of ethical gradualism. 
An illuminative example illustrating one of the main concerns regarding 
Næss’s interpretation is his comments on the Earth First! movement (Næss 
1999e: 229) revealing the effectiveness of so-called ecotage (Ibid) that is 
accepted as a part of ecodefense (Ibid). He specifies that ecotage can be 
adopted unless less drastic methods do work (Ibid), which raises the ques-
tion how and from whose perspective the situation can be objectively evalu-
ated. Næss considers the ecotage in Scandinavia as ineffective because of 
“the traditional level of trust between people in power and the population” 
(Ibid). However, relying on the premise of trust is a double-bind issue. Oth-
erwise, we would not have witnessed how the debate about environmental 
protection and industrial development has gradually turned into a ‘versus’ 
debate in time. It is also questionable who decides that it is appropriate to 
adopt ecotage since thus there would be a risk to go back to the formula ‘the 
                                           
397 Regarding traditional forms of struggle, Næss argues that hate during the occupation of Norway 
has been a very strong one (Næss 1999: 77). Another open question is how to understand Næss’s 
statement that Gandhists’ efforts can help after-war Germany to overcome the pain and sorrow 
(Næss 2000: 24).  
398 The methodological connection between rights and informed consent does not necessarily pre-
sume narrowing morality to moralization, as Næss suggests. Regarding the role of informed con-
sent, it explains why first, we cannot claim, like Næss does, that since Gandhi’s experience is quite 
complicated , our conclusions do not have a scientific status (Næss 2000: 35), and second that sym-
pathy with others is straightly expressed (Ibid: 38). It is the informed consent achieved by various 
techniques of communicating that makes Gandhi’s ethics of non-violence a well-grounded one.  
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end justifies the means’. It also remains problematic to what extent we can 
refer to the mode of violence as a sufficient reason while identifying some-
one as a supporter of deep ecology399. 
Furthermore, if deep ecology movement is determined as a revolutionary 
one, as Næss suggests, the role of social ecology may also be clarified as a 
revolutionary one in so far as both of them insist on some political changes 
to be primarily performed in the rich countries (Næss 1999h: 469). The dif-
ference with social ecology is defined by Næss on the level of ecodefense, 
which in turn can also be grounded in Gandhi’s ethics, namely, as a way 
nonviolently to protect a place, where “you belong” (Næss 1999e: 228). 
                                           
399 See Næss’s interpretation of the status of Earth First!-ers (Næss 1999e: 230). 
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5.3.1. Gandhi and Norwegian Activism 
What is the concrete impact of the reception of Gandhi’s ethics400 on Nor-
wegian environmental activism according to Næss? As a zealous supporter 
of the grassroots movements, Næss argues that he “feels at home with such 
movements” as well as that he has found a strong motivation in the way 
Gandhi has managed to mobilize people (Næss and Haukeland 2008c: 
221).401 
In the mid-1970s, Næss contributed to the people’s action Future in Our 
Hands (Framtiden i våre hender). In the preface of Erik Dammann’s book 
(having the same title and published in 1972), he wrote that “we need only a 
small insight to realize that the flow of goods and services we give a central 
place in life does not make us necessarily happier” as well as that the way to 
a human life, which presumes a responsibility to the third world to be taken 
is also the way of achieving a “better well-being for ourselves” (Ibid: 281). 
The book became a huge success, several thousand people showed their in-
terest in participating in the action and as a logical result, the Action Com-
mittee of People’s with Næss as a foreman was established in Nadderud 
(April 2nd 1974) . An important point in this context is that the action saw 
                                           
400 What is the line of arguments that can contribute to revealing Næss’s willingness to universalize 
Gandhi’s ethics of non-violence as a core of peace studies? According to Galtung, Næss’s deep in-
terest in semantics as well as in rational reconstruction of Gandhi’s thoughts is not ‘his’ (Galtung 
2011). Galtung claims that Næss accepts Gandhi’s approach to structural violence, but not the one to 
direct violence, which is defined as too risky. Furthermore, Galtung argues in favor of a peaceful 
conflict transformation, which to be fulfilled before the actual conflict takes place, or as he called it 
“to mediate conflicts before violence”, to reconcile if it fails and to “build peace structures to trans-
form conflicts with empathy, non-violence, creativity” by imagining new realities (Ibid). Galtung al-
so argues that Næss takes into account the role of empathy and non-violence, but does not search for 
new realities – only for common goals (Ibid). 
401 Næss’s engagement with the peace movement in the 1940s and 1950s was the step that helped 
him to move forward getting engaged with the environmental activism (Ibid: 221). 
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the fight against the ecocrisis in connection with the fight against poverty in 
the world402 (Ibid). 
This experience made Næss claim that the folk action is a process that con-
sists of three phases403. The first one is the phase of self-inquiry (selv-
granskingsfasen), i.e. the phase of determining the aim, or so called motiva-
tional phase, which encourages the simplicity and the role of specifying 
own values (Ibid: 283). The second phase is the explanation phase 
(utredningsfasen), which presumes people to agree on something to be 
achieved on a local basis. Here, we do not have to forget that we are all ex-
perts (Ibid). The third phase is to make local, or more encompassing collec-
tive decisions (Ibid). In this context, Næss emphasizes two main steps, 
which should be made. During the first one a strategy of a collective and 
organized change should be developed, while the second step concerns the 
thorough discussions about the means of social changes (Ibid: 286). 
These three phases were brought to light ten years later, in order the aspects 
of the deep ecology movement to be explained404 (Ibid: 221). In the Apron 
diagram we see again the three levels developed in Nadderud (Ibid). The 
grounding level, the one of self-inquiry, is the level, where one formulates 
his/her values, norms and develops his/her ecosophy inspired by the plural-
ity of pictures (Ibid). On level two, one should find something common, a 
platform of formulations, which the supporters can agree about. On level 
three, we should concentrate on the consequences, means and plans for ac-
tions, which bring us back to one multi-sided stage of the movement (Ibid). 
Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I draw the conclusion that we 
cannot talk about a direct parallel between the three stages and the ones dis-
                                           
402 At the first meeting, Næss delivered a lecture explaining how one can develop and strengthen 
people’s movement. The lecture had the title The light side of the issue (Sakens lyse side) emphasiz-
ing both the light sides and the joy of triggering the necessary changes (Ibid). However, this title was 
changed against Næss’s will in the book New Lifestyle (Ny Livsstil) (1974) into the one of We 
should begin to step on the politicians’ toes (Vi må begynne å tråkke politikerne på tærne). Næss 
himself did not like the change of the title and when he published the lecture in his book Technol-
ogy, Pedagogy and One New Life Style (Teknikk, pedagogikk og en ny livsstil) (1978), he brought 
the first title back making the following comment: “We wish the Norwegian people to have more 
joy, less struggle after protecting themselves with means that may, or may not, give joy” (Ibid). 
403 The phases were defined at the first meeting in Nadderud in 1974 (Ibid: 221).  
404 One position, which as I already showed, was subjected to further modifications by Næss in fa-
vor of solving environmental problems first. 
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played on the Apron diagram in so far as at the three stages, we have the 
role of engagement as a prototype characteristic, which is irreducible to a 
hypotetic-deductive analysis. 
On a macro methodological level, going back to the problem of introducing 
the motivational gradualism in quantitative terms by presuming that they 
should later coincide with the qualitative ones, we face again the concerns 
deriving from Næss’s statement about the connection between logical and 
motivational components. There is a serious methodological problem if we 
presume that motivation comes first, and the actions (graduating from indi-
vidual to collective ones) come second because such an approach does not 
explain why the individual is able to act without being necessarily engaged 
with collective initiatives. Otherwise, it would mean that we should deny 
the role of the individual heroes as a less significant one. Regarding values, 
they should be formulated at the first stage, but their clarification is equally 
important for the next two levels since the expertise is impossible as a val-
ue-natural competence. 
Concerning the clarification of environmental problems in Norway, Næss 
emphasizes three trends in solving conflicts, namely, violent, passive and 
non-violent trends (Næss 2000: 42). In his analysis, he faces the same prob-
lems as the ones, while discussing the need of justifying ethical gradualism, 
i.e. how to define the cases of self-defense as something different from ex-
erting other forms of violence. Non-violence is irreducible to pacifism be-
cause according to Næss, the latter is a form of passivization in contrast to 
Gandhi’s ethics that presumes a given type of activism to be adopted (Ibid: 
57). One of the main methodological differences is seen on the level of ac-
tiveness in solving problems for which there are no normative arguments. 
However, Næss does not deny that most principles proposed by Gandhi are 
also implemented in pacifist activism. In turn, I disagree with Næss’s state-
ment that Gandhists look more intensively for conflicts than the pacifists 
because in both cases, there are values involved as well as consensus that 
violence reduces self-realization. 
The issue of whether we would give preference to Gandhi’s ethics or so-
called by Næss pacifist forms of activism is important for revealing the 
ways environmental campaigns in Norway were held. Is it possible, and if 
so, how can Mardøla and Alta actions be defended as Gandhist initiatives 
(Ibid: 62, 83) merely on the basis of the friendly attitudes towards the oppo-
nent, taking into account that most activists were not led by the reason to be 
friendly, but rather by the one of protecting environment? In this context, I 
argue that the friendly attitude is a necessary but not sufficient condition for 
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self-realization if it is understood within the framework of nature’s realiza-
tion as a goal. 
Another significant problem is that we should question Næss’s distinction 
of activism, demonstration and reformation. Relying on Gandhi’s ethics, he 
argues that albeit the direction is revolutionary, the steps should be reforma-
tory ones (Næss 2005p: 216). That is why one of the main concerns is that 
there is no normative need the quantitative changes to be recognized as 
qualitative ones. Distinguishing between action, campaign and movement 
(Ibid: 215), Næss does not take into consideration that goals are ‘more than’ 
just a means in qualitative sense underrating the fact that the quality is de-
termined by the idea of normative validity. That is why none of these levels 
can be necessarily anticipated as quantitatively ‘bigger’ (in size, aims and 
means) than the previous one. The tension is raised by justifying the quanti-
tative implications of the proportion between risks and alternatives (how-
ever, big risks may provoke big alternatives even within the small activi-
ties), which does not contribute to specifying what the qualitative differ-
ences between activism, demonstration and reformation are. Nor is the time 
longitude a criterion of providing such a classification in so far as the long-
lasting action is not the only one criterion of organizing campaigns (regard-
less of the fact the duration can be its significant characteristic).  
Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I draw the conclusion that the 
problem is how would we evaluate the situation deciding whether to exert 
all these forms of radical struggle? Furthermore, how can we delimit them 
so that to prevent their degradation into pure violence? Would it be a ques-
tion of time, or of number of people involved? Would not this distinction re-
ly on the implicit forms of violence as a means of achieving certain goals? 
And if so, what would be the normative requirement of stopping these pro-
tests respectively? 
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5.4. Norwegian Green Party’s Platform 
as Seen from within 
Examining the genealogy of deep ecology movement and its aims, it is im-
portant to emphasize its relationships with the green movement, as repre-
sented by Næss as well as to clarify to what extent we can claim that Næss 
defines the green movement as ‘closer’ to some of the principles of shallow 
ecology movement. According to Næss, the green society characterizes with 
a high degree of decentralization, grassroots’ democracy and non-violence 
(Næss and Haukeland 2008c: 289), i.e. it has some aims, which are also 
shared by the supporters of deep ecology. In turn, the green society is de-
scribed as taking place against the background of deep ecology’s stance on 
our relationships with nature and natural processes (Ibid: 290). On the one 
hand, Næss argues that such a society is a general utopia (Ibid: 293), while 
on the other one, he emphasizes that between 1965 and 1975 we have wit-
nessed unique creativity within the framework of green social and political 
thinking (Ibid: 295). Naess points out that the difference concerns the at-
tempt of the social greens to first change the society, i.e. to impose “a more 
social form” of a green lifestyle (Ibid: 291) and only then to look at the en-
vironment. 
On a macro methodological level, Næss’s theory of so-called green utopia is 
contextualized in Norwegian ecopolitics regarding green economy since the 
latter can contribute to reducing ethically unacceptable unemployment. It 
envisions a labor-intensive economy because the capital intensive one is 
closely tied with the raising level of unemployment. However, Næss clearly 
states that there are no great green economists (Light 2009: 79-80).  
He argues that green parties do not necessarily show the feelings of solidar-
ity and compassion (Næss 2005o: 199)405. In turn, this statement remains 
too general. It does not reveal how the issue of balance between ecological 
sustainability and moral engagement with people in need can be kept, nor 
does it clarify why deep ecology movement provides better solutions. 
                                           
405 It is a matter of increasing the contributions to the Third World in its daily fights with hunger and 
torture looking for more ecologically sound solutions (Ibid). 
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Næss also discusses the more general implications of ecopolitics examining 
the three poles of so-called political triangle406 (Ibid: 203), namely, the 
blue, green and red ones. Green cannot be placed between blue and red be-
cause, as Næss relevantly claims, a second dimension is needed (Ibid). On 
the other hand, even if we accept that the red, blue and green circles overlap 
and thus to presume that “green is a dynamic wavelikeforce” (Ibid) and an 
intuition of a sudden realization should affect all points along (Næss 2005v: 
204), we still cannot argue that the politics of greens can be reduced to a 
form of seeing affinity, as Næss suggests (Ibid), especially within green pol-
icies’ attempts to minimize the interference in the biosphere (Næss 2005aa: 
504).  
In relation to I.A and III. B of Næss’s scheme, green politics is displayed as 
opposed to the red and especially to the blue one (Næss 2005p: 209)407. 
Undoubtedly, green politics combines local and global perspectives (Ibid: 
210), but we do not have to forget that national identity is not a static term, 
as Næss claims. It can never be based on unchangeable local communities 
even historically. Despite the fact that Næss rejects the opportunity deep 
ecology to share similar philosophy with green politics, the latter is called 
“good or responsible ecopolitics” (Ibid). 
Judging by what Næss argues, I draw the conclusion that we face the fol-
lowing contradictions. Green politics would have a higher status if we ac-
cept Næss’s statement that ecopolitics is neutral to the extent it is a form of 
ecophilosophy, as he suggests. Such a presumption would lead to question-
ing the normative validity of deep ecology because thus it would only partly 
share the goals of green politics. In this context, there are two options: deep 
ecology to be recognized as ‘more responsible’ than green politics. It is a 
vague definition, which (if adopted) would also provoke the well-known 
discussions how to define the qualitative evaluation. The other option is 
deep ecology to be determined as ‘less responsible’ than green politics. This 
statement remains problematic in terms of how to justify the role of empa-
thy with other living beings. 
Furthermore, keep thinking about the evaluation of ‘more’ and ‘less’ does 
not contribute to solving the problem of so-called by Næss hybrid cases, 
                                           
406 According to Næss, green societies and cultures may be quite diverse, but so-called blue econ-
omy hides this fact (Næss 1999h: 466). 
407 IA concerns the politics of polluting human environment, while III B affects the politics of popu-
lation of non-human beings (Ibid). 
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namely, when according to the principles of deep ecology, we should react 
both centralizing and decentralizing (Ibid: 208-209). Such an interpretation 
would limit the debates to the quantitative projections of the issue by think-
ing in oppositions such as shallow vs. deep, local vs. regional, national vs. 
global etc. (Ibid). The only qualitative dimension in Næss’s classification is 
the one of favored vs. unfavored, which still needs to be examined from a 
dialectical perspective. 
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6. THE IMPACT OF MAHAYANA 
BUDDHISM AND HINDUISM ON NÆSS’S 
PHILOSOPHY 
Outlining some parallels between the heterogeneous number of Buddhist 
sources and ecosophy in particular is required for outlining the origin of 
Næss’s specific interpretation since revealing the role of these sources is 
useful for understanding the horizon of his statements (Cavazza 2014: 43). 
On the other hand, the idea of talking about so-called green Buddhism and 
deep ecology should be carefully examined. Regarding the analysis of the 
Green Buddhism, I refer to Cavazza’s theory saying that “a Buddhist eco-
logical attitude towards nature is simply problematic”408 (Ibid: 27). 
The influence on Næss’s gestalt ontology can also be explored on the level 
of self-realization’s embodiments in so-called engaged Buddhism. Regard-
ing the connections between deep ecology and engaged Buddhism, it is im-
portant to replace the latter with green Buddhism, as K. Kraft suggests 
(Gregory and Sabra 2008: 60). According to Kraft, what are sometime rec-
ognized as individual Buddhist practices are better understood as starting 
points for cultivating deep ecology (Ibid) because “walking in the world as 
if it were our lover leads inevitably to deep ecology” (Ibid: 61). However, 
even if we accept such a premise, form that it does not follow that engaged 
Buddhism can be defined as a form of Green Buddhism. One of the most 
distinguished representatives of the engaged Buddhism, the Vietnamese 
monk Hanh argues that we begin to see the non-self first (Ibid: 55). Then, 
we start seeing the interdependent nature, and once we see the latter, we see 
                                           
408 As Devall and Sessions argue, Buddhism places undue emphasis on sentience, which does not 
allow us fully to develop our capacities for deep ecology thought (Devall and Sessions 1985: 8). 
According to them, Buddhism in general seems to ignore the importance of rocks and trees, namely, 
whether or not non-sentient beings can achieve enlightenment. Furthermore, taking this sentience as 
a basis of our identification remains “shallowly anthropocentric” from the perspective of deep ecol-
ogy” (Leopold in Gregory and Sobra 2008: 62). 
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Buddha (Ibid). In this context, he defines ecology as deep ecology, in the 
sense that it is not only deep, but also universal, claiming that we need to 
protect ecology of the Earth, and the one of the mind respectively409 (Ibid: 
56-67). Judging by these investigations, I draw the conclusion that it is the 
process ontology that can be justified as initiating the recognition of the 
necessary dependence of self-realization on nature’s one as a form of mu-
tual engagement. 
Furthermore, as Ian Harris claims, “no direct parallel to the western nature 
can be found there” (Cavazza 2014: 28), which would mean to compare two 
quite different in their origin and embodiment concepts. Another relevant 
line of arguments in this context is the one of Elisa Cavazza who points out 
that Næss also does not provide a definition, or a semantic field for nature 
(Ibid). According to her, he makes use of Husserlian concept of Lebenswelt 
(our lived world) (Ibid), but from that it does not follow that we can draw a 
direct methodological parallel between Næss’s understanding of nature and 
the one of Mahayana Buddhism, which to be recognized as a necessary and 
sufficient condition for justifying deep ecology. On the other hand, a serious 
concern derives from the fact that Næss’s references to Mahayana Bud-
dhism are quite vague in many respects, so that I draw a conclusion similar 
to the one made by Kvaløy, which refers to Næss’s interpretation of Spino-
za (i.e. that it is rather Næss than Spinoza), namely, that Næss’s reception of 
the principles of Mahayana Buddhism entails more of the characteristics of 
his own paradigm rather than staying ‘closer’ to the original messages of 
Mahayana Buddhism410. 
On a macro methodological level, the impact of Mahayana Buddhism and 
Hinduism on Næss’s conception can be mainly traced on the following lev-
els: on the reception of Gandhi’s ethics of non-violence due to the fact that 
Gandhi himself is influenced by both Mahayana Buddhism and Hinduism 
(Bhagavad Gita) as well as on the level of gestalt ontology in so far as in the 
strive for grounding a new type of process philosophy both Næss and 
Kvaløy return to some sources of Mahayana Buddhism.  
                                           
409 For Næss’s reception of Engaged Buddhism, see also Cavazza 2014: 26, Notes 11-12. 
410 Going back to Mahayana Buddhism’s influence on Næss (Næss 1997: 4), we should also specify 
the role of feeling. If “feeling” to one of these premises does not imply philosophical knowledge or 
interest, as Næss suggests, how can some of the premises be used as ultimate ones so far? If the one 
who is interested in Buddhist teaching about greed (for instance) is not interested in nirvana, he 
should stop in the middle of the way seeing no sense in continuing it. 
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Judging by those investigations, I reach the conclusion that Kvaløy outlines 
in detail the genealogy of the problem saying that environmental philosophy 
understood as a certain type of process philosophy cannot be identified with 
the one represented in Mahayana Buddhism. It is due to the fact that this 
process philosophy also adopts some specificities which are typical for the 
Western process philosophies.  
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6.1. The Role of Mahayana Buddhism 
and Hinduism on Ecosophy 
According to Hinduism, life has four goals, namely, power and wealth, aes-
thetic enjoyment, ethics (dharma) and liberation from rebirth (so-called 
moksa) (Jacobsen 1996: 224). Examining Næss’s reception of Gandhi’s in-
terpretation411 of Bhagavad Gita, I argue that the inconsistencies regarding 
the latter derive to a certain extent from Gandhi’s own misconception of the 
relationship between Mahayana Buddhism and Hinduism. Discovering 
Bhagavad Gita as a source, Gandhi anticipated this relationship as one 
based on the understanding of Buddhism as a reform movement within 
Hinduism412 (Gier 1996: 88).  
Mahayana Buddhism’s theory of atman is anticipated in Næss’s statement 
that seeing the larger Self everywhere strengthens solidarity and non-
violence due to the process of identification in Næss’s sense. However, the 
aforementioned comparison regarding ethics requires at least one significant 
difference to be outlined, namely, that Mahayana Buddhism pays special at-
tention to the role of ethics413, while Næss narrows morality to moraliza-
tion. As De Silva argues, Næss misses the role of moral laws, which is cru-
cial for Buddhism in general (De Silva 1998: 41). In this context, I argue 
that the broad parallels concerning ethics can be drawn on the level of ethics 
of non-violence, which is grounded in the idea of liberation from suffering 
(in Buddhism) as well as in the positive transformation of the possibility for 
                                           
411 Being raised in Gujarat, Gandhi was interested in the Jainist version of Hinduism (Gier 1996: 94). 
412 On the other hand, Næss is criticized by some Indians that he misses the entity of Gandhi’s per-
spective (Jacobsen 1996: 238). 
413 Mahayana’s six perfections include generosity, morality or good conduct, patience, vigour, 
meditation and wisdom. Compassion (karuna) remains as important as wisdom since Mahayana 
Buddhism made compassion one of the highest virtues in its system. Since Mahayana Buddhism 
acknowledges the Four Noble Truths, the connection between wisdom and compassion can be de-
fined as concerned with the understanding of the ego illusion (atta-ditthi) and and suffering (dukkha) 
(De Silva 1998: 37), which should be overcome by the right vision. In turn, the fourth principle of 
the eight-fold path concerns the right action, which is not harmful for the others (Ibid: 55). Thus the 
ultimate good is justified as liberation from suffering, or as a strive for so-called state of nibbana 
(nirvana) (Ibid: 71). 
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conflicts in Næss’s conception, which is due to the reception of Gandhi’s 
ethics of non-violence. 
Regarding beautiful actions in Buddhism and Næss’s theory, De Silva rele-
vantly points out that they are irreducible to Buddhist ethics (Ibid: 107). 
Compassion (karuna)414 arises spontaneously when impermanence (anicca) 
and non-self (anatta) are truly seen (Cavazza 2014: 42). Concerning the ex-
trapolation of compassion to Næss’s theory is recognized by refuting the 
ontological separation between the ego and the other. But as De Silva points 
out, Næss’s understanding of morality makes it difficult to relate beautiful 
actions to Mahayana Buddhism because “A beautiful action in the Buddhist 
context” should be defined as “the finest expression of morality” (De Silva 
1998:107). Judging by these investigations, I claim that being spontaneous, 
as understood by Næss, is a necessary but not sufficient condition for justi-
fying ethics since being ‘spontaneous in time’ is irreducible to ‘spontane-
ous’ as a part of the complex understanding of someone’s motivation. 
                                           
414 Cavazza emphasizes that compassion is the “worldly virtue par excellence” concerning bodhi-
sattva resolution to delay the ultimate liberation for the purposes of liberating all beings (Cavazza 
2014: 43). 
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6.2. Reading Ecosophy T through Bhagavad Gita. 
Næss’s interest in Hinduism is provoked by Gandhi’s influence on his own 
writings. Næss argues that Hinduism is not as clear (as a religion) as Chris-
tianity and Islam are (Galtung and Næss 1955: 95). According to him, the 
Hindu concept of God is described as a universal one, but “with many dif-
ferent realizations (embodiments) for the different people” (Ibid). In this 
context, it remains problematic why the ‘clearness’ of one religion can be 
explored as contrasting its versions, and second, to what extent the clearness 
itself can be determined by the clearness of the definition of the concept of 
God alone.  
Hinduism is described by Næss in a practically related way as a system of 
social norms and religious rituals in which the existence of the caste and sa-
credness of cows are central (Ibid). The latter is used as an illustration, 
which shows a fundamental respect and modesty also for beings, which are 
subjected to people’s treatment. However, Næss claims that it is not an ob-
stacle for Gandhi to attack the Indians415, when this cult reaches a para-
doxical level (Ibid). Regarding the analysis of Gandhi’s religious visions, 
Næss examines his concept of God referring to Andrews and Mühlemann’s 
theory of the three crucial concepts in Gandhi’s theory, namely, the ones of 
insistence on truth (satya), brahmacharya (self-control) and ahimsa (non-
violence) emphasizing that it is not easy, from a linguistic point of view, to 
find a relevant translation of the aforementioned terms (Ibid). 
As Knut Jacobsen points out, Næss does not mention Hinduism among the 
ultimate premises of deep ecology, albeit he refers several times to Bhaga-
vad Gita while justifying deep ecology416 (Jacobsen 1996: 219). One of the 
questions concerns Næss’s reception of Hindu terminology regarding the 
distinction between individual selves and comprehensive one (Ibid: 234, 
Note 2). In this context, we face two problems. First, we should clarify how 
                                           
415 He argues that during his own life, Gandhi declares himself as a Hindu who fights against caste-
less rights not because he was against every form of the caste system, but because he considered 
Hindu discrimination of “God’s children” as breaking one more fundamental principle, namely, the 
one of human entity (Ibid).  
416 According to Zimmerman, Ecosophy T can be partly compared rather with the principles of Ma-
hayana Buddhism and Advaita Vedanta, while Heidegger’s theory can be examined as influenced 
by Buddhism and Taoism (Næss 1997: 4).  
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to interpret the distinction between so-called individual self (jiva) and the 
comprehensive Self (Atman) while discussing Gandhi’s conceptions.  
Emphasizing that ‘jiva’ and ‘atman’ are Sanskrit words, Næss, however, 
does not want to explicitly associate himself with Hinduism claiming that 
he refers “to some Eastern traditions” (Ibid). Næss tries to further remote 
atman’s consistency with Buddhist Anatman (non-self) since the atman in 
his ecosophy is not a “permanent indestructible soul” (Ibid). A suggestion in 
respect with this refusal can be seen in De Silva’s statement that Næss is 
“perhaps aware that metaphysics of atman as a permanent entity may con-
flict with a Buddhist position” (De Silva 1998: 130). In turn, there are sev-
eral revisions of how to consider the methodological connection between 
the self and so-called non-self, namely, how to talk about self “of-non-self 
elements” (Cavazza 2014: 23), or about Buddhist non-self417 (Curtin 1996: 
240). The problem is even more serious if we want to trace its genealogy, 
i.e. to find an answer to the question what kind of methodological borrow-
ing are anticipated in order Næss to defend the concept of ecological self, or 
Self with a capital letter, within Ecosophy T. 
On the other hand, Gandhi’s theory of the brahmachariya’s purification is 
merely partly comparable with Ecosophy T. While according to Mahayana 
Buddhism, truth about our causal relations dictates the good we ought to do 
(Gier 1996: 97-98), in Næss’s theory it is ontology rather than ethics that 
determines our behavior. 
                                           
417According to Næss, the Self is not an eternal or permanent Self. Furthermore, he presumes that it 
is wrong to think that “the ego is dissolved” in the “larger Self” referring to the metaphor of the 
moving arrow (Reed and Rothenberg 1989: 9) (De Silva 1998: 130). 
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6.2.1. “The Hybrid Use of the Vedanta Concept of Larger 
Self” 
De Silva argues that Næss’s reception of the larger Self it is a matter of “un-
steady hybrid, using of Vedanta metaphorical concept of the larger Self”, 
but painted this with “characteristic Buddhist brush strokes” (De Silva 
1998: 131). In this context, he outlines that Buddhism does not accept nei-
ther self nor Self of a permanent entity talking about ultimate experience 
(nibbana), as an experience without a self (Ibid). Fox and Rothenberg also 
claim that the positive definition of the “comprehensive Self” has much to 
do with Næss’s understanding of a disciplined meditation (yoga), which is 
recognized as a means for self-realization.  
According to Næss, every element is non-separate (Næss 2005ii: 121) refer-
ring to the Buddhist formula sarvam dharmam nihsvabhavam theory, which 
reveals how the lack of substance and self-existence are interrelated (Næss 
1997: 3). If some interrelated phenomena lack substance, as implied by the 
aforementioned Buddhist formula, there would be no ultimate ontological 
gap between subjects and non-subjects, between humanity and nature. Næss 
adds the idea of ultimate and absolute (Ibid), but ambiguously reveals in 
what sense the absolute is different from the ultimate.  
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6.2.2. The Role of Bhagavad Gita for Næss’s Reception 
of Gandhi 
An important premise for understanding the role of Ecosophy T is the im-
pact of Gandhi’s interpretation of Bhagavad Gita as well as Næss’s particu-
lar reception of the reading in question, which differs in many respects from 
both Gandhi’s interpretation and the text itself.  
K. Jacobsen argues in favor of affinity between Bhagavad Gita and Ecoso-
phy T, albeit “environmentalism is not the purpose of the teaching” of 
Krsna (Jacobsen 1996: 221). The statement of Hindu non-duality is that the 
self is identical with the brahman. Everything is brahman in the sense that 
nothing can exist apart from this principle (Ibid: 222). For Sankara418, real-
ity has several levels (Ibid: 223)419. However, when the highest level is 
achieved, there is only one Self, namely, plurality does not exist any longer 
(Ibid). In turn, due to Hindu monism, the realization of the self (atman) is 
recognized as identical with the permanent and unchanging source of the 
world (brahman) (Ibid). In this context, Jacobsen claims that there is a di-
vergence between Sankara’s Advaita and Ecosophy’s T non-dualism con-
cerning the aforementioned disappearance of plurality (Ibid). 
He emphasizes that in Advaita Vedanta, the self-realization is a result of a 
soteriological experience of contentless consciousness rather than of one of 
enjoying nature’s processes (Ibid). It is a cause of the world understood as 
an ultimate reality, not of the diversity of self-realization (Ibid: 224). Re-
garding these examinations, Jacobsen points out the need of keeping the 
                                           
418 Næss adopts some principles of Mahayana Buddhism (as displayed in the Diamond Sutra) and 
some of the Theravada texts (Cavazza 2014: 27). However, according to De Silva, he has taken the 
metaphysical terminology of Vedanta, introducing to its content a concept that may be close to the 
Buddhist context, albeit not completely. If he has used a neutral vocabulary regarding self-
realization, which to be independent of Vedanta and Buddhism, there may not have been a great 
number of commentaries on that issue, but more clarity (De Silva 1998: 131). Næss refers to Maha-
yana Buddhism since in contrast to Hinayana, it defines nirvana as achievable goal for all humans in 
this lifetime, namely, here and now (Gregory and Sabra 2008: 53), replacing the image of the 
‘Arhant’ with the notion of Bodhisatva and thus asserting the possibility of compassion (Ibid). 
419 According to Jacobsen, the implications of this advaita (non-dualism) concept for environmental-
ism is that one can identify with all beings because one’s true identity is the same as theirs (Ibid), as 
Næss suggests. 
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methodological difference between Ecosophy T and Advaita Vedanta420 as 
a difference concerning the point that the goal of Advaita renunciant was 
how to leave the world, not how to preserve it, while for Ecosophy T, the 
true self is the natural world (Ibid: 224-225). 
On the other hand, the experience of unity within Ecosophy T presumes the 
fulfillment of the individual self-realization, but it does not imply the reduc-
tion of plurality to singularity, as in Advaita Vedanta (Ibid: 225). It rather 
reveals the need of being aware of the organic unity of the interdependent 
parts, which are not essentially different from the self himself/herself. To 
the extent that Ecosophy T recognizes the true self421 as the natural world, 
the mode of realizing oneself does not correspond to the Hindu idea of real-
izing the absolute Atman, as Jacobsen claims (Ibid). 
On a macro methodological level, the differences should be traced on the 
level of whether it is possible the self within Bhagavad Gita to be inter-
preted as creatively supporting the deep ecology platform (Ibid: 227) as 
well as how does it affect Gandhi’s understanding of the self and its recep-
tion in Næss’s writings? Starting with the first part of the question, as ex-
plored by Jacobsen, I argue that in the interpretation of Gita, the self-
realization is understood as a form of identification, which in turn is deter-
mined on the highest level of perfection. Thus the dialectics between unity 
and diversity stated in Ecosophy T does not correspond to the one repre-
sented in Gita because the former is hierarchically organized in favor of 
unity. The idea of unity, as in Bhagavad Gita, should entail and annihilate 
the diversity as such in so far as the latter is justified as a lack of being, 
namely, diversity is recognized as an illusion (maya). 
Regarding the second question (i.e. Gandhi’s understanding of the self), Ja-
cobsen claims that it is a result of interpretating the person with stabilized 
mentality as a satyagrahi (Ibid: 228) as well as determining the liberation 
(moksa) as something, which one attains by adopting a social duty (dharma) 
(Ibid). According to Jacobsen, “This is the same as seeing other beings in 
one’s Self”, which in turn means to make some progressive steps in yogic 
                                           
420 Gandhi’s interpretation of Vedanta concerns the clarification of the deprived of qualities absolute 
and two equivocal affirmations of Advaita (Gier 1996: 100). 
421 Jacobsen argues that Næss wants to give a non-religious meaning to the atman by contrast to 
Bhagavad Gita in which the latter is defined as a form of religious experience (Ibid: 231). Such an 
attempt leaves the question whether Ecosophy T may imply religious experience at all open (Ibid: 
232). 
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experience” (Ibid: 228-229). While Næss distinguishes between ego and 
self, Gandhi is rather focused on how the Supreme Self is everywhere when 
the self is extinguished (Ibid: 229). Furthermore, the one who has real-
ized422 the Self in question is in constant service to the others423. 
Jacobsen also argues that Radhakrishnan’s contemporary form of Advaita 
Vedanta, which entails some principles of Hinduism and Christianity, is 
comparable with Ecosophy T, more precisely, in respect with monism and 
social activism (Ibid: 230). The path goes first inwards only in order to go 
back again to everything. In Næss’s interpretation, this is the path of action 
(karma-marga) that leads the action-yogi (karmajogi) into a contact with all 
creatures (Næss 1989: 194). 
Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I draw the conclusion that we 
cannot talk about direct methodological borrowings from Mahayana Bud-
dhism and some versions of Hinduism on side of Næss, but rather about af-
finity in Jacobsen’s sense since the theoretical references in Næss’s writings 
are rather vague to the extent they are based on interfering concepts with 
broader interdisciplinary meanings. Even if we can outline some similarities 
on a macro methodological level, i.e. some similarities regarding concepts 
and definitions, we should take into account that they have a different origin 
and contextualization. That is why one of my main concerns about Næss’s 
interpretations derives from the fact that he decontextualizes the principles 
he borrows as well as that he insists on providing ambiguous definitions, 
even when the latter may raise some misconceptions. The mechanism of 
borrowing itself is realized on the principle of incomplete induction, when 
the similarities of the definitions are described by default as deriving from 
similarities of the premises, albeit the similarities in question may have a 
different normative validity.  
                                           
422 On the other hand, Næss argues that Gandhi’s first principle is the same as in Ecosophy T, name-
ly, his Norm 1 is “Seek complete self-realization!” (Ibid). 
423 The liberation of the self at the fourth stage of life is abandoned in classical Hinduism (Ibid). 
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6.3. Næss’s Gestalt Ontology as Inspired 
by Advaita Vedanta 
According to Jacobsen, Næss quotes the philosophy of Sankara, which dis-
plays one of the tendencies towards non-duality in Hinduism (Jacobsen 
1996: 222)424. However, Vedanta’s non-duality determined as an ideal 
model is incomparable with the gestalt thinking in Næss’s sense since this 
singularity presumes a very specific form of unification to be accomplished.  
On the level of understanding knowledge, the problem in the Buddhist 
teaching of Four Noble Truths425 concerns the role of ignorance (avijja) 
(Cavazza 2014: 32) and so-called docta ignorantia in Næss’s sense426. In 
this context, the issue of docta ignorantia can be examined as regarding not 
a general form of ignorance, but rather the ossification of views. Referring 
to Cavazza’s statement that Buddhist soteriology begins with ‘right vision’ 
(sammaditthi) (Ibid: 33), which is a form of inquiry, I argue that the point in 
question is the quest for experiential wisdom whose distant premises can be 
found in “Buddha’s predicament on free inquiry and the value of doubt” 
(Ibid). In the latter case, however, the epistemological ignorance is much 
more clearly related to the problem of moral misconceptions than in Næss’s 
writings. Ignorance is described as involving both cognitive deficiency and 
“unfavorable attitude” or “prejudice” (Ibid: 35) since the immoral conduct 
takes place by misapprehending the facts. 
The second important issue that should be clarified in this context is the 
parallel between the concept of Buddhahood and self-realization. Næss rec-
ognizes Buddhahood as permissible to gestalts alone (Næss 2005s: 196). 
However, if Buddhahood is permissible merely to the gestalts, it remains 
unclear how to interpret the aforementioned discontinuity and imperma-
nence in so far as every single being ‘participates’ in Buddha’s nature for 
                                           
424 See also De Sylva 1998: 131.  
425 It explains the problem of suffering with craving and passionate greed, which produce desperate 
attachment or clinging to things as if the egos and the objects were independent things in them-
selves. In turn, clinging arises from ignorance. It is not a general form of ignorance but ossification 
of views. 
426 However, as Jacobsen relevantly points out, Advaita Vedanta and Ecosophy T have different 
aims since the former was a system of religious thoughts of how to liberate the self from the burden 
of rebirth. 
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the sake of being free of suffering and realizing its own nature. Such a com-
parison is possible if we keep the definition on the level of gestalt ontology, 
where the principle of analogy is considered as an ontological one alone. 
However, in both cases with Mahayana Buddhism and Næss, rejecting the 
role of the subject-object dualism is a necessary condition for referring the 
process of liberation to the one of self-realization. 
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6.3.1. The Influence of Mahayana Buddhism on Næss’s 
Gestalt Ontology  
The influence of Mahayana Buddhism on Næss’s gestalt ontology becomes 
understandable if we examine the genealogy of the Sanskrit expression ‘sva 
marga’ (your way) (Næss 2008b: 160), which means to focus on the way 
that cannot be obtained by following some rules alone. I argue that accord-
ing to Næss’s interpretation, ‘your way’ is recognized as an internal com-
pass that redirects the person, when the self falls in the ditch, or loses the 
way. This way is unique and it cannot be articulated, nor can it be scientifi-
cally shared. It is an imperative whose performative power has ontological 
roots in so far as it derives from life as such inflicting a way of engaging. 
On a gestalt level, the engagement can be explored as a matter of engaging 
with the world situation based on the principle ‘everything is connected’, 
which can be identified as a crossing point between Næss’s gestalt ontology 
and Mahayana Buddhism. This principle does not have to be interpreted as 
belonging to Mahayana Buddhism alone because, as Sessions points out, 
this is also the first law of ecology. Due to Næss’s interpretation of the prin-
ciple, as referring to Mahayana Buddhism, we can see the contextualization 
of already discussed formula “sarvam dharmam nihsvabhavam” (all entities 
have no essence) possibly paraphrasing Nagarjuna’s words (Cavazza 2014: 
26).  
On the other hand, I argue that the methodological connection between Ma-
hayana Buddhist way of thinking and gestalt ontology can be seen by draw-
ing some parallels whose starting point could be ascribed to already dis-
cussed mode of ‘to think like a mountain’. The idea of walking is of crucial 
importance for both Mahayana Buddhism and ecosophy; one aspect, which 
is also stressed by Curtin since according to him, “we are realized by the 
mountain’s walking” (Curtin 1996: 245). He claims that if we have doubts 
about mountain’s walks, it means that we do not know our own walking 
(Ibid: 246). 
Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I draw the conclusion that the 
practical implications of self-realization achieved through the process of 
identification are grounded in different views on gestalt ontology, which 
Næss compares with ‘becoming a Buddha’. In both cases, it is not a matter 
of presuming a certain unity. The recognition of Ecosophy T, which aims at 
“seeing oneself in all things” can be described as having not only ontologi-
cal, but also moral connotations due to which the subject can contribute to 
“the life style of all the other beings” while realizing themselves, and the 
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other way around (Næss 2008: 196). In turn, the differences between ge-
stalts are described by Naess as ones regarding joy and suffering, as I al-
ready showed in the chapter on Næss’s theory of gestalt ontology. In 
Næss’s sense, subject’s realization is defined as a form of identification 
with others by developing a certain kind of activeness, while in Mahayana 
Buddhism, it is a matter of a specific unifying process. On the level of ge-
stalts, the difference in question concerns the different understanding of ex-
periential gestalts since Næss’s one ‘I am the river’ has a different process 
character than the gestalt manifested in Mahayana Buddhism, whose proto-
type characteristic is the illusion of permanence. Næss still relies on the 
point that diversity comes from the experience itself and the never-ending 
need of its structuring. Otherwise, we would have all turned into abstract 
structures.  
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IV.1. KVALØY’S ECOPHILOSOPHY. 
A GENERAL OVERVIEW 
1.1. To Be Carried Away by the Stream without 
Getting Drawn. Ecophilosophy of River Time427 
In contrast to Næss’s gestalt thinking mode428, Kvaløy introduces the one 
of river time (elvens tid) focused on the continuity of time and its normative 
validity rather than on the spatial continutity. According to Kvaløy, one of 
the main methodological questions is how to discern between space and 
time as fundamental life’s dimensions (Kvaløy 2014: 82). The possible an-
swer can be found by reflecting upon the type of engagement we make 
against the background of the illusion that we can ‘arrest’ time; similarly, 
we try to “arrest” the sound with the help of different devices such as gram-
ophone record and cassette recorder (Ibid: 6) that both expand and orient 
our ambitions to elaborating new methods for ‘catching’ the sound. In this 
context, the biggest illusion is recognized as stemming from people’s belief 
that it is possible to subject time. That is why our communication is reduced 
to living with the initial impossibility of possessing the world picture as a 
dynamic one having its own normative validity. 
On a micro methodological level, Kvaløy’s river time can be characterized 
as a time of a constant change which guarantees the coherence of space and 
time. In this context, one of the most challenging tasks is how to anticipate 
time and space in their varieties since the world picture has its inexhaustible 
(unexploitable) dynamic rhythm. Referring to Kvaløy’s theory of time, I ar-
gue that time presumes embodiment of rhythm, which never starts and nev-
er ends.  
                                           
427 River time is the title of the last compendium of Kvaløy’s texts written in 2014. 
428 See also Kvaløy 1985a: 43. 
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Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I conclude that Kvaløy’s pro-
cess philosophy can be examined as a philosophy of time, as a process phi-
losophy due to which time speaks with its own voice. It is a thinking mode 
that is also a mode of practicing in so far as the powers of improvisation 
(Ibid: 13) have their own normative validity. 
Under the influence of Husserlian phenomenology, Kvaløy defines experi-
ence as a stream of events (Kvaløy 2004: 270). The latter presumes recon-
sidering the thinking mode since time dimension provides us with momen-
tous pictures (processes), while the spatial one is justified by the modern 
scientific tradition. Thus the new thinking mode creates an obstacle the 
wholes and traditions (Kvaløy 1976: 21) to be considered as a break with 
our European scientific tradition since the thinking mode resembles the 
Buddhist one but does not overlap with it. Regarding the Taoist way of 
thinking, the aforementioned new mode can be compared with it in respect 
with the status of being, but in contrast to both Buddhism and Taoism, it us-
es other, sharper thinking tools for evaluating experience (Ibid). 
In turn, Næss defines deep ecology as an expression of a spatial structure 
presuming that the Self can be determined in both horizontal and vertical 
dimensions. He interprets the self in small letters (the non-ecological self) 
as a vertical one in so far as building space is considered as a vertical proc-
ess. However, from this it does not follow that the process of shaping the 
ecological Self should be horizontally understood by default since it is a 
multidimensional one. The self in small letters can be determined in a verti-
cal dimension due to its potential to subordinate nature. On the other hand, 
Næss’s conception of depth can be defined as implying a sense of verticality 
because it is built as contrasting the idea of surface, which is considered as a 
superficial one (Ibid). Judging by these investigations, I draw the conclusion 
that we could introduce two modes of dimensionality, which are neither on-
tologically nor axiologically contradicting, i.e. we could talk about both ver-
tical and horizontal dimensions429.  
What are the macro methodological implications of the aforementioned 
contradictions between horizontal and vertical dimensions? At first sight, it 
is a contradiction between dynamic and static, Eastern and Western thinking 
modes. Analyzing Kvaløy’s theory in comparison with Næss’s one, I argue 
that this distinction concerns the one between two types of philosophy: be-
                                           
429 Similarly to Næss, Kvaløy specifies that one’s presence depends on where and how one leaves 
one’s traces (Kvaløy 2014: 100). 
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tween the one of gestalts and the one of streams. On a micro methodological 
level, this distinction is determined as discerning between thinking in struc-
tural entities and thinking in temporal continuities. 
The space-time mode in Kvaløy’s sense provides one dimensionality to be 
explored as a compressed space (Kvaløy 2014: 93). The latter is recognized 
as the only one space available whose anticipations are considered as pro-
jections of one dimension into different directions, namely, into the ones of 
up (height), middle (length) and down (width) (Ibid). As Kvaløy points out, 
thus we have a civilization which, first and foremost, aimed at stopping time 
expansion (Ibid). It is math that helps time to be quantified and depicted on 
the surface of the clock430, i.e. time to be incorporated into apparent space 
measurement (Ibid). Regarding math’s calculations431, the formula regard-
ing the knowledge of power was dominated by the knowledge of height, 
length and width, mass and speed, or so-called primary (mechanical) char-
acteristics (Ibid), which can be objectively measured. In this context, the 
projections of power can be traced back to anticipating as much space as 
possible in the least possible time. 
In turn, we can replace the word ‘experimenting’ in Kvaløy’s texts with the 
one of diverse experiencing. He suggests the engagement with space to be 
substituted with the one with time, but then one of the main methodological 
problems is how to keep interpreting both modes in a noncontradictory way. 
We cannot argue that engagement with time is ‘more natural’ (in the sense 
of being original and more valuable) than the one with space. Otherwise, 
extrapolating Kvaløy’s theory, we should discern between two types of or-
ganicity, which is a problematic distinction since organic interconnected-
ness is indiscernible as such. Furthermore, the genealogy of such internal 
connectedness can be revealed if we trace what both Næss and Kvaløy un-
derstood by spontaneity. 
According to Næss, intuition is extended to the concept of improvisation 
(Næss 2008: 200) seen as an embodiment of temporal fluctuation. The im-
provisation itself has a given normative validity, which provides following 
natural rhythm, as it is. However, the engagement with rhythm does not ex-
clude the one with space. Paraphrasing Kvaløy’s theory, we may claim that 
                                           
430 He argues that the time of the clock has replaced time as such (Ibid). 
431 According to Kvaløy, nowadays, one should change the track of both space and time, and even 
worse: one should be in one space, which lacks time since one changes one’s identity as one chang-
es shirts (Ibid: 100). 
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rhythm can be examined not only in quantitative, but also in qualitative 
terms in so far as the metrical rhythm is something, which has been equated 
with its quantitative implications post factum and thus it has contributed to 
justifying the rhythm as accelerating tempo in the industrial development 
society.  
On a cultural level, such a measurement leads to so-called need of cultural 
fundament of living culture through geometrical anticipation of the world 
provided by the industrial civilization (Kvaløy 2014: 96), which embodies a 
mechanistic rationality (Ibid: 97). A society promoting such a rationality is 
characterized as a stop-time society (Ibid: 102) since Kvaløy’s main con-
cern derives from the presumption that this is a world, which underrates it-
self and which works with abstractions (Ibid: 104). 
On a macro methodological level, the distinction between time and space 
(Ibid: 106) can be examined as implying two world pictures (Ibid: 157) – 
the one of Western world, which is static and subjectable to unique map-
ping. According to this picture, math formulas are considered as a key for 
understanding how the changing mode is made as static as possible. The 
most illuminative illustration of the Eastern world can be found in Kvaløy’s 
reception of Mahayana Buddhism, which contributes to rehabilitating the 
role of improvisation against the background of the understanding that sta-
bility is an illusion, i.e. by strictly discriminating fantasy from illusion432. 
                                           
432 The illusion of the Bhutanese is implied in the ‘readiness for improvisation’ rather than in the 
system planning (Ibid: 158). 
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1.1.1. Some Implications of Diversity and Time 
for Kvaløy’s Theory 
Calling Bergson the first ecophilosopher433 (Kvaløy 1985: 30), Kvaløy de-
fines improvisation as a rhythmic improvisation with qualitative implica-
tions (Ibid: 23). The organic interrelatedness presumes the orientation to 
provide a better understanding of the environment in terms of ‘‘taking a 
place’’. Otherwise, the interrelatedness in question would have lost its po-
tential to initiate the need of committing moral and political engagements. 
The meta-methodological connection between diversity and time presumes 
the genealogy of so-called organic and mechanical time434 to be examined 
in so far as they are key elements of Kvaløy’s theory of life necessity soci-
ety and industrial development one. In this context, I argue that the differ-
ence in specifying time stem from the different understandings of reality as 
space: whether it is interpreted as a complex coordinate system. Regulating 
two systems in a different way presumes grounding two different forms of 
control, namely, a quantitative controllability, which determines that every-
thing is a subject to control and a qualitative self-regulation of the system. 
In turn, the control of the coordinate system that supports the multiple di-
mensions, and thus brings the visibility of diversity to life, can be described 
as a qualitative rather than quantitative control in which the insecurity435 is 
a necessary condition for the development of the system itself. It is a guar-
antee for the variation of the quality as such.  
The indisputable conceptions of control derive from the aforementioned dis-
tinction of time being based on an illusion. The latter corresponds to the ‘as 
if nature’ mode due to which phenomena are recognized as unreal (or less 
real) representations. To a certain extent, the impact of the control in ques-
tion can be explored by a reference to Johan Galtung’s social cosmology of 
homo occidentalis oeconomicus (Galtung 1985: 13).  
                                           
433 Næss’s critique of Bergson’s distinction of time is a problematic one. He claims that Bergson 
says nothing against the quantification and use of time’s measures, albeit the steady use of ‘exact 
time’ (av ‘eksakt’ tid) is deeply grounded signifier of our global society (Ibid: 42).  
434 This distinction will be examined in detail in the chapter on Kvaløy’s theory of organic and me-
chanical time. 
435 This idea takes place against the background of Kvaløy’s interest in chaos theories. See Kvløy 
2004. 
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If we investigate Kvaløy’s theory that space is a function of a process focus-
ing on his arguments that it is not only the way but also the conditions, 
which specify it, it would lead to justifying the following conclusion: time 
is not ontologically superior to space, i.e. the latter is not a function of the 
former. 
On the other hand, Kvaløy also provides relevant arguments for exploring 
the gist of computers as unable to deal with the conflicts’ dialectics neither 
in place, nor in time since they are focused on a problem solving from the 
type A or non-A rather than on expanding the decision making process. 
Otherwise, we should reject the idea of ‘being on the way’, which is of cru-
cial importance for understanding the phenomenological character of 
Kvaløy’s philosophy. 
Going back to his idea of streaming (strøm på veg) (Kvaløy 1985: 29), i.e. 
of the possibility to be involved with the stream by being in motion, I claim 
that it is the possibility mode that presumes the stream to be explored as a 
process rather than a goal. In this context, time is understood as a horizon 
that needs to be investigated in respect with the idea of situatedness, i.e. 
with the one, where we can find our home place. 
In turn, constituting and recognizing space as a factor in programming a 
given machine is necessary in order ‘to have job done’, as Kvaløy suggests 
(Ibid), but even if we accept this theory, it does not mean that time onto-
logically precedes space. Furthermore, I argue that it is a matter of internal-
izing the idea of situatedness, i.e. of anticipating the potentiality of places as 
being at place in order to describe one job as done.  
The socio-political implications of the sense of belonging defined as a cer-
tain form of fellowship built on the attachment to work clarify what it 
means to be grasped by the stream, namely, to be forced to teach yourself to 
swim (Kvaløy 2014: 68). Partly, the ‘must’ mode comes not only on man’s 
side, but also on the one of the river. The latter mainly regards the responsi-
bility for being engaged with conflict situations in so far as ‘staying against 
the unexpected’ (Ibid) strengthens the maturity of the individual. On a mac-
ro methodological level, it means that to teach yourself to swim presumes to 
take moral and political responsibility as a commitment to life. Kvaløy him-
self emphasizes that young people who jump for the first time into the deep 
water of environmental activism, swim for the first time, taking responsibil-
ity for both themselves and their environment (Ibid: 84). Thus the global re-
sponsibility remains noncontradictory merely by making given individual 
commitments to life. 
 347
Developing the idea of situatedness, Kvaløy supplies it with very strong so-
cio-political connotations, namely, it is considered as a prototype character-
istic of cultivating “a right to Earth” (Kvaløy 1985b: 129), which is a matter 
of law of nature. The law is to be left to gain living power from the initial 
connection with Earth through cultivating the sense of belonging to a piece 
of land. The later opens a new mode of working with nature going beyond 
the distinction between sources and resources436.  
In this context, we should confront two types of helplessness – the one of 
the natural efforts required for reviving the organic intuition of time, and the 
one of repairing defined in terms of fixing time. The process of reviving is 
realized by opening the space for children and giving time back, as Kvaløy 
suggests (Kvaløy 1985: 34). It is the performative power of deliberating but 
not by repairing that takes place within the framework of depriving man of 
the authority to compare space and time. This would mean that to be on 
time would presume to be at place (i.e. at home), where the orientation mark 
should be understood in qualitative rather than in quantitative terms. 
On a macro methodological level, extrapolating Kvaløy’s conception of 
time, we may speculate whether our culture is based on the idea of place 
(Kvaløy 1985b: 136), due to the fact that the possibilities of space become 
technological ones437. Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I draw 
the conclusion that it is not the ranking of space, technology and time, but 
rather the intrinsic inseparability of time and space, which has an impact on 
the establishment of monoculture or multi-cultures in Kvaløy’s sense. Oth-
erwise, it would mean that the problem arises not from the opportunities 
themselves, as much as they are determined as space opportunities, but from 
the intensification of time and space dimensions. It is also a matter of how 
to make ‘where and when’ mode possible in minimum time and minimum 
space. 
Referring again to Tordsson’s idea of Nansen’s moral geography, I argue 
that Kvaløy’s theory contributes to avoiding the reduction of geography in 
question to cartography, which deprives the locus of life by compressing its 
                                           
436 According to Kvaløy, to work with (med) nature is a driving force in developing the aims of 
green workers on an international level. 
437 According to Kvaløy, we have roots in a space-based culture (Ibid). We make time embodied 
due to the spatial opportunities, which are technological opportunities. 
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dimensions. The moral geography438 itself describes the places that are 
three-dimensional, which in turn shows their intrinsic value.  
On the other hand, outlining the normative validity of the latter presumes to 
reveal the coordinates of the places, which make one locus. On a macro 
methodological level, it means that a given place becomes recognizable as a 
home, when we noncontradictory decode both its location and duration not 
only here and now, but against the background of the coordinate system of 
the biosphere. 
                                           
438 Kvaløy’s conception is that Europeans behave as if the world is a map of lines and dots depicted 
on a paper, or on computer: a piece of space, where a given measure is always determined by the 
plot (Kvaløy 1985: 23). 
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1.1.1.1. The Role of Process Philosophy in Shaping Cultural 
Traditions 
According to Kvaløy, justifying cultural traditions and their embodiment is 
ontologically dependent on the recognition of time and space as well as on 
their internal relations within the framework of process philosophy, which 
is understood as a reaction against ‘arresting’ time and space (Kvaløy 2004: 
1), as I already showed. Furthermore, the impact of cultural traditions is im-
portant in so far as the need of process philosophy as an explanatory one 
occurs. It takes place when the need of analyzing the sense of homeness 
provokes a genealogical examination regarding the recognition of situated-
ness mode. Concerning culture, it means that one grows up in a cultural tra-
dition in which the ‘spatiality’ of the place is justified by outlining its cul-
turally determined boundaries. Kvaløy claims that our civilization provides 
an enormous experiment in seeing how long one can persist in grasping 
people and nature in machines’ size as well space to be anticipated as being 
high, long and wide alone (Kvaløy 2014: 62). 
In this context, it is important to emphasize that the aforementioned experi-
menting is different from the one of improvising since it is an experiment 
whose aim is to quantify both the object and the process itself. The quantifi-
cation should compress the multidimensionality by imitating the process of 
creation and situating it in only one given dimension. That is why I argue 
that the most successful way of cultivation within sustainable development 
society is understood as a process of planning due to which the idea of land-
scape is replaced with the one of compressed (‘flat’) space. 
Reconsidering the role of culture in building identity in Kvaløy’s sense is 
also a matter of justifying an ‘own’ mode, which is not the one of posses-
sion, but rather a mode of belonging. Thus following the natural dynamics 
of environment, we should cultivate the sense of homeness, which again 
presumes to question the Western rationality thinking mode. Breaking the 
cultural boundaries, which determine identity’s ones, inevitably leads to the 
self-sufficient process of expansion provoking the myths of European ideal 
“beyond nationality” to be established (Ibid). These myths contribute to 
erasing the contradictions of the boundaries in order to provoke new ones 
regarding the justification of some new identities. 
In turn, the unity of cultures (Enhets-kulturene) gives a proof of recognizing 
cultural diversity as independent of the material expansion or competition, 
as Kvaløy suggests (Kvaløy 1976: 63). We are parts of nature before we 
want this or not, namely, even before we decide whether to strengthen the 
equilibrium or to develop the balance disorders. The win achieved at the 
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expense of nature is always a loss for the self. In this context, Kvaløy rec-
ognizes the role of religion as the most important part of a total culture (en 
total-kultur), which holds the groups together (Ibid: 77).  
On the other hand, Kvaløy’s justification of life necessity society is based 
on questioning the distinction between monoculture and multi-cultures439 
arguing that the former supports so-called technocapitalism since it is based 
on the development and encouragement of a certain type of cultural knowl-
edge and historical interactions. However, he specifies that while examining 
technocapitalism, he does not make fundamental distinctions between the 
systems in which it takes place (whether it is in the EU, US, Japan etc.) 
(Ibid: 96). Within the framework of ecological thinking mode, Kvaløy rec-
ognizes imperialism as a systematic decomposition of the diversity of nature 
as well as of culture’s specificities and man’s resistance potentials (Ibid: 
100). In this context, he talks about “future imperialism”, which is defined 
as a new form of colonialism (Ibid). That is why Kvaløy determines the va-
rieties of bio and human ecology as the most important scientific specifici-
ties against the development of the aforementioned future imperialism (Ibid: 
109). 
Judging by these investigations, I draw the conclusion that technocapitalist 
model turns out to be the one grounding the uncontradictory recognition of 
imperialism beyond the ‘here-and-now’ mode. It is based on supporting so-
called omnipotent expertise by all means, namely, by the ones of hard tech-
nologies reducing the need of conducting critical research which strength-
ens pluralism. In other words, pluralism in Kvaløy’s sense is defined as a 
socio-political embodiment of natural diversity, which contradicts the impe-
rialism of mono-reality/mono-culture.  
In turn, new colonialism is supported by so-called value-prognoses (Ibid: 
104), which are examined against the background of Pittsburgh Values Pro-
ject. In ecology, the values are always determined as implying a certain kind 
of responsibility for the sake of preserving both the values themselves and 
their objects.  
On a macro methodological level, it is the contradiction between industrial 
development and nature’s growth, whose prototype characteristic is the bal-
ance of nature’s dynamics (Ibid: 109) that makes the idea of multi-cultures 
having a higher normative validity than the one of monoculture. Regarding 
                                           
439 According to him, the culture, which gives identity, is a result of a close, specific long-lasting in-
terplay with one special place as well as with specific nature’s conditions (Kvaløy 2014: 126). 
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researcher’s responsibility440 (Ibid: 110), recognizing neutrality and ‘value 
freedom’ do not support nihilism or moral relativism, but rather a free 
choice of values for the sake of achieving epistemological, moral and cul-
tural integrity.  
                                           
440 Kvaløy explicitly states that researchers do not have to be involved in promoting defensive or 
negative measures (Ibid: 112). Related issue is whether they should impose an active or a passive 
form of popularization, which in turn affects the anticipation of the promoted issues (Ibid: 113). 
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1.2. The Influence of Mahayana Buddhism 
on River Time Philosophy 
Kvaløy defines ecophilosophy as a process philosophy. He is partly influ-
enced by the idea of processuality, as represented in Mahayana Buddhism, 
which is not uncritically borrowed, as I showed in the chapter on Næss. 
This idea, as anticipated by Kvaløy, is one of the main prerequisites for 
questioning the Western thinking mode that supports the implementation of 
dualism in contrast to Mahayana Buddhism, which is focused on the integ-
rity of all living forms. In turn, this integrity is interpreted by Kvaløy, while 
conceptualizing natural rhythm as a means for measuring both ontological 
and normative validity of change. 
Referring to Bhagavad Gita, Kvaløy argues that in Hinduism, Buddhism 
and Taoism man is recognized as an inextricable part of all other living be-
ings when he/she anticipates himself/herself as an individual. It “depends” 
on the deception (beror det på et bedrag), namely, that he/she is fully con-
scious about both himself/herself and the situation as such (Ibid: 18). The 
Buddhist process thinking and its role are evaluated against the background 
of the dialectics of general system theory since Buddhist philosophy is con-
sidered by Kvaløy as “the most radical attack against the ideas of permanent 
structures and mono-centered individuals” (Kvaløy 2004: 330). Further-
more, Buddhism is characterized as the world-view, which provides the 
most radical description of the wolrd as a process due to which soul is seen 
as a type of rhythmic paradigm (Kvaløy 2014: 26). It changes and goes 
from one way of being (form) to another, almost like an improvised music 
piece or as a whirlpool in a river (Ibid). 
What are the practical embodiments of the process thinking in Mahayana 
Buddhism, which are anticipated by Kvaløy in his theory of river time? 
Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I argue that he justifies the 
process thinking as a mode while striving for rehabilitating the idea of or-
ganic time, as defined by Bergson, which contradicts the one of mechanical 
time characterizing industrial development society. In this context, Maha-
yana Buddhist process thinking becomes one of the necessary conditions for 
establishing ecophilosophy since the rehabilitation of time as a process is 
used for giving priority to life necessity society at the expense of the indus-
trial development one in Kvaløy’s sense. This change goes beyond the idea 
of meaningfulness as reducible to a set of given meanings, which would 
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hinder man’s self-realization to be recognized within the framework of na-
ture’s realization. 
Another serious concern derives from the understanding of the unity be-
tween man and nature in Buddhism, which, according to Kvaløy, is often 
misunderstood in the West by some researchers such as Alan Watts441 
(Kvaløy 1976: 63). However, I argue that not every single form of non-
dualism can be considered as belonging to the Eastern thinking mode. In 
this context, Norwegian ecophilosophies can be described as providing a 
non-dualist mode of thinking that combines different (in their contents) non-
dualist tendencies, which are irreducible to the idea of processuality, as de-
scribed in Mahayana Buddhism. 
                                           
441 Allan Watts (1915-1973) is a British philosopher who is a populariser of Eastern philosophy. 
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1.2.1. Kvaløy’s Reception of Gandhi’s Ethics 
of Non-violence 
In addition to Mahayana Buddhism, Kvaløy is strongly influenced, similarly 
to Næss, by Gandhi’s ethics of non-violence, as I already showed in the 
chapter on Næss. Gandhi’s conception of ‘the way is the goal’ is analyzed 
by Kvaløy against the background of what it means to be taken by the 
stream, namely, to leave yourself to be reunited with the wholeness which 
you belong. The latter cannot be recognized as a passive behavior since or-
ganic belonging is a matter of a ‘life in time’. 
Kvaløy argues that both Bhagavad Gita and Mahayana Buddhism take place 
in one and the same environment (Kvaløy 2014: 168). He explores two quo-
tations formulated by Gandhi while interpreting Bhagavad Gita, namely, 
“You who enter here, leave of yourself the whole self442” and “The man 
who acts without binding is the Highest!” (Ibid). 
Kvaløy examines the first statement in a Buddhist context, or at least, as an 
expression of a Buddhist influence (Ibid): sometime the real Hindu can use 
it as a starting point but would talk about the self as being together with all 
living beings, i.e. to become a Brahman (Ibid). In turn, the second statement 
is analyzed in the light of the first one. Referring to Bhagavad Gita, Kvaløy 
claims that to behave without any binding whatsoever means to behave in 
tune with truth and non-violence in order to spread them into the world 
(Ibid). While doing so, one should be bound neither to oneself, nor to the 
goals of the deeds. The idea of truth is recognized as both ‘truthfulness’ and 
‘a position of an open and unrestricted contact between people, and between 
people and everything, which lives, when violence is missing: in thoughts, 
in feelings as well as in word and doing443 (Ibid). 
                                           
442 On the other hand, it is not well-clarified how the illusion of the self can contribute to internaliz-
ing freedom as a form of moral commitment to the others. Referring to moral experiential gestalt 
would contribute to understanding the gist of social engagement, or what in Kvaløy’s terminology is 
to learn how to swim. According to him, environmental politics requires reconsidering the engage-
ment with nature as an attachment to life (Ibid: 84). 
443 This interpretation is supported with two more quotations of Bhagavad Gita: “To stay away from 
deeds’ fruits is the way to something” and “This is the centre to which Gita is woven” (Ibid: 168). 
However, it does not mean that we should look for postulating an eternal goal, but rather that the re-
sult is as important as the deeds are. 
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In this context, Kvaløy emphasizes the role of Gandhi’s interpretation of 
what it means to say that “the way is the goal” (Ibid: 169). Gandhi also out-
lines two aspects, namely, that everything is a part of a process pattern as 
well as that the new teaching should be sought in Satyagraha (Truth). The 
aim of revealing the process pattern is provoked by the one of laying new 
ways in order the dynamic rhythm to be corrupted with difficulties. The 
goal itself is based on the correspondence that if violence inflicts violence, 
then non-violence should also inflict non-violence (Ibid). 
Regarding insistence on truth as a new teaching, it would contribute to 
knowing more about the world and its own opportunities on the way. In 
turn, it would lead to testing them, in order to adjust the way so that it to 
lead to better opportunities (Ibid: 170). This theory can be clarified if we go 
back to Kvaløy’s metaphor of the self, which co-creates stream’s whirlpools 
(Ibid). Thus one of the most illuminative contemporary projections of 
‘Kharma Buddhism’ can be seen in a certain kind of ‘wakefulness’ (Ibid: 
171) regarding the impact of human actions in time as well as in their influ-
ence on nature in a long-term perspective. Paraphrasing Kvaløy’s concep-
tion, I argue that the implicit gist of karma should be man to know that 
his/her responsibility towards biosphere is ineradicable since mankind’s 
space and time are an irreducible part of the biosphere’s ones.  
By contrast to Næss, Kvaløy does not insist that ecophilosophy, as based on 
a certain type of process philosophy, is directly influenced by the Eastern 
traditions. Kvaløy argues that the increasing interest of ecology in the self-
regulation of the organic systems as well as the issue of equilibrium are 
proofs of a thinking mode, which the old Indians and Chinese have not had, 
but which is given to us by the modern science (Kvaløy 1974b: 74). Fur-
thermore, Kvaløy does not underrate the fact that it is provided by the same 
Western tradition, which has contributed to the establishment of the envi-
ronmental crisis by giving priority to the process of specialization (Ibid). 
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1.3. To Think Like a River 
Analyzing Kvaløy’s theory, I claim that his process philosophy can be char-
acterized by the mode ‘to think like a river’, which corresponds to Næss’s 
one ‘to think like a mountain’. Both modes presume justifying a new type of 
knowledge, namely, experiential knowledge, which inflicts the reconsidera-
tion of the normative validity of feelings and emotions. That is why both 
modes require the subject to achieve his/her self-realization by having ec-
static experience (Kvaløy 1985b: 128).  
Næss and Kvaløy share the understanding of the father mountain, but they 
also interpret the idea of experiential in the sense of the Greek philosopher 
Heraclitus444, namely, that the process mode is embodied in the formula 
‘everything flows (panta rhei), everything changes’445 (Kvaløy 1985: 32). It 
is the continuity mode of experiencing fluctuations of time that makes the 
constant dynamics irreducible to the statics of space as such. Giving priority 
to temporal dimensionality rather than to the spatial one (Kvaløy 1985b: 
135) concerns the different way of defining the idea of structuring experi-
ence itself. While Næss’s thinking like a mountain, interpreted as conditio 
sine qua non, displays gestalt thinking, Kvaløy’s one concerns the embodi-
ment of holistic rhythm that may not necessarily be harmonic, but rather 
harmonizing time. The latter clarifies the dialectics of time whose being for 
itself is recognized as dependent on the one in itself within the horizon of 
temporality mode. 
Referring again to Heraclitus’s metaphor, I argue that the river in Kvaløy’s 
sense is the ocean, where water is never the same in its stream, but it is still 
similar to itself in terms of keep being water. Extrapolating Kvaløy’s inter-
pretation, I conclude that it is the organic coherence that follows its own 
natural rhythm. 
In this context, Kvaløy’s methodological contribution can be seen in intro-
ducing a new form of getting attached to a place, namely, in recognizing 
river as a home: not as a locus, but as a lifestream, where the mode of be-
coming is justifiable both in time and place. 
                                           
444 Næss also adopts Heraclitus’s idea but in a different context, namely, while interpreting Sami’s 
slogan “Let the river live!” 
445 As I outlined in the previous chapter of the current research, Næss argues that “I am the river!” 
(Næss 2008: 3). 
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Judging by what Ø. Dalland (Ibid: 129) claims about the river folk and the 
power of poetry of the river, I also draw the conclusion that the comparison 
of the aforementioned two thinking modes contributes to revealing another 
type of mythopoetic projections. They are similar to the ones outlined by 
Næss, which concern the strive for achieving proximity with the river. In 
turn, recognizing the latter is a matter of realizing a certain type of both 
pedagogical and poetic proximity (Ibid).  
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2. WHAT PRICE DID THE ECOPHILOSOPY 
PAY? 
Ecophilosophy is coined as an attempt to build up a logical, connected, un-
derstandable, articulated description of life’s society and its condition, with 
a special attention to the structure, processes and communication (Kvaløy 
1974b: 73). It also represents an attempt to formulate norms for actions 
from an objective point of view, i.e. to maintain or to open “an ecological 
balance of systems” (Ibid). 
The strive for philosophizing is recognized as a practical activity of experi-
menting (Kvaløy 2014: 34), which is always a politically relevant activity. 
In this context, Kvaløy’s attempt at building ecophilosophy is driven by the 
idea to develop a way of thinking engaged with nature’s rhythm, which has 
a shaping function (Ibid). It is the rhythm obtaining the normative validity 
of organic that remains open for the new due to the fact that unrepeatedness 
through repetition is something intrinsic for its nature. Shaping is not a mat-
ter of building a system or a structure because its constitution does not re-
quire machine’s perfection to be adopted as an ideal goal. 
On a macro methodological level, ecophilosophy takes place in order to 
bring out and make understandable the contradiction between mutli-sided 
man 446 and mega-machine (Kvaløy 2004: 150). By reconsidering the nor-
mative validity of nature’s enigmatic rhythmic stream, we face a strong re-
action against the cartography of man’s planning. 
Furthermore, ecophilosophy aims at connecting with the Norwegian tradi-
tions regarding outdoor life and so-called ‘work in nature’ because it is the 
body experience that is in the center (Kvaløy 2014: 86). However, from that 
it does not follow that we should discern between qualitative and quantita-
tive modes of evaluation while referring to the initial connection between 
man and nature since corporeal representations concern both modes. The 
                                           
446 Diversity, however, can be recognized as a radical one within industrial development society, 
which questions the existence of life necessity one (Kvaløy 2004: 180). 
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main benefit of avoiding such a distinction is the opportunity to deepen the 
empathic engagements in so far as the complex understanding goes beyond 
the purely cognitive framing. 
Regarding political activities, ecophilosophy is defined by Kvaløy as pro-
viding an orientation to the conditions, which lead to the environmental cri-
sis, as well as clarifying how such a crisis can be overcome by reconsider-
ing the implications of the engagements the political actors make. On the 
other hand, experimenting is not equivalent to speculating since the former 
presumes to uncontradictory integrate the new knowledge as a form of a 
new engagement. Related problem in this context is the interest in question-
ing specialists’ monopoly of knowledge (Kvaløy 1976: 4) at the expense of 
practical engagement447. 
Kvaløy claims that the task of ecophilosophy is to try to understand the cri-
sis’s development as far as possible in its wholeness and on this basis, to 
propose something usably (brukbart) new (Kvaløy 2004: 3270). The field is 
outlined by introducing four illuminative characteristics (Ibid: 3271) regard-
ing the clarification of the relationship between man and nature’s philoso-
phy of life. The characteristics in question also refer to the different activi-
ties that support saving man and nature by developing ecophilosophy as an 
engagement as well as establishing a new lifestyle. In this context, Kvaløy 
points out that defining ecophilosophy is not just a matter of combing two 
words together, namely, the ones of ‘eco’ and ‘philosophy’ unless a clear 
engagement is made, as I showed in the first chapter of the current research. 
In turn, reconsidering the connections between man and nature is an attempt 
to clarify the global and local aspects of their interaction by examining them 
as interdependent wholes: when all these aspects are explored within a net 
of holistic interactions in so far as the initial connection between man and 
nature is seen as a complex one.  
Concerning the description of so-called by Kvaløy communication, I argue 
that it corresponds to Zapffe’s explanation of the living energies, namely, to 
his theory about the myriads of energy impulses (Kvaløy 1972: 748). Char-
acterizing Zapffe’s philosophical conception as belonging to the realm of 
philosophical anthropology, Kvaløy examines how anthropocentrism based 
                                           
447 Another issue is the ecological definition of other types of imperialism such as cultural, eco-
nomic, political imperialism etc.  
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on both overexposed self-awareness and the strive for meaning, typical 
merely for the human beings448, leads to the contemporary ecocrisis449. 
According to Kvaløy, the communication concerns the origin of the dis-
seminating network of ecosystems understood as a multidimensional subject 
(Kvaløy 1976: 178). Each ecosystem consists of a net of disseminating 
channels, like the communication system (Ibid: 23). That is why if man’s 
communication is based on the ‘natural’ one deriving from the ‘natural’ 
spreadability of the living energies, it can avoid the complicated process of 
standardization450, which distances it from the complexity of natural 
rhythm. The normative validity of the aforementioned naturalness is in-
flicted by the intrinsic relationship between humankind and other systems in 
the biosphere in so far as they are initially connected in a way that does not 
presume the reduction to objective naturalism. Kvaløy displays this initial 
dependence as a mutual involvement in a gigantic thread net (trådnett), or as 
a net channel stretched between us and the rest of our world (Ibid: 24). He 
uses the bridge metaphor to show that the communication channels between 
the individual, group and the circumstances (Ibid: 38) should be examined 
as bridging opportunities, which support complexity of nature. 
The ecopolitical aspects concern the task of ecophilosophy to inflict politi-
cal changes by engaging all man’s capabilities in solving not only conflicts, 
but also in reconsidering their significance, namely, by rehabilitating the 
normative validity of the conflicts, when they represent a fight for life’s 
values.  
The understanding of the forth component (Kvaløy 2004: 3271) is described 
by Kvaløy as connected with the third one451. It clarifies why and how the 
                                           
448It provokes the false justification that man is a very special living being, which in turn encourages 
the noncontradictory overrating of the role of anthropocentrism. 
449 Referring to Zapffe’s disenchantment of overexposed faith in anthropocentrism, I argue that it is 
done for the sake of showing how ecophilosophy cannot function driven by its own interests alone 
(Ibid). 
450 For the standardization of the communication between man and environment, see Kvaløy (Ibid: 
34). 
451 The forth component concerns how ecophilosophy to formulate values, norms and ways of pre-
serving the diversity of life’s processes in respect with the given individual, human society and life’s 
processes as a whole. In turn, the third one affects the critical function of society, namely, how to 
formulate ecophilosophical engagement due to the critical evaluation on side of science, technology 
and economical and political conceptions and governmental control (Ibid). 
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ecophilosophical change can be a successful one only if it is accomplished 
as a normative change. In turn, such a normative change illustrates the re-
consideration of the value of life’s processes understood as wholes, which 
should be ‘walked’ by each and every man and society at once (Ibid). With-
in this framework, diversity can be appreciated merely by rehabilitating the 
initial value of nature as such. 
Furthermore, justifying ecophilosophy as a practical philosophy is done for 
the purposes of providing a response to the global crisis (Kvaløy 2014: 138-
139). Its ‘practical’ aim is to give an insight, methodological advice and 
training principles (Ibid: 139) in order to start a process, which goes away 
from the course of catastrophe452.  
Another significant aspect of ecophilosophy’s practical implementation 
concerns how it initiates the noncontradictory recognition of given ecopoli-
tical platforms in terms of abstracting and embodying some of the ecosys-
tems’ correspondences. Clarifying the impact of the latter and their extrapo-
lation (including internal ecosystem’s dynamics and its role in solving con-
flicts) (Kvaløy 2004: 1110) as well as regaining concreteness as a main pre-
requisite for revising the environmental crisis as a systems’ one, ecophi-
losophy provides us with an answer to what is wrong with our industrial de-
velopment society (Kvaløy 1976: 17). The ecopolitical implications of the 
latter affect the recognition of imperialism in Kvaløy’s sense by conquering 
the world in all its modes. In this context, ecopolitics (Ibid: 18) is recog-
nized as a project, which is important for the social life. That is why I argue 
that the generalization of such a project can be defined as irreducible to pure 
abstraction if we deepen the opportunities for empathy. 
While the decision-making process in conflicting situations is interpreted 
due to Kvaløy’s theory of ecopolitical engagements, including both moral 
and political aspects, Næss claims that Kvaløy has been searching for more 
conflicts to get involved into than necessary. This statement brings us back 
to the point how to uncontradictory define what a ‘necessary’ confrontation 
is. Næss himself finds the solution in similarly problematic terms, while 
talking about the differences between action, demonstration and reforma-
tion, as I already showed in the chapter on Næss, because the directedness 
                                           
452 That is why it does not have to be neither too specialized, nor too abstract, but to allow ‘peoples’ 
language (Ibid) to be concrete and full of illustrations, which can help people easily to identify with. 
According to Kvaløy, we need a religious feeling inspired by man and nature, something to reunite 
us with the rhythm’s streams in the usually chaotic world (Ibid: 170). 
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of the conflicts cannot be a criterion of the validity of motivation, nor is it 
representative for keeping so-called by Næss harmony model unattached. 
On the other hand, we cannot talk about activeness if it is not built on the 
engagement with different actions for social and political change, which to 
be directed to a given situation or situations, albeit there is no situation with 
a capital letter. Regarding time’s reference to space, I suggest discussing the 
role of situatedness as a matter of complexity rather than complicated situa-
tionism. Such a distinction further strengthens contradiction between the 
processes of transformation and reparation since the latter has modifying ef-
fects merely on a surface level. In turn, diversity as well as its normative va-
lidity derive from life as such because according to Kvaløy, diversity is 
life’s potential (Ibid: 34). The latter statement is shared by both Kvaløy and 
Næss in so far as they argue that cultural diversity is inseparable from the 
natural one453.  
                                           
453 On the other hand, Kvaløy emphasizes that contradicting deep and ‘green’ is an effect of propa-
ganda in some situations, where it could be a matter of simplifying so-called organic system think-
ing. In this context, he claims that the crossing point between Marxists and Gandhists is the inspira-
tion to embody situatedness in different situations without reducing it to a certain form of situation-
ism. 
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2.1. Ecophilosophy and/or Ecosophy? 
The Strive for Finding a Place 
As it was outlined in the first chapter of the current research, comparing and 
contrasting Næss’s and Kvaløy’s theories is not just a matter of examining 
why they choose different words for ecophilosophy, but rather of outlining 
why regardless of the fact that they share common philosophical ground-
ings, they provide different conceptions of what the most relevant (envi-
ronmentally friendly) ecopolitics should look like. 
Some common features are concerned with what I called experiential phi-
losophy, namely, with issues such as the normative validity of man’s self-
realization, with the common commitment to preserve the biosphere as a 
condition of achieving the realization in question, with analytically ques-
tioning anthropocentrism at the expense of rehabilitating the values of bio-
centrism. 
According to Kvaløy, ecophilosophy is a product of changes in the world 
understood as initiated by nature’s dynamics. Epistemologically speaking, it 
would mean that raising the awareness is a matter of cultivating sensitivity 
by encouraging our responsibility to both ourselves and the world. Ecophi-
losophy contributes to clarifying the role of human society as an integrated, 
but not necessarily harmonic part of the ecosystems’ net (Kvaløy 1976: 23). 
The dialectics of integration as a strive for harmony provides the need peo-
ple to cultivate a sensitivity towards the normative validity of processuality. 
Kvaløy himself claims that the prefix ‘eco’454 stays for the global ecosys-
tem (Kvaløy 1985: 22). The system’s component is removed because it is 
often associated with fast relationships between “fast points” (Ibid), but the 
idea behind is the process character of philosophy to be more and more em-
phasized. Kvaløy argues that the aforementioned prefix points out to what 
extent the modern ecological way of thinking should be spread (Ibid: 19). In 
this context, he couples wisdom with love emphasizing the role of power of 
intuition for the “forgotten time” or the attempt “to stop time” (Ibid: 30), 
representing the internal ontological tension between intuition and intelli-
gence. The latter provide different capacities of orientation. While the intui-
                                           
454 According to him, ecologists have developed a worldview, which is similar to the one of Eastern 
philosophy. The prefix ‘eco’(øko) is the one signifying that modern ecophilosophical thinking is in-
debted to Gandhi’s ethics, which provides a fellow feeling with the whole nature (Ibid). 
 364
tion fights by provoking love in response to civilization’s amnesia, the intel-
ligence is focused on expanding the obsession with planning (cartograph-
ing). 
This statement is interpreted as an argument against Næss’s claim that dif-
ferent ecophilosophies do not point to something new in so far as the idea of 
novelty is embodied in the one of diversity by default. In turn, Kvaløy ar-
gues that the ‘sofi’ suffix concerns the insight, wisdom and love showing 
the internal engagement and feeling the full motivation to the object of the 
feelings (Ibid). That is why we can talk about the priority of insight or 
world picture rather than the one of value and normative interests.  
Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I draw the conclusion that the 
practical implications of Kvaløy’s ecophilosophy concern the coordination 
of process thinking and process action, which to redirect the orientation 
process to solving the global ecological crisis. As one of the methods, gen-
eralisation is understood as a certain type of comparativism adopting the 
concrete language for the sake of grounding the normative validity of the 
process of understanding by experiential learning. According to Kvaløy, it 
becomes possible because the concrete world is a value saturated, creative 
process, as understood by Whitehead and Buddhism (Kvaløy 1994: 29), so 
that it presumes the relevant understanding to be initiated by process learn-
ing. 
Since people participate in keeping the crisis’s dynamics, they may regulate 
it by introducing some new forms of engagement, which to boost the proc-
ess of self-identification on a group level. In this context, the process think-
ing’s embodiment is possible only if norms are not contradicted to insights, 
but are rather examined within the framework of experiential morality due 
to which the participants’ interests can be defined in a complex way. 
However, it is also problematic whether if we define Næss’s philosophy as 
a “holistic, relational, total field image” and Kvaløy’s one as concerning na-
ture as a “diversified process” in its openness and change (Jakobsen 2011: 
186) respectively, the dilemmas would be solved. According to Næss, the 
idea of ecosophy is a result of elaborating the philosophical groundings of 
ecology, while Kvaløy’s ecophilosophy is a “short version of philosophy of 
ecology” (Næss 1973: 22).  
In this context, I argue that Kvaløy’s contribution can be also found in his 
point that we talk about emotionally engaged strive for situations (Kvaløy 
1985: 22), which makes the necessary conflicts part of love. This is possible 
because the social and political conflicts are focused on clarifying so-called 
life’s truth, which is a complex rather than complicated phenomenon. Fac-
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ing such conflicts is a stage of development of both love and wisdom in the 
process of building and directing attitudes towards home. However, emo-
tional engagement cannot be interpreted as imposing a form of moral rela-
tivism since love is coupled with wisdom due to the implementation of a 
new type of rationality, namely, due to adopting imaginative rationality in 
respect with ecophilosophy. That is why I argue that Kvaløy’s ecophiloso-
phy benefits seeing the ecopolitical embodiments of the internal connection 
between love and wisdom. 
On a macro methodological level, ecophilosophy presumes adopting and 
elaborating moral experiential gestalts since philosophy in question can be 
defined as based on a certain type of ontological ethics, which contributes to 
understanding the process of self-realization. As a prototype characteristic 
of the latter, I point out the complex moral engagement, which in turn pro-
vokes the responsibility for making relevant political engagements. How-
ever, it does not mean that ‘moral’ becomes an ontological synonym of ‘po-
litical’, but rather that it is the engagement itself that provides the integrity 
of moral and political as two mutually connected sides in changing ecopoli-
tics and thus in recognizing the role of collective responsibility towards pre-
serving nature. A proof of this statement can be found in Kvaløy’s stance 
that life is full of meanings, when political and philosophical engagements 
go hand in hand (Ibid). 
While Næss defines ecosophy as based on an ecologically oriented social 
anthropology, Kvaløy argues that adopting the methods of sociology and 
social anthropology is not enough (Kvaløy 2001: 743). Man is such a being, 
which cannot conquer the world by using a miraculous technology; regard-
ing his/her basis of existence, he/she is still primitive. 
Outlining the methodological similarities between Næss’s and Kvaløy’s en-
vironmental philosophies presumes examining some crossing points such as 
the one that both ecophilosophy and ecosophy require total engagement 
making the process of self-realization dependent on the one of nature and 
the other way around, the commonly shared respect to Gandhi’s ethics of 
non-violence, the recognition of nature’s wholeness, which corresponds to 
Næss’s conception of the knots of biosphere, the normative validity of the 
connection between ecophilosophy and ecopolitics etc. In turn, regardless of 
the aforementioned claims, Kvaløy explicitly emphasizes the role of ethics 
in establishing a relevant ecopolitics, while Næss prefers to talk about ge-
stalt ontology, as I already showed. 
Analyzing Kvaløy’s ecophilosophy, I raise the hypothesis that it is an expe-
riential ecophilosophy whose prototype characteristic is the normative va-
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lidity of wholeness understood as a being ‘in process’. The latter could be 
interpreted as equivalent to the definition of ‘in progress’, taking into ac-
count that the progress itself does not have to be recognized as technologi-
cally oriented one. Furthermore, the definition of ‘in process’ can be deter-
mined as corresponding to the one of ‘in progress’ evaluated from the per-
spective of the complexity of nature if the progress is not a strive for achiev-
ing aim by aim, but rather one for revealing the potential of the new living 
energies. That is why the progress does not have to be examined as ground-
ing a geometric progression, but as a horizon, which contributes to disen-
chanting the multitude of the unknown (only for the bystander), configura-
tions of living energies. It is this interpretation of progress as a self-
regulation that is questioned by the technological progress as a primitive 
one. On a macro methodological level, it gives preference to the meaning of 
natural as primitive instead of the one of being ‘first in its genus’. 
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3. KVALØY’S THEORIES OF COMPLEXITY 
AND COMPLICATION 
Kvaløy claims that the distinction between the concepts of complexity and 
complication is borrowed from the modern ecological thinking (Kvaløy 
1976: 19). He clarifies that these concepts have qualitative multiplicities 
(Ibid: 27), which are defined on the principle of opposition (Ibid). The dis-
tinction in question concerns the specification of the normative validity of 
diversity that is a prototype characteristic of the system’s building. Such a 
distinction is of crucial importance due to the fact that it contributes to clari-
fying what the implications of the “industrial development versus environ-
mental protection” debate would be if we want to keep recognizing the lat-
ter under the guise of “industrial development and environmental protec-
tion” debate. 
In this context, Kvaløy talks about eco-growth (økovekst) (snm 1974: 71), 
which has been discredited within the framework of so-called circulation 
economics (kretsløpsøkonomi) (Ibid). The principle of economic growth is 
recognized as nevertheless meaningless, it can only be fulfilled at a steadily 
bigger speed (tempo) in the process of circulation (Ibid). Judging by the 
aforementioned investigations, I argue that among the other factors, it is the 
acceleration of time in Kvaløy’s sense (which initially contradicts the or-
ganic (‘river’) time mode) that leads to narrowing the concept of economic 
growth to the one of industrial development. 
Kvaløy borrows the concept of diversity, as defined by the system ecology 
and Odum school455 (Kvaløy 1976: 5), while the one of difference is deter-
mined as a difference between qualitative dynamic diversity and quantita-
tive static complication, namely, between to be yourself and to lose yourself 
(Kvaløy 2004: 2760). Thus diversity regarding the building and working 
                                           
455 Eugene Odum (1913-2002) was an American biologist who is well-known for his pioneering 
work on ecosystem ecology. Together with his brother, Howard T. Odum, Eugene Odum is an au-
thor of many publications on developing the term ecosystem.   
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modes, and communication is understood as a diversity of existence, which 
presumes gathering things as they are (Kvaløy 1976: 27).  
In turn, the contextualization of life necessity society and stable ecosystems 
can be described against the background of Kvaløy’s process philosophy. It 
would mean to internalize subjects’ dialectical mode of thinking since the 
process thinking is steadily based on the process ontology I already dis-
cussed. The ‘non-stopping’ change does not have to be understood as hav-
ing a self-sufficient ‘being-for-itself’, but rather as having the latter as in-
trinsically connected with its being in itself. On the other hand, the specifi-
cation, which should be made is that it is a change of time and space keep-
ing the ideas of both time and space ‘unchangeable’. According to Kvaløy, 
it illustrates that the process thinking requires rehabilitating the temporal 
continuity corresponding to a given spatial extension (Næss 1985: 38).  
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3.1. Complexity of Life Necessity Society 
Furthermore, Kvaløy argues that it is the reconsideration of the role of eco-
logical dynamics and its conceptualization as dialectics that make the un-
derstanding of complexity possible. The latter presumes a never ending or-
ganic interplay (interaction), which is always changing on its way to some-
thing new. Nature develops diversity and diversity gives living force – it is a 
process of changing encouraging the outburst of life’s loom (livsvevet) 
(Kvaløy 1976: 136). Last but not least, it is a matter of wholeness that is ir-
reducible to its parts requiring a certain kind of cultural cooperation to be 
established. 
Extrapolating Kvaløy’s concept, I point out that complexity is justified as a 
particular mode of both being in nature and its anticipation, taking into ac-
count that it is the role of organic interaction that becomes its prototype 
characteristic. On a macro methodological level, I draw the conclusion that 
nature’s mode requires processing to constantly developing rhythmic bal-
ance, which to be recognized for the sake of reliesing the whole potential of 
life’s force as such. On a micro methodological level, the intuition about 
complexity in Kvaløy’s sense grounds the capability of improvising while 
building and participating in nature’s wholeness. Thus the participation in 
question can be understood by employing analogy without falling into the 
trap of moral objectivism. In turn, the role of rhythmic improvisation 
(Kvaløy 2014: 34) is defined by Kvaløy as complex since it presumes that 
the new changes are initiated due to its internal logic. That is why the 
rhythmic improvisation can be considered as triggering a qualitative change 
due to the fact that its dialectics makes movement be recognized as a com-
plex mode of changing, which does not exclude some static moments as 
conditions for its function. 
Regarding the methodological impact of complexity on man’s being, I ar-
gue that Kvaløy simplifies what Næss defines as benefits of adopting gestalt 
thinking for the sake of rehabilitating temporal continuity mode. However, 
exploring the role of complexity, Kvaløy emphasizes the impact of gestalt 
sensitivity as a reference frame, which guarantees the normative validity of 
relating intellectual and emotional capabilities. It means to simultaneously 
introduce and compare moral feeling and aesthetic sensitivity (as tertiary 
qualities), introducing moral imagination; an approach, which can help us to 
avoid the distinction between ethical and aesthetic methodology, as Kvaløy 
himself suggests (Ibid: 37). 
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He defines life necessity society as a society, which does not necessarily 
deny the idea of industry (Kvaløy 1976: 17). As an illuminative illustration, 
Kvaløy points out the role of Sherpa’s society, clarifying what it means to 
be in one and the same boat while giving priority to the satisfaction of vital 
needs (Kvaløy 2014:74) (Kvaløy 1976: 62). Analyzing the role of this illus-
tration, we can see how following the rhythm is not a matter of establishing 
a physically grounded process of imitating by analogy. Otherwise, breaking 
the rhythm would have been conceptualized as equivalent to breaking with 
the roots, which in turn means breaking with the natural rhythm456 as such. 
Thus the process of rebuilding would have been reduced to a simple form of 
reconstruction containing no innovative element at all.  
In this context, I argue that one of the main methodological benefits of 
adopting Kvaløy’s statement concerns the clarification of the vital needs in 
the process of the self-regulation of equilibrium by effectively preserving 
nature’s dynamics, namely, by building an equilibrium society through jus-
tifying complex diversity, as Kvaløy suggests (Ibid: 19, 21, 63). The differ-
ence with the contemporary industrial society is considered as a difference 
between improvisation and planning, between abstract and concrete 
(Kvaløy 2014: 48) in so far as the idea of freedom is embodied against the 
background of the difference between living and mechanically constructed 
systems (Ibid: 56). 
In this context, life necessity society can be examined as built not on ‘free-
dom from’ but rather on ‘freedom to’ justifying meaningfulness as such. To 
a certain extent, the latter can be defined as a freedom from given meanings 
for the sake of engaging with the idea of meaningfulness. 
What should the life necessity society look like? Kvaløy argues that Tser-
ingma is a symbol of the equilibrium society becoming a positive alterna-
tive to our unstoppable (ustoppelige) industrial development society 
(Kvaløy 1976: 78). On a macro methodological level, it shows why outlin-
ing the genealogy of the experience in the mountain is crucial for under-
standing the one of life necessity society because mountain is a meaningful 
landscape, which provides meaningful self-understanding. Here comes the 
role of cultural experience. Pain and joy, life and death, tears and smile are 
interpreted by Kvaløy as shared by all people regardless of their cultural and 
ethnic origin (Ibid: 79). This is an argument that strengthens the thesis of 
                                           
456 Kvaløy argues that the planners (belonging to the industrial development society) do not take in-
to account that people’s “roots in mother earth’s soil” are torn off (Kvaløy 1976: 152). 
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unity (not of monopoly) of cultures, which is irreducible to establishing 
monoculture itself. Such a unity boosts fellowship among people since it 
concerns the knowledge of how nature can be used without being destructed 
(Ibid: 86). In other words, the role of culture in life necessity society reveals 
how nature can be considered as providing sources rather than resources in 
different ways. 
The understanding of what meaningful is illustrated what Kvaløy called a 
direct interaction, or playing457. Due to the latter, the normative validity of 
imagination regarding the achievement of the coherence of individual and 
collective experience is guaranteed. Playing strengthens the sense of identi-
fication in respect with what ‘life should be’ since this life is always based 
on a rhythm, which provides a mode of changing to be uncontradictory 
adopted. In turn, rhythm is always embodied in the ‘between’ mode (in the 
one of interacting) due to which the dynamic of nature presumes one change 
to be justified as normatively valid rather than causally determined. 
In this context, understanding Kvaløy’s theory of life necessity society pre-
sumes the genealogy of complexity to be clarified as a strive for “rhythmic 
development of diversity” activating the ability to differ living from me-
chanical (Kvaløy 2004: 450). The development is justified as built in tune 
with (in rhythm with) the landscape and human behavior (Kvaløy 2014: 9) 
because its plan and order mainly stem from the relationship between man 
and nature. For the purposes of understanding life necessity society’s inter-
nal logic, we should realize that it does not have to be understood as a lack 
of planning, but rather as a matter of preserving organic coherence, which 
cannot be abstracted from the internal structure of the plan itself.  
In other words, having a plan is a necessary but not sufficient condition for 
achieving organic coherence in its complexity. That is why I argue that the 
rhythm of human behavior in Kvaløy’s sense follows the one of the land-
scape without imitating it because, otherwise, it would mean that there is no 
such a thing as man’s behavior. It is a matter of participating on the princi-
ple of anticipating the organic coherence. Therefore, we should talk about 
normative dependence, not about physiological one in so far as the latter 
should have reduced the idea of society to the accomplishment of the physi-
cal process of satisfying vital needs. As Kvaløy outlines that by contrast to 
the industrial development society, life necessity society is based on the in-
                                           
457 The idea of playing as irreducible to the one of game, or games is also shared by Næss, as I 
showed in the chapter on Næss. 
 372
herent economy (bondeøkonomien) (Ibid: 40) that presumes experience in 
which the ‘green diversity’ can never be simplified to a resource alone. 
Judging by these arguments, I draw the conclusion that one of the main 
methodological differences between life necessity society and industrial de-
velopment one can be traced back on the level of life’s quality. While in the 
‘complex’ society, the stress is put on reaching high quality of life, in the 
‘complicated’ one, a preference is given to raising the living standard. The 
close supporter of Kvaløy, Hjalmar Hegge458, describes this distinction as a 
matter of contradicting economic values and life’s ones (Hegge 1974: 78). 
Hegge defines the living standard as being determined by the index of life’s 
cost (“levekostnadsindeks”) (Ibid), in contrast to the quality of life that is 
specified due to the value of fundamental life’s goods such as to be able to 
breathe a clean air, to drink a clean water etc. (Ibid).  
It is important to outline that the axiological distinction between the two 
types of values, characterizing the quality of life and the living standard, is 
also projected as an axiological difference on the level of goods. The latter 
affect how the process of evaluation is misplaced with a certain type of a 
cost-benefit analysis reducing value to a calculable price on side of the mass 
population. That is why we can define the living standard in the modern in-
dustrial society as intrinsically based on the value of mass production, 
which should aim at satisfying the needs of the general audience. According 
to Hegge, these mass goods have a “scarcity value” (Ibid: 79), which in turn 
is closely tied with justifying the need of industrial and technological ex-
pansion (Ibid: 83) for the sake of increasing the quantity of goods. Further-
more, I argue that the principal difference between the calculable values and 
the life’s ones can be recognized as a contradiction between ascribing value 
to the quantitative and qualitative aspects of the concept of value, as 
Hegge459suggests. 
On a macro methodological level, I draw the conclusion that the difference 
between the life necessity society and the industrial development one can be 
traced back to the origin of continuity and its break understood as necessary 
conditions for defining man’s experiential gestalt. The break in question is 
provoked by the replacement of rhythm on side of the industrial develop-
                                           
458 Together with Kvaløy, he is one of the leading figures of snm. He is also one of the authors of 
the snm manifest as well as of many other important texts of the movement. 
459 According to him, people’s experience of space was connected with the concrete, “quantitative 
experience of it” (Hegge 1974b: 105). 
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ment society with so-called staccato break (Kvaløy 1976: 140), which is 
caused by accelerating the idea of growth’s tempo and flexibility coming 
from nature itself. That is why going back to the idea of reviving life neces-
sity society means to be in tune with the rhythm of the landscape460.  
In turn, Kvaløy claims that breaking the natural rhythm is an illuminative 
sign of the civilization in its fight with itself as well as with homeless and 
restless man, which is driven by the fabulous success in subjecting nature 
through imposing the ideal of competition (Ibid: 91). Extrapolating his con-
cept, I claim that the civilization is built on exaggerating the role of analogy 
by simplifying it to a literal correspondence between one form and another 
one, which in turn provokes the substitution of the mode of becoming with 
the one of being understood as the only one possible mode. Only in a differ-
ent context, the formula ‘to travel to yourself’ recognized as an already for-
gotten thinking mode may have an uncontradictory normative validity. 
                                           
460 According to Kvaløy, the unfolding of rhythm in Sherpa society concerns the outstanding cul-
tural surplus achieved by complexly balanced social institutions, religion and art (Ibid: 133). Fur-
thermore, rebuilding means society to build its own rhythm in what Kvaløy calls elastic way regard-
ing growth (Ibid: 132). 
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3.1.1. The Role of Meaningful Work in Life Necessity 
Society 
Kvaløy’s theory of meaningful work is highly influenced by the one of E. F. 
Schumacher in the mid-1970s (Kvaløy 2014: 127). In this context, eco-
activism is reconsidered as a form of meaningful work, namely, as a fight 
for a meaningful work in which young people find themselves by denying 
their own ego. 
The work issue is also emphasized by Næss who sees the opportunity of 
overcoming the crisis as an effort to overcome an ecosocial crisis in so far 
as questioning the implications of work may contribute to questioning both 
the normative validity and its impact (Næss and Tschudi 2007: 129). How-
ever, it is important to outline that the negative consequences to the envi-
ronment, while strengthening the sustainable development are not caused by 
the changing meaning of work alone, but rather by changing the symbolic 
capital of the connection between production and consumption. It should be 
clarified that meaningful work becomes more and more a matter of accept-
ing the expertise provided by the technocrats who operate with a prelimi-
nary specified concept of work. One concept, which is coined to meet the 
needs of the sustainable development society alone. 
According to Kvaløy, meaningful work guarantees that the commonly 
shared conceptions of what a meaningful activity is make one society both 
ecologically and socially balanced because it is based on the presumption of 
a complex growth, which affects the development of human potential and 
capabilities (Kvaløy 2014: 71). The idea of self-sufficient resourcefulness 
can be properly interpreted merely within the life necessity society. Other-
wise, it should have been grounded in erasing the difference between source 
and resource, recognizing self-sufficiency as a factor of a ‘capsule environ-
ment’ in Kvaløy’s sense. 
In other words, work can be called meaningful only if it contributes to see-
ing and accessing nature’s diversity without corrupting it. Furthermore, 
meaningful work as such encourages the direct interaction with nature, but 
not its direct exploitation461. An illustration favoring the latter statement 
can be found in Kvaløy’s analysis of the role of both society and nature in 
revealing the implications of a given work as a meaningful one (Ibid: 70). 
                                           
461 As a significant difference with the industrial development society, the lack of distinction be-
tween working time and free one in Sherpa society is outlined (Ibid: 84). 
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The direct contact with nature is described as having different embodiments 
due to the varieties of the relationship between body and environment. 
Kvaløy introduces five criteria of meaningful work (Ibid). According to the 
first one, the latter guarantees the material grounding of life. Due to the sec-
ond criterion, meaningful work contributes to securely building different 
qualities including both good and bad ones because the challenges in life are 
as diverse as people themselves are. The third criterion of the work in ques-
tion is that it benefits the development of solidarity, loyalty and common 
work. In turn, due to the forth criterion, the products, both goods and ser-
vices, promote life in nature and society. Last but not least, work is recog-
nized as the most important social field in which children can participate 
(Ibid). 
In this context, Kvaløy pays special attention to engaging children with 
meaningful work because thus they become integrated in a society by giv-
ing priority to vital needs, finding a meaning in their lives. He characterizes 
the process of rehabilitation as an appeal for giving time back to children in 
order they to develop themselves as human beings (Ibid: 36). However, 
meaningful work presumes a certain space to be given, so that rehabilitating 
time should be examined as inevitably connected with revising the idea of 
space as such. The participation of children in work along with their parents 
made them meaningful as well since the presumption of the need of work is 
no longer reducible to the one of survival (Ibid: 71)  
The main pedagogical effect of the aforementioned participation is seen by 
Kvaløy in the fact that it functions as a behavior modeling (Ibid: 95) in so 
far as children can solve tasks following their own initiatives (Ibid: 158). 
They can steadily look for a quality plan in order to orient themselves in na-
ture in a steady way (Kvaløy 1976: 138). Children are the ones playing 
along the river, which is a metaphor of the life’s stream (Kvaløy 2014: 80). 
Playing is also recognized as a “normal activity” outside of the industrial 
society (Ibid: 92) since the modeling of life’s meaning presumes coopera-
tion to be understood not only as strictly referring to given obligations 
alone, but also as a form of process interaction on side of man with his/her 
environment in time. 
It means that cooperating is a meaningful activity that contributes to culti-
vating the sense of situatedness understood as a sensitivity towards the 
group belonging. Life’s meaning as such is provoked by the interaction with 
nature justified as a ‘natural’ activity, i.e. as an activity that does not contra-
dict the entity of human nature, but rather benefits man’s self-realization. It 
is both driven and not driven by nature because, otherwise, it would mean 
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that there would be no need of cultivating fellowship by the common par-
ticipation.  
As the most important part of the process of elaborating meaningful work, 
Kvaløy points out the cultivation of process empathy recognized as a com-
plex understanding of natural and social diversity, which continuously con-
stitute the course of events, where everything changes in the process of in-
teraction (Ibid: 116). The latter has different representations in different 
‘spatial’ scopes, albeit it always remains grounded in a certain type of relat-
edness (including relations such as part and whole, new time and traditions, 
society and nature, theory and practice). Furthermore, empathy could be de-
fined as ‘feeling with understanding’ due to which none of the components 
is reducible to the rest; one premise, which guarantees the character of the 
interaction in question. 
According to Kvaløy, man is the most diversely equipped of all beings, but 
at the same time, he/she is the least specialized one (Ibid: 26). That is why 
one person’s diversity presumes the role of what a meaningful work is to be 
clarified as well as its connection to what Zapffe calls individual freedom to 
be revealed. The meaningful work concerns both the task and the means, 
which makes it possible work to be considered as supporting the function-
ing of life necessity society. Regarding man’s behavior, environmental pro-
tection is seen in the realization of the equilibrium society by elaborating 
sensitivity towards diversity (Kvaløy 1976: 63). In this context, the problem 
of freedom enters the scene as initially referring to the possibility man to 
expand his/her ego-boundaries (Kvaløy 2014: 60). However, the latter does 
not have to be understood as an argument in favor of biological determin-
ism. By looking for freedom in life necessity society, Kvaløy interprets the 
expansion of the boundaries in question in order to raise the level of the 
normative validity of self-reliance, i.e. the self to become self-reliant, con-
scious, active part of a bigger wholeness (Kvaløy 2004: 1140).  
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3.1.2. The Strive for Freedom in Life Necessity Society 
Kvaløy claims that meaningfulness is expressed in the freedom of thoughts 
(Kvaløy 2014: 99), which I define as a ‘space’ given by the work in differ-
ent landscapes. The intrinsic methodological connection between under-
standing meaningful work and man’s freedom is crucial for his theory sup-
porting the need of adopting the principles of life necessity society. 
Kvaløy’s view of freedom can be described as a way to freedom due to 
which man simultaneously chooses different paths for the purposes of living 
many parallel lives as well as using the uncountable diversity of navigation 
means (Ibid: 26). The latter are available to every man and every man’s 
group, which is naturally disposed to them (har kimene til) (Ibid). Thus 
freedom’s objective is to grasp both the world and ourselves in our natural 
continuity. 
In other words, freedom in Kvaløy’s sense is understood as navigation to 
meaningfulness achieved by taking different ways, while wondering, in Ar-
istotle’s sense, rather than walking. However, the simultaneousness of liv-
ing opportunities leads to the following conclusion, namely, it is a wander-
ing-wondering endeavor since wandering as such means moving without 
destination or purpose. In Kvaløy’s sense, it is a way of wa(o)ndering, 
which has reaching meaningfulness as a goal, i.e. to enjoy the possibility of 
having living alternatives, which are embodied in the possibility of un-
countable paths. Adopting the parallelism mode does not mean that one al-
ternative is more meaningful than another one, but rather that they share a 
similar normative validity as being ways to meaningfulness. An important 
point, which has to be outlined on a macro methodological level, is that 
their qualitative representations are not guarantees for the implications of 
their normative validity. 
In turn, the qualitative difference determines the debate about freedom 
against the background of already discussed distinction462 between living 
and mechanical (Kvaløy 2004: 450). In this context, the key feature of life’s 
process is unfolding freedom as irreducible to something, which can be con-
structed by man and as such can be specified in the form of system theory 
or cybernetic models. 
                                           
462 According to Kvaløy, the prototype characteristic of the living systems is not equilibrium, but 
complexity and its tendency, which freedom has much to do with (Kvaløy 2004: 450). 
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Analyzing the role of freedom within the two traditions outlined by Kvaløy, 
namely, within so-called individual and fellowship traditions (I-tradisjonen 
og F-tradisjonen) (Ibid: 510) presumes their genealogy to be examined. He 
argues that the individual tradition is an idealist one, which concerns seeing 
the world as full of conflicts merely on the surface level because on a deep-
er one, there is only harmony (Ibid). In turn, the fellowship tendency is de-
scribed as deriving from the tradition of fellowship liberation after Marx463. 
It is materialistically oriented towards recognizing the world as a dualist one 
by claiming that harmony is on the surface, while on the deepest level, there 
are always conflicts (Ibid). Furthermore, joy itself comes from the state of 
togetherness with the fellows while fighting for achieving a commonly 
shared goal (Ibid). 
According to Kvaløy, within the framework of the idealist tradition, the 
world can be determined as a static one mentioning Spinoza’s theory. This 
is the European tradition, which dates back to Antiquity with its ambition of 
eternal perfection. The tradition in question shows how time is justified as 
an embodiment of a spatial dimension464, changing and originality are rec-
ognized as an illusion465, as well as the specification of time is defined as 
time-deafness (Ibid: 600). However, Kvaløy clarifies that adopting the latter 
expression provides us with more associations than the one of time blind-
ness. The sight (Blikket) can ‘return’ to the starting point, we can ‘reserve’ 
the process, while the chance of hearing gives us an access to a stream that 
cannot be stopped or reserved (Hørsels-sansen) (Ibid: 600, Note 5.23). 
The second tendency within the idealist tradition is to see the world as a 
process. According to Kvaløy, an illuminative illustration in this respect is 
Hinduism, which aims at capturing world’s dynamics as a counter action to 
the mechanistic world picture. Hinduism is defined by him as developing a 
                                           
463 Regarding Marx, Kvaløy argues that his ideas differ from Bergson’s ones. He criticizes Marx’s 
theory saying that it successfully questions the pyramidal character of society on an individual level 
alone (Ibid: 1200, Note 22). 
464 In our time, Europeans confronted many problems regarding the understanding of relativity theo-
ries, e.g. the ones of ‘space and time’ in contrast to the theories of dialectical and orientation process 
thinking (Ibid: 540-570). 
465 Kvaløy refers to Buddhist theory of questioning the experience of the world as static (Ibid: 600).  
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coherent tendency to establish a series of different attempts to build a libera-
tion learning based on the awareness of the map of world’s processes466.  
On a macro methodological level, I draw the conclusion that Kvaløy’s con-
ception of freedom should be considered as recognizing ecophilosophy as a 
process philosophy467 belonging to the B mode of idealist tendency whose 
prototype characteristic is freedom, understood as liberation on both indi-
vidual and collective levels. In turn, the process of liberation, when it is pro-
jected on the level of politics (i.e. understanding ecophilosophy as ground-
ing relevant ecopolitics) entails some of the features of the fellowship tradi-
tion, namely, the common efforts for liberating via inflicting activeness, 
which is needed for achieving certain commonly shared goals.  
That is why I argue that the change of the growth vs. industrial development 
discourse presumes two forms of freedom to be adopted at once, namely, 
                                           
466 According to Kvaløy, the most radical attempts at building a teaching of salvation on the basis of 
world’s process character are made by some representatives of “North Buddhism”, albeit they are 
already embodied in The Song of Shakya family (Den Vise av Sakya-slekten) (Ibid: 720). Due to 
Shakyamuni’s conception, it is a matter of stretching world’s dynamic character which goes beyond 
Hinduism. He eliminated the thought about the soul as transmitted through generations as well as 
the thought about one “Big Self” (Ibid: 750). Man is captured in Buddhist life circle for such a long 
time so that he/she does not see the self as an illusion. Kvaløy examines Buddhist term of rebirth as 
immensely different from the Hindu reincarnation (Ibid: 750, Note 8.1). There is no soul’s unity: the 
individual is a chain of deeds in time and this chain does not break with death, which in turn leads to 
disability of achieving the state of nirvana (Ibid). 
467According to Kvløy, Næss’s interpretation of Spinoza is “more Næss than Spinoza” (Ibid, 5.3 
Note). He recognizes Spinoza’s conception on freedom as a premise, which is “totally colorless” 
because Spinoza’s liberation of man does not concern him/her as a social being, but rather as an in-
dividual, intellectually pressed to deepen his/her situatedness in the world (Ibid). Furthermore, 
Kvaløy characterizes Spinoza’s interpretation of man’s status as an unrestricted fragment of nature, 
of something, which we, first and foremost, accept as qualitative diversity (Ibid). Outlining this as-
pect makes his point similar to the one of Næss since both of them are focused on rehabilitating the 
crucial role of bioegalitarinism for the sake of both mankind’s and nature’s realization. However, 
discussing Spinoza’s theory of freedom Kvaløy argues that in contrast to the atomist, radical process 
learning, partly represented in Mahayana Buddhism, we do not find a form of pure learning of unity, 
or so-called pure monism in Spinoza’s writings. He claims that in Spinoza’s texts, we can find an 
echo from the Jewish distinction between God and the world (Ibid). In turn, it is contrasted with the 
Chinese Mahayana providing a differentiation between eternal, motionless and motion (Ibid: 399). 
According to Kvaløy, if we choose the static monism as a grounding belief, we will always have 
troubles with explaining our own proof of perceptions (vidnesbyrd), especially if we refer to the 
Western mechanistic world picture based on distinctions such as time/space, I/the others (Ibid: 693). 
 380
the ones of ‘freedom to’ and ‘freedom from’, as I already argued. On a mi-
cro methodological level, the meaninglessness of egoistic strives (Ibid: 809) 
does not have to be understood as being in a passive mood. Relying on 
Gandhi’s ethics of non-violence, it initiates becoming free through regulat-
ing the impact of rhythm’s means. The latter require the responsibility to the 
world to be developed on both man’s and world’s sides. 
However, Kvaløy defines the situation as displaying the dynamics of life. 
He tries to preserve the Buddhist strive, but refers it to the means of dialec-
tics by examining Marx’s understanding of freedom as a goal (as a dialecti-
cal materialist freedom). The main methodological solution derives from 
defining freedom as a way to freedom (Ibid: 3030), as a way of learning 
about both the world and ourselves. The simultaneous choice of different 
ways contributes to seeing conflicts and harmony as irreducible to the cor-
respondence between surface and depth. Furthermore, the practical projec-
tions of questioning surface-depth relationship can be seen in Kvaløy’s de-
scription of freedom by implicitly revealing the role of deficiency of py-
ramidal fundament (Ibid: 1470), where the pyramidal character presumes a 
given hierarchy to be justified. It is a matter of radical decentralization, 
which to rehabilitate the normative validity of nature’s continuity. 
In this context, the unity of soul and body is examined by Kvaløy in respect 
with so-called dialectical materialism (Ibid: 1080). He specifies that the dia-
lectical or so-called by him dynamic materialism does not automatically 
presume adopting uncontradictory process philosophy. It may contribute to 
getting closer or enlarging the difference between idealist and fellowship 
tendencies (Ibid: 1110), which in turn to benefit the infliction of political 
change via building a relevant fellowship engagement.  
Man’s freedom is considered as a quality, which can be trained up (tenes 
fram) in the sense of an activity of its own type. It is a statement in favor of 
solidarity saying that solidary behavior is a significant component of the en-
tity of freedom (Kvaløy 2014: 68). The sense of cultivating stance of soli-
darity is developed in time. Thus the fluidity of human existence is exam-
ined against the background of the time thinking mode due to which the 
continuity of fluctuations is taken from its constructive side, namely, from 
the perspective that ego identification is merely one swirl of the flow. The 
control of the stream itself is not a subject to people’s will. However, from 
that it does not follow to irresponsibly choose because the act of choosing 
differently derives from the requirement to life as such: it is a choosing 
mode realized for the sake of fulfilling life’s aims. 
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In this context, freedom concerns to responsibly choose the uncontrollable 
life, which is controllable merely by following its own internal logic. It is a 
certain kind of compatibilism in which freedom presumes interacting by ex-
panding our understanding for otherness.  
To the personal freedom, industrial society confronts so-called pipe society, 
as Kvaløy argues, where functionality is measured by adjustment (or so-
called customization). I draw the conclusion that we can talk about two self-
sufficient systems whose development is due to their self-sufficiency, while 
the huge methodological difference concerns the genealogy of the mecha-
nisms of changing. Regarding the case of pipe society, change is character-
ized as misbalance because it is driven by the contradiction between sub-
ject’s changes and system’s status quo. However, in the case with the life 
necessity society, motivation presumes full internalization as a condition for 
fulfilling, i.e. the changing mode is recognized as a process of self-
realization providing the modes of ‘freedom from’ and ‘freedom to’. On a 
micro methodological level, we can comment on this issue by referring to 
Kvaløy’s statement that every single individual has energy to interact with 
the world (Ibid: 57). The different projections of the interaction in question 
determine whether one of the aforementioned two modes is adopted. 
Referring to Kvaløy’s statement, I claim that to approach freedom means to 
allow to be carried away by the stream without getting drawn in so far as 
the latter is the basic form of control over the uncontrollable which we may 
exert upon. 
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3.2. The Impact of Complication on Building 
Industrial Development Society 
In his analysis of the genealogy of the contradiction between complexity 
and complication Kvaløy refers to R. Margalef’s theory468 (Kvaløy 2004: 
2400). However, he argues that Margalef does not scientifically ground this 
distinction in a clear enough way (Kvaløy 2014: 142). Introducing the way 
complication mechanisms function, Kvaløy claims that they are based on 
the understanding of machine’s diversity (Ibid: 143) that only superficially 
reminds of nature’s one. In turn, the idea of working machine can be under-
stood by exploring the role of its exchangeable parts because its activity can 
be described with mathematical punctuality. Its main characteristic is that 
machine is subjectable to control on man’s side. We can control and govern 
it in so far as it can be broken to pieces but machine itself can never turn in-
to something it has never been before. Since the machine should have a con-
trol centre, it is not complex but complicated. The embodiment of complica-
tion on a societal level brings to life so-called industrial development soci-
ety469.  
The methodological differences are based on differentiating the normative 
validity of the contradictions between dynamics and statics as well as their 
multiple representations. In this context, analyzing the latter is important for 
understanding what it means to live in a situation , namely, what it means to 
be in someone else’s shoes being focused on the situation rather than on the 
subject, and thus to restrict the potential empathy by triggering co-
experience alone. Defining via opposing since complexity and complication 
are considered as two ideal modes, Kvaløy refers to Whitehead’s concep-
tion of fallacy regarding the possibility of misplacing concreteness (Ibid: 
144).  
On the other hand, it is the ecological equilibrium that makes us aware of 
the different types of organicity, namely, of the dynamic one, which does 
not recognize the opposition between center and periphery since it does not 
provide the qualitative saturation of some living energies to be considered 
                                           
468 Ramon Margalef (1919-2004) was a Catalan biologist who became one of the leading figures in 
modern ecology. 
469 According to Kvaløy, the Western complication society develops balance by adopting technol-
ogy and administration expertise (Kvaløy 1976: 60). 
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as an emanation of ontological potentiality. Nor does it require favoring the 
classical mechanics (dynamics as a branch of physics) due to which every 
motion to be examined in respect with the relations between forces and tor-
ques470. Regarding the transformation of growth and development debate 
into the one of environmental protection versus industrial development, we 
see that another concept that changes is the one of environment. It becomes 
identifiable as a “technological capsule” or so-called “Apparat-
environment” (Apparat-miljø), which stays between man and nature as well 
as between different people (Kvaløy 2014: 58; Kvaløy 1976: 45). 
In this context, Kvaløy analyzes the contradictory aspects of the unques-
tionable justification of complication society. He argues that “A naturally 
complicated life society” functions merely slightly, or cannot contribute 
with almost anything to man’s use (Kvaløy 1976: 10). By the term ‘natural’ 
he does not mean produced by nature, but originally complicated. In turn, 
reducing natural to naturalism leads to simplifying the understanding of 
growth by expanding its definition with the one of exponential growth (Ibid: 
12) and thus to recognize a type of economic growth, which causes the col-
lapse of life’s diversity. 
Regarding the practical aspects of complication society, Kvaløy argues that 
it is based on competition as well as on a casually justifiable connection be-
tween industrial methods and products (Kvaløy 2014: 144). Practically 
speaking, it means to overrate the role of applied scientific knowledge (Ibid: 
128) that is supported by unquestionable applied ethics whose main aim is 
to achieve a level of perfection at the expense of cultivating moral sensitiv-
ity. 
                                           
470 They concern the casual relations in the center-periphery space. 
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3.2.1. The Burden of Meaningless Work in Industrial 
Development Society 
By increasing competition, industrial development society provides a dif-
ferent justification of the quantitative and qualitative implications of what a 
meaningful work is (Ibid). It also recognizes a misleading connection be-
tween the understanding of sources, resources and products since being fo-
cused on multiplying the latter, the industrial development society encour-
ages a questionable identification of sources with resources. Thus it under-
rates nature’s diversity concerning nature’s own dynamics. According to 
Kvaløy, in the industrial development society, the products are deprived of 
a constructive role (Ibid: 128), namely, to engage the subjects of production 
with their own achievements. From that it follows that there is no solidarity 
and loyalty between them, neither are the children engaged with the process 
of working in so far as the latter is reduced to the products and the increase 
of their quantity. In turn, the transformations presume a passive rather than 
active interaction on side of the citizens, which leads to defining the indus-
trial development society as a deficient one471 (Ibid). 
Without work, environmental changes become a situation with no meaning 
(desperate situations) because work does not provide the subject with a 
grounding behavior how to interact with the environment in a meaningful 
way, namely, how to keep being engaged with it, and by that, to develop 
his/her own living capabilities.  
On the other hand, Kvaløy argues that pseudo-meaningful work is done at 
an accelerating pace as well as that it is realized due to the criteria of indus-
trial development society (Kvaløy 1976: 16): it is internalized as a form of 
violence, which one imposes on himself/herself (Ibid). The paradox de-
                                           
471 Schumacher’s response (Ibid: 146-147) is to transfer the activity mode by trans-
forming the lack of meaning as well as by outlining the boundaries of what a mean-
ingfulness is and how it can be achieved respectively. Work is recognized as a first 
necessity like food because meaningfulness concerns not only the existence but also 
the value of interaction. In this sense, I argue that it is a goal in itself, which does not 
have to be examined within the paradigm of objective naturalism since it is the 
meaningfulness that cannot be objectified to the extent it grounds the normative va-
lidity of being. Work is a goal in itself because it supports the becoming mode due to 
its unquestionable meaningfulness.  
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scribed by Kvaløy affects the fact that pseudo-meaningful work presumes 
the noncontradictory justification of unnecessary work and decreasing num-
ber of workers by planning. Thus the work in question strengthens the quan-
titative rather than the qualitative nuances. Their embodiment, which also 
provides their empowerment, guarantees man’s body, mind and heart’s po-
tential to function properly472. 
On a macro methodological level, the distinction between meaningful and 
technological work in Kvaløy’s sense concerns the fight against artificial in-
telligence contradicting robot-work and genuine one (Kvaløy 1985: 27). 
Kvaløy claims that if we lose the war against machines, we lose everything 
(Ibid). He starts analyzing the specificities of the ‘work-in’ mode (Ibid: 29) 
examined as a spatial activity but not as a temporal process. However, from 
the fact that it describes a spatial relation, it does not follow that it is not a 
real process. 
A significant consequence of defining and discerning meaningful from non-
meaningful work affects the status of the subjects exerting the work who 
provide a certain type of specialization or generalization due to which they 
give priority to life necessity society or to industrial development one. Re-
garding the clarification of subject’s mode of becoming, what is considered 
as mystic and sentimental is evaluated as “an extremely down to Earth func-
tion” (Ibid). In turn, what is missed in the industrial society is workers who 
to be emotionally connected with their working place. According to Kvaløy, 
this attachment is defined by the capitalist society473 as a waste of a “colos-
sal energy” (Kvaløy 1985b: 129). 
                                           
472 However, the critical reception of Mahayana Buddhism has multilateral implications. On the 
level of practice, Kvaløy argues that some concerns arise from the wrongly posed questions about 
the mutual exclusion of work and meditation, namely, from questions such as “Meditation during 
work, or work as meditation?” (Ibid: 164). Kvaløy refers to Schumacher’s Buddhist economy re-
vealing the illusion of Western tradition to discern between body and soul (Ibid). If work is defined 
as contradicting meditation, which is not prescribed by Mahayana Buddhism, then its meaningful-
ness would no longer be considered as a necessary condition for the relevant functioning of life ne-
cessity society. This would lead to simplifying the role of time as implying a coherent temporal per-
spective, which entails the dialectical entity of being.  
473 In this context, work becomes recognizable as a meaningful activity in so far as it contributes to 
clarifying the situatedness of the worker, with the socio-political aspects of the place where he/she 
belongs to, while working. According to Kvaløy, the concept of worker is wider than the one intro-
duced by Marx (Kvaløy 1985b: 129-130). It concerns the fellowship between all of those who fore-
see that in the end, we are finally dependent on the Earth and the greens (Ibid).  
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According to Kvaløy, industrial development society (IVS) (Kvaløy 1976: 
90) does not tolerate steady economic growth in so far as it is based on 
boosting individual economic competition remaining implicitly dependent 
on quantified planning. Adopting the latter statement means that growth 
should be smooth, but in fact, the planning as such concerns the justification 
of a specific type of acceleration, which goes at a higher and higher speed. 
That is why planning is defined as a management, which is “foreign” to the 
international development of the systems in so far as so-called exponential 
development (Ibid: 91) concerns the accelerating non-equilibrium. 
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3.2.2. The Role of Knowledge in Industrial 
Development Society 
Another crucial aspect in understanding the role of growing technocratiza-
tion in the industrial development society concerns the changing attitude 
towards knowledge and its connection with the process of development. 
These tendencies are outlined not only by Zapffe, Næss and Kvaløy, but 
also by another distinguished Norwegian philosopher, Knut Tranøy. His 
methodological contribution to this debate can be specified by revealing 
how the uncritical reception of our intellectual heritage affects the substitu-
tion of the contents of the category of knowledge with the one of scientifi-
cation. He follows a line, which is similar to the one provided by Kvaløy, 
albeit pointing out another crucial argument, namely, the lack of critical re-
flection on how the ‘old’ working categories are replaced with categories 
with a new meaning, which gives a green light to the new knowledge as a 
knowledge with a capital letter. 
By contrast to Næss, however, Tranøy argues that epistemological norma-
tive validity is closely tied with the ethical one, i.e. that all the problems of 
our knowledge derive from underrating the role of ethical norms, which 
should guide us in having a balanced and ecologically sustainable society. 
According to Tranøy, the well-grounded position is the one, which has two 
foundations – our best knowledge and our best ethical norms (Tranøy 1991: 
49). The latter contribute to obtaining two principles of our cultural heri-
tage: to secure knowledge recognized as a scientifically grounded one as 
well as to consider the new scientific knowledge as better than the old one 
(Ibid). While the first principle binds us as both individuals and society with 
the search for truth in the name of mankind’s well-being, the second one le-
gitimizes the hunting for a new knowledge as related to connection between 
searching for truth and increasing well-being (Ibid). Similarly to Kvaløy, 
Tranøy defines the hunting for a new knowledge as a dynamic category, 
which benefits justifying the role of unlimited technocratization since sci-
ence is defined as a search for new knowledge. 
It leads to ascribing a completely new meaning to the concept of growth 
(Ibid: 48). Gaining such a meaning provides a radically new stance, which 
determines the complicated society to be defined as sustainable develop-
ment society, where the experts should have control over the most critical 
spheres by obtaining a relevant knowledge about them (Ibid). However, not 
all the new knowledge is similarly valuable, which illustrates why the axio-
logical aspect of knowledge does not have to be examined as isolated from 
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the epistemological one, especially if we want to witness ecopolitical 
changes by achieving the highest possible ecological sustainability. 
In this context, Kvaløy talks about so-called pyramidal societies (Kvaløy 
2014: 46) and pyramidal citizens (Ibid: 47), which are determined as “ele-
mentary particles of the system” (Ibid). The success measure is the use of 
the industrial output justified by strengthening the individual competition. It 
is supported by the means of a new applied science, which operates for the 
sake of determining abstract social ideals. On the other hand, from that it 
does not follow that since the pyramids are spatial constructions, time is ir-
relevant to their formation. On the contrary, space reduction is possible in 
so far as time is narrowed down to its present dimension of ‘here-and-now’. 
Against the background of these specifications, Kvaløy argues that pyrami-
dal societies make man feel like a machine as well as look alike (Kvaløy 
2004: 1350). On a macro methodological level, the truth of pyramidal socie-
ties contradicts the one of democracy (Ibid: 95), so that the worst existential 
consequence is that we become reserve parts adjusted to timeless drawing 
board (Ibid). 
Industrial development society provides “structured and safe existence” 
(Kvaløy 2014: 40). The requirements to its structuring come from ‘outside’ 
and to a very small extent correspond to the real behavior of the society’s 
members. The dependence on the living environment is big and society has 
only a small potential to introduce changes. By contrast to the natural econ-
omy, the industrial one is built on manipulation (Ibid). 
However, the dependence in question is not a physical one because, other-
wise, it should have caused a dependence on living nature. It is rather a de-
pendence on deeds in so far as they are examined as produced and subjected 
to human will. 
In turn, the definition of industrial development society, as provided by the 
snm’s ecophilosophy group (Ibid: 42), is examined within the framework of 
the quantification of some other concepts, namely, the ones of balance and 
(re)sources. In this context, the exponential growth474 is characterized as a 
constant growth of products, not of abilities. It becomes justifiable as an 
economic growth by default, while standardization and quantification are 
                                           
474 The exponential growth is defined by Kvaløy as based on the unquestionable presumption that 
social balance replaces the natural one, but not in the sense of life necessity’s balance (Ibid: 44). It 
brings the consequence of grounding the uncontradictory justification of competition within the 
framework of the competence of applied knowledge. 
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reconsidered as preventive measures against social misbalance by adopting 
the means of so-called social engineering.  
Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I draw the conclusion that it 
is the replacement of life necessity society with the industrial development 
one that makes the idea of multiplicity of growth be substitutable with the 
one of development understood as sustainable development475.  
Kvaløy himself sees in the life necessity society an alternative in avoiding 
the contradiction that derives from the industrial development society. 
However, he specifies that life necessity society cannot provoke a process 
of pure transformation, but it rather gives priority to a certain type of pro-
duction, which is in tune with satisfying the vital needs of the population. 
That is why what Kvaløy and Næss mean by imposing soft technologies is 
intrinsically connected with the successful mediation between the processes 
of production and consumption. On a micro methodological level, it should 
illustrate the role of grounding behavior, which counters sustainable devel-
opment by taking into consideration that not every single need can be uni-
laterally satisfied in one way only. 
As Kvaløy points out, “without identity there is no development” (Ibid: 
125). Within the framework of sustainable development, humankind’s op-
portunity for existential self-development is denied because human freedom 
is not responsibly referred to the environment. On a macro methodological 
level, it means that the ontological potential of grounding behavior is under-
rated since it also presumes one to grow up in a cultural tradition, which to 
internalize as one’s own and thus to obtain an identity (Ibid).  
Emphasizing the other forms of grounding behavior can be determined as a 
significant premise of how uncontradictory to avoid the identification of 
growth with development in so far as the culturally determined understand-
ing of the former is a guarantee for justifying the normative validity of the 
latter. 
Identity crisis in the industrial development society comes not only from the 
pure act of restricting the diversity of life’s impulses, but also from the fact 
that the latter have strong axiological connotations. In other words, such a 
                                           
475 The normative validity of the latter comes from the presumption of Brundtland’s report that sus-
tainable development is a “grounding behavior” (Ibid: 124), i.e. it gives grounds for evaluating the 
alternative behavior for the sake of building continuity of generations. 
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crisis restricts the possibility for both man and other living beings to express 
their potentials by questioning their intrinsic value and thus to underrate 
their basic right to live and blossom.  
Judging by these investigations, I draw the conclusion that Næss and 
Kvaløy’s starting point is the similar ontological vision of complexity hav-
ing diversity as its prototype characteristic, albeit Næss remains on the level 
of ontology, as I already showed. While he claims that life is a complicated 
set of subordinate gestalts, Kvaløy talks about sensations and ‘happenings’ 
(Næss 1985: 40), emphasizing the fragileness of the temporal dimension as 
such. 
On the other hand, the methodological differences between them are irre-
ducible to differences in terminology and illustrations. An illuminative rep-
resentation of a conceptual difference can be seen in Næss’s statement that 
the lack of a common political understanding derives from the impossibility 
to understand the other, simplifying Kvaløy’s position of non-violence in 
the individual world (Ibid: 40-41). The interpretation in question can be 
read in the sense of Næss’s Ecophilosphy T as a matter of self-realization, 
which is irreducible to atomism. In this context, his claim that Kvaløy un-
derrates the meaning of diversity within ecosophy (Ibid: 41) is a question-
able one because Kvaløy rather emphasizes the lack of commonly shared 
moral commitment to it. 
In this context, Kvaløy introduces three types of societies, namely, the ones 
of Gaia, Servoglobe and Disney world (recognized as a pseudo-complex so-
ciety) (Kvaløy 2014: 52-54). All three models differ in the problem-solution 
patterns they provide. Within complexity’s framework (the Gaia type), the 
solution is grounded in the development of so-called natural course, within 
the complication one (the Servoglobe type476), it is seen in achieving a giv-
en practical goal, while within the pseudo-complexity framework (the Dis-
ney-world type), the solutions are recognized as a goal, which functions as 
if it is naturally determined. In turn, the as if mode gets a negative norma-
tive validity since it creates illusions disguised as improvisations.  
                                           
476 An interesting parallel can be drawn with Knut Tranøy’s analysis of Harry Martinson’s poem 
Aniara (1956), which I define as a literary version of Servoglobe scenario. Kvaløy’s interpretation 
gives a hint why the latter can be examined as a product of human hybris that cannot replace the log-
ic of the real life and development. In this context, we can find a similar unquestionable faith in the 
intellect as a meta-structure (as the one embodied in Servoglobe). It is examined by Tranøy as lead-
ing to the problematic justification of human control understood as the only one possible control 
(Tranøy 1991: 52). 
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3.2.3. Complexity vs. Complication. The Fight against 
Servoglobe 
Gaia versus Servoglobe debate can be characterized as provoked by a cer-
tain, deliberately caused amnesia477 (Kvaløy 1985: 27), when people are 
forced to forget about organic time for the sake of making more apparent 
some of its dimensions such as intensity and functionality which is wrongly 
equated with effectiveness. The result is the justification of time as reduci-
ble to its own representations. 
The philosophical grounding of complexity vs. complication distinction is 
described as having projections on the Norwegian ecopolitics as well. In 
turn, industrial development society, which made the dream of Servoglobe 
fulfilled, is described by Kvaløy as an explosion of individualizing ways 
marked with catchy slogans and references to where one should feel at 
home (Kvaløy 2004: 2070). 
According to Kvaløy, Norway accepts computerization “with a great na-
ivety” (Kvaløy 2011: 100), which should be overcome due to the need of 
stopping computer violation of privacy imposed by the EU’s Big Brother 
scenario for control (Ibid). His arguments against growing technocratization 
are based on the double-bind meaning of primitive, which is embodied in 
two different contexts whose prototype characteristic is the one of naivety. 
Within the technocratic discourse, naivety is recognized as following the ra-
tionality of the primitive understood as the one, which is prima facie unme-
diated. In turn, relevant ecopolitics should disenchant the naivety of taking 
the complication as if it is complex by avoiding taking the complication for 
granted since the management of the natural dynamic systems is interpreted 
as problematic from the perspective of social constructivism. Referring to 
Kvaløy’s theory, I claim that the double-bind connotations of primitive de-
fined either as ‘first in nature’, which is its initial meaning, or as simplistic 
(due to the false deduction of simple) contribute to justifying two different 
visions of naivety, namely, the naivety of complexity determined from the 
perspective of complication and the one of complication, which is recog-
nized from the perspective of complexity respectively. 
In contrast to the sociopolitical differences in building the best environmen-
tally friendly society, here, we can outline the methodological similarities 
                                           
477 According to Kvaløy, we have forgotten about time, namely, about genuine or natural time 
(Ibid). 
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between Næss’s and Kvaløy’s models in so far as they both share the main 
principles of Gaia theory. On the other hand, reconsidering the genealogy of 
the ontological tension between complexity and complication presumes to 
emphasize one more significant aspect, namely, the inheritance of Zapffe’s 
ideas about technological invasion and expanding ungrounded anthropocen-
trism. 
Kvaløy outlines how the problem of rehabilitating the role of national eco-
politics soon becomes an issue on the global scene since national is stigma-
tized as local by contrast to establishing the new normative validity of the 
global itself. Thus the extrapolation of the global conflict is conceptualized 
as the one between Gaia and Servoglobe478 representing the conflict be-
tween two different worlds, the one of constructivism and the one of im-
provisation (Kvaløy 2011: 99). 
Servoglobe itself is the name of a super-nationally run ‘global supercom-
puter’; an artificial intelligence system “coupled to a global network of in-
formation” “created partly by economic globalization forces, partly to serve 
mankind’s survival in the face of a destructively simplified natural bio-
sphere” (Ibid: 101). In this context, Gaia is recognized as “too messy for ra-
tional management” (Ibid) in contrast to Servoglobe that is justified as a fi-
nal solution to all problems. Striving for perceiving complex as if it is com-
plicated, while increasing the strength of the self-propelling processes, 
which are rooted in the impossibility to realize the aforementioned man-
agement, Servoglobe determines its own death. The overexposed mechani-
cal control is doomed to decline because the destructively simplified bio-
sphere still produces dilemmas, which cannot be easily eradicated. 
                                           
478 While the Gaia theory became popular in the Norwegian public discourse of the late 1960s, 
mainly by the works of some well-recognized ecologists (such as Dag Østerberg and Ivar Mys-
terud), the Selvoglobe phenomenon was coined as Servex in Chr. H. Williams’s book Fistful of Dig-
its (1968) (Ibid) (Kvaløy 2004: 1800) in respect with examining the idea of how to create an all en-
compassing machinery control system. In turn, the concept of so-called all encompassing, state ma-
chine system was announced in 1948. Then it was further developed by N. Wiener who aimed to 
justify the machine in question using all the possible means (Ibid: 1830, Note 30:1). From the 1980s 
onward the theory of Servex has been elaborated as encouraging the adoption of fantasy’s full struc-
tures and utopian constructions recognized as parts of the industrial development society. The proc-
ess took place against the background of the human attempts to succeed in ‘arresting time’. In this 
context, Kvaløy defined Servex as a product of world’s ideology (Ibid: 2160), which was considered 
as incompatible with the character of life’s processes and nature as such. 
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On a macro methodological level, it means that pretending to fight chaos, 
Servoglobe falls into a vicious circle because the fight results in chaos 
again, revealing different sides of it. In turn, the fear of empty space (terror 
vacui) becomes apparent since it does not come from man, but from nature 
itself, albeit man is the only one species that consciously anticipates it. Thus 
I reach the conclusion that Servoglobe fails in the way it pretends to find 
panacea for the fear in question. The only one solution is humankind to get 
reconciled and to develop its self-estimation by thinking how to find mean-
ing in the meaninglessness as such. Last but not least, I argue that the myth 
of final solution is the worst myth of technocratization in so far as it encour-
ages the formula ‘goal justifies the means’ to be adopted.  
A possible solution in specifying the search for meaning can be seen in 
what Høyer calls a distinction of life’s strength and survival one (Høyer 
2011: 50), taking into account that life is always ‘more’ than the survival it-
self. Kvaløy gives another name to the difference between qualitative and 
quantitative, albeit sharing the same logic. He talks about a clash between 
qualities and parameters since complexity should be referred to qualities, 
while complication – to mechanical parameters (Kvaløy 2011: 103) 
It is the double bind meaning of the specification of ‘more’, i.e. whether it 
would be considered in qualitative or quantitative terms that makes the con-
tradiction between normative validity of complexity and complication ap-
parent only in the process of comparison. In other words, there is no contra-
diction when ‘more’ is not determined in qualitative terms within the 
framework of complexity model, nor when is it defined in quantitative ones 
within the complication paradigm. The contradiction arises when qualitative 
‘more’ is compared with the quantitative one because it automatically raises 
the debate which normative validity matters ‘more’.  
A significant part of understanding the ontological tension between Gaia 
theory and Servoglobe’s one is driven by analyzing the genealogy of so-
called space ship as well as how it has been modified within the techno-
capitalist ideology. The influence of K. Boulding’s theory of spaceship 
economy vs. cowboy economy presumes recognizing the ship as a coherent, 
centralized system with a uniformed, goal oriented man pilot (Kvaløy 2004: 
1230). In this context, it is important to emphasize, as Kvaløy does, that the 
unity of the model (eternity’s model) is a matter of a rational planning, 
which is based on the presumption regarding the idea of hierarchy. The lat-
ter in turn strengthens the one of political centralization within the industrial 
development society. 
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On the other hand, I claim that the unity of ecological systems determined 
as a spaceship in Kvaløy’s sense (Ibid: 1500) is mainly on disposal to the 
person who is reduced to an ‘intelligent fragment’. The spaceship makes 
sense only if we uncontradictory ground so-called pseudo-dynamics (Ibid: 
2760, Note 51.4) due to which turning the qualitative change into a quanti-
tative one means a reduction of the plurality of time and space to a spatial 
dimension to be made. However, the technocratization of time, as embodied 
in the industrial space, underrates the fact that “the spaceship is not a ship, 
and the space between stars is not an ocean”, as Kvaløy outlines (Ibid: 
3000). The world’s space is extremely frightening to human environment. 
Being frightening as such determines nature’s dialectics to be positively 
evaluated as having conflicts as its necessary condition for development. 
In turn, J. Lovelock claims that Gaia hypothesis concerns the justification of 
Gaia as Earth organism’s intelligence analyzing why man can never play 
the role of Gaia’s intelligence (Ibid: 1530). Furthermore, we should outline 
that one can try to obtain a position merely by adopting organic expertise. 
That is why one of the main methodological arguments arising from this in-
terpretation is that intelligence is irreducible to the intellect as such, which 
in turn means that the relevant understanding presumes a different process 
thinking mode to be acquired as well as that it is the intelligence mode that 
requires a normative validity of intuition to be ascribed. On a micro meth-
odological level, it illustrates that even if the intellect can be possessed by 
man in planning his/her own behavior and interactions with the world, intel-
ligence cannot. 
What is the Norwegian contribution to this crucial debate? The technocrati-
zation embodying the raising appeal for countering the fear from empty 
space corresponds to Zapffe’s emphasis on the mechanisms of fixation. The 
attempt concerns humankind’s willingness to compensate the deficiency of 
meaning, which it needs to have at hand in order to develop its confidence 
in the universe as a dominant species as well as to question the ‘natural’ 
grounding of insecurity479.  
                                           
479 Høyer specifies that Zapffe’s and Kvaløy’s interests in investigating the Disneyland effect repre-
sent the strive for disenchanting the means of compensating the human tragedies of the Industrial 
Growth Society (IGS) (Høyer 2011: 67).  
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3.2.3.1. The Clash of Organic and Mechanical Time 
While complexity refers to the existence of something real, the complica-
tion is a product of human intellect “taken to express the real world” 
(Kvaløy 2011: 103). Furthermore, to be real means to be concrete, imperfect 
and practice-related, pre-intellectual by contrast to artifacts such as com-
puters, which are considered by Kvaløy as an “extension of living” (Ibid). 
Thus the tension between complexity and complication is recognized as 
driven by the tension between organic and mechanical diversity since it is 
the complexity that provides diversity in “structure, function and communi-
cation”, by contrast to the complication providing one without organic co-
herence (Høyer 2011: 49).  
Organic time characterizing complexity is expressed through the idea of 
rhythm as a part of the natural processes because it is the “movement itself” 
(Kvaløy 2011: 103). In turn, mechanical time grounding the complication 
model is defined as an “intellectual invention” (Ibid) that quantifies natural 
time and makes culture as such possible.  
To the two different types of time examined by Kvaløy, the Norwegian phi-
losopher Arne Vetlesen opposes the compression of time and space under-
stood as an embodiment of the most primitive narcissism480.  
That is why the macro methodological projections of Servoglobe’s vicious 
circle can be traced to how humankind’s tragedy, driven by the feeling of 
being temporary species in the universe, has turned into Homo consumens’ 
tragedy. Referring to Kvaløy’s theory, I claim that the latter is multiplied in-
to some other tragedies because the mechanisms of compensating the initial 
tragedy, which stems from the fragility of human beings, are strengthened 
by the unsuccessful attempts at playing different happy endings that end up 
as tragedies. On a macro methodological level, it means that the tragedy of 
species becomes tragedy of time. The clash is provided by the strive for 
                                           
480 Vetlesen defines annihilating time and space (Vetlesen 2011: 29) due to the omnipotence of 
technologies that allow us “liberation from the constraints of distance and frustrations of waiting” 
(Ibid). The latter are justified as ontologically driven contrasts, which contribute to differentiating 
possible from impossible. Compressing time and space is done for the sake of reducing all con-
straints regarding the effects of the unpredictable, which were described as both frustration of wait-
ing and unlimitedness of our desires. The latter is a part of the project to create one unquestionable 
‘here-and-now’ model, which is called by Vetlesen “gigantic production of presence” (Ibid: 30) 
making the world bigger by becoming smaller while creating its own kind of absence and loss. 
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compensating the lack of general solutions with short-term ones, which to 
be justified in a long-term perspective. Furthermore, I argue that the tension 
of the new time’s tragedies is a result of the ontological pretention of time 
compression to rehabilitate the surplus of being. Going back to the new 
time’s tragedies dominated by the ontological pretention of time’s compres-
sion, I examine how Kvaløy’s differentiation of organic and mechanical 
time grounds the fundamental distinction between complexity and compli-
cation. In this context, I claim that time compression is strengthened not on-
ly by the myth of final solution, but also by the one saying that organic time 
can be artificially extended to eternity. Projections of the latter are well-
depicted in already examined distinction between meaningful work and me-
chanical one (Ibid: 106), which is based on the tension between organic and 
mechanical time respectively (Ibid: 103-104). 
Judging by these investigations, I reach the conclusion that the division be-
tween organic and mechanical time in Kvaløy’s sense does not prevent the 
risk organic time to be equated with the free one; a tendency imposed due to 
the growing normative validity of the model of complication that is dis-
guised as the model of the only one possible complexity. Defining organic 
time as a free time is provided by the aforementioned transformation of the 
debate ‘growth and environmental protection’, as I already emphasized, 
which in turn benefits environmentally unfriendly politics to be justified by 
the maxima ‘grow or die’. Furthermore, equating organic time with the free 
one would means that the former is possessed by the subject. It can unre-
strictedly be exploited by the latter for his/her own sake and thus to be rec-
ognized as a different representation of the mechanical time itself. 
The compression of time, which is made from the perspective of the me-
chanical time, pretends to encompass, if not to annihilate organic time: it 
benefits equating the spatial dimension with the temporal one. The com-
pression in question refers to the compression of time and space at once that 
is provided by the compression of being. Thus the normative validity is re-
duced to a top norm of consumption, which determines the politics of meri-
tocracy as environmentally unfriendly politics.  
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3.2.3.1.1. ‘Timing’ Culture in Kvaløy’s Theory 
Kvaløy makes an important statement about two types of culture based on 
the two different visions of time, which justify two different types of aes-
thetics, namely, the one of Western culture whose climax is the engineering 
perfection of the Greek temple and so-called stop-time aesthetics of the 
Eastern culture represented in the Sherpa house, i.e. in an organic structure 
decaying day by day (Ibid: 104-105). In this context, I raise the hypothesis 
that the fundamental difference between the two cultures is based on the 
justification of the myth of perfection that is tightly concerned with the one 
of already discussed final solution, while examining the genealogy of Ser-
voglobe.  
The myth of perfection contradicts the stop-time aesthetics since the latter 
can be described as an ontological aesthetics supported by the understand-
ing of nature as a home project (oiko-logos). The ontological aesthetics 
grounds the presumption that the house should be a home by nature because 
it should behave like a living organism: to follow the organic rhythm, which 
can be captured by adopting imaginative rationality alone. On the other 
hand, the myth of teleological perfection that dominates Western culture is 
strengthened by the ideology of the static harmony, which has its ground-
ings ‘here-and-now’. Due to the myth in question, the world understood as a 
living organism is opposed to the one functioning as a machine, as a global 
spaceship that will substitute Gaia (Ibid: 110). That is why the conflict-
fertilization, emphasized by Kvaløy, is recognized as a result of the invasion 
of the hyper-aesthetics, according to which small and organic is never beau-
tiful.  
Extrapolating Næss’s and Kvaløy’s theories, I conclude that imposing hy-
per-aesthetics at the expense of the ontological one would lead to confront-
ing generalists to specialists-saboteurs481 who overexploit the use of service 
as servitude, reducing the transperspectivity of knowledge to the one di-
mensionality of eco-ideology. Compressing ethics and aesthetics, which is a 
result of the hyper-compression of time and space nowadays provokes what 
Kvaløy calls the soap era of science fiction due to which people end up as a 
redundant part of the machine (Ibid: 111). 
                                           
481 This problem will be examined in detail in the chapter on Skirbekk. 
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3.2.3.2. Growth vs. Growing. Methodological Challenges 
to the ‘Sovereign Power’ of Market 
A shared point of Næss’s and Kvaløy’s theories is the one regarding the 
need of rehabilitating the role of bioregionalism within environmental poli-
tics, which is formulated, last but not least, against the EU’s ‘global’ poli-
tics482 of introducing ‘global’ market. 
The idea of expanding the boundaries of the market is examined as pro-
voked by the increasing use of high-technologies promoted by the EU. Thus 
the pyramidal models as well as the free market ones inflict a contradiction 
on governmental level, where the centralization in Kvaløy’s sense stems 
from adopting ‘artificial intelligence’ and microprocessors (Kvaløy 2014: 
66). All that takes place against the background of the abstract Servoglobe 
machinery and ‘concrete’ nature, taking into account, as Kvaløy outlines, 
that Servoglobe puts a full stop to the free competition. On a macro level, 
the global market contributes to establishing a crisis society based on plan-
ning, which, as Kvaløy relevantly specifies, makes its own members passive 
to the society itself (Ibid: 76). The internal logic of the crisis society contra-
dicts the processes regarding the internal development of societal functions 
since the crisis society is driven by politically powerless regimes, which can 
easily degenerate (Kvaløy 2004: 1380).  
In this context, Kvaløy contrasts the pyramidal way of social engineering 
and Buddhist process philosophy483 by analyzing how social development 
should follow the mechanisms of connecting with others, as they are intrin-
sically determined in nature. However, this analogy does not have to be 
simplified to outlining literal correspondences but rather to finding uncon-
tradictory arguments in establishing similar interactions, which do not ques-
tion neither man’s status as a social actor, nor environment as such. 
                                           
482 As it was emphasized by the representatives of snm, the EU does not have a compound and de-
veloped regional politics (snm 1974: 57). 
483Kvaløy claims that he does not support so-called folk Buddhism that presumes the existence of a 
uniform soul, which achieves through the wheel of life’s series the state of transmigration (Kvaløy 
2004). Such a misrecognition regarding man’s soul is justified as a commonly shared characteristic 
of the pyramidal structures, where it is supported by ‘pyramidal’ means. In this context, Kvaløy in-
troduces so-called pyramidal person (contrasting him/her to the multiple-sided one) whose subjec-
tion to particularization (de-individualization) is outlined as a prototype feature of one’s nature. The 
latter requires the person to be further subjected to management of a pyramidal character (Ibid: 
1350) and thus to become a ‘disk man’ (Skivemennesket) (Ibid).  
 399
Næss and Kvaløy agreed about the statement that so-called techno-
capitalism is helpless not only in finding solutions for the ecological prob-
lems, but also in clarifying the social dilemmas about solidarity and self-
realization. Therefore, the double bind attitudes towards economics should 
be examined, taking into account that the two extremes are either to deny 
the idea of growth as such (i.e. to talk about zero growth), or to absolutize 
the benefits of the latter. 
According to Høyer, most of the complications concerning the problematic 
conceptions of growth derive against the modified background of trans-
forming humanity into an accessory of the machinery (Høyer 2011: 49), i.e. 
it takes place within the framework of gradual dehumanization of society 
due to the overexploitation of technologies that are introduced for the sake 
of achieving growth at any expense. Judging by the aforementioned investi-
gations, I reach the conclusion that sustainable development becomes a goal 
in itself, which justifies the means, namely, the unrestricted use of tech-
nologies. If we support the thesis that nature works in a ‘trial-and-error 
mode’ (Hägerstrand 2011: 141), where the error is a subject to fixation by 
default, the process of ‘correcting mistakes’ could be defined a self-
sufficient goal: it could be determined in the name of the machinery rather 
than for the sake of nature itself. 
However, we should also keep in mind that growth as such has many faces, 
for example, we have biological, technological, economic growth. Høyer 
argues that this multiplicity should be explored in respect with the distinc-
tion between the complicated, quantified time of the Industrial Growth So-
ciety (IGS) and the complex one (Høyer 2011: 51) as related to the different 
forms of cultures, which contributes to clarifying one more aspect of the 
role of biological growth. Interfering its different aspects (mainly the as-
pects of economic growth with the ones of biological growth) leads again to 
escalating the pressure regarding the debate about industrial development 
and environmental protection. Going back to the conception about nature 
understood as a ‘trial-and-error mode’, I draw the conclusion that biological 
growth, recognized as supporting nature’s diversity, is simplified by the 
myth that everything can be fixed with proper means. It opens the possibil-
ity of interpreting the contradictions as an imperfection that has to be 
changed. Following this mode of development, biological growth is defined 
as representing a lower stage, which should gain its ontological validity by 
analogy with the technological growth having a higher value. 
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3.2.3.2.1. The Benefits of Bioeconomics 
Regarding the different aspects of economic growth and its normative valid-
ity, we should analyze the role of bioeconomics, as represented in the works 
of Næss and Kvaløy. Exploring the role of bioeconomics484 is important 
since it contributes to outlining the impact of ethics on the Norwegian eco-
philosophies’ growth criticism (Høyer and Næss 2011: 200).  
According to Høyer and P. Næss, the entropy law applied to economics pre-
sumes reconsidering the laws of thermodynamics showing how to think 
about economics as such (Ibid: 201). A. Næss (1989) and Kvaløy (1974) 
analyzed Roegen’s theory seeing in it an opportunity of rehabilitating the 
normative validity of bioeconomics as a field (Ibid). Referring to Roegen’s 
The Entropy Law and the Economic Process in his Ecophilosophical Frag-
ment, Kvaløy calls Roegen one of the most critical contributions to the 
Norwegian ecophilosophy (Ibid: 209). He claims that due to the crucial role 
of bioeconomics, the limited life of industrial development society can be 
overcome by reconsidering the mechanisms of the latter as a pendulum be-
tween “production and consumption within an isolated system” (Ibid: 204). 
Against the background of the aforementioned investigations, Høyer and P. 
Næss see one of the main benefits of adopting the law of entropy, as dis-
played by A. Næss and Kvaløy, in the conception that only due to the law of 
entropy, things can have a value (Ibid: 205). They get such a one when en-
tropic resources are transformed into human labor and capital equipment 
(Ibid). 
Furthermore, I argue that another methodological benefit of examining 
Næss’s and Kvaløy’s conceptions of bioeconomics is that we can reveal the 
complex picture of the methodological pros and cons of decoupling growth 
from environmental impact as well as with outlining how sustainable devel-
opment not only provokes ecological unsustainability, but also modifies the 
social theories to the extent to which we can neglect the ecological limita-
tions. This means that one of the main problems is not the exploitation of 
nature as such, but rather the management of the exploitation itself, which is 
determined by different social and political conceptions about the connec-
tion between development ‘in process’ and the one “in progress’. 
                                           
484 Introducing the entropy law to economics is done by Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen who coined 
the term bioeconomics providing critical arguments to the neoclassical economics. 
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Furthermore, it is also important to examine how dangerous is so-called dis-
ciplinary tunnel vision towards eco-centrism; i.e. whether the definition of 
treating nature as a living laboratory hides the risk of pushing the pendulum 
to its other extreme by rejecting any development whatsoever, which can 
help people to live a better life.  
While Næss does not pay special attention to the imperative of capital 
growth, Kvaløy is convinced that “a steady growth cannot be tolerated 
without a break down” (Ibid: 210) because the ecocatastrophe can be pre-
vented if growth takes place only within one or few areas (Ibid: 209). In 
turn, Næss is reluctant to “explicitly recommending zero-growth” since it is 
not easy to justify an ecologically responsible policy (Ibid: 206). 
In this context, I draw the conclusion that analyzing the origin of the con-
tradictions regarding economic growth presumes to clarify the dilemmas 
concerned with the political framework it takes place in, precisely, with the 
tension between the processes of centralization and decentralization. On a 
macro methodological level, it illustrates that the fight against the ecocrisis 
is driven by the strive for questioning the normative validity of centraliza-
tion without reducing the one of decentralization, i.e. without equating the 
latter with anarchy. 
According to Næss, due to the fact that people have a full control over their 
technological and economic systems, it is the cultural traditions that make 
the understanding of growth axiologically justifiable (Næss 1973: 12). He 
argues that talking about centralized materialism requires exponential mate-
rial, which benefits the deep change in terms of production and ideologies 
both in the western countries and Japan (Ibid: 14). Despite the fact that 
Næss is not a zealous supporter of economic growth, he sees the opportu-
nity of rehabilitating its normative validity in encouraging the use of soft 
technologies and local production. As an argument in favor of the latter, we 
can point out that Næss also disenchants the pitfalls of the global framework 
revealing the unwillingness on governmental side to strengthen the ecopoli-
tics on a local level since the decentralization would make the government 
less powerful.  
Otherwise, growth would become misleadingly connected with the idea of 
control, which drives from the questionable presumption that there is no un-
controllable (in a centralized way) growth. If so, it would have led to the de-
struction of the system itself. On the other hand, it is the distributive form of 
control implemented in the democratic societies that makes growth be irre-
ducible to the industrial development as such.  
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3.3. The Pseudo-complexity of Tivoli-Effect 
Pseudo-complexity is defined by Kvaløy in the sense of being complicated, 
i.e. as an ‘imitation’ of the complex485. Regarding the clarification of the 
latter, he outlines the role of imitation as an aesthetically oriented decora-
tion, which reveals the double bind character of the imitation as such 
(Kvaløy 1976: 144). Judging by these investigations, I argue that the meth-
odological difference between complication and pseudo-complexity is rec-
ognized by Kvaløy on the level of engagement by introducing the as if 
mode. The normative validity of self-experience within the framework of 
complexity determines the as if mode to be accepted as the ‘most’ norma-
tively valid one (as a real mode), while the complication manipulates the 
use of the latter by imposing a generalized experience as a self-experience. 
In turn, pseudo-complexity is defined by Kvaløy as a surrogate, as a secu-
rity arch (velv) due to the natural disposition of man to be involved in a 
complex interaction with other beings and nature (Ibid: 145), so that it can 
be coined as a surrogate in the sense of imitating the process dependence of 
man on nature. Speculating with the normative validity of the dependence in 
question takes place against the background of justifying mapping versus 
planning, which can be quantified, while the mapping is rather a subject to 
qualitative evaluations (Ibid: 31). 
It is the normative validity of the quantitative ‘more’ that grounds what 
Kvaløy calls “Apparatlandschaft society”; society, which masters its total 
environmental potential through choosing technologies, which contribute to 
“the dominance of the level of complication” (Høyer 2011: 50). Against the 
background of the attempt “to replace naturally flowing eocsocial system 
with an artificially controlled mechanic scheme”, so-called ‘Amusement di-
versity’ and ‘Disneyland effect’ take place (Kvaløy 2011: 102).  
                                           
485 According to Næss, this new type of pseudo-complexity is reached by diverting the sense of 
awareness while watching TV. Its messages concern the development of awareness of what hap-
pens, or even better, what can be elaborated providing an active state, which deserves an equal status 
with the daily tasks (Næss 1995: 75). Listening to the forecasts about weather and wind has “big and 
important differences” (Ibid: 71) with the real conditions. Næss compares the TV visits with the visit 
to a small cabin, somewhere in the ocean, on a small island (Ibid: 80). What he claims is that regard-
less of the way of reproducing reality, the ‘natural’ representation has its intrinsic value even if it is 
mediated by sources and channels. The latter make the concept understandable if we recognize it 
more visibly attractive.  
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Regarding the clarifications of freedom, so-called Tivoli-effect is defined by 
Kvaløy as justifying the role of pseudo-freedom as the only one possible 
freedom (Kvaløy 2014: 55). It is due to the fact that the latter produces sim-
plified engagements by absorbing the tension between physical and psycho-
logical complexity’s growth, which every man is born with (Ibid: 54) and 
thus creates obstacles for the realization of human potential. However, from 
that it does not follow that man’s survival strength is neglectable. It repre-
sents the global tendency that the change of environment is made to a tech-
nological capsulation (Ibid: 60). 
To a certain extent, Tivoli-effect can be defined as such a technological 
capsule in so far as it suppresses the full representation of man’s complex 
abilities for self-realization by creating a self-sufficient reality through 
adopting technologically specified means alone. It would show that techno-
logical strength is recognizable as life’s strength by becoming one of the 
most illuminative representations of Boudrilard’s simulacra. 
On a macro methodological level, Kvaløy argues that man’s “complexity 
impact” can unilaterally be mitigated with “Tivoli-means” by increasing the 
economic combination of mobility and rootlessness of the big cities (Kvaløy 
1976: 43). The mobility in question is achieved by the bombing with effects 
and powerfully established “budge” of channels of communication, which 
support the Tivoli-effect (Ibid: 41). Judging by the aforementioned investi-
gations, I conclude that the illusion of pseudo-complexity is justified by 
strengthening the circus effect: it keeps making people breathless and 
thrilled at once in so far as mobility is reduced to a restless motion without a 
goal and accomplishment. 
One of the main methodological characteristics of the Tivoli-effect is its 
impossibility to uncontradictory justify the mode of improvisation. That is 
why it provides pseudo-life’s strength. In turn, the dream does not have a 
constructive power any longer since it is simplified to an illusion, which 
may underlie the ungrounded pretentions for over-control. The result is so-
called synthetic reality due to which the development is understood by the 
means of complication, namely, by the ones of calculating, quantifying etc. 
Kvaløy also emphasizes that the Tivoli-effect questions the opportunity one 
to build one’s strength of life (Ibid: 62). He specifies that by contrasting 
life’s strength and nature, which can be elaborated as a process on the basis 
of its dynamical ways of changing some grounding structures, the survival 
strength of the ecosystem becomes based on monocultures. Despite the fact 
that the latter support and prolong its existence, survival strength can also 
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be reduced within the same life’s strength (regarding ecosystems) in a long-
term perspective (Ibid: 63). 
In this context, I argue that the Tivoli-effect can be considered as justifying 
the technological strength at the expense of life’s one by reducing the life’s 
strength to survival one through decreasing the multicultural diversity to a 
simple set of given, self-sufficient monocultures, where ‘mono’ becomes 
and ontological synonym of ‘global’. The latter contributes the normative 
validity of the Tivoli-effect to be explored by justifying this effect as a 
global phenomenon. That is why Tivoli-effect can be defined as inflicting 
the idea of surplus (Ibid: 64) to be recognized in quantitative terms alone, 
i.e. the maximum of life’s strength to be interpreted as having apparent 
quantitative dimensions, which to be understood as saturated with life’s po-
tential. 
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4. ENVIRONMENT OR LIFE! 
SOME TECHNOLOGICAL DILEMMAS 
IN ECOPOLITICS 
Kvaløy describes the society, which is grounded in the total mastering of 
environment as a techno-capitalist society (Høyer 2011: 50). This issue is il-
luminative for clarifying how the society in question is justified by the un-
contradictory recognition of the monopolization of knowledge, which de-
termines the global vision of ecopolitics. Another important objective is to 
outline whether techno-capitalism based on the monopole of knowledge, 
which has to determine different forms of exploitation, is the only one mod-
el problematizing the environmentally friendly ecopolitics as such. 
Due to the increasing role of technologies and their exploitation, transper-
spectivity is wrongly defined as equivalent to the total visibility, which does 
not leave any side whatsoever unseen. Regarding this tendency, we should 
emphasize that setting the total visibility as a goal is possible only from the 
perspective of the bystander, but does not follow from nature. In tune with 
the aforementioned tendency, the idea of equilibrium understood as a proc-
ess is substituted with the static vision of balance. 
In turn, the monopole of knowledge brings one more negative consequence 
to light, which is also concerned with the increasing faith in human power; 
with what von Wright calls change in the predictability of natural processes 
(von Wright 2011: 118). Pretending to have all knowledge at hand, human-
kind empowers itself with the potential to predict all the possible changes in 
nature as well as to control them because it can foresee the consequences of 
their functioning. One of the most illuminative projections of this over-
control is the vicious circle of technological development recognized for the 
sake of the development itself. Its teleology to provide all possibilities on 
people’s disposal leads to producing more and more new technologies, 
which to meet the forthcoming challenges. 
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4.1. The Ethics of Provocative Pessimism 
On the level of ethics, I argue that we can talk about different types of en-
gagement; one problem, which is pointed out by Næss in his book Ecology, 
Community and Lifestyle (1976) and quoted by Vetlesen, namely, that the 
engagement with nature is reduced in favor of the one with technology 
(Vetlesen 2011: 25). The aforementioned engagements are grounded in dif-
ferent attitudes towards ethics, precisely, in the ones towards ontological 
ethics, when we talk about nature as well as in what I call ethics of com-
pressed time. An illuminative illustration of the implications of the latter is 
von Wright’s explanation of typical environmental questions, which are 
“what we should call technological problems”486 (von Wright 2011: 119).  
On a macro methodological level, the problem is provoked by the well-
known concerns about normative validity, i.e. by the human pretention to 
ascribe one and the same normative validity to different goals and means, in 
our case – to the ones of nature and technologies. On a micro methodologi-
cal level, it means that the normative validity of environmental issues is 
wrongly recognized as one of the technological issues, which leads to the 
misleading presumption technological solutions to be defined as suitable in 
solving environmental problems by analogy. The latter is a main prerequi-
site for the justification of one of the strongest ideologies: the ideology of 
anthropocentrism whose subject is the omnipotent man dealing with all the 
difficulties by mastering his/her own capabilities. Furthermore, the relevant 
ecopolitics appeals for providing environmental solutions to environmental 
problems rather than technological ones since technological solutions are 
not panacea giving us merely short-term solutions in the scope of ecology, 
as I already showed. 
In this context, it is important to outline Kvaløy’s conception of the difficul-
ties regarding spontaneous experience of nature, whose normative validity 
also entails the unpredictable which goes beyond human capacity as a by-
stander. What is unpredictable for man is realizable within natural predict-
ability because the latter does not arise from the perspective of the by-
stander, but from the one of nature’s dialectics, i.e. from the process of 
                                           
486 According to him, the current ethical debate in science is opened by technology in statu nascendi 
since employing technology presumes acquiring a particular understanding of the value of goals and 
means (von Wright 2011: 119). 
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harmonization based on the development of life’s forms that contradict each 
other. Substituting equilibrium with balance as a socially constructed pat-
tern is done by man for the sake of isolating the unpredictable; the one, 
which is recognized as uncontrolable in terms of pure rationality that ex-
cludes the forms of imaginative rationality in its strive for becoming ration-
ality per se. In this context, globalization makes one more problem appar-
ent. It justifies the work with categories per se (such as economy per se, 
technology per se) aiming to noncontradictory impose the negation of only 
one category, the one of nature per se. 
As Vetlesen points out, one asymmetry is substituted with another one, 
when the concern about the others is suppressed by the one about us (Vetle-
sen 2011: 35). According to him, now wilderness takes place as a “sacred 
place in the disorientation of technology”487 (Ibid). We have forgotten to 
see the full dimensionality of things in the initial transperspectivity of na-
ture giving preference to our own perspective, which has been determined 
as the perspective with a capital letter. The symmetry of complexity includ-
ing what we consider as asymmetry by default is erased by the technologi-
cal invasion at the expense of the symmetry of complication. The latter is 
based on so-called natural asymmetry, namely, on hindering self-
realization, which is narrowed to the being of a given living form. In the 
complicated societies, the asymmetry in question presumes reconsidering 
the role of normative validity as well since the dominating concern for us is 
the lack of concern about the others. 
Referring to Kvaløy’s conception, I also claim that the normative validity of 
the as if clause is justified by adopting imaginative rationality, which con-
tributes to avoiding the restriction of the circle of ‘Thou’ to the ones who 
are ‘close’ to the Self and thus to reduce the target group of the empathy 
addresses. In other words, it is the as if clause and imaginative rationality it 
entails that make the asymmetry symmetrical through the act of addressing. 
However, restricting the multilateral relationships between the Self and the 
                                           
487 Vetlesen emphasizes one more significant aspect, which is also relevant to Kvaløy’s theory. 
Technology is a means of decontextualizing the meaningfulness by reducing it to a sum of different 
meanings. He argues that technology is a way of making something accessible by breaking its pre-
existing and particular context (Ibid: 31). One of the main methodological concerns which arise is 
that there is no such a thing as a pre-existing context at all because all the forms of being are ‘born’ 
in a context. A problem, whose logic is similar to the logic regarding the problem of unpredictabil-
ity, is the reconsideration of the idea of lack of pre-existing context that makes possible what Vetle-
sen calls letting “things be in the fullness of their dimensions” (Ibid: 35). 
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Other to the substratum of their being (their interdependent self-realization 
to the dependence of their being turns the space of the mutual recognition 
into an arena of meritocratic invasion.  
Regarding ethics, I draw the conclusion that the technological invasion en-
courages the substitution of ontological ethics with moral relativism 
grounded in the overexposed trust in human potential to dictate the bounda-
ries of his/her own self-realization. One process, which leads to a vicious 
circle provoked by the way the subjectively held point of view, recognizes 
itself as an objective judgment due to the normalization of the subjective in-
sights as arguments with unquestionable validity. As Vetlesen claims, how 
we perceive something determines how we are disposed to treat it (Ibid; 
42); one process that brings the dramatics asymmetry to the arena of contra-
dictions. 
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4.2. The Role of Generalists and Specialists 
The difference between specialists and generalists, as recognized by Næss 
and Kvaløy, also contributes to clarifying the distinction between hard and 
soft technologies, while giving priority to industrial development society or 
life necessity one because, according to Kvaløy, technological performance 
can contribute to building complexity (Kvaløy 1976: 45). On a macro meth-
odological level, it means that the differences in question concern even the 
literal embodiments of Kvaløy’s river time, namely, whether river will be 
considered as a source, which should be preserved, or as a resource that 
should be exploited (Kvaløy 2014: 72). Practically speaking, it leads either 
the river to be left ‘free’, or to be exploited by building atomic energy’s 
constructions. Kvaløy points out that the running water in the landscape 
gives the complete image of wholeness, which is used as an example in the 
life necessity society in contrast to the concession picture that is focused on 
quantifying the landscape by planning (Ibid: 80). 
Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I argue that Kvaløy contrib-
utes to the tendency established by Zapffe, namely, to reconsidering the pri-
ority of industrial development as grounded in the idea of technologically 
supported practice of competition. The idea of competition has much to do 
with the expertise of so-called by him and Næss generalists and specialists.  
According to Næss, there are two types of generalists: those who have an 
orientation in all fields and those ones who have a good competence in two 
fields respectively (Næss 1973: 210). The specialization should be restricted 
on the level of local communities, where ecologically responsible politics is 
of crucial importance in judging which technologies should be changed or 
how to set knowledgably specified technologies in life (Ibid: 105). Restrict-
ing specialization, however, is not concerned with increasing the lack of 
competence, but with the process of centralization. That is why it is the 
uniqueness of competence rather than the role of expertise that matters.  
An additional methodological challenge is brought to light by the fact that 
research and science are a part of our economic/social growth’s system, as 
Kvaløy argues (Kvaløy 1976: 120), so that they inevitably depend on the 
objectives stated by the industrial development as well as on the conditions 
for their fulfillment. In this context, the specialization turns out to be 
grounded in the project of centralization of knowledge. Furthermore, the 
decentralization in question, which provides the decentralization of politics, 
should counter the authorization of both knowledge and politics. 
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In turn, Kvaløy’s conception of the ecophilosopher as a super amateur 
(Kvaløy 2001: 747) due to which amateur does not mean that he/she is in-
competent, but rather that his/her knowledge is irreducible to a narrowed 
competence and thus may see the things in their wholeness, benefits the un-
derstanding that integrity is not the same as harmonization. Otherwise, we 
should put in question the dialectical character of nature itself, i.e. of what 
Kvaløy calls the total ecoperspective as such.  
According to Kvaløy, the super amateur is a specially oriented and “articu-
lated everyday philosopher” (Kvaløy 1974b: 66). In this context, one is de-
fined as a “searching amateur” who is supposed to make relevant decisions 
against the background of the contradiction between the city and country-
side environment (Ibid). On the other hand, the possibility of justifying the 
role of ecophilosophy as intrinsically connected to the one of ecopolitics 
becomes possible due to the impact of ecology, which strives for under-
standing the complicated common play within the units (Ibid). On a macro 
methodological level, it means that ecology contributes to providing the 
generalists with a thinking tool (tankeredskap), i.e. with a “key for under-
standing” (forståelsesnøkkel), which helps them to be trained as super-
amateurs (Ibid). 
Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I conclude that it is the reha-
bilitated role of human ecology that makes the ecophilosophical compe-
tence be irreducible to an expertise knowledge and thus to affect building a 
relevant ecologically sustainable politics488. The competence in question 
has understanding as its necessary condition for justifying the need of moral 
and political commitment489. Thus the super-amateur can be defined as a 
super-generalist due to the fact that he/she not only aims to elaborate the 
ecological knowledge as crucial for building the political decision-making 
process, but also how this knowledge can fully benefit experiencing all the 
aspects of the situation we live in, i.e. of the living situation as a mode of 
becoming. The latter, which, according to Kvaløy, is a key element of estab-
                                           
488 Kvaløy argues that environmental politics should rely on the wide-ranging attempt to have the 
view, empathy and co-experience provided by the ecophilosophy (Ibid: 75).  
489 This commitment is recognized by Kvaløy as a total engagement, which concerns the different 
types of experience in the interplay with nature being irreducible to the knowledge, which is pro-
vided by one given discipline (Ibid: 75). In other words, it is an engagement grounded in the norma-
tive validity of the embodied understanding in different contexts, where every context is an interplay 
of different living situations. 
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lishing the life necessity society, is determined as “understanding and empa-
thy (innlevelse) in a situation” (Ibid: 71).  
The concrete implications of the role of the super amateur, who is defined 
as an “ecological super-amateur” (Ibid: 76), concern his/her ability to con-
stantly mediate between speculations and reality as well as between theory 
and practice (Ibid). Regarding ecophilosophy, which should function as 
ecopolitics, the human and human society should be the centre of attention; 
the latter is a matter of adopting a total ecological perspective in so far as it 
recognizes man as “an integral (but not harmonic) part of the ecosystem” 
(Ibid). On a macro methodological level, the aforementioned dialectical 
balance, which is irreducible to reaching harmonization (taking into account 
that harmonization and balance are not one and the same in the biosphere), 
becomes a prototype characteristic of the super amateur’s expertise. 
Analyzing Kvaløy’s implicit ontological ethics, we can see that one of the 
main problems concerns the complex society as well as why it misses an 
ethical objective in human understanding (Kvaløy 1978: 208). In this con-
text, the lost surplus of meaning is recognized as a lost moral understanding, 
which in turn leads to the incapability of moral learning.  
Maybe one of the most significant consequences of the overexposed faith in 
technologies is that natural imbalance becomes recognizable as a techno-
cratic balance, which diverts the whole idea of normative validity since the 
idea of accelerated tempo turns into the most significant representation of 
time. The aforementioned changes imply the need of justifying the principle 
of compensation at the expense of the one of correlation, i.e. the irrigations 
of culture and outdoor life’s offers, imposed with the help of apparatus and 
electronics, should compensate the broken social connections (Ibid: 209). In 
this context, I claim that Kvaløy’s appeal for rehabilitating the assumptions 
for a meaningful life embodied in a living democracy is a strive for rehabili-
tating the idea of necessity within ethics. It has an initial unquestionable 
value since it derives from life as such. Last but not least, the necessity 
should contribute to building a complex society functioning as a life neces-
sity one. 
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Næss himself is also not indifferent to these problems emphasizing the role 
of so-called soft research of future (“myk fremtidsforskning”)490 based on 
milder prognostics and a better clarification of opportunities (Næss and 
Haukeland 2008c: 53). Such a research would contribute to building an eco-
logically responsible politics in the current century, which requires an ex-
ponential growth of technological knowledge and inventive spirit looking 
for new directions to be developed (Ibid). On a micro methodological level, 
it means that the expertise concerns the combination of economic growth 
and the maintenance of a sound environment, which raises the awareness of 
some advanced manipulative technologies (Ibid: 202). In this context, Næss 
argues that the experts in general should feel that they have an insufficient 
competence beyond the scope of their own expertise (Ibid: 305). 
What is the role of generalists and specialists in this area? Kvaløy argues 
that generalists are such specialists who should be better equipped in an 
open debate with big economic and big bureaucratic specialists (Kvaløy 
1976: 114). His appeal for the need of educating generalists concerns mobi-
lizing these ones who suffer most directly from the crisis into new alliances 
for political action491 (Ibid: 153).  
In this context, the role of generalists can be defined in line with what 
Tranøy recognizes as a great challenge, namely, the challenge of environ-
mental crisis to the society of researchers, and last but not least, to the phi-
losophers in particular (Tranøy 1991: 46). It is the critical attitude that is 
emphasized by both Tranøy and Kvaløy to the extent it questions taking for 
granted the new knowledge as the best one. Regardless of the fact that 
Tranøy does not provide a distinction between generalists and specialists, 
his conception of the role of the scientist is similar to the one of generalists 
in Kvaløy’s sense. According to Tranøy, it is scientist’s responsibility that 
contributes to maintaining a critical position also to this, which we consider 
as our best heritage (Ibid), i.e. to search for knowledge that is most neces-
sary for attacking the environmental crisis in practice (Ibid: 49). 
                                           
490 Disenchanting the complex relationships between competence and expertise contributes to re-
vealing the ones between prognostics and life’s possibilities going beyond the statistical calcula-
tions. The latter is an objective that is justified by Næss’s ‘soft research’, which strives for making 
the ideal of ecological sustainability fulfillable nowadays. 
491 Kvaløy’s statement advocates what Tranøy identifies as an origin of the environmental crisis, 
namely, that it derives as a product of the Western knowledge and its technological offspring 
(Tranøy 1991: 46).  
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In turn, the aforementioned changes concern the need of justifying new ex-
pert knowledge, which to be both recognized and regulated as following na-
ture’s dynamics by grounding the one of life necessity society beyond the 
paradigm of objective naturalism. On a macro methodological level, refer-
ring to the latter would mean to support a radical biocentrism, which would 
lead to as serious consequences as the ones provoked by anthropocentrism. 
According to Kvaløy, here comes the role of generalist, namely, of a certain 
type of super-amateur (Kvaløy 1976: 1). The latter is supposed to provide 
one issue along some lines of development, which cannot be implemented 
by the specialists. The new type of expertise also concerns the justification 
of the political life because democracy is examined as irreducible to obtain-
ing a given expertise alone (Ibid). The super amateur’s expertise is a new 
type of holist expertise, which should affect both society and the “life sys-
tem’s health”492 (Ibid).  
Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I claim that the super ama-
teur’s expertise in Kvaløy’s sense is the one adopted in democracy because 
it is built on the idea of pluralism of vital needs. Furthermore, super ama-
teur’s expertise is based on life necessity society’s vital needs proposed as 
an ideal in so far as it takes as a premise the genuine experience of different 
situations, determining what vital needs are and how they should be fulfilled 
respectively.  
Referring to Kvaløy’s understanding of ecophilosophy as a practical phi-
losophy, it becomes clear why the super amateur is determined as a day-life 
philosopher, i.e. as one who can understand the normative validity of the 
day-life experience (Ibid: 2). His/her competence, which is justified as a 
special type of expertise, can be defined as concerned with experiential un-
derstanding. The latter is grounded in the modern scientific ecology, which 
is called by Kvaløy an attempt at “experienced understanding” of the most 
specific concepts of the ecology in question (Ibid: 23). However, I choose 
the concept of experiential understanding because it emphasizes the norma-
tive validity of the process character of experiencing. 
The new type of competence concerns the opportunity of avoiding artificial 
elaborations of individual contacts with both nature and society since they 
hinder the possibility of realizing complex fellowship relationships. That is 
why Kvaløy outlines the role of non-academic language adopted by the 
                                           
492 Kvaløy argues that its prototype characteristic is so-called branching vision (forgrenende innsikt) 
that is missed by the specialists (Ibid). 
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generalists, who have to relate their insights to everyday life (Ibid). It is the 
role of natural language that does not operate with ‘naturalisms’ becoming 
language of time (Kvaløy 2014: 36). It is a result of justifying a new type of 
expertise, which is not focused on elaboration for the sake of achieving per-
fection, but rather on rehabilitating the role of imperfection as preserving 
nature’s dynamics in its complexity. 
According to Kvaløy, the role of language of time (as a natural one) ques-
tions how the abstract epistemological time has forgotten time itself (Ibid). 
On the other hand, we should keep in mind that from that it does not follow 
that natural to epistemological languages refers as concrete to abstract. Nat-
ural is irreducible to the concrete as such because it includes the ‘natural’ 
logic (the pace of life’s development) in which new is always (in its poten-
tiality) irreducible to the being itself. On the other hand, natural as a struc-
turing mode would lose its structural character if we define that wholeness 
(especially if we talk about ecosystems) consists of a given sum of concrete 
beings/meanings alone. Such a simplification would problematize the inter-
connectedness between the ecosystems denying the possibility to reveal the 
biosphere as a net in Næss’s sense. 
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4.2.1. The Know-How of Ecology  
As I already mentioned, Norwegian ecophilosophies are closely tied with rely-
ing on a given type of knowledge about different scopes such as ecology, social 
economy, social anthropology etc. These disciplines contribute to contextualiz-
ing the aforementioned philosophies as well as to clarifying how they can bring 
social and political changes proposing relevant ecopolitics.  
On the other hand, Kvaløy argues that it is possible for one to orient one’s real-
ity in tune with the entropy theories, with the help of soft technologies and thus 
to control time’s process instead of fighting against it.  
Regarding ecology, one of the biggest methodological problems concerns the 
normative validity of fragmentarization493 and how it could be contextualized 
respectively. According to Kvaløy, cybernetic/structural anthropology’s main 
problem is that it cannot avoid the application of a certain degree of fragmenta-
rization to the study objects (Kvaløy 2004: 2640). The point is to reveal the at-
omist foundation as a matter of a stable theoretical argument. Furthermore, it 
should forward a way of thinking due to which one’s different reactions always 
to be explained by each other on all levels as well as from the perspective of the 
social structure they function in (Ibid). There would be no factors, boundaries or 
levels, which can be considered as grounding ones (Ibid: 2670). Furthermore, 
personal diversity would be developed as something constructive and enlighten-
ing. Thus the potential for freedom would be explored in a ground-breaking 
sense (Ibid).  
These investigations make me argue that natural fragmentarization leads to 
questioning the normative validity of freedom, which can be rehabilitated by 
adopting process philosophy. Otherwise, natural development would be misin-
terpreted by simplifying its dynamics via reducing it to a sum of conflicts, 
which, on a macro methodological level, would lead to reading Kvaløy’s state-
ment that we are born of a conflict in a purely literal sense. 
                                           
493 This conception was also outlined by the representatives of snm saying that ecology’s meaning 
lays in the new perspective that introduces a total understanding of the assumption of having a life 
on the Earth (snm 1974: 11). Such holism is in contrast to the fragmentarization, which is implied by 
the modern politics and science. In this context, the Western technological development presumes, 
last but not least (skyldes ikke minst), that one should isolate casual connections and lawfulness in 
nature (Ibid). Furthermore, what we experience today is a backlash in the form of catastrophes 
(Ibid). 
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Kvaløy argues that human ecology if crucial for recognizing the need of adopt-
ing ecophilosophy, namely, how a part of bio-ecology’s thinking mode can be 
applied to understanding the changes in our society (Kvaløy 1976: 7). In turn, 
the latter reveal what is considered as risks of complication since the exploita-
tion of nature negatively affects the society people live in. As I already outlined, 
for both Næss and Kvaløy, ecology is a necessary but not sufficient condition 
for justifying the role of ecophilosophy as a certain type of metaecology be-
cause ecology merely provides the direction of some possible normative chang-
es in ecopolitics. In other words, it shows why relevant ecopolitics should be fo-
cused on legitimizing the intrinsic value of nature as such, but it does not pre-
sume the prevention of the destructive ecopolitical practices in the long run. On 
a macro methodological level, it means that justifying ecopolitics as concerning 
the better understanding of environment is possible only if it is mediated by de-
fining a relevant ecophilosophy, which has normative validity. This thesis is 
shared by both Næss and Kvaløy since they refer to the normative validity of 
ecophilosophy as a premise for questioning anthropocentrism for the sake of 
imposing biocentrism. 
An illustration of the necessary but not sufficient role of ecology for ecopolitics 
can be found in Kvløy’s statement that ecology deals with the diversity of forms 
and working modes, which constitute life’s society (Ibid: 8). Man him-
self/herself is examined as a product of Earth’s enormous long-lasting devel-
opment of life’s diversity recognized as dependent on the fact that complicated 
life’s pattern continues to be complicated (Ibid). Since this tracery of life’s 
forms and cooperation advices look very complicated, it is important for man to 
have an overview of what happens to one intervention494 (Ibid). 
According to Jakobsen, the problem with Kvaløy’s and Næss’s ecophilosophies 
is their ‘closeness’ to biology and ecology. They have not elaborated an in-
depth analysis of the distinction between the transitive and the intransitive di-
mensions (Jakobsen 2011: 195); i.e. between ‘being as a process and change’, 
and ‘being as a part of wholeness’ (Ibid). However, we can keep discussing 
whether so-called ‘being as a part of wholeness’ is an intransitive dimension 
since ‘being’ a part of nature’ is not being, but becoming, which entails implicit 
ontological connotations. In this context, I reach the conclusion that ‘being as a 
process and change’ is a crucial condition for justifying the being as a part of 
                                           
494 Regarding the reconsideration of knowledge in Kvaløy’s sense, I argue that adopting human 
ecology contributes to raising the awareness of the ontological need of specifying the relations be-
tween complexity and complication as well as the boundaries of our own sense of belonging. 
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wholeness, illustrating that the transitive dimension is a necessary condition for 
recognizing the intransitive one. 
Furthermore, building Norwegian ecophilosophies is conceptualized by Ja-
kobsen as a matter of reductionism in a different sense. That is why we should 
talk about ecologism rather than physicalism (Ibid: 180). Jakobsen’s thesis ben-
efits revealing the normative validity of sciences for the pruposes of justifying 
the potential of ecophilosphies. This type of non-traditional reductionism is 
based on the Norwegian ecophilosophies’ way of recognizing ecology as “an 
ontological model for environmental philosophy” (Ibid: 184). In turn, Kvaløy’s 
ecophilosophy is defined as a philosophy of ecological sciences since the con-
cept of complexity is interpreted as having its origin in ecology by contrast to 
the one of the physicalism of complication (Ibid). Another methodological ben-
efit of adopting Jakobsen’s theory is that it stresses the role of philosophy in 
turning ecology into a prerequisite for determining relevant ecopolitics. What 
Jakobsen calls ‘to formulate an ecophilosophical approach with relevance to 
ecoploitics’ (Ibid), illustrated by Kvaløy’s conception of the equilibrium state in 
which no form of being is able to develop itself at the cost of the others, shows 
where to search for a model of the steady state society. The direct implementa-
tion of ecology would be a form of classical reductionism, but taking into ac-
count that this reductionism is interpreted as an ontological model, ecologism as 
such may be determined as a model, which to be mediated by ecophilosophy for 
the purposes of gaining normative validity. 
In this context, Jakobsen makes one more relevant specification, namely, that no 
one knows what metaphysical or ontological views of nature, humans and soci-
ety can be derived from ecology as well as whether such ecologism may turn 
out to be “too simple” (Ibid: 185). Talking about ontological dependence would 
lead us either to a form of determinism, or to one of relativism because, as he 
claims, there are no unquestionable reasons for outlining objective forms of de-
pendence between ecology and society. That is why I argue that instead of an 
ontological model, we may talk about ontological ethics, which to be considered 
as a paradigm in evaluating the normative validity of horizontal relatedness on 
the level of ecology, ecophilosophy and ecopolitics. Theoretically speaking, it 
means that we can analyze Kvaløy’s theory by referring to the normative valid-
ity of equilibrium in nature as a model of evaluating the one of the equilibrium 
in society. It is the idea of normative validity that contributes to avoiding physi-
cialism, or what I called moral naturalism, while comparing both models in the 
search for finding similarities. Thus we can avoid reducing the process of ex-
planation to the one of the direct ‘borrowings’. 
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Jakobsen outlines that Næss believes that ecology can provide us with a model 
for thinking “about the deep philosophical questions that need to be addressed” 
(Ibid)495. It shows us how to justify the decentralization on social level without 
questioning the status of local communities. He also claims that human ecology 
represents the cultural variations coupled with the ones of environment496 
(Næss 1990: 242). Last but not least, Næss suggests that the study field of hu-
man ecology is the deep ecology movement, which clarifies its own aims by re-
ferring to the researchers’ results in the scope of ecology. Thus studying ecosys-
tems makes us aware of our own ignorance (Ibid: 38). 
Diversity of the ecosystems has objective groundings, which gives us reasons to 
adopt the mode of speaking by analogy, when we face diversity in society. It is 
the cultural diversity, benefiting the recognition of the process of decentraliza-
tion in the field of ecopolitics that contributes (by analogy with natural diver-
sity) first, to discerning politics from ideology, which is embodied in different 
utopian scenarios and, second, to talking about different ecopolitics rather than 
ecopolitics with a capital letter. On a macro methodological level, it means that 
extrapolating the idea of nature’s diversity has an influence upon recognizing 
the premises of an environmentally friendly social and political change. It clari-
fies how to question monoculture as an artificial form of centralization as well 
as to restrict the use of hard technologies at the expense of the soft ones. 
Against the background of Næss’s and Kvaløy’s conceptions concerning the 
role of ecology for ecophilosophy, I agree with Høyer’s statement that Norwe-
gian ecophilosophy should be understood as a philosophy of involvement 
(Høyer 2011: 63). It is the presumption based on human ecology that provides a 
relevant grounding for the reconceptualization of the biological interactions in 
the public discourse, which are recognized as inflicting mutual engagement. 
                                           
495 According to Næss, ecology is the one that has taught us to respect the big common play in the 
biosphere (Næss 1973: 17). 
496 That is why the green politics should take into consideration the risks raised by the technological 
monoculture because most utopias ignore the need of cultural diversity. 
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4.2.2. How Much Democracy Do We Need 
to Overcome the Ecocatastrophe? 
According to Kvaløy, industrial development society would hardly tolerate 
a food-production society next to itself, especially in a long-term perspec-
tive. On the other hand, Earth’s life system would not tolerate another total 
industrial development in a short period (Kvaløy 1976: 73). In this context, 
I argue that environmental crisis is provoked by implying different norma-
tive validity to both short and long term perspectives. They are determined 
as non-interacting and thus as mutually exclusive, which raises the tension 
between the two societal models built on them, namely, between life neces-
sity society and industrial development one. Otherwise, the role of so-called 
continuously improvising person in the society would be lost in so far as 
improvisation is defined as a key resource in human mastering of the myr-
iads of challenges that withdraw from quantification (Kvaløy 2004: 4000). 
In turn, the recognition of democracy due to the principles of ecology is also 
discussed by the representatives of snm, who argue in favor of ecological 
reasons in building democracy (snm 1974: 92). This contradictory, at first 
sight, statement has its roots in the justification of the general system think-
ing. The topic is of special interest for snm since 1969, when the representa-
tives of the movement started arguing that the general ecological system’s 
modes can be used for the purposes of human society (Ibid). In other words, 
providing such a comparison can contribute to finding a new beginning in 
reconsidering the equilibrium and permanent life’s strength (varige 
livsstyrke) as dependent on the practically functioning democracy (Ibid).  
On a macro methodological level, it means that it is the system thinking that 
makes human ecology comparable with a certain kind of sciences regarding 
the development of society in so far as the mechanisms guiding the func-
tioning of the ecosystems are similar, in the sense of being based on com-
mon principles, to the ones regulating the societal mechanisms. On a micro 
methodological level, I argue that the development of human society, when 
it meets the requirements of what Kvaløy calls life necessity society, func-
tions as an ecosystem. The crossing points can be found in justifying the 
equilibrium since the society in question is grounded in satisfying the vital 
needs and interests of its participants, which are ‘natural’ but not in the 
sense of being objective by nature. Furthermore, equilibrium in a given so-
ciety is dependent on the functioning of democracy, but not in the sense that 
the equilibrium in question is a matter of democracy. In the biosphere, the 
equilibrium aims at satisfying the vital needs and interests, which are recog-
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nized as significant issues with an unquestionable normative validity both 
for human beings and other species, albeit in a different way regarding the 
specificities of their own nature. Therefore, we can think about the function-
ing of the ecosystems and society by analogy, which in turn is irreducible to 
simply transferring the characteristics of the ecosystem to the ones of soci-
ety. The analogy could be recognized as searching for similarities on system 
level rather than outlining factual coincidences, which would bring us back 
to the paradigm of moral objectivism.  
In turn, the representatives of snm examine the problem of environmental 
protection as based on the common work by emphasizing the role of decen-
tralization (Ibid: 69). According to them, the only one thing, which guaran-
tees the permanent equilibrium and the strength for survival is the own con-
trol of the system based on geological and human delimitations that make 
them claim that “We should also deal with a new ecological grounding of 
democracy” (Ibid).  
Such a statement, however, requires special attention while exploring how 
relying on the aforementioned delimitations, we can reach the conclusion 
that democracy is ‘dependent’ on ecology as well as in what sense. In this 
context, I argue that we should take into account the different way of imply-
ing the criterion of decentralization to nature and society. In both cases the 
own control of the system presumes a certain type of decentralization, while 
in human societies, the decentralization is a matter of rationalized proce-
dures, which are based again on the mutual delegation of rights and duties. 
On the other hand, the similarity is that in both cases the decentralization is 
irreducible to annihilation of the system control because it rather contributes 
to the process of development itself.  
According to Kvaløy, a certain big society should be free willingly and col-
lectively built of many small, with a huge self-reliance, societies (Ibid: 92). 
In turn, the collective building should be organized so that even the smallest 
societal units to be benefited of this in their strive for a balanced life, pre-
suming that each of them should have a connection with its own distinctive 
character (Ibid). Furthermore, all these small units should be “naturally” 
limited: due to their functional competence, they have been developed in the 
long-lasting process of a close common work; a work of solving common 
survival and life problems, which are different for each and every environ-
ment (Ibid). 
On the other hand, the concrete implications of the system thinking concern 
the normative dependence of ‘big’ on ‘small’ and vice versa, as being both 
ontologically and normatively interrelated, because the normative related-
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ness clarifies how the gist of the equilibrium should be interpreted. The 
aforementioned interrelatedness does not put in question the independence 
of the given links of the chain in so far as it is a necessary condition for hav-
ing a ‘bigger’ living organism (both in terms of its natural and social) func-
tioning. Furthermore, there is also a difference that makes us talk about nat-
ural equilibrium and democracy adopting the mode of analogy. I draw the 
conclusion that if the development of the equilibrium in nature is deter-
mined due to the principles of evolution projected into the common work, in 
democracy, the common work is a matter of a deliberate delegation of rights 
and duties in respect with the recognition of a common moral and political 
engagement. Regardless of the fact that the small societal units are ‘limited’ 
to the ‘natural’ abilities of developing a competence for a common work, 
the latter concerns solving the common life problems, like in the case with 
other species. However, it also includes the element of expertise, which is 
typical merely for human beings in so far as they can be moral and political 
agents and discussants.  
Regarding the first members of the ‘natural’ small societies, they know 
themselves, as well as their own close conditions better than the people 
from ‘outside’ since the old, small local societies have a diverse “root” to 
grow from (Ibid). In this context, we can elaborate the aforementioned dis-
tinction again: i.e. in the small, human societies the better recognition is 
based not only on being a part of the traditions, but also on being aware of 
the function and the role of the traditions in question. This reflection is not 
typical for the other species by default. 
For Kvaløy, democracy is examined as achieved by the efforts of the gener-
alists as super amateurs who had not only expertise, but also competence to 
couple politics with ethics. Thus they develop meta-competence, which can 
make democracy a subject to a system thinking analysis, albeit it is irre-
ducible to the idea of ecological equilibrium. According to him, democracy 
means an amateur power (amatørvelde) (Kvaløy 1974a: 5), which concerns 
knowing something about many things (Ibid). If we have a technocracy in-
stead of democracy, the specialist can avoid the worst contaminations 
(Ibid). The solutions would be found by relying on technologization and a 
total administration of the global environment (Ibid). When this day comes, 
the whole nature would function at the technological man’s cost. Thus all 
normative advices would be incorporated in the gigantic supply machine, 
which is needed in the big cities (Ibid). Furthermore, there would be only 
one culture: the Western one as well as specialists who to control the world 
since the whole responsibility would be placed on the technicians’ arms 
(Ibid). In turn, the global technocratization would support itself with the 
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myth of the need of a standardized production, which would lead to the re-
placement of man with the mass man (Ibid: 6). 
On a macro methodological level, it means that the centralized administra-
tive function becomes more and more ‘foreign to the system’ being non-
functional in respect with the small systems. Kvaløy defines the climax of 
this development as a dictatorship. However, the “system’s own form” of 
control could lead to establishing a completely decentralized system. Sur-
vival strength of the societies increases in these decentralized areas because 
they have a capacity to temporarily unite with bigger, free collaborative en-
tities, when they are threatened by a common enemy (snm 1974: 92). In 
turn, the bigger entities are immediately dissolved when the external threat 
is eliminated and do not create permanent “over-national” (overnasjonale) 
administrative organs497.  
On a macro methodological level, Kvaløy emphasizes again the internal 
connections between the system thinking mode and the democratic type of 
decentralization, which is irreducible to the annihilation and the lack of re-
sponsibilities and duties. In this sense, dictatorship is justified as politically 
irrelevant to the extent that it is ‘foreign’ to the system thinking mode and 
functioning. In turn, democracy is recognized as the best system supporting 
bioregionalism on the global scene. In this context, the over-national forma-
tion can be defined as closer to the dictatorship rather than to a democratic 
order because it is built on the permanent incorporation of the small units 
that are deprived of the possibility to follow their own logic of develop-
ment. 
Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I argue that in Kvaløy’s writ-
ings, the recognition of system thinking mode in democracy comes on a 
new level, namely, it reveals why system’s mode is ‘better’ for both people 
and nature while incorporated into a political system. The generalists are the 
ones whose competence is irreducible to expertise, albeit the latter is a nec-
essary condition for having such a competence. However, it is the lack of 
full overlapping between competence and expertise, between experiential 
knowledge and expert knowledge that makes the administration of global 
environment something more than an administrative task, being rather a 
form of both political and moral commitment. On a macro methodological 
                                           
497 According to Kvaløy, “We have a democracy in a pure form”, where the growth is grounded in 
system’s own control (Ibid). 
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level, democracy is recognized as a political system498, which can counter 
the invasion of Servoglobe in all spheres of human life. 
The connection between real democracy and environmental protection is an 
important object of investigation since Kvaløy argues that the connection in 
question is mediated by the relevant realization of life necessity society. On 
a practical level, such a realization is interpreted as a matter of complexity’s 
disposition (Kvaløy 1976: 37). Democracy is defined as encouraging the 
projection of different alternatives, which the members of society to choose 
as well as to give concrete meaning to the choices they make (Ibid). Kvaløy 
himself specifies that choosing contradicts the process of standardization 
supported by the complication’s cells and ‘cancer-development’, which in 
turn stops the mechanism of process development (Ibid). 
Reconsidering these statements, I argue that one of the crossing points be-
tween natural and political pluralism derives from the normative validity of 
the intrinsic value of meaning, namely, life as such to be regulated by its in-
ternal meaningfulness, which, due to the specificities of the different life’s 
forms, gains its embodiments in different meanings that not necessarily con-
tradict. It is the premise of meaningfulness provoking every single meaning 
to get its relevant embodiment that may contradict the rest only in terms of 
content, but not normatively. Regarding politics, democracy is the one that 
guarantees pluralism of choices to be normatively refrained in a non-
contradicting way and thus to avoid the simplification to political specula-
tions and accusations of relativism.  
According to Kvaløy, there is a clear relation between environmental pro-
tection and work for democracy (Ibid: 38). The latter is examined again on 
the level of expertise in so far as it is researchers’ responsibility to outline 
the methodological dependence of political pluralism on pluralism in 
knowledge. That is why he argues that democratic-critical tradition should 
remain independent for the sake of strengthening future research (Ibid: 
101), presuming the common work of sciences such as social anthropology, 
                                           
498 Næss emphasizes the political benefits of adopting democracy by expanding the concept of “democ-
racy in the biosphere” (Hansen 1974: 13). He claims that ecosophy contributes to establishing a class-
less society within the biosphere – “a democracy, in which everybody can talk about justice not only in 
respect with men” (Ibid). This conception is justified against the background of the principle that every-
thing hangs together and we are only fragments, with limited capabilities, in this area (Ibid). However, 
defining democracy’s problems as biospherical ones leads to underrating the particularly political im-
plications of these problems, namely, that people are not only fragments, but also responsible moral and 
political agents who can take care of both themselves and environment as such. 
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ethnography etc. to be taken into account. The aim of the aforementioned 
sciences is to contribute to questioning the Western colonial power while 
striving for reducing cultural diversity (Ibid: 100). 
On a macro methodological level, it would mean that pluralism in culture 
and politics should be derived from nature’s one without equating it with a 
certain kind of objective naturalism. In turn, it would mean that cultural plu-
ralism mediates nature’s diversity and politics’ one so that mutli-cultural 
societies such as life necessity societies to embody democracy in the best 
possible way. On the other hand, diversity of nature is represented on a cul-
tural level as a plurality of cultures driven by the plurality of ecosystems. At 
that stage, the differences, even when they contradict each other, are not ex-
amined as initially contradicting due to the principle of total exclusion. This 
principle is extrapolated also on the level of politics as political pluralism in 
so far as the plurality of political choices is determined as a guarantee of the 
implication of a relevant ecopolitics based on the process of harmonization 
rather than the one of static harmony. 
Thus the lack of democracy would question the type of personality that 
would be encouraged in society, namely, so-called multisided person to 
confront the pyramidal one in Kvaløy’s sense for whom the climax of free-
dom is to be effectively integrated in a hierarchically organized society, as I 
showed in the chapter on freedom. 
In this context, Kvaløy discusses three types of personality, namely, unitary 
personality (Enhetlig personlighet), integrated or multisided personality (In-
tegrert, flerdelt personlighet) and fragmented personality (Fragmentert per-
sonlighet) (Kvaløy 2004: 2477). Referring to the definitions in question, I 
argue that the fragmented personality cannot be supported by the democ-
ratic regime, which in turn means that fragmentized person would best real-
ize himself/herself in a centralized society of a pyramidal type. A proof of 
this thesis can be found in Kvaløy’s statement that having big pyramidal so-
cieties is possible as a result of societal perfection only if it is grounded in 
gathering “small (persons’) pyramids” (Ibid: 2762). By contrast to the py-
ramidal society, he describes the one of multisided people whose most illu-
minative embodiment, is Sherpa society499 (Ibid: 2478), where the sense of 
                                           
499 Sherpa society is recognized as an ideal society in so far as it is grounded in the idea of meaning-
ful life, which in turn presumes a meaningful growth to be realized. The role of democracy concerns 
the retrieval of ecological balance (Kvaløy 1976: 143), which is undermined today due to the mass 
production of thinking machines that pretend to control the whole decision-making process.  
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freedom does not derive from any centralization whatsoever supported by 
machine dependence. 
The preservation of the strive for freedom itself as well as its normative va-
lidity stem from so-called natural dependence of the ecosystems, which, due 
to its normative validity, questions the attempts at hierarchization in so far 
as the aforementioned natural dependence of the systems is irreducible to 
any hierarchy whatsoever (Kvaløy 1976: 139). As Kvaløy argues, it takes 
place due to the fact that life’s forms do not constitute a pyramid but rather 
a circle500 (Ibid: 10). 
                                           
500 On a macro methodological level, the idea of this double bind vision of centralization is devel-
oped due to the restrictions of so-called Holon theory. However, I argue that the theory of decen-
tralization and democracy-holon conceptions hide the risks the second type of multi-sided person to 
be replaced with the fragmentized person, which explains why Kvaløy gives preference to elasticity 
over Koestler’s holarchy model (Kvaløy 2004: 2520). 
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4.2.2.1.‘We Are All in the Same Boat!’ 
Extrapolating Næss’s argument that “We are all in one and the same boat” 
(Næss 1973: 216), I argue that accepting this statement could raise the risk 
of neglecting the role of solidarity if it is left without clarification. Næss’s 
association with the boat sets forth values and norms, which, however, may 
lead either oneself to cling tight to the boat, or to leave oneself to be taken 
by the stream501.  
In this context, I claim that Kvaløy’s interpretation can be described as fo-
cused on the purely political implications of being in one and the same boat 
with others as well as on what it means to be carried away by the stream502 
(Kvaløy 2014: 139). The latter may be recognized as a strong and devastat-
ing whirlpool, which to turn the boat down if the balance and the dynamics 
of the stream for itself and the one in itself are not taken into consideration. 
The need of a new boat is outlined because it should better tolerate strokes 
and thus to give possibilities for the downstream (Ibid: 149). 
Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I emphasize that revealing 
the aforementioned genealogy is a necessary but not sufficient condition for 
building relevant ecopolitics since it does not benefit disenchanting the 
problem of normative validity. In other words, it would mean that changing 
the mode of speaking does not have the power to inflict social and political 
changes alone. Thus it could easily become a part of the propaganda talk. 
That is why I draw the conclusion that we would rather say that the boat is 
one and the same, but we stay on different decks. In this context, so-called 
by Kvaløy new colonialism can be defined as a result of ascribing the nor-
mative validity of the ‘instead of’ mode to a different boat, i.e. to a different 
reality arguing that it is different because of its different social, economic 
and cultural potential.  
Otherwise, neglecting the specificities of the boat, it would mean to disguise 
the fact that the differences themselves are constructed from our perspective 
of differentiation since we are always on side of homogeneity. The prob-
lems regarding the contradictory justification of the aforementioned new co-
                                           
501 Galtung describes in detail how the inequality in question stems from economic, social and eco-
logical polarizations, which derive from the ideology of centralized power. The latter is justified by 
authoritarian experts who approve the increasing implementation of the hard technologies. 
502 According to Kvaløy, to set up values and norms is considered as clinging to a boat carried away 
by the stream and then as a matter of discussing alternative movements against the stream (Ibid). 
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lonialism come from the forgotten fact that we can keep being in one and 
the same boat preserving the prototype characteristics that make us ‘we-
they’. Furthermore, it means to keep talking about togetherness. ‘We’ and 
‘they’ make togetherness possible because ‘they’ keep what makes them 
‘we’, respecting the principle that ‘they’ for ‘us’ is always like ‘we’ for 
‘them’. 
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4.3. The Role of Ecophilosophy for the EU Debates 
Since one of the main functions of ecophilosophy in Kvaløy’s sense is to 
provide unquestionable reasons for triggering changes in ecopolitics when 
necessary, it is not surprising that he looks for potential solutions to the en-
vironmental crisis by outlining what the place of Norway in the global pic-
ture is. In this context, ecophilosophy is recognized as a necessary means 
for overcoming the crisis in question since the construction mistake of civi-
lization is spotted yet by Zapffe and Rolf Edberg (Kvaløy 2014: 32). The 
practical implications of the problem become apparent when the develop-
ment is no longer under control (Kvaløy 1976: 7). Furthermore, Kvaløy de-
fines the lack of controllability as affecting not only nature, but also life as 
such in so far as all the ecosystems in the biosphere are intrinsically con-
nected. Thus the environmental crisis is justified as simplifying life’s sys-
tems: in order to better understand the crisis, we should better understand 
ourselves and our own situation (Ibid: 8, 96).  
On a macro methodological level, the negative consequences can be ex-
plored from two perspectives, namely, from the one of man’s self-
realization and from the perspective of life as harmonizing the net of eco-
systems by determining their initial value, which is questioned by specify-
ing the concept of growth in economic terms503. Kvaløy himself defines the 
crisis as life’s fight (Ibid: 21), which does not have to be literally under-
stood in so far as it also presumes a fight for grasping life’s meaning as 
such. According to him, one of the main consequences of the crisis affects 
man’s intense experimenting with both his own psyche and society (Kvaløy 
2004: 1650). However, when experimenting turns into an aim in itself, it 
simplifies its own dialectical character by reducing its mechanisms to a set 
of ‘successful’ experiments. Then, as Kvaløy claims, one does not need 
much fantasy in order to understand why “Live better electrically” becomes 
something more than just an advertisement (Ibid: 1770). 
Against the background of these investigations, he recognizes ecophiloso-
phy as specifically ‘Norwegian’ because it is a combination of a unique 
“work-in-nature” romantic and the efforts of the Norwegian working 
movement, which, according to him, is also unique, since it was only partly 
                                           
503 Kvaløy argues that there are growth’s mechanisms, which simplify the ecosystems for no reason 
(Kvaløy 2014: 12).  
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involved in the industrial proletariat (Kvaløy 2014: 32). In its other part, the 
working movement is described as established by the community of small 
Norwegian producers such as highland farmers, fishermen who have been 
building their own boats etc. (Ibid). 
Judging by Kvaløy’s investigations, I argue that Norwegian society’s ro-
mantic, which promotes a unique work production, can be interpreted as 
justified by introducing a unique idea of meaningfulness of being and be-
coming embodied in the vision of what a cultivated place is. In turn, roman-
tic concerns the recognition of social and cultural groundings of life’s ne-
cessities, which are recognized by revealing the concrete aspects of what a 
meaningful work is. That is why I draw the conclusion that it is the norma-
tive validity of the contextualized romantic that becomes a necessary condi-
tion for supporting bioregionalism on the level of politics. 
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4.3.1. When Does Nature Say ‘No’? Ethical Dilemmas 
in the Ecopolitical Projects Pros and Cons the Potential 
Accession of Norway to the EU 
The debates about the increasing technological invasion took place against 
the background of two fundamental events of the Norwegian history, name-
ly, the two referendums of the potential accession of Norway to the Euro-
pean Union conducted in 1972 and 1994. The situation was also escalated 
with the statement of the Norwegian Prime Minister at that time, Bratteli 
who said that he will resign if people vote ‘no’ to the EU, which he later 
did. In the summer of 1972, Næss and a group of people wrote an open let-
ter to Bratteli about the consequences of Norway’s accession to the EU ex-
plaining why Norway could contribute to building an ecologically sound 
course for Europe’s future if people vote ‘no’. As Næss and Haukeland ar-
gue, both sides were mobilized, and the supporters of the ‘no’ movement 
reached 110 000 people504.  
What are the practical implications of these debates? The negative attitudes 
inflicted by the discussions about Norway’s accession to the EU were 
grounded in the view that the increasing transfer of goods as well as the un-
controllable flow of people would lead to irreversible consequences, name-
ly, that ecological unsustainability would become the status quo, which in 
turn would affect the equilibrium of the biosphere. Both Næss and Kvaløy 
share arguments that raise concerns about to what extent environmental 
preservation should be defined as a goal in itself if the inseparability of eco-
logical problems from those of poverty and justice is taken into account. 
However, Næss and Kvaløy adopt different philosophical, ecological and 
economic arguments since they do not similarly evaluate the role of ethics 
in solving ecopolitical problems, as I already outlined in the chapter on 
Næss. 
Against the background of these investigations, the representatives of snm 
defined the EU as a system of a catastrophic course (snm 1974: 90) because 
the eco-catastrophe is recognized as increasing overexertion (stigende over-
belastning) on the people by introducing a stable, more technologized and 
distant way of directing (Ibid). The latter is imposed on the average people 
                                           
504 As a result of expressing his main concerns about the future of ecological sustainability in the 
long run, in 1973 Næss published his well-known article about deep ecology and shallow ecology 
movements (Næss and Haukeland 2008c: 49). 
 431
with an accelerating extermination of the small societies, which people and 
nature have built in the 1000-year interaction (Ibid). The representatives of 
snm emphasized that regardless of the fact that people are aware of the eco-
logical catastrophe, they are not aware, among the other things, of the hu-
man ecological crisis (humanøkologiske krise) because these people do not 
have objections against what they wish, i.e. against appealing for more 
technology and experts (Ibid). In turn, human ecology means that there is 
one almost postponed collapse, which will encompass everything, when it 
comes (Ibid). That is why a decentralized society in the EU will, sooner or 
later, force itself to become acceptable, but not before a period of violent 
revolutions and chaos is overcome (Ibid). In this context, the representatives 
of snm formulated the main point in the debate about the EU, as follows: 
Why would not Norway contribute to one less painful replacing system by 
going against the incorporation into the catastrophe system, which has the 
label (merkelappen) EU? (Ibid). 
The discussions regarding the referendums raised scientific arguments pros 
and cons, which were represented on the pages of the Norwegian Vett se-
ries505. Sigmund Kvaløy claims that when his book Nature’s No: On the 
EU, Free Trade and Ecological Chaos (Naturens nei: om EU, frihandel og 
økologisk kaos) was published in 1994, it was focused on revealing how en-
vironmental problems are proportional to the expanding free trade process, 
namely, to the fear of reconsidering to what extent the latter is responsible 
for the growing number of transmitted diseases and dangerous organisms 
(Kvaløy 2006: 4). His solution was to restrict the free flow of people and 
goods encouraged by the European Union. According to Kvaløy, Norway’s 
potential accession to the EU is dangerous not only for the people, but also 
for the other species (Ibid) since the flow in question should be considered 
as a global threat to the biosphere506. In turn, Næss507 also warned against 
                                           
505 Vett is a thematic journal of No to Eu’s movement, which is published three to five times per 
year. In turn, No to EU (Nei til EU) is a Norwegian interest group, an antiracist and pan-political or-
ganization, which strives for justifying Norway’s independence of the EU. 
506 His conception is in tune with the one of the other representatives of snm who emphasize that the 
modern, industrial society creates mobility (snm 1974: 89), which leads people to be known of the 
(kjennes ut av) clearly set out, domestic, close environment. Due to this approach, they become 
“suitable for” an objective outside of their own living situation. These people can be used as “mak-
ers of working power”, while, on the other hand, the possibilities of a socially meaningful existence 
concerning the average man are destroyed (Ibid). 
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the threat cultural diversity to be put at risk by the aforementioned accession 
as well as against the disputable ways of evaluating zero growth within the 
framework of the challenges posed to the national economy.  
Another part of the problem is how to evaluate the normative validity of 
knowledge understood as being crucial to justifying relevant ecopolitics. 
That is why it is not by chance that Kvaløy described ecopolitics as deriving 
from the fight to obtain monopoly of knowledge. He argues that the ideol-
ogy imposed by the supporters of the EU avoids researchers who see in it a 
threat to the health of mankind, animals and plants (Ibid: 7). Furthermore, 
the ecological perspective becomes ‘dangerous’ (farlig) from the ‘yes’ 
standpoint because due to its normative validity, the work of the supporters 
can be questioned and they can be dismissed in the long-run perspective. 
Kvaløy himself argues that the ‘no’ standpoint rests on stronger arguments 
since they contribute to understanding the complex process of the present 
situation through the focus of climate change (Ibid). 
On a macro methodological level, the ‘yes’ and ‘no’ arguments have a dif-
ferent normative validity because they are based on different understandings 
of what knowledge is. One of the main methodological issues is that by rec-
ognizing one type of knowledge as ‘more objective’ than another, we still 
face the risk of confusing objectivity with normative validity, supporting the 
privilege of speaking from the best possible perspective. Last but not least, 
we should clarify that specifying the normative validity is a necessary but 
not sufficient condition for avoiding the pitfalls of ideological rhetoric, 
which stems from questioning the distorted presumption that ‘our’ argu-
ments are always better than the rest. 
However, the criticism to Norway’s potential accession to the EU was not 
only a result of a strong personal stance, but rather of a stance, which was 
advocated due to the principles of snm, which Kvaløy belonged to. The rep-
resentatives of snm argued that Norway’s membership would be a step to a 
global environmental crisis (snm 1974: 2), which, on a macro methodologi-
cal level, would mean that average man’s opportunities to regulate his/her 
own living situation would be reduced (Ibid). Snm built its own work on the 
insight ecology gives by clarifying the total life’s strength of the society and 
                                                                                         
507 Næss’s critical position is revealed in detail in the following two articles: Zero Growth of Zero 
Importance? (O-vekst av null betydning?) (Klassekampen 4/6/1992) and Cultural Diversity Needs 
Protection (Kulturelt mangfold trenger vern Rapport fra Konferansen Norske Kunstners og den Eu-
ropeiske Unon) (1994). 
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the ability for survival (Ibid), which are recognized against the background 
of the open conflict between the ideology of the industrial development and 
the ecological life’s values. Extrapolating the aforementioned statements, I 
argue that Kvaløy’s skepticism to Norway’s potential accession to the EU 
can also be described as provoked by the transformation of the growth and 
development debate into a contradiction between ideology and axiology508 
due to which ideology pretends to be axiology with a capital letter. In turn, 
justifying such a contradiction as a leading one explains why bioregionalism 
is displayed at the environmental platform of snm as having a higher norma-
tive validity than the one of the macro-development in so far as bioregional-
ism means to preserve the unique life’s possibilities as life’s values without 
which human life is deprived of a value as such. Furthermore, both Kvaløy 
and the other representatives of snm insisted on solving the regional prob-
lems as a priority task, i.e. as a national task, nevertheless, it often confronts 
the Treaty of Rome (Ibid: 57). Therefore, the genealogy of the connections 
between Norwegian ecophilosophies and Norwegian environmental politics 
can be revealed if we trace the preservation of bioregionalism as one of the 
main objectives of national ecopolitics. This objective can be determined 
due to its interconnected moral and existential implications regarding the in-
trinsic value of each and every individual of a given society509. 
Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I argue that Kvaløy and the 
other representatives of snm see the main threat of the arising flow of peo-
ple in the increasing instrumentalization of human power, which is simpli-
fied to exchangeable capital, i.e. to reducing the flow of people to the one of 
goods in so far as both are determined as exchangeable resources. This also 
negatively affects both the understanding and the functioning of the living 
situation, which is determined as a possibility of implying a cost-benefit 
                                           
508 The representatives of snm are even more radical in their statement. They argue that in front of 
the EU’s ideology stays the choice between democracy and progress (Ibid: 55), which in turn ex-
plains why the EU does not have a complex and elaborated regional politics (Ibid: 57).  
509 According to the representatives of snm, it is the Treaty of Rome that plays a central role in the 
EU’s reports (Ibid: 46). They argue that clause two justifies the European community to be based on 
unbroken and misbalanced development providing a common trade policy towards the third world 
countries. It aims at withdrawing the member countries from the obstacles regarding the free flow of 
people, goods and capital as well as to guarantee that the competence on the common market would 
not be displaced (Ibid). In this context, snm’s members reach the important conclusion that, from an 
ecological perspective, the Treaty is a matter of recognizing a philosophy of economic (industrial) 
development (Ibid: 47).  
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analysis. Since the EU is defined as supporting the global market policy that 
strengthens the exploitation of people as goods, snm’s conclusion is that the 
potential membership of Norway to the EU would mean not only to raise 
the depopulation, but also the centralization of power, capital and working 
problems (Ibid: 64), which is grounded in the risk management concerning 
ecological sustainability.  
The concrete implications of the centralization affect the underrating of the 
interests of regional politics, which in turn is based on providing a different 
type of planning. By contrast to the ecologically responsible mapping, cen-
tralized planning does not support the reestablishment of multidimensional 
and for that purpose, stable ecosystems, but rather the “externally special-
ized area of exploitation” (Ibid: 72). 
The global crisis is triggered by internalizing the pseudo-complexity mode, 
which in so far as it is based on the pseudo-experiential one, determines the 
quantification of the world. In turn, the latter is justified by introducing 
global tourism against the background of the work of institutions such as 
FAOs, IMFs and World Bank (Kvaløy 2014 :145) believing that the crisis 
in question can be overcome by “repairing” the landscape similarly to the 
way we repair machines. In turn, the careers of the administratives are con-
cerned with presenting and determining the complex as if it is complicated 
for the purposes of making the reparation looks possible. The quantification 
itself is grounded in the appeal for monoculture pretending that factory’s 
chemistry can improve, in the sense of perfecting, Earth’s performance. 
Thus the planning makes mapping through calories and dollars possible 
(Ibid). 
Furthermore, Kvaløy points out that the European Union is the best example 
in contemporary Europe of how the industrial development society tries to 
consolidate itself by the economic crisis (Kvaløy 1976: 119). According to 
him, one of the crucial questions Norway faces nowadays510 is not the EU 
membership, but, like in many other countries, the constantly accelerating 
tact of destroying the variabilties of the survival of global life’s society 
(Ibid). Both the European Union system and the nature system it includes 
contribute an enormous (uhyre) network of causes and effects to be con-
structed. That is why a broad ecological analysis of the EU is required, 
which to support the need of decentralization to be reconsidered. In this 
context, Kvaløy evaluates Norwegian negative vote as a strive for preserv-
                                           
510 It is a reference to the time when the book was written.  
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ing the portion of the global human habitat, which is corrupted by the indus-
trial development society (Ibid: 146).  
On a macro methodological level, the origin of the aforementioned contra-
dictions can be seen in what the representatives of snm recognized as a mat-
ter of replacing values with price mechanisms, which is based on reducing 
the concept of value to the one of price. According to them, the economic 
structure that lays up in the EU makes the price mechanism a factor of a 
primary regulation and thus justifies the considerations of the industrial 
economy as the most important one (snm 1974: 32). There are many and big 
values, which do not express themselves in numbers, and which cannot be 
regulated by the price mechanism (Ibid). In the EU, the guiding principle is 
the one that the market determines the development, and the regional poli-
tics has, first and foremost, a character of a “socially supported measure” 
(sosialt pregede støttetiltak) (Ibid: 32-33). 
On a macro methodological level, it means that the yes and no arguments 
have a different normative validity in so far as they are based on different 
types of knowledge. Last but not least, the difference between the two types 
of normative validity is a necessary but not sufficient condition for avoiding 
the pitfalls of ideological rhetoric. The latter derives from questioning the 
distorted presumption that ‘our’ arguments are always better than the rest. 
An illuminative example in this respect is how preserving the balance of lo-
cal communities by analogy with the one of ecosystems is justified as an 
important prerequisite for preventing the invasion of global chaos. It is pos-
sible when ‘identity’, ‘ecological’ and ‘social’ are no longer examined as 
mutually connected on an ontological level alone. Judging by the aforemen-
tioned investigations, I draw the conclusion that the ecocatastrophe would 
turn into a global one due to the fact that two different projects collapse, 
namely, the one of the expanding free trade and the one of local markets, 
which impose two different perspectives for self-realization. Both models 
are models of dependence, but they presume different modes of fulfillment. 
The mode represented by Kvaløy, whose philosophical groundings corre-
spond to the ones of Næss’s ecosophy as well as the mode of global eco-
nomics concerned with the dependence of making nature’s sources unlim-
ited resources of exploitation. 
Analyzing the ideas displayed in Nature’s No, I argue that Kvaløy diverts 
the logic of explanation by emphasizing the visible (socio-economic) con-
sequences of globalization by relying on some implicit philosophical prem-
ises. These premises are more influential in terms of disenchanting the ge-
nealogy of national communities’ crisis, understood as provoked by the cri-
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sis of self-realization. If global economics works to accomplish goals set 
according to the top-down principle (thinking about macro results first and 
then about their consequences), local ecopolitics functions the other way 
around. That is why the idea of stability is replaced with the one of stabili-
zation: with a mechanism of keeping a given order for the sake of the order 
itself. In this context, I reach the conclusion that Kvaløy’s critiques to the 
free trade politics of the EU are critiques to the economic turn it entails.  
The aforementioned problem can be characterized by referring to Georg 
Henrik von Wright’s definition of market as a sovereign power in which a 
planned economy is replaced with “galloping capitalism” 511 (von Wright 
2011: 121). The latter is grounded in the compression of time, which re-
quires improving efficiency not in terms of quantity, but rather in terms of 
quality. Extrapolating von Wright’s theory, I claim that the goal of Norwe-
gian society is to limit the galloping, when it contradicts the development of 
the new local (the one of developing countries, which are the new local po-
litical actors on the global arena). This is why clarifying the role of ecopoli-
tics is of crucial importance in determining how local communities can face 
the challenges of increasing complication by preserving the normative value 
of their complexity 
In the biosphere, ecological crisis turns into a global one since the economic 
stabilization causes the homogenization of ecosystems recognized as a pro-
cess of harmonization, which has a high value in the normative system. 
However, such a homogenization narrows down what Kvaløy calls existen-
tial opportunities. The most significant representations of the latter are the 
increasing mobility questioning the old ecosystems’ boundaries as well as 
the reduction of multiplicity providing the dominance of organisms, which 
“flourish in chaos” (“trives i kaos”) (Kvaløy 2006: 50). This statement 
brings the debate back to the point who has the power to impose a new type 
of normative validity. Extrapolating Kvaløy’s statement that there are two 
levels of discussing life’s richness, namely, the one of local systems and the 
one of different ecosystems on a global level (Ibid: 48), I argue that we 
                                           
511 In this context, Kvaløy’s critiques to Brundtland’s report derive from the description of the gal-
loping crisis. According to him, one of the most serious concerns is how to understand the “system’s 
necessary dynamics of crisis” (Kvaløy 2014: 114). It presumes the interpretation of different world 
pictures for the purposes of overcoming the traditional European elitism, which appeals for a narrow 
specialization. At the first pages, Kvaløy argues that most of the proposed methods just lead to 
strengthening the crisis by undermining the possibility that there is a different type of economic 
growth (Ibid: 50). 
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should consider two types of globality. The first one is the one driven by 
what I called horizontal relatedness regarding the normative validity of the 
initial (natural) relationships in the globe. According to the second meaning, 
global is defined as an ontological synonym of ‘bigger’ underlied by the 
presumption that the local systems should become bigger (global), i.e. we 
should talk about one polarized globe. 
Kvaløy himself talks about ecosystems’ nationalism, which is interpreted 
within the framework of small nationalisms regarding the objective need of 
keeping the boundaries of the local communities untouched. However, it is 
still problematic whether we can call globalism a ‘big nationalism’ since the 
latter puts in question the idea of national as such. Erasing boundaries has 
mainly economic reasons that are concerned with the value of the import-
export processes. The free trade suppresses the development of the poor 
countries in two ways: by the increasing import as well as by the export af-
fecting the low development of schools’ subsidies and local goods, which 
are incomparable with the cheaper and better goods coming from the rich 
countries (Ibid: 18). 
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4.3.1.1. The Threat of Mass Tourism 
Furthermore, the connection between free trade, local markets and the aris-
ing number of harmful organisms (Ibid: 11), which leads to the growing re-
sistance to antibiotics as well as to expanding the side effects of the intakes 
of hormones (Ibid: 26), as Kvaløy suggests, inflicts the transmission to be 
considered as a transformation by default. According to Kvaløy, a signifi-
cant part of this process is not only the transfer of goods, but also the one of 
a special category of people, namely, the tourists. Regarding the increasing 
challenges provoked by the globalization, he directs the attention to one not 
so well-known problem at that time for which he has been strongly criti-
cized in the press, namely, the negative influence of mass tourism and its 
difference from the migration process. 
At the beginning of Nature’s No, Kvaløy described the tourists as “spread-
ing infections” (Ibid: 7). However, he was quite surprised to see that the 
Norwegian journal Daily Economic Life (Dagens Næringsliv) had registered 
the appearance of a paper called Nature’s No three years after his own was 
published. In this paper, Tore Stubberud512 misinterpreted Kvaløy’s con-
ception as saying that he “hates the tourists” (Ibid): he distorted Kvaløy’s 
main argument that urbanization and mass tourism contribute to the spread 
of diseases513 (Ibid: 11).  
Kvaløy justifies his significant distinction between tourists and migrants by 
claiming that it results from a methodological specification. He argues that 
immigrants and refugees are also mentioned as transmitting infections, al-
beit they are not as dangerous as tourists. Tourists want to travel, but are not 
obliged to do so, while refugees do not want to, but have to (Ibid: 18). Due 
to the fact that tourism is an industry driven by competition, the travellers 
strive for economic goods in the “society’s mutual fight” (Ibid). Tourists 
should live an unrestrained life, deprived of consciousness, as this is the 
way they spend their money. 
Since Kvaløy’s ecophilosophy is shaped within the philosophy of snm, it 
becomes clear why his appeal for restricting the flow of tourists is not a 
matter of hate. The restriction can be described as concerning the problem 
of distributive justice because Kvaløy’s ideal social model of realizing the 
                                           
512 Tore Stubberud (1947-) is a Norwegian writer, philosopher and publisher. 
513 The latter is caused by the intensified transfer of goods and people through the channels of free 
trade and mass tourism which makes man’s health more endangered than ever. 
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most relevant ecopolitics requires solidarity and equal distribution of goods 
to be achieved due to which the process of self-realization is maximally 
supported by society. On a macro methodological level, movement is rec-
ognized as a prototype characteristic of both groups (tourists and immi-
grants), but the fundamental distinction comes from the different under-
standings of the meaning of life and lifestyle. While the tourists’ lifestyle is 
examined as determined by the complication model, which justifies itself as 
a model with a capital letter, the one grounding immigrants and refugees’ 
way of living is not so clear. The latter is affected by the pretention of the 
complication society as being the most complex formation: a pretension that 
deprives the local community of the possibility to realize its complexity in 
full. In this context, the tourist becomes a “passive client on the Western 
market” (Ibid: 29). 
According to Kvaløy, it is the lack of politicians’ responsibility that grounds 
the mixture of technological and economic power requiring a strong deter-
mination in the name of complicated world (Ibid). There is one more crucial 
reason why Kvaløy’s theory is not a theory of hate in so far as it is not 
based on absolutizing the principle of negation alone. He argues that we are 
responsible for providing the hungry people with food, but also for prepar-
ing space for the ones who have lost the place they have had, the immi-
grants who cannot go back (Ibid). Following this line of arguments, Kvaløy 
introduces the thesis that if we use some of the tourists’ resources, we may 
help the others deprived of space (Ibid). 
He argues that politicians have even less chances than the scientists in re-
considering the deep roots of contemporary ecocrisis (Ibid: 13) because 
their decision-making process lacks the necessary normative validity. 
Kvaløy claims that missing the process thinking is also typical for the jour-
nalists. While they rely on the mode of compression of space and time fo-
cused on the concrete implementations of the formula ‘here-and-now’, the 
politicians prefer to think in abstract concepts: by ideologies that pretend to 
be omnipotent ones since the politicians are obliged to govern on behalf of 
the world. 
Kvaløy also outlines the crucial role of the media in shaping public opinion 
seeing the biggest danger of its influence in justifying so-called monocul-
ture at the expense of the normative diversity of the multiplicity of cultures. 
According to him, the media misses the opportunity of thinking in relations 
and processes, i.e. the opportunity to evaluate the events in a process ori-
ented way (Ibid: 9) because it supports the popularization of the sensational 
points embodied in the thinking ‘here-and-now’ mode. Judging by the 
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aforementioned definitions, I reach the conclusion that journalists are de-
scribed as falling into the category of the specialists who are qualified to 
work only at a given moment of compressed time as well as whose effi-
ciency is the most apparent one. The insufficiency of their work derives not 
from the object of investigations, but from the pretention brought by the 
normative validity of time with a capital letter, namely, that the ‘here-and-
now’ mode embodies the time and space as such. 
Going back to Tordsson’s theory of Nansen’s moral geography, I claim that 
similarly to Næss, Kvaløy introduces another moral geography based on 
having home as a top norm. In this context, he sees the biggest threat of so-
called new colonialism driven by the globalization, which forcefully de-
prives people of the opportunity of having a home and thus justifies social 
chaos by inflicting an ecological one. The concrete implications of the eco-
logical chaos concerned with the climate change are just the tip of the ice-
berg because the regulation of the living Earth is not restricted to the forms 
of being in nature, but to the ones of the biosphere itself. 
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4.3.1.2. The EU and the Establishment of Monoculture  
Another significant issue concerns the origin of monoculture as a product of 
a technological invasion in Kvaløy’s sense, which is outlined by revealing 
the genealogy of the ‘old-new’ dichotomy. Kvaløy’s theory corresponds to 
the views of the other representatives of snm who emphasize the negative 
role of the unstable monocultures developed by the EU (snm 1974: 7). They 
represent societies with a unilateral and specialized economic basis (Ibid), 
by contrast to the traditional, local societies, where the concrete experience 
is both anticipated and internalized since their economy is based on care and 
cultivation of many resources at once (Ibid). 
In this context, Kvaløy analyzes in detail how the negative axiological con-
notations of the old are a result of a secondary interpretation, which is pro-
voked by the desperate fight for recognizing the authenticity of the new. 
That is why he tries to provide a revision that to rehabilitate the ontological 
grounding of natural as authentic and thus not only to expand, but also to 
give arguments in favor of the thinking by analogy, when we talk about cul-
tures. Kvaløy claims that diversity of culture is ‘natural’ because its authen-
ticity can be interpreted by analogy with the one of the diversity of ecosys-
tems. Referring again to the as if clause, we can understand why cultural di-
versity is similar to the natural one without being equivalent to it. Accord-
ing to Kvaløy, the old ecosystems are like the old cultures – “developed and 
stabilized as an answer to the very different conditions, which are offered 
by the world’s different regions” (Kvaløy 2006: 28). The strive for keeping 
the diversity on all levels whose normative validity is justified by analogy to 
the one of biosphere, is more ‘authentic’ than the appeal for justifying the 
Earth as a unified field of exploitable resources governed by monopolist 
politics514.  
Another important issue, which is stressed by Kvaløy, is that monoculture is 
a self-sufficient system that does not have the potential to contradict the ex-
                                           
514 A good example in this respect is what Kvaløy argues about the mechanisms of weaken ecosys-
tems, which increase the chances of invasion (Ibid: 40). The monoculture is determined as “more 
susceptible to new organisms” (Ibid), which explains the increasing resistance to antibiotics and 
dangerous microorganisms transmitted by the growing flow of people and goods. Furthermore, 
Kvaløy claims that maintaining monocultures means a fight against nature’s own way of being 
(Ibid: 46). A fight, which we are doomed to lose due to the prevalence of nature’s superior sources 
of multiplicity and ingenuity over the power magnet of our epoch, namely, the industrial system 
grounded in the competition (KIS) (Ibid).  
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ternal influences by developing its own resistance. His statement corre-
sponds to what is defined by the other representatives of snm as a connec-
tion between the establishment of monoculture and so-called mono-
production (Ibid: 52-52). The representatives of snm also argue that the EU 
has traditionally tried to solve the stabilization problem with colonization. 
However, its attempts to stabilize a given monoculture as achieved by 
adopting different forms of trade represent only a short-term solution be-
cause the population and the use of resources increase everywhere in the 
world (Ibid: 53). 
On a macro methodological level, it means that building a monoculture by 
establishing mono-production with a capital letter is a matter of relying on a 
vicious circle since it is grounded in providing quantitative solutions for 
qualitative problems, as I showed above.  
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4.4. Isolation vs. Solidarity in the EU 
Kvaløy sees the recognition of normative validity of natural, i.e. of the di-
versity of ecosystems and the multiplicity of cultures respectively, in what 
forms the perspective of complication, which is determined as isolation. 
According to him, taking off the border control leads to reducing the bio-
geographical obstacles that influence the development of life’s diversity on 
the Earth (Ibid: 32). Within the framework of complexity vs. complication 
model, isolation should be understood as a preservation of ecosystems’ on-
tological potential, which may be questioned by bioinvasion. Such a threat 
is born in the process of globalization that endangers the development of the 
net of ecosystems by denying the normative validity of the boundaries as 
such515. Thus it diverts the logic of establishing the normative validity of 
the natural status quo.  
In turn, the fight for normativity could be examined as supported by inflict-
ing different fears in the society through adopting different rhetoric strate-
gies. Due to establishing relevant ecopolitics, the fear of increasing pollu-
tion is recognized as proportional to the fear of destroying life’s diver-
sity516. Against the background of what Chr. Bright calls invasion diseases 
(Ibid: 36) these fears raise the question what kind of politics should be ap-
plied in order bio-invasion to be restricted. 
On a macro methodological level, the normative validity of isolation as a 
‘state of nature’ contradicts the isolation understood as an ethical and socio-
political problem, namely, as a matter of alienation. Within the framework 
of the debates about the Norwegian membership to the EU, Kvaløy and 
some of the supporters of snm agree on the following issue: solidarity is of 
crucial importance for reconsidering the role of global arena. In turn, Dag 
Seierstad discusses whether the EU is not the political answer for the glob-
                                           
515 A relevant embodiemnt of the latter can be seen in what Harper calls a climate changing Europe 
(Harper 2006: 15). In this context, I reach the conclusion that the climate changes gradually turn into 
a sovereign power such as the market itself, which leads to diverting the logic of being and becom-
ing. 
516 In this context, the developing oil industry is given as an example of why the threat of erasing 
boundaries is a crucial threat for life’s diversity. 
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alization, but rather its inspiratory (Seierstad 2005: 22)517. That is why the 
political answer should be sought by questioning big concerns’ politics 
whose main objective is to expand the force of capital518.  
In turn, it is problematic to keep thinking about the relationship between big 
and small as a methodological pattern giving omnipotent solutions. Accord-
ing to D. Seierstad, since the Norwegian population is 1% of the whole 
population of the EU, it is easier to change the Norwegian politics rather 
than the one of the EU, albeit changing the latter is more important for the 
others (Ibid: 23). In this context, he raises the rhetorical question: What 
should we choose: the simpler or the more important solutions? 
On the other hand, extrapolating Seierstad’s statement, I also draw the con-
clusion that one of the main methodological counter arguments is that we do 
not have to examine solidarity as a ‘possession’ of the minority i.e. as justi-
fied by analogy with the contradiction between ‘big’ and ‘small’. A possible 
solution can be found in Kvaløy’s principle of collaboration due to which 
the unity is initiated by respecting not only the interests of other species, but 
also human interests as such. However, accepting his position of keeping 
the physical isolation also creates some difficulties because keeping “offen-
sive close interests” smaller (Ibid: 24) does not make them less offensive, 
neither less interests at all. Such a problematic conception underlies the pro-
cess of the pseudo-justification of the globe as globality, which in turn leads 
to making rich countries richer and poor poorer.  
How can we summarize Kvaløy’s and Seierstad’s main arguments against 
the potential accession of Norway to the EU? A tentative answer can be 
found in snm’s stance that it is a “positive no” (et positivt nei) (snm 1974: 
93). No, which means “yes” to the fight for a well-balanced future society; a 
society that provides democratic conditions for people and meaningful col-
lective work with nature instead of a fight against nature (Ibid). The fight 
                                           
517 Seierstad gives examples with different conferences, where Norway has declared its support for 
the developing countries by ratifying different crucial moratoriums such as the conferences in Jo-
hannesburg (2002), in Rio (1992), the one in Montreal (2000) etc. (Ibid: 26-27). However, we 
should be skeptical about justifying a correspondence between the size of the country and the degree 
of solidarity it shows as well as whether to be outside of the EU is a necessary and sufficient condi-
tion for being a morally engaged political state. In this context, Seierstad’s question whether the EU 
is a project of solidarity (Ibid: 4) finds its well-justified no-answer. 
518Taking into account that Norway is a part of the EEA, it follows many of the EU’s market regula-
tions, which directly or indirectly, affect the developing countries. 
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for the balanced society is defined as one giving inexhaustible joy and op-
portunity for internal growth, with its “fantastic, endless creative surplus” 
(Ibid).  
In other words, this tentative yes is recognized for the purposes of justifying 
an ecologically sustainable society in the long run. It presumes the devel-
opment of the welfare state to be done by solving the debate about how to 
eradicate ecological unsustainability. This is possible if the society in ques-
tion is determined as a life necessity society, where the standard of living is 
less important than raising the quality of life. On a macro methodological 
level, it is the ‘complication’ society that is described as a result of the EU’s 
global politics. Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I draw the 
conclusion that the ‘positive no’ can be interpreted as ‘no’ to the sustainable 
development society, justified by the EU, for the sake of saying ‘yes’ to the 
life necessity one.  
In this context, the democratic functioning of the small societies relies on 
the normative validity of the self-regulation process, which entails some of 
the characteristics of a life’s process, but being adopted for the purposes of 
the mutual commitment. The latter takes place by achieving consensus, 
which in turn is irreducible to compromise. By contrast, the self-
management in the global society, introduced within the EU, does not nec-
essarily concern people’s common interests, but rather experts’ ones, which 
are, first and foremost, economically oriented, and only afterwards, socially 
oriented. Against the background of such a self-management, nature’s own 
rules should be understood in a broader sense as referring to both man and 
nature in so far as man is an integral part of the biosphere. 
According to Kvaløy, the supporters of the potential accession of Norway to 
the EU believed that the Norwegian No in 1972 would contribute to the di-
vision of the EU (Ibid). The EU was defined as an “especially badly” suited 
organ for a collective work in terms of environmental political problems to 
the extent the ecopolitical co-work is a global issue (Ibid: 94). As a possible 
alternative of how to overcome the side effects of the bad common work, 
the representatives of snm outlined the globally responsible eco-politics, 
which would have provided a real protection of our life’s environment 
(Ibid). 
Judging by these investigations, I draw the conclusion that the ‘bad’ collec-
tive work could be recognized as a strictly operationalized one, which does 
not necessarily presume informed consent and commonly shared under-
standing of interaction to be adopted, i.e. this work could be uncontradictory 
justified even if it functions as a meaningless work. The only one require-
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ment is it to be uncontradictory in an administrative sense because its effi-
ciency is evaluated due to expanding the principles of the global market as 
having the highest ‘positive’ value by equating the latter with the concept of 
price. In conclusion, snm’s interpretation, and Kvaløy’s one in particular, 
concern the justification of a global transformation, which to emphasize the 
need of rehabilitating the concept of global responsibility (not only the one 
of global justice) as a prototype characteristic of the ecologically sustainable 
national and international politics. 
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Skirbekk’s significant contribution to the development of 20th-century 
Norwegian environmental philosophy can be traced, among many other 
issues, to the reconsideration of the limits of technological rationality by 
distinguishing between expertise and hermeneutic competence, to con-
ceptualizing the sense of belonging to nature within the framework of 
ethical gradualism, which requires a deeper ecological consciousness to 
be adopted as well as to the rehabilitation of the role of vital needs and 
vital interests by justifying the role of the welfare state in changing the 
vision of ecological reproduction. 
V.1. BOOSTING THE FAITH IN 
TECHNOLOGICAL PANACEA. THE 
PROBLEM OF TECHNICAL FIX 
1.1. Some Disadvantages of Technological 
Expertise. The Need of Counter-expertise  
Questioning the role of technological rationality is of crucial importance in re-
thinking the complex understanding of man’s self-realization as existentially 
dependent on the realization of nature by developing a unique sense of belong-
ing. The sense of belonging to nature, as introduced by Skirbekk, benefits clari-
fying the question why we should give preference to what I defined in the pre-
vious chapters as experiential knowledge over the ‘purely’ cognitive knowl-
edge. He defines the aforementioned sense as life’s attitude embodied in a par-
ticular “ecosophic reverence for life” (Skirbekk 1992: 95)519. 
While Næss and Kvaløy appeal for revising the status of the scientist and the 
politician by ‘equipping’ them with an extended competence, namely, with the 
                                           
519 The ecosophic reverence is associated by Skirbekk with mountaineering and ecological concerns 
(Ibid). It is understood in terms of Albert Schweitzer’s concept of “reverence for life” ethics (Ibid). 
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one of so-called by Kvaløy super amateur520, which is not equivalent to being 
inexperienced, Skirbekk looks for a transformation on the level of the normative 
validity of knowledge. So-called by Skirbekk hermeneutic mediation between 
the different disciplines (Ibid, Skirbekk 2007: 82) opens new perspectives in 
addition to the ones outlined by Næss and Kvaløy since adopting the hermeneu-
tic approach not only broadens the scope of the expertise itself, but it also 
strengthens the normative validity of both expert’s role and expertise in so far as 
it clarifies why the rationality is intrinsically connected with the process of un-
derstanding. 
On a macro methodological level, it means that instead of presuming a trans-
formation from the bottom to the top such as the one of introducing compe-
tence, which to avoid the reduction of knowledge to cognitive rationality, we 
have to revive what hermeneutic understanding is. This understanding does not 
follow a certain hierarchy of transformations, but affects them all at once due to 
the fact that it questions the normative validity of the rationality as rationality 
with a capital letter. In this context, we can talk about “supplementary exper-
tise” in Skirbekk’s sense (Ibid: 22, Ibid: 84) because it concerns the recognition 
of a complex change whose target is not only the subject and the idea of knowl-
edge, but also the rehabilitation of the complex human experience. 
According to Skirbekk, one of the main problems accompanying the process of 
modernization concerns the overexposed role of the “technical fix” in the deci-
sion-making process, which is recognized as a certain kind of panacea against 
all the societal and economic problems (Skirbekk 2007: 77). It is not the need of 
elaborating the role of technologies themselves, but rather the “optimistic be-
lief” in some technical fix521 (Ibid), as Skirbekk argues, which, in my point of 
view, corresponds to the consequences brought by already discussed by Kvaløy 
myth of final solution. In other words, the normative validity of the aforemen-
tioned panacea can be defined as deriving from the belief that relying on tech-
nologies, we can ‘fix’ all the possible problems by looking for technological so-
lutions alone.  
Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I argue that we can talk not only 
about narrowing the idea of expertise, but also about misrecognizing the norma-
tive validity as such reducing it to the one of verifying calculations. An illumi-
native example in this respect is examining the problem of the technological ex-
                                           
520 The role of the super-amateurs as generalists was already discussed in the chapter on Kvaløy. 
521 A similar concern is expressed byNæss and Kvaløy as well as by von Wright who argues against the 
growing technocratization, which turns into an aim in itself due to the ideology of the free market. 
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pertise in the framework of what Skirbekk characterizes as a cost-benefit analy-
sis (Ibid). Thus the ‘narrowing’ aspects of the expertise can be outlined if look-
ing for technological solutions for the economic problems evaluated on the ba-
sis of two prototype criteria, which are also economically determined, namely, 
the ones of costs and benefits. Furthermore, the justification of the connection 
between these criteria and means is described by Skirbekk as made for the sake 
of preparing for actions in accordance with the cost-benefit analysis in which 
the issues of cost and safety are defined by the experts (Ibid). The normative va-
lidity of this connection is grounded in the “ability of being scientifically ration-
alized” (Ibid), which makes the technologically based approach appropriate for 
the free-market economy (Ibid).  
However, the idea of expertise becomes so important because it should be ap-
plied to a situation of global crisis. According to Skirbekk, the experience of the 
crisis indicates not only the limits of nature, but also “a growing awareness” of 
the limitations of the technological rationality and practice (Skirbekk 1992: 1). 
Otherwise, the decision-making process would have remained ‘trapped’ within 
its own premises due to the fact that it works with purposes merely on an epis-
temological level. Furthermore, referring to the cost-benefit analysis means that 
the crisis expertise can be productive in short terms rather than in long ones in 
so far as it concerns the concept of interest, which is determined by the experts 
as a utilitarian interest. In turn, the self-regulation derives from the presumption 
that the basic needs are no longer regarded as implying the normative validity of 
the vital interests, but the other way around. The latter are examined as ‘pro-
duced’ by purposive rationality (Skirbekk 2007: 78) and that is why they are 
unquestionably determined as vital interests, albeit in practice they may function 
as non-vital ones. 
Regarding the safety criterion, the genealogy of the overexposed normative va-
lidity of rationalization can also be revealed by providing a well-grounded risk 
management. Extrapolating Skirbekk’s theory, this would mean to talk about an 
optimistic belief in the controllability of the risk management as such (Skirbekk 
2015: 2-3). Examining the reactions to the possibility of building a subsea ca-
ble522, Skirbekk claims that in the press, the project was represented by the ex-
                                           
522 Skirbekk discusses how Auke Lont, who became the new President and CEO of Statnett in 2009, 
declared that “According to our assessment, one subsea cable solution would not provide us with robust 
and secure power supply.” (Ibid: 1). Lont stated that the focus on security of supply, value creation and 
climate should step up developments in the years ahead. Examining the different arguments, Skirbekk 
poses the question whether the risk management is seriously considered by Statnett in a dialogue with 
some representatives of political and military authorities, discussing the option of choosing between 
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perts as a safe one since technological risks were defined as manageable ones 
(Ibid: 7). The role of specifying the impact of risk taking by avoiding the eco-
nomic argument523, accompanied with the one of elaborating an expertise in the 
process of comparing the benefits of similar initiatives, does not give better re-
sults either524.  
That is why I claim that the risk management is focused not on clarifying both 
the real risks and real consequences for the general audience, but rather on 
overexposing the role of safety, which is based on supporting the belief in the 
‘unquestionable’ parameters of the technological expertise such as preciseness 
and controllability. The consequences of the risk management are evaluated 
from the perspective of technological/economic understanding of success-
failure, which in turn is determined due to the implementation of the manage-
ability criterion. However, when we talk about politics and ecopolitics in par-
ticular, there is an intention of under-communication (Ibid: 7-8), as Skirbekk ar-
gues, which in turn strengthens the need of introducing the component of loy-
alty525 (Ibid: 8) to the ones that make technological rationality definable as pur-
posive one (Skirbekk 2007: 79). 
In this context, technological expertise should be recognized as an expertise 
with a capital letter in so far as it is presumably justified as a climax of the ra-
tionalization making the decision-making process recognizable as the best pos-
sible process. On a micro methodological level, the role of ‘pure’ cognitive 
knowledge is equated with the one of scientific rationalization, while the latter is 
defined as a modification of the utilitarian mode of maximizing economic 
goods and minimizing economic deficiencies. The problem arises from the fact 
that these goods are supposed to function as social benefits, albeit they are eval-
uated from an economic perspective alone due to the overexposed implementa-
tion of technologies. Thus the decision-making process is simplified to master-
ing one or another calculation for the sake of elaborating the calculation process 
                                                                                         
overhead lines and subsea cable (Ibid: 2). He also examines the double-blindness of the reasons behind 
Lont’s later decision to outline the challenges for Norway against the background of the problems 
Norway to contribute with the renewable energy and the need for a better climate (Ibid: 10). 
523 Skirbekk argues that when the economic argument is ‘dead’, the question about the subsea cable 
gains new power, namely, it starts concerning the need of power supply as a new crucial argument 
(Ibid: 7). 
524 According to Skirbekk, we live in an education society (utdanningssamfunn) (Ibid: 8). 
525 In democracy, loyalty to politics is described as preceding the loyalty to particular people (Ibid: 8).  
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as such since it is justified by the presumption that economic needs in the con-
temporary society are mainly vital needs. 
On the other hand, the optimistic belief Skirbekk talks about derives from the 
presumption that technology and free market economy are intrinsically depend-
ent on each other, which in turn requires they to be self-regulating due to the 
wisdom of “the invisible hand” (Ibid: 77-78). Furthermore, this wisdom is 
grounded in the epistemological equation of the potential impact of the techno-
logical and its real implementation on the market. Both modes, the ones of po-
tentiality and actuality, are interpreted as having similar ontological validity. 
That is why if we have to talk about global ethics in this context, it inevitably 
meets the requirements of the utilitarian one526. 
One of the main consequences of the optimistic belief in the technical fix is that 
the scientific expertise does not necessarily coincide with the technological one, 
albeit the latter undoubtedly represents a certain kind of scientific expertise527. 
The distinction between scientific and technological expertise should be traced 
on the level of defining what competence is, which has the expertise as a neces-
sary but not sufficient condition for its justification. Skirbekk argues that a 
“range of relevant branches of expertise is required in order to realize the vari-
ous consequences and to start discussing their negative and positive values” 
(Ibid: 81). A necessary condition is that “the right kind of expertise” is the one 
that does not operate with an “inadequately narrow range of disciplines”528 
(Ibid). Skirbekk claims that this condition should be taken into account “if we 
want to be rational in our attempt at understanding the case with its far-reaching 
consequences…” (Ibid).  
In turn, the idea of counter-expertise, which requires not narrow specialists, but 
rather generalists in Næss and Kvaløy’s sense to be involved is crucial for un-
derstanding the multiple aspects of the scientific expertise as well as for reveal-
ing its normative validity. So-called supplementing expertise (or counter-
expertise) (Ibid: 84) can easily lead to conflicts, as Skirbekk points out, firstly, 
                                           
526I argue that when the idea of global ethics is examined as based on a cost-benefit analysis, it 
would lead to its justification due to overexposing the role of the processes of maximization and 
minimization as its necessary and sufficient conditions.  
527 Analyzing the implications of what is technologically acceptable in respect with the ecological 
expertise, Skirbekk outlines the role of scientific expertise as creating an “optimal basis for decision 
makers” (Skirbekk 1992: 5). 
528 Skirbekk gives an example with the ecological expertise, which is embodied in many large scale 
projects (Ibid). 
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on a professional level regarding the self-understanding of the representatives of 
different disciplines, and secondly, on economic and political levels justifying 
various “particularistic short-term interests” (Ibid). On the other hand, the 
aforementioned expertise can also be examined as having a constitutive effect, 
namely, in terms of extending the criterion of verification to the one of norma-
tive validity due to which the counter examples are interpreted as showing the 
complexity of the chosen criterion.  
Questioning the idea of supplementing expertise is also important for understand-
ing why environmental politics is dependent on how we define verification as a 
main principle regarding the decision-making process. Going back to Skirbekk’s 
example with the subsea cable, we face the problems concerning the position of 
the energy minister Terje Riis-Johansen, who was called ‘The Bureaucrat’ in the 
press (Skirbekk 2015: 9). Among the three main weak points of the discussions in 
the press, Skirbekk outlines the point of first giving priority to the argument of 
economy and then replacing it with the one of power supply (Ibid). One of the 
crucial concerns is that reducing the problem of rationality to a cost-benefit analy-
sis indicates that rationality should be developed by providing minimum alterna-
tives, i.e. by gaining benefits while choosing the first ‘suitable’ alternatives. Only 
then it is relevant to talk about ‘economically rational way’ of solving social prob-
lems since the values will be ‘rationally’ (in a rationally grounded way) reduced to 
prices. If we want to avoid the recognition of this process, we should think about 
the opportunity to limit the technological expertise by introducing a better func-
tioning definition of what a competence is, as I argued above. 
The process of transformation is described by Skirbekk as a matter of overcom-
ing understood in Hegel’s sense (Skirbekk 2007: 87) in so far as the instrumen-
tal rationality is no longer seen as having a being in itself, but also a being for it-
self. According to Skirbekk, this is an internal overcoming of “a narrow techno-
logical expertise” toward a “discursive and procedural rationality” (Ibid: 83). 
Regarding the role of morality, such an overcoming concerns the eradication of 
the cost-benefit analysis at the expense of introducing global ethics in Skir-
bekk’s sense. In political terms, it affects the overcoming of narrow bureaucratic 
interests toward a “political culture of co-responsibility” (Ibid), which means 
that such an overcoming gains a global transformative function due to the nor-
mative validity of the process of transforming without annihilating. 
The latter process can be better understood if we not only question the overes-
timated instrumental role of rationality, but also the choice of the discourse it-
self. Skirbekk argues that the normative decision theory (and the rational choice 
theory respectively) is “a paradigmatic version of instrumental rationality”, 
which has an “appropriate function within some realm of action” (Ibid: 91, Note 
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4). In this context, he defines the process of overcoming as a matter of sublat-
ing: as a matter of both situating and translating since a relative legitimacy can 
be achieved within the theory of the communicative or normative regulating ac-
tion (Ibid). Such an interpretation raises the issue that the ‘ought to’ mode 
should be determined as a purely rational one because the ideal presumption of 
a rational choice is supposed to optimally regulate the accomplishment of the 
determined goals. Only then the latter can be defended as constitutive ones.  
That is why I argue that the instrumental aspects derive from the justification of 
the way of choosing understood as a way of accomplishing, i.e. as a process, 
which should be recognized as one of progression. The progression itself implies 
what Skirbekk calls “a knowledge of causal connections” (Ibid: 79): knowledge, 
which principally allows us to control events either by “precluding an undesired 
event” (by suppressing some causal elements), or by producing a desired one (by 
establishing the causal elements) (Ibid). Furthermore, the progress as such is justi-
fied by establishing causal connections for the sake of the overall maximization 
achieved by the best, in the sense of most rational, predictions, which can function 
as a certain kind of a grounded explanation. In turn, the technical fix is based on 
technological maximas, which are the ones whose normative validity directs the 
actions to what is defined as a technologically progressive way. 
On the other hand, the issue of unpredictability is also important for specifying 
the normative validity of the values and their adoption for the sake of supporting 
the technical fix. According to Skirbekk, we should strive for some modesty in 
our “ambitions for technological planning” (Ibid: 82) because this is “an issue 
of a political importance”529 (Ibid: 93, Note 15). The element of unpredictabil-
ity concerns our calculations of probability values (Ibid), which again leads to 
justifying the cost-benefit analysis as regulated by the criterion of verification.  
On a macro methodological level, questioning the impact of the taken for grant-
ed goals in the normative decision theory (in the sense that their ‘rightness’ is 
not discussed) (Ibid: 79) faces the difficulties in evaluating their consequences 
since the evaluation is a normatively determined process530. As Skirbekk 
                                           
529In this context, political importance can be traced back to the way the optimistic belief in the 
technical fix affects so-called social engineering. 
530The latter is a criterion of evaluating the possible benefits as ‘real’ or ‘unreal’ ones, while the cri-
terion regarding morality is the one of normative validity. 
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claims, it is “intuitively reasonable”531 to choose rationally between different 
alternatives (Ibid) while comparing highly probable with improbable conse-
quences, which in turn have highly positive or highly negative values532 (Ibid). 
Such an evaluation is a double-bind process. First, it concerns the probability of 
the consequences, in terms of desirability or lack of desirability, and second, it 
affects the consequences themselves. Relying on this intuition affects the need 
of evaluating the two aforementioned aspects due to the normative decision the-
ory, taking into account that the concrete evaluations are examined as a sum of 
“mathematical products” of probability values533 (Ibid), which aim at clarifying 
the normative validity of the chosen alternative.  
According to the normative decision theory, the agent is rational if he/she 
chooses the alternative with the highest sum of the mathematical products of 
probability values as well as the consequences of evaluation. Skirbekk argues 
that “the choice between playing safe and gambling is a choice of strategy, 
which appears somewhat differently in cases”, where the actor plays with hiw 
own interests or with the interests of other people534 (Ibid: 81) relying on the 
presumption that minimizing suffering has a broader effect than maximizing 
well-being.  
                                           
531 However, his definition of what reasonable intuition is does not correspond to Næss’s one, which 
meets the criteria of irrational insight. In contrast to Næss, Skirbekk provides well-grounded argu-
ments against another ‘extreme’ interpretation, namely, against defining reasonability as predictabil-
ity, which is understood as a sum of given calculations. 
532 As Skirbekk points out, the process of their evaluation is a normative one, while the one regard-
ing probability is a purely scientific problem (Ibid). 
533 Skirbekk claims that in the normative decision theory, the intuition is considered as based on the 
sum of mathematical products, i.e. on the “numerical size of probability and of desirability” for each 
consequence, as well as by characterizing the choice of the alternative with the highest positive sum, 
or the lowest negative sum, as the rational choice (Ibid: 80). 
534 This issue is another illuminative example showing why it is the criterion of normative validity ra-
ther than the one of verification that should be applied while evaluating people’s interests. It is the speci-
fication that the reasonable intuition is not ‘reasonable’ in the sense of predicting given changes, as I 
mentioned above. It is ‘reasonable’ since it is normatively grounded when others’ interests are at stake. 
Evaluating the consequences of probability values would lead to adopting a certain kind of utilitarian 
ethics, which, among many other problems, raises the following one: minimizing suffering to have a 
broader effect than increasing the well-being, which is not a less important issue. 
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1.2. Are Overcomers Super-amateurs? 
Another crucial issue that is related to the question why overcoming should 
be understood in Hegel’s sense as a dialectical transcending, as Skirbekk 
suggests, is the need of defining experts as generalists, as both Næss and 
Kvaløy do. According to Skirbekk, the different attitudes to such an ‘over-
coming transcendence’ regarding rationality lead to outlining the following 
four groups: the one of ‘technocrats’ (relying on a few natural scientific or 
technological disciplines), the group of ‘humanists’ (who underestimate the 
impact of the aforementioned disciplines), the one of ‘total-refusers’ (reject-
ing reason tout court), and the group of the ‘overcomers’ (‘sublaters’) (who 
appeal for overcoming the technological rationality in favor of hermeneutic 
understanding, which mediates between disciplines and researchers and 
general audience) (Ibid: 83, Skirbekk 1992: 7). The latter can be described 
as the category of generalists in Næss and Kvaløy’s sense, who argue in fa-
vor of multidisciplinarity that is not realized at the expense of underrating 
the role of the disciplinary knowledge. From that, however, it does not fol-
low that ‘more’ knowledge is better than ‘less’ knowledge (understood in 
quantitative terms), but rather that we need to reconsider the idea of norma-
tive validity of knowledge in qualitative terms.  
That is why the interdisciplinary competence of the generalists cannot be 
defined as a sum of given competences, but as grounded in broadening the 
concept of competence as such by justifying the normative validity of the 
interaction process. As a prototype characteristic of the latter, we can point 
the process of understanding, or what I called experiential understanding, 
which is not a matter of utilitarian predictability. In turn, the methodological 
difference between utilitarian and pragmatic takes place in so far as Skir-
bekk introduces a new discursive type of competence, which does not coin-
cide with the expertise. In this context, communicative rationality is deter-
mined as grounded in the “enlarged interdisciplinary understanding” be-
cause it is driven by a dialogical reflection of discursive or argumentative 
rationality (Skirbekk 2007: 83).  
Regarding ecological sustainability, the irreducibility of generalists’ compe-
tence to an expertise is concerned with the need of guaranteeing the legiti-
macy of the ecopolitical decisions. As Skirbekk argues, the administrative 
procedures are not enough for making political decisions (Skirbekk 2015: 
9). The problem is that from the fact that certain interests are not explicitly 
stated, it does not follow that they are supported due to adopting a generalist 
competence because the latter presumes its own boundaries to be estab-
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lished as a result of an enlightened consensus. Extrapolating Skribekk’s 
analysis, I argue that while the administrative staff mainly relies on expert 
knowledge, the politicians should master a competence, which to contribute 
to relevantly justifying the decision-making process as a process with a cer-
tain normative validity, i.e. they should react as generalists in Næss and 
Kvaløy’s sense. 
Furthermore, Skirbekk points out that the politicians should not permit to be 
dominated by powerful expert groups (Ibid: 18). The statement presumes 
generalists’ responsibility of a different type to be adopted. Extrapolating 
Kvaløy’s theory, I claim that this responsibility is more complex than the 
one of the narrow specialists which is two-folded: it can be either right or 
wrong in so far as its demarcation criterion is the one of verification. Since 
generalists’ competence is based on looking for more than one alternative as 
well as on not necessarily choosing the first appropriate alternative avail-
able, it provides more possibilities for mastering informed consent.  
That is why clarifying the methodological connection between politics and 
expertise is a leading factor in revealing how the issue of informed consent 
can contribute to strengthening the political engagement, including the one 
with nature. Speaking in negative terms, it is a political task to oppose a spe-
cialized narrowness (fagleg trongsyn) and narrowing expertise, as Skirbekk 
claims (Ibid: 12). For the purposes of avoiding such a simplification, he justi-
fies the role of the open discussions, which are not based on instrumental and 
strategic reason seen from the perspective of a narrowed model (Ibid). 
In turn, the reconsideration of the generalists’ competence is also crucial for 
reevaluating the issue of ecological sustainability due to the aims of build-
ing relevant environmental politics by determining politicians’ compe-
tence535, as I mentioned above. In this context, it becomes important to 
avoid making one given model dominate, as Skirbekk points out (Ibid: 8), 
because the narrow expertise affects the justification of the monopoly of 
knowledge.  
Regarding ecological expertise, at first sight, it seems that Skirbekk follows 
Næss and Kvaløy’s distinction of generalists and specialists, but he intro-
duces one more aspect, namely, the impact of normative evaluation, which 
is not explicitly outlined by both of them. Skirbekk claims that due to the 
ecological expertise, what is politically, economically and technologically 
                                           
535 Skirbekk points out that the politicians should be governed by “ecologically enlightened and ra-
tional expertise” (Skirbekk 2007: 89), which is realizable in the modern societies (Ibid). 
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possible is not always morally acceptable (Skirbekk 1992: 2). Regardless of 
the fact that both Næss and Kvaløy agree about the need of avoiding the 
scientification of ecology, their stances on how to overcome the is-ought 
distinction, while discussing environmental ethics, need further elaboration; 
especially in Næss’s writings who narrows morality to moralization due to 
his vision of imposing gestalt ontology as a paradigm of environmental phi-
losophy, as I already showed in the chapter on Næss. By contrast, Skirbekk 
explicitly argues that the question of evaluation is a normative one, which 
should be distinguished from the question of predictability. The latter is 
seen as a scientific prediction of possible results achieved by adopting sci-
entific methods536. 
Regarding ecological sustainability, we should examine its role within the 
framework of what Skirbekk calls a sustainable ecological reproduction, 
which is a part of sustainable socio-cultural reproduction (Skirbekk 2007: 
89). The ecological reproduction is defined as a “balanced interplay” of the 
instoitutions “for a sustainable future for the whole of our ecosphere” (Ibid) 
against the background of the joint appeal to “reasonableness, solidarity and 
co-responsibility” (Ibid). In this context, politicians’ competence can be de-
fined as concerning the generalists’ responsibility for preserving the socio-
political and cultural balance in the welfare state. 
In practice, the competence, having an impact on the clarification of so-
called Hardanger case537, affects how to take into account the role of cli-
mate changes as well as the implications of new, collaborative engagements 
(nye samarbeidsopplegg), which to be seriously evaluated by relevant and 
independent experts (Skirbekk 2015: 14). Skirbekk points out that we 
should pay attention to the case if a new evaluation requires gaining a po-
litical legitimacy (Ibid). Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I 
draw the conclusion that it is the role of evaluation that makes the expertise 
and competence similar and different at once. Due to generalists’ compe-
tence, the evaluation gains a broader normative validity, while due to pro-
viding a full expertise (understood as recognizing as much non-
contradictory knowledge as possible), the validity in question is reduced to 
the criterion of verification, which I already discussed. 
                                           
536 These methods were discussed in the previous chapter. 
537 The case with the subsea cable in Hardanger is an important topic of Skirbekk’s writings on the 
practical implications of Norwegian environmental politics. 
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On a macro methodological level, we should specify that the climate predic-
tion is always a matter of axiological predictions, when we talk about com-
petence in predicting climate changes. Skirbekk describes the problem as 
one of looking for environmentally optimal response (Ibid), which is an-
other example of why expertise and competence are irreducible to each oth-
er. However, it does not mean that the response in question is an aim of the 
generalists alone. Both specialists and generalists strive for preventing the 
climate change problems, albeit by implying different criteria of what ‘ob-
jective’ evaluation is. 
In this context, the ones who can be defined as specialists in examining the 
aforementioned problems are not only the narrow specialists themselves, 
but also the administrative staff since they aim at elaborating ‘true’ exper-
tise by calculating predictions. Comparing generalists and specialists, we 
should consider two different types of efficiency. Achieving short-term so-
lutions in the scope of environmental politics means a political task to be 
solved in an administrative way. In this case, the political efficiency is un-
derstood as coinciding with the administrative one, which would lead to 
simplifying and deteriorating the mechanisms of the welfare state by over-
exposing the role of rational expertise as a technological fixation538.  
Extrapolating Skirbekk’s theory, I draw the conclusion that generalists’ 
competence is defined as a multidisciplinary one, being recognized in quali-
tative rather than in quantitative terms since it is based on a pragmatic abil-
ity. The difference between the latter and the ability to automatically fulfill 
tasks is a matter of adopting a different kind of normative validity because 
the practical ability to move trans-disciplinary in Skirbekk’s sense (Skir-
bekk 2007: 82) concerns informed consent to be acquired through the proc-
ess of aware participation. Furthermore, such ability is affected by the in-
herent “need for interdisciplinary pluralism”, as he suggests, due to which 
the agents are seen as “the educated participants” in a democratic society 
(Ibid). On a macro methodological level, it means that the idea of compe-
tence, which is irreducible to the instrumental expertise supporting the tech-
nological fixation, is possible only in democratic societies, where the par-
ticipants are involved in open and enlightened discussions, as Skirbekk 
points out. 
                                           
538 Another problem derives from the bureaucratic language because it supports the instrumentaliza-
tion of values. 
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2. WHY IS ETHICAL GRADUALISM BACK 
ON THE SCENE? SKIRBEKK’S 
PERSPECTIVE 
ON ENVIRONMENTAL PHILOSOPHY 
Comparing already examined implications of Næss’s deep ecology and 
Skirbekk’s environmental philosophy, I argue that aiming to avoid ethical 
anthropocentrism, Næss advocates the justification of radical biocentrism, 
albeit he theoretically supports the principles of ethical gradualism, as I al-
ready showed in the chapter on Næss. In this context, an alternative solution 
for how the principle of solidarity could contribute to rethinking the nega-
tive consequences of radical biocentrism can be found in Skirbekk’s theory 
of ethical gradualism, which could be interpreted as a way to counter ethical 
anthropocentrism as a certain type of eco-speciesism. One of the main is-
sues regarding the clarification of the latter concerns the debate about actual 
and advocatory participation of the living beings, which presumes the con-
cept of moral difference to be examined on a different level, as Skirbekk 
suggests (Skirbekk 1994: 93). Furthermore, one of the main challenges is 
how to examine this difference beyond the scopes of both moral naturalism 
and moral absolutism, which however, does not mean that we should en-
tirely neglect the role of biological gradualism as such. 
In turn, Skirbekk does not completely deny the role of anthropocentrism, 
nor does he completely reject the one of biological gradualism. He claims 
that anthropocentrism can get a certain support within the framework of 
discourse ethics, but it is “only to a certain extent”, i.e. on an empirical level 
(Ibid: 92-93). Judging by his investigations, I draw the conclusion that Skir-
bekk makes a step further by rehabilitating the role of ethical gradualism 
and clarifying that even when a given form of anthropocentrism is permis-
sible, from that it does not follow that ethical anthropocentrism should be 
adopted (Ibid). 
The question why ethical gradualism is needed for the purposes of rele-
vantly evaluating the borderline cases, where due to ethical evaluations one 
species (or representatives of one and the same species) should be given 
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priority over another (or others), is preceded by the question concerning so-
called paradigmatic case of human beings. In turn, we should specify that 
the problem of choosing ‘either-or’ regarding human and other species’ re-
lationships is inevitably grounded in absolutizing the principle of priority, 
especially when we talk about either anthropocentrism, or biocentrism. 
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2.1. The Principle of Advocatory Representation 
One of the issues, which benefits rethinking the role of ethical gradualism is 
the principle of so-called advocatory representation, namely, the one clari-
fying how living beings, which do not have a relevant moral status can have 
moral rights as well as to be subjected to moral evaluation. According to 
Skirbekk, the notion of advocatory representation is “the standard case for 
minors” (Ibid: 81) concerning the delegation of responsibility. He also em-
phasizes that in certain cases, the advocatory representations can be gradu-
ally reduced in time, when the subjects become mature individuals who can 
take care of themselves (Ibid). 
As another crucial aspect, Skirbekk outlines the need discussed by J. 
Rachels to distinguish between being a subject to a biological life and being 
a subject to a biographical one (Ibid: 117, Note 10). For the animals, bio-
logical life coincides with the biographical one, so that it is problematic to 
use the latter as a criterion against killing animals. In turn, we may specu-
late whether this conception makes clear how to choose if two biographical 
lives are ‘at stake’, i.e. how to make a decision when killing is unavoidable 
anyway. Otherwise, we will face again a certain type of speciesism, namely, 
one individual of a given species to be recognized as more important than 
another one of a different species539. In this context, Skirbekk specifies that 
the confusing point is that “biology works with continuity whereas we are 
used to thinking of morality in terms of absolute borders” (Ibid: 85)540. 
However, the principle of advocatory representation leaves the question 
how to implement ethical gradualism unanswered. It still remains ambigu-
ous to define and establish one both objective and equally valid for every-
body concept of development (in the sense of maturity) in so far as the crite-
ria of human behavior, even the ones regarding the representatives of the 
human kind are very complicated. On the other hand, the concept of matur-
ity is a result of social elaboration, i.e. it can refer only to the ones recog-
nized as becoming members of the social communities. That is why the ad-
                                           
539 A more serious problem would arise when the individuals belong to one and the same species, 
which in turn is an illuminative example showing why ethical gradualism should be adopted. 
540 This is an argument against ethical speciesism. Skirbekk also emphasizes that our moral intuition 
of ethical speciesism presumes the definition of humankind to be provided in purely genetic terms 
(Ibid: 86).  
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vocatory representation is a complex issue requiring further examinations 
not only on an individual level, when we face the plurality of borderline 
cases, but also on a collective one since it is one and the same concept of 
maturity that should meet the criteria of a procedural consensus every now 
and then. An illuminative example of showing some difficulties on the level 
of community is what Skirbekk defines as a concern about the future gen-
erations (Ibid: 114). In this context, the broader application of maturity 
should be predicted so that the most complicated relationship between 
moral rights and moral status to be regulated (Ibid). 
On a macro methodological level, introducing ethical gradualism contrib-
utes to giving relevant suggestions for the discussions about actual and po-
tential properties of the beings due to the principle of advocatory represen-
tation. However, if we remain on the level of choosing between different 
types of properties alone, we still face the risk, as Skirbekk warns, of a pos-
sible naturalistic fallacy541, namely, the ‘is’ mode to be misconceptualized 
as ‘ought’ one since relying on the ‘is’ premises does not lead to a norma-
tive conclusion. 
On a macro methodological level, Skirbekk argues that one of the greatest 
challenges is rethinking the relationship between paradigmatic and gradual 
thinking, which concerns the clear justification of the moral status of hu-
mans as well as the definition of gradualism having different aspects such as 
the one of the biological gradualism. Furthermore, he points out that over-
coming this challenge is possible within the field of discourse ethics (Ibid: 
87). It is important to specify that if ontological gradualism, based on actual 
and potential properties, is represented as an ethical one, then we will be 
forced to adopt ethical speciesism, or biological gradualism in the best sce-
nario. 
In turn, so-called reasonableness of intuition regarding the definition of eth-
ical gradualism can be referred to what Skirbekk describes as a gradual 
transition from the paradigmatic case of autonomous persons to the cases of 
“mere” moral subjects (Skirbekk 1996: 35). Before examining the concerns 
about the implementation of ethical gradualism as such, I will focus on the 
genealogy of the distinction between moral subjects, moral agents and mor-
al discussants, as displayed by Skirbekk. According to him, moral agents 
are all humans, but not all members of Homo sapiens are moral agents (e.g. 
                                           
541See Ibid: 119, Note 17. In this reference, Skirbekk does not examine the concrete implementa-
tions of the naturalist fallacy but rather points out the role of the principle of equality. 
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fetus, mentally retarded people etc.). There are those who are able to take 
part in moral discussions, which means again that moral discussants are all 
humans, but not all members of Homo sapiens are moral discussants (e.g. 
infants) (Ibid) (Skirbekk 1994: 105). Judging by these investigations, Skir-
bekk claims that the complex interrelations between moral agents and moral 
discussants are examined in the universal pragmatics as well as in the theo-
ries of socialization and modernization (Ibid: 103). Last but not least, those 
who are neither moral agents nor moral discussants, but who can still be 
morally harmed, are defined as moral subjects542.  
                                           
542 “The beings who only belong to this category we could, for the lack of a better name, call moral 
subjects”. (Skirbekk 1996: 45, Note 16). 
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2.2. Skirbekk’s Definitions of Moral Subject, 
Moral Agent and Moral Discussant 
Regarding the three types of categories, namely, moral subjects, moral 
agents and moral discussants, I will first explore Skirbekk’s distinction be-
tween moral subjects and moral agents because its clarification is important 
in terms of revealing the normative validity of what moral obligations 
should be. According to Skirbekk, moral agents are capable of acting mor-
ally, while moral subjects “are capable of being harmed in a morally rele-
vant sense” (Skirbekk 1994: 101). In this context, moral obligations are de-
fined in respect with the “interrelationship between moral agents and their 
relationship to moral subjects” (Ibid). Moral subjects “who are not moral 
agents are unable to have obligations…” (Ibid). 
The concept of moral subject can be described as a broader one compared to 
the notion of moral agents whose prototype characteristic is the capability 
of acting morally. This agency is determined as a matter of rational evalua-
tion, which makes agents reasonably active, but at the same time, such an 
evaluation may not necessarily require to building a morally motivated 
moral engagement in so far as moral motivation is not equivalent to build-
ing a rational motivation, as Skirbekk argues. It is moral discussants whose 
moral agency is initiated by some open and enlightened discussions leading 
to a consensus on how to react morally (Ibid: 102). This, however, does not 
mean that the motivation is a purely moral one. We may give many exam-
ples in this respect such as reciprocal altruism, behavior of social sanctions 
etc.543, which require a moral action to be performed as driven by a com-
plex moral motivation. Furthermore, due to the specificities of the different 
social practices and their requirements, there might be a gap between the ra-
tional consensus what an ethical agreement is and the pure moral motivation 
for initiating a moral behavior as a result of a given agreement. 
                                           
543 Skirbekk also raises the following important question: could we claim the other way around i.e. 
that being able to participate in a moral discourse is a sufficient condition for being able to act mor-
ally? (Ibid: 103). According to him, it depends on the presuppositions regarding the concept of mor-
al discussant (Ibid). 
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Against the background of these specifications, I draw the conclusion that 
the difficulties in defining the status of moral subjects544 partly derive from 
the fact that there is a tendency they to be misleadingly treated as objects of 
moral interest545. They are not able, and this characteristic brings us back 
not only to the debates about how the actual and potential abilities directly 
to affect moral agents and discussants, but also to the ones how moral sub-
jects to be treated on their behalf (for their own good) by avoiding their 
treatment as moral objects. 
Animals also meet the definition of moral subjects to the extent moral 
agents, or moral discussants, are the ones deciding on their behalf for the 
sake of their own well-being. It is the two characteristics, namely, not only 
deciding on the behalf of, but also for the sake of that make the principle of 
advocatory representation recognizable as an ethical principle. The ethical 
aspect derives from moral agents’/moral discussants’ understanding that to 
be harmed is a morally unacceptable action, which they project on animals, 
being aware that the latter are not able to reflect on that state in a morally 
relevant manner. The obligation stems from the ideal presumption that since 
someone is defined as a moral agent/moral discussant, he/she becomes re-
sponsible for the decision-making process he/she participates in. On a mac-
ro methodological level, the principle of advocatory representation is 
grounded in the unquestionable moral obligation one to be morally engaged 
with the diversity of otherness. This principle can be referred to specifying 
the normative validity of the distributive responsibility regarding the obliga-
                                           
544 The concept of moral subject is a double-bind one depending on whether it is examined in con-
trast to, or in relation to the status of the moral agents and moral discussants. When moral subjects 
are defined in contrast to moral agents and moral discussants, they represent borderline cases of in-
dividuals or species (including some particular groups of people), which cannot become moral 
agents and moral discussants. However, when moral subjects are examined in respect with moral 
agents and moral discussants, i.e. when it is emphasized that the latter groups are also moral sub-
jects, the definition of moral subject is analyzed from the perspective how one to develop a compe-
tence from a pragmatic point of view. In other words, I argue that while ‘the positive’ definition of 
moral subjects mainly concerns the representatives of human kind, the ‘negative’ one characterizes 
the group of non-humans, plus some groups of people i.e. moral subjects who are unable to become 
neither moral agents, nor moral discussants. 
545 They represent borderline cases of different species since the criterion of selection is the capabil-
ity of making moral decision and exerting undoubted moral actions. Furthermore, defining the status 
of moral subjects as ‘incapable’ moral agents or moral discussants raises the risks the subjects in 
question to be objectified in the ethical sense of the word. 
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tion to care, which is exerted by the moral agents or moral discussants. As a 
prototype characteristic of such a responsibility we can determine what 
Skirbekk calls an evaluation of the moral importance of what one does and 
does not do, which provokes an action “in accordance with that understand-
ing and evaluation” (Ibid: 101). The stress is also put on the mode of distri-
bution, which is understood as a mode ‘in accordance with’ what is morally 
valuable. 
Having clarified the methodological differences between moral subjects and 
moral agents and moral discussants, we should also specify the complex re-
lationships between the three groups since such an analysis is of crucial im-
portance for understanding why discourse ethics provides better solutions in 
terms of building moral obligations to moral subjects. Skirbekk argues that 
the concepts of moral agent and moral discussant are co-extensive: those 
who are able to act morally are able to discuss546 moral actions and vice 
versa (Ibid: 102). However, he points out that even if these concepts are co-
extensive, they do not converge into one. That is why it is reasonable to 
think of moral agents as potential moral discussants (Ibid). Skirbekk claims 
that the interrelatedness of moral agency and ethical discourse can be elabo-
rated by referring to the universal pragmatics (as represented by Apel and 
Habermas) as well as to the theory of socialization and modernization (as 
defined by Kohlberg and Weber) (Ibid). 
However, evaluating the similarities is easier compared to outlining the dif-
ferences because it is easier to imagine a case in which moral agents547 be-
come moral discussants due to the process of cultivating sensitivity towards 
otherness by initiating open and enlightened discussions, as Skirbekk out-
lines. It occurs since both moral agents and moral discussants are able to 
exert moral agency as well as to be morally engaged, taking into account 
that in both cases a certain level of moral awareness and reflection is need-
                                           
546 If we refer to Skirbekk’s thought-experiment with the robots and Martians (Ibid: 99-100), we see 
that there might be borderline cases in which some agents to be able to act morally but without be-
ing able to discuss the actions in question in so far as they miss a relevant bodily experience, or are 
not aware about the complexity of moral motivation as such. 
547According to Skirbekk, the difference between moral agents and moral discussants can be also a 
result of moral agents’ disability to be good at discussing ethical issues, albeit they may have good 
(in ethical sense of the word) intentions. On the other hand, he also emphasizes that the ones who 
are good at arguing might be self-deceptive due to different reasons such as having “false con-
sciousness”. This is the case when one is what one is doing but does not see the consequences, 
which might be negative ones. 
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ed. Exploring the differences hides the risk to go back to examining the 
mode of the paradigmatic beings, namely, to go back to the idea of potential 
and actual capabilities, albeit this time they are elaborated on the level of 
moral commitment as moral (potential or actual) qualities. If in the case 
with potential and actual capabilities, the elaboration is examined as an evo-
lution, or as a certain type of biological development, in the one with poten-
tial and actual moral qualities, it is justified as a cultivation provoking moral 
agency. In turn, the cultivation concerns the opportunity of providing an 
evaluation, i.e. of making moral agents/moral discussants aware of the mor-
al motivation behind a given moral action. In turn, the motivation is irre-
ducible to the physiological explanations what the process of elaboration is, 
albeit it can partly be driven by them. 
Undoubtedly, the ability to discuss moral questions presumes considerable 
intellectual skills to be adopted as well as a certain training to be mastered 
(Ibid). As Skirbekk argues, the latter requires not only having mature indi-
viduals, but also a given cultural development, which is a matter of “a cer-
tain degree of modernization” (Ibid). In this sense, the definition of moral 
discussants becomes understandable if we determine what a moral devel-
opment is within the broader framework of cultural and social definitions 
and thus to trace both the origin and the role of the enlightened discussions. 
Skirbekk claims that the concepts of moral agents and moral discussants do 
not have to be explored in empirical terms, but rather in terms of presuppo-
sitions and idealizations (Ibid: 103), i.e. in the field of universal pragmatics 
by outlining “competences inherent in speech acts”, as well as due to the 
theory of modernization and socialization regarding the impact of concep-
tual development and the development of social identity (Ibid).  
This theory also affects how to extend the practice of advocatory represen-
tation by investigating the role of gradualism not only in terms of physio-
logical and psychological capabilities, but also in the ones of discursively 
achieved decisions by giving an answer to the value question What is a 
“good life”? on behalf of moral subjects (Skirbekk 1996: 35).  
Skirbekk claims that everybody with a point and everybody concerned 
should have a say, in a normative sense (Skirbekk 1992a: 96). He also dis-
cusses the role of pragmatically competent speakers who are not able to par-
ticipate because they could not be there at a certain time, or who cannot yet 
participate (children), or who are no more able to participate, the ones who 
could never be able to participate in any discourse (babies with severe brain 
defects) (Ibid). An important sub-group is the one of the “merely hypotheti-
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cal participants, of coming generations” (Ibid) who are not yet individual-
ized, but who are statistically recognized (Ibid).  
One of the main issues in this context is how by defining the pragmatically 
competent speaker, we can avoid legitimizing a given kind of speciesism 
since we differently talk about the discursive representation by somebody 
else (Ibid: 97). Skirbekk finds a solution in determining the pragmatic ca-
pacity, namely, he goes beyond justifying the biological implications of 
what a legitimate participant is at the expense of emphasizing the aspects of 
the pragmatic capacity, understood as aspects of a mastered competence ra-
ther than biological capability.  
What is the role of so-called paternalistic agreements, or decisions based on 
discursive interpretations of available and “relevant knowledge”? (Skirbekk 
1996: 36). According to Skirbekk, “the discursive element remains un-
touched” (Ibid), but “the participatory and consensual aspects are weak-
ened” due to establishing forms of advocatory representation (Ibid). Since 
many of the moral subjects in the welfare state can never be autonomous 
persons, it does not make sense these arguments to be called “paternalistic” 
ones in an unqualified pejorative sense (Ibid). However, we should distin-
guish between various kinds of paternalism, as Skirbekk suggests: ‘some 
being legitimate, others not’ (Ibid). He argues that adopting this term is ap-
propriate for moral, legal and political theory to the extent that social poli-
tics aims at protecting the interests of “moral subjects”-beings who are only 
potential moral agents, (or “moral discussants”) (Ibid). That is why it is ir-
relevant to call this “an act of illegitimate paternalism” (Ibid). 
Furthermore, it is important to clarify that avoiding the pejorative aspects of 
paternalism depends not only on how we decide, but also on who decides 
because the decision-making process should be realized on behalf of the 
others, when they are moral subjects alone. That is why I argue that regard-
ing the principle of advocatory representation, it means we to choose a dif-
ferent type of a ‘positive’ definition, as I already argued, i.e. the one of what 
these moral subjects are rather than relying on the negative one saying what 
they cannot be. On a macro methodological level, such a change demon-
strates that the illegitimate paternalism can be avoided if we examine others 
as moral subjects, not as incapable moral agents and/or moral discussants. 
However, we should keep the criterion of capability in mind, in both ethical 
and biological sense, because such a specification is a necessary but not suf-
ficient condition for acting morally.  
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2.2.1. The Criteria of Continuity and Discontinuity. Does 
Biological Gradualism Still Have a Place in the Ethical 
Anthropocentrism? 
In this context, one of the main risks is to overexpose the impact of the para-
digmatic case of human beings, which to lead to what Skirbekk calls ethical 
anthropocentrism based on the discussions about the role of actual and poten-
tial properties of the individuals (Skirbekk 1994: 84). Overexposing the role 
of properties would provoke simplifying not only the similarities, but also the 
differences between moral agents and moral discussants. Despite the fact that 
ethical gradualism does not exclude by default the development of a certain 
type of ethical anthropocentrism, it cannot be reduced to the latter since the 
process of moral differentiation goes beyond the problem of real properties, 
which are a prototype characteristic of the aforementioned paradigmatic case. 
Furthermore, if we want to examine the benefits of adopting ethical gradual-
ism beyond the field of ethical anthropocentrism, we should pay attention to 
the status of moral discussants as social beings. According to Skirbekk, hu-
man freedom, which sets people off from nature, is closely tied with their 
status as social beings (Ibid: 88) because it concerns the social identities of 
the ones who communicate by language (Ibid). Transcending the limits of 
the immediate adaptation, human beings become able to develop their prog-
nostic attitudes by making a socially determined existential choice between 
different alternatives rather than by making a prediction, which concerns 
one and the same paradigmatic case. In turn, the socially determined choice 
is a result of a reflexive decision-making process, which is driven by what 
Skirbekk calls “personal identity acquired through a vulnerable process of 
socialization and individualization” (Ibid).  
Regarding the connection between ethical gradualism and ethical anthropo-
centrism, we can talk about normative continuity in terms of what Skirbekk 
defines as paradigmatically appropriate characteristics of humans as moral 
beings (Ibid). These characteristics justify the normative validity of continu-
ity of moral beings as such since the “phenomenology of humans as moral 
beings” (Ibid) is a necessary condition for avoiding the reduction of ethical 
gradualism to ethical anthropocentrism, which can be defined as a certain 
kind of eco-ethical speciesism. 
According to Skirbekk, the arguments from potentiality are determined as 
“partly reasonable” ones (Ibid: 84). One can always go further because they 
entail “an implicit normative notion of nature” (Ibid: 117, Note 9), which in 
turn hides the risk of reducing ethical gradualism to a biological one. Oth-
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erwise, it would mean to introduce a given kind of misleading determinism 
intermingling the current moral status of the individuals with their future 
status by accepting reality as a necessary and sufficient condition for prog-
nostics. It would affect the equation of the capability with the probability 
mode. 
As Skirbekk claims, the ability to act rationally and freely does not neces-
sarily support the idea of moral difference (Ibid: 89) and its implementation 
in practice, while distinguishing between humans and non-humans as well 
as between the representatives of human species as such. He specifies the 
role of so-called potentiality of a second order, i.e. the potentiality of having 
potentialities (Ibid). One of the challenges in this context is that changing 
the focus from considering the real potentials of an individual to the ones of 
the species which the individual belongs to would lead to replacing the in-
dividual characteristics with the species’ ones in the process of moral evalu-
ation. Thus we face what Skirbekk calls a distinction between genetic and 
conceptual approaches (Ibid: 90) in so far as the genotype difference is not 
enough for providing a well-grounded moral differentiation, not only when 
we compare two different species such as human and chimpanzee (Ibid: 89), 
but also when we compare representatives of one and the same species. 
Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I conclude that the argument 
of potentiality can be accepted as an unquestionable one within the frame-
work of ethical gradualism only if we deliberately interfere the first and se-
cond orders of potentialities. In turn, one of the main issues concerning the 
clarification of the debate about the actual and potential properties presumes 
the concept of moral difference to be examined on a different level, as Skir-
bekk suggests (Ibid: 119, Note 17). Therefore, the problem is how to inter-
pret this difference beyond the scope of moral naturalism as well as how to 
avoid a certain form of moral absolutism to be established, which can be 
provoked by imposing the principle of ontological determinism. 
The other side of the coin of the properties’ debate is the one regarding the 
distinction between continuity and discontinuity, examined against the 
background of the utilitarian and deontological positions, which narrows 
ethical gradualism to the biological and psychological ones. In this context, 
Skirbekk explores the question how to define morally relevant continuity 
and discontinuity in respect with biological gradualism548 while talking 
                                           
548As one of the most outstanding aspects of utilitarian theory, Skirbekk points out the role of biological 
and psychological gradualism as implying ethical gradualism from an utilitarian perspective (Ibid: 94). 
 471
about humans and non-humans (Ibid: 85), i.e. how to define them in norma-
tive terms, which can contribute to avoiding the interference of the first and 
second order potentialities. We may argue that the difficulties in specifying 
the relationships between the different types of gradualism concern also the 
fact that it is problematic to determine some unquestionable criteria for ap-
plying biological gradualism such as the one of sentience. In other words, 
the problem is how can we firmly define the characteristic of being sentient 
as a prototype one, which in turn to benefit the justification of suffering as a 
morally inappropriate one? Such an interpretation would lead us to adopting 
again the mode of ‘Whose justice? Which rationality?’ while talking about 
the normative validity of sentience. It raises the concern whether we will 
not remain trapped again in the framework of ethical anthropocentrism 
since the criterion of sentience is determined from a human point of view.  
 472
2.2.2. The Role of Suffering with, or without Compassion549  
According to Skirbekk, the problem of suffering is intrinsically connected 
with the status of the moral agents, which requires a further elaboration in 
so far as it theoretically displays a mediating status between two extremes, 
namely, between the fully competent moral subject (the moral discussant) 
and the completely incompetent one (the moral subject) (Skirbekk 1992a: 
99-100). Furthermore, if we do not discuss whether the good will is a prem-
ise for being a moral agent since the latter is seen as capable to act morally, 
we should leave the question of the moral motivation550 open, as I already 
argued. We should also leave the one how a moral agent can do immoral 
things open. Thus we will be forced to neglect problems such as the one of 
the harm of white lie. On a macro methodological level, following this line 
of arguments would provoke the wrong conclusion that the concept of ethi-
cal discourse never changes.  
In this context, Skirbekk argues that those who cannot be harmed in a mor-
ally relevant sense cannot be moral subjects, and therefore, they cannot be 
moral discussants551 (Skirbekk 1994: 104), even if “they have the intelli-
gence, the information and the semantic competence required” (Ibid). These 
investigations raise, among many other issues, the following questions: 
what would be the status of the moral agents if they are only able to act 
morally, without necessarily experiencing moral harms? What kind of sub-
jects are they? How do they exactly differ from the moral discussants? And 
last but not least, is not it the characteristic of moral acting too broad includ-
ing creatures such as the Martians and the robots of Skirbekk’s thought-
                                           
549Before examining some implications of Skirbekk’s theory of compassion, it is important to em-
phasize that he recognizes compassion as something that comes naturally not in the sense of moral 
naturalism, but rather in terms of ontological ethics, namely, as something very basic and human 
that determines our life as human beings. In turn, it is culture, religion and mythology that provide 
the ‘differentiation’ of understanding compassion and anger in the different types of societies. 
550Otherwise, we should presume a complete overlapping between deeds and motivation claiming 
that a certain deed is a moral one because it is driven by default by a purely moral motivation. 
551 The problem is whether and how we will define the issue of moral harm due to the principle of 
advocatory representation. If so, it raises again the question about the connection between moral and 
rational reasons for the definition of harm. Moral agents have an ethical knowledge of harm, so to 
speak, but do not necessarily have a moral experience in contrast to the moral discussants. This is 
one of the reasons why Skirbekk examines different borderline cases such as the ones with the ro-
bots and Martians as belonging to the group of moral agents. 
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experiment, which are deprived of the experiential capability of being mor-
al, and if so, are they moral subjects and moral agents at all? According to 
Skirbekk, biologically rooted learning and vulnerability represent a shared 
foundation of moral discussants, moral agents, and moral subjects (Ibid: 
105). 
An illuminative example in this respect is what Skirbekk outlines as a 
change in the questioning mode. Referring to J. Bentham’s theory, he ar-
gues that the question is no longer “Can they (animals) reason? nor “Can 
they talk?”, but “Can they suffer?” (Ibid: 94). However, even if sentience is 
determined due to whether it can be witnessed or not, the evaluation of bio-
logical gradualism remains a necessary but not sufficient condition for de-
fining ethical gradualism. 
In this context, Skirbekk clarifies that while the principle of advocatory rep-
resentation reveals why animals do not have rights in the full sense as hu-
man beings have rights, the issue of compassion gives new perspectives for 
moral evaluation beyond the intuitions of continuity and discontinuity 
(Skirbekk 1992a: 92-93).  
Furthermore, Skirbekk claims that discourse ethics and utilitarianism are 
two rationalized approaches, which support the intuition of making a differ-
ence between man and animals as well as the one between them in respect 
with continuity (Ibid: 92). He also argues that neither of these two ap-
proaches “fully captures the dimension of compassion, which has an impor-
tance of its own” (Ibid: 93). Compassion concerns not only the understand-
ing of the main aspects of human relationships with higher mammals and 
the full eco-ethical status of the latter, but also the “widening of the human 
self-understanding and identity relative to these animals” (Ibid). 
On a macro methodological level, I argue that the role of compassion in 
building experiential morality with a certain normative validity as well as its 
impact on cultivating so-called by Skirbekk eco-consciousness should be 
explored.  
Analyzing the role of eco-consciousness is important since having rational-
ized ethical procedures does not necessarily give us an answer to the ques-
tion what it means to be in someone else’s shoes, namely, how the ‘posi-
tive’ normative validity of moral imagination can be recognized. As I al-
ready argued in the previous chapters, moral imagination can be defined as 
having a different type of normative validity, which is irreducible to pure ir-
rationality, namely, it provides the need of rehabilitating the normative va-
lidity of feelings and emotions in building a complex eco-consciousness. In 
this respect, Næss’s statement regarding the introduction of new experien-
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tial learning should be positively evaluated. A similar line of thoughts is ar-
ticulated by Skirbekk who claims that the imagination of childhood and 
fairy tales might still be of some eco-ethical importance in the modern sci-
entized world552. According to him, they “teach us on a personally experi-
enced level something about the ecological togetherness and interdepend-
ence which scientific ecology describes and explains” (Ibid: 105). 
                                           
552 See also Næss’s comments on Feyerabend’s thesis why children should learn magic at school, 
which I discussed in the chapter on Næss. 
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2.2.2.1. Calculating Morally Unacceptable Killing. The Impact of 
Pain-calculus Utilitarianism 
According to Skirbekk, utilitarianism has some other problems of its own, 
which derive from the notion of justice when it is referred to the seeming 
asymmetry between negative and positive values such as pains and pleas-
ures (Ibid: 99). In these cases, we have different versions of utilitarianism 
depending on the subject they treat (Ibid). What are the consequences of 
that for so-called pain-calculus? Skirbekk argues that from a pain-utilitarian 
perspective, the “cases of equal pain have equal right or equal status”, re-
gardless of whether the pain is incarnated in a human body or in an animal 
body (Ibid). However, if the pain of smashing the hand of a man and chim-
panzee with a hammer is the same553, “how could the act be morally wrong 
in the first case and morally neutral in the second” one? (Ibid: 99-100)554.  
This example is instructive not only because it raises again the question of 
how we know that the pain is the ‘same’, namely, that there is an unques-
tionable connection between the physical experience and its moral evalua-
tion, and our knowledge about it respectively. It also benefits understanding 
how recognizing that we are moral discussants who interact with moral sub-
jects, which are initially deprived of the consciousness of what moral is, 
does not necessarily result in reducing the pain-calculus to a certain speci-
esism. Otherwise, the principle of advocatory representation would leave no 
room for compassion with other species. On a macro methodological level, 
it means that the comparative pain analyses require not only biological or 
psychological interpretations, but also ethical ones. This, however, does not 
mean to neglect the role of the former as a factor in providing such analy-
ses.  
Furthermore, it is the introduction of discourse ethics that makes pain analy-
sis going to a deeper level of evaluation, as Skirbekk suggests, by clarifying 
why albeit we do not underrate animals’ suffering in all its forms, we should 
distinguish between morally acceptable killing of animals and morally un-
                                           
553 By examining utilitarianist projections as a pain-related calculus, Skirbekk outlines the role of 
human-size mammals for measuring pain sensitivity in the bio-medical research (Ibid).  
554 Skirbekk emphasizes the role of immediate pain experience “disregarding the question of pain 
expectation or pain-remembering” (Ibid: 100). 
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acceptable killing of humans555 (Ibid: 101). As he points out, adopting such 
an approach brings us back to reviving the principle of advocatory represen-
tation supplemented with the criterion of painless killing of animals. 
An instructive example in this respect is how pain-utilitarian considerations 
are related to the principle of advocatory representation in practice, which in 
turn requires the pain-utilitarianism to be included into the discursive eco-
ethical procedures (Ibid: 102). The reconsideration of the issue of compas-
sion is of crucial importance for what Skirbekk calls a transition “from a 
compassion embracing pain and well-being to a compassion embracing only 
pain” as well as a transition from a compassion with an individual creature 
to a compassion with the species as such (Ibid: 104). Thus the debate about 
morally (un)acceptable killing gains another dimension, namely, it takes in-
to account the relationships between individual and collective suffering at 
once by illustrating why so-called preference utilitarianism should not be 
neglected. 
However, we should keep in mind that the pain-utilitarian calculus can non-
contradictory be carried out by a moral agent who does not feel compassion 
by relying on the means of scientific data and cost-benefit analyses, as Skir-
bekk relevantly argues (Ibid: 103). This investigation shows that ethical 
utilitarianism is not the most appropriate paradigm if we want to differenti-
ate the scale of minimizing pain and suffering because it does not take into 
account the whole complexity of the problem remaining focused on its 
regulation in quantitative terms. If we remain within the framework of these 
interpretations, it would mean that minimizing suffering would automati-
cally increase the well-being. Such a presumption is contradictory also in 
the sense that due to it compassion and empathy should increase the well-
being at any expense. Secondly, working in terms of calculating does not 
benefit the complexity of the specificities: neither of individual/species’ suf-
fering, nor of their well-being. 
In turn, the deontological paradigm is defined by Skirbekk as specifying 
why it is moral agents alone who can have moral rights in the process of 
evaluation (Skirbekk 1994: 95-96). Neglecting the diverse relationships be-
                                           
555 Furthermore, he also pays special attention to the difficulties regarding the definition of what 
morally acceptable killing is when we talk about painless killing of animals. Skirbekk claims that 
even if the latter may be justified by the transition from utilitarianism to discourse ethics, the pain-
less killing of people such as euthanasia remains even more questionable within the field of dis-
course ethics (Ibid: 101). 
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tween moral subjects, moral agents and moral discussants by specifying the 
status of the moral agents alone would lead to ethical anthropocentrism. 
Due to the latter, we will have the ideal image of a capable moral agent who 
exercises his/her rights in respect with the power of his/her duties. As 
Skribekk claims, moving from the status of moral subjects to that of moral 
agents affects the restriction of the conditions of being a moral subject (Ibid: 
95). The latter has an impact on the aforementioned debate by giving prior-
ity to the actual properties alone (since the possibility of having a real duty 
and the duty itself are important aspects of this ethics), but does not provide 
solutions by going beyond the debate as such. 
Referring again to Skirbekk’s thought experiment with the robots and Mar-
tians, which theoretically meet the requirements of moral agents, it would 
mean they to be able to require a reduction of suffering without being mor-
ally engaged. On the other hand, we should keep in mind that compassion 
can be felt without reaching a procedural consensus, even when we talk 
about mutual compassion, which illustrates why the rationalized ethical 
procedures provided by the discursive ethics are merely a necessary condi-
tion for encouraging empathy and compassion. In this context, Skirbekk 
makes the relevant comment that personal experience, plus scientific 
knowledge, plus discursively improved opinions are “all essential to pro-
mote compassion for “beasts” and other sentient animals and even to pro-
mote some deeper identification with all other species” (Ibid: 104). 
On a macro methodological level, discussing the role of compassion beyond 
the positions of both discursive ethics and utilitarianism is of crucial impor-
tance for justifying ethical gradualism as a measure against anthropocen-
trism seen as a form of eco-ethical speciesism (Ibid: 106). As Skirbekk ar-
gues, eco-ethical speciesism cannot be defended from a universal pragmatic 
position by referring to its formal characteristics, nor from a utilitarian posi-
tion (Ibid). However, this fact does not imply a relativism or reductionism 
of anything which, from the perspective of these two positions, can be said 
in favor of human dignity and worth (Ibid). Thus, according to Skirbekk, 
gradualism presupposes including non-humans to the extent they feel pain, 
have needs, or can even be ascribed an interest in the survival of the own 
species (Ibid). 
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2.3. The Remedy of Discourse Ethics. The Roles 
of Mini-ethics and Universal Ethics 
What would be the solution to the aforementioned problems as well as why 
is discourse ethics justified against the background of utilitarian and deonto-
logical ethics as providing some new alternatives for treating moral sub-
jects? Examining the role of universal pragmatics and discourse ethics, 
Skirbekk emphasizes “the operative priority” of answers revealing “insuffi-
cient perspectives or views” by stressing the need of improvement (Skir-
bekk 1992a: 95). However, from adopting such an approach it does not fol-
low that a certain “positive claim of absolute truth within the discursive 
procedure” (Ibid) is found. According to Skirbekk, gradualism is implicit in 
the process of ‘correcting’ in so far as it is based on the gradual nature of 
the tentative process of improvement (Ibid). On a micro methodological 
level, it means that we should talk about gradually increased discursive 
treatment dependent on the real case, but without presuming a definite end, 
which to provide guaranteed final answers (Ibid). It is the relevance of the 
pragmatic competence that reveals how discursive treatment is dependent 
on the “actual case” (Ibid) and as such has a normative validity with an un-
questionable status. The unquestionability itself derives from the presump-
tion that a definite end is not equivalent to having a final answer. On the 
contrary, it is a process of coming as close as possible to the most suitable 
solution for a given case. 
According to Skirbekk, “Sufficient rationality, and finitude, and a belief in 
improvement, are all constitutive for discursive rationality” (Ibid). Discur-
sive rationality presumes not only a strong belief in the process of im-
provement, but also understanding (on side of the participants in the dis-
course) of what finitude is as well as an agreement about what sufficient ra-
tionality is (Ibid). On a macro methodological level, the gradualism charac-
terizing discursive treatment is the one that makes man’s status differ from 
the one of animals since it is human that is qua pragmatic speaker (Ibid). In 
this context, Skirbekk reaches the conclusion that the main strength of the 
discourse ethics is grounded in the “self-referential inconsistency inherent 
in denying any of the pragmatic preconditions of argumentation” (Ibid: 94). 
Among such preconditions, we should outline the one of reciprocal recogni-
tion of the participants, which is normatively essential in so far as it pre-
sumes justifying these participants as (rational) discussants (Ibid), i.e. it re-
quires a common ethical status for all pragmatically skilled language users 
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to be approved556 (Ibid). The normative validity of the preconditions, how-
ever, does not have to be interpreted in absolutist terms, as something hav-
ing both an unchangeable form and content. On the contrary, it should be 
explored as intrinsically tied with the mode of becoming of the discursive 
participants because it is the precondition of the reciprocal recognition that 
makes us able to talk about moral discussants at all, albeit the latter may dif-
fer in their moral views and ethical stances. Therefore, the preconditions do 
not have to be defined as absolute conditions, but rather as conditions with-
out which557, with all their specificities, it becomes impossible to introduce 
discourse ethics in Skirbekk’s sense. As he argues, within the discursive 
frame, there are various “substantial” issues (in the sense of normative ques-
tions) (Ibid), which are open in their contents and realization. On the other 
hand, it is the presupposed equality of all participants that provides “a 
pragmatic a priori defense against ethnocentricity and inter-human differ-
ences” (Ibid).  
Skirbekk argues that all obligations (except the ones regarding ‘perfect du-
ty’), either between moral agents, or between moral agents and moral sub-
jects should be discursively interpreted (Skirbekk 1994: 106). In turn, dis-
cursive rationality is adopted when the questions of the utility of individual 
rights are addressed (Ibid). Otherwise, a pre-skeptical stage of “defective 
self-reference among the proponents of utilitarianism” and deontology will 
be established (Ibid). The pre-skeptical itself should be understood as not 
aiming at a procedural consensus in so far as the decision-making process it 
provokes is deprived of its initial normative validity. On the other hand, re-
ferring to the paradigm of discourse ethics can contribute to overcoming the 
aforementioned difficulties, while discussing the interrelatedness between 
moral agents and moral subjects if we enrich the concept of obligation with 
the one of responsibility. Thus we can avoid distributive responsibility to be 
restricted by moral absolutism, which is not a result of open and enlightened 
discussions. 
Since discourse theory does not necessarily reject the implication of all 
utilitarian principles, Skirbekk raises the issue how it can display “a critical 
but also a sublating rationality in relation to utilitarian thinking, with its var-
                                           
556 However, we do not have to forget that, as Skirbekk himself argues, being rational is only one of 
the necessary conditions for talking about morally aware agents and discussants. 
557 Absoluteness does not have to be understood as a fundamental mode, i.e. as a universal ground-
ing.  
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ious versions of cost-benefit analyses” (Ibid: 107). Adopting such analyses 
would mean that the differences with the discourse ethics cannot be seen in 
the context of implementation alone, but rather in the one of revealing the 
methodological reasons behind a certain evaluation, which is defined as a 
moral one. On a macro methodological level, it illustrates that the discourse 
ethics gives us relevant grounds for reconsidering the principle of advoca-
tory representation within the meta-ethical discourse, by rethinking the role 
of so-called meta-ethics and mini-ethics in Skirbekk’s sense. 
Utilitarian propositions are described as too narrow to clarify the borderline 
cases, from which, however, it does not follow that the descriptive analy-
sis558 adopted by the utilitarian proponents is wrong in itself (Ibid: 97). In 
his conclusion, Skirbekk claims that the idea of a paradigmatic difference 
between humans and non-humans is most relevantly conceived by the theo-
rists of social identity and discursive rationality (Ibid), which benefits un-
derstanding why defining humans as a paradigmatic case does not necessar-
ily question the role of moral obligations, nor does it underrate the role of 
biological gradualism as such, as I already showed. 
According to Skirbekk, discourse ethics focuses on the self-reflective in-
sight of argumentation “using irrefutability of its constitutive preconditions 
as its foundation” (Ibid: 98)559. He argues that this ethics provides the best 
proposal for a fundamental ethical theory specifying the normative validity 
of concepts such as justice and solidarity as well as the opportunity for 
achieving critical universalizability in so far as discourse theory contributes 
to avoiding abstract individualism and naturalism concerning the problem 
of rights and properties (Ibid). Compared to utilitarian and deontological 
ethics, which only partly touched the issues of rights and properties, the dis-
course ethics, as Skirbekk points out, justifies the universalizability in ques-
tion by stressing the role of social identity, as I already mentioned. 
On a macro methodological level, the procedural norms of discursive activ-
ity represent so-called by Skirbekk “a common mini-ethics of the modern 
world” (Skirbekk 2007: 85), which is supposed to be “universally valid 
while rationally irrefutable” (Ibid). He outlines that discourse ethics is uni-
                                           
558 We can argue that this analysis is ‘right’ in terms of descriptively specifying the problem, but in-
sufficient in terms of clarifying its normative validity. 
559 Skirbekk argues that he disregards the differences between Apel’s and Habermas’s theories con-
cerning the status of discourse ethics (Ibid: 122, Note 33) for the sake of outlining the impact of the 
general role-taking and the presupposed mutual recognition (Ibid: 98). 
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versal, albeit from that it does not follow that it has a metaphysical content 
(Ibid). The norms are described as procedural and formal ones in Kant’s 
sense since they are normatively binding as pre-conditions of a rational dis-
course (Ibid). This means that the various issues discussed within these pro-
cedures cannot be prescribed a priori, which in turn makes the content of a 
given rational discourse an open question (Ibid). 
Furthermore, the definition of the procedural norms is normatively valid in 
its way of functioning rather than due to the implications of its content. If 
the latter was unchangeable, then the idea of procedural consensus560 would 
have been one and the same, while the consensus itself should have lost the 
opportunity the potential to change its own content561. In this context, Skir-
bekk reveals the role of “unsurpassable meta-ethics” as a rationally binding 
set of norms for doing research and discussing (Ibid). It is the normative va-
lidity of ethical unsurpassability that is a pre-condition for having a possi-
bility of a rational consensus. In turn, the requirement of ‘mini’ can be seen 
as ‘basic’ in terms of normatively grounding and thus as having an univer-
salizing function because it can be equally referred to all both real and po-
tential members of the discourse. 
It is the normative indetermination of mini-ethics and mini-rationality562 
that makes the ‘mini’ requirements a subject to both ethical and epistemo-
logical examinations, which are dependent but irreducible to each other. 
Otherwise, mini-ethics should have functioned as utilitarian ethics based on 
the principles of the cost-benefit analysis: the other alternative is rationality 
to be justified as incompatible with the idea of solidarity, which would put 
in question the role of ethics as such. According to Skirbekk, mini-ethics 
“displays a modern, post-skeptical notion of rationality and ethics inde-
pendent of cultural and religious differences” (Ibid: 86), i.e. it presupposes 
                                           
560 The idea of procedural consensus is defined due to the fact that it is based on the presumption of 
having a reciprocal recognition on side of the participants in the ethical discourse. 
561 Comparing Skirbekk’s and Næss’s theories of consensus, I argue that the misleading recognition of 
moral objectivism is due to the fact that Næss considers academic environmental ethics as meta-ethics 
as well as ambiguously interprets the objectives of the latter (Light 2009: 83). In this context, I draw the 
conclusion that Næss grounds his theory in the misconception that ethics coincides with activism, while 
the rest is a talk about ethics that embodies the strive for consensus (Ibid). However, he underrates the 
fact that not every single consensus is a result of a commonly shared moral agreement. 
562 In this sense, mini-rationality and mini-ethics can be recognized as crucial factors since their def-
initions concern their functioning in principle regardless of their contents. 
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the need of introducing universal ethics. In this context, I draw the conclu-
sion that one of the most apparent implications of justifying universalizable 
ethics is rebuilding the role of so-called by Skirbekk communicative compe-
tence563, which contributes the role of moral engagement to be relevantly 
evaluated564. 
                                           
563 That is why we can justify the competence of being morally engaged as a prototype characteris-
tic of the communicative competence. 
564 In turn, the aforementioned idea of reciprocal recognition of moral discussants is seen as a matter 
of both collective and individual moral responsibility. Even when moral engagements differ in their 
contents due to the complex purposes of the social interaction, or because moral agents are acting 
“communicatively” in different ways (Skirbekk 1994: 108), the reciprocal recognition is defined by 
Skirbekk as not embraced by the utilitarian view (Ibid). From a utilitarian perspective, there is an 
agreement but it is made by the ones who are already accepted as moral participants. On the other 
hand, within the framework of utilitarianism and preference utilitarianism in particular, it remains 
unclear why we have to adopt the principle of overall utility maximization as an obligation. One 
possible explanation can be found in the concept of maximizing self-interests. However, recogniz-
ing such a presumption does not benefit finding an answer to the question how to prevent turning 
the interests in question into egoist interests, which might lead to equating the personal preferences 
with the moral obligations. 
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2.3.1. Vital Rights and Moral Obligations. Some 
Perspectives on Ethical Gradualism 
According to Skirbekk, ethical gradualism does not have to be interpreted as 
relativism since we have a clear obligation as moral discussants to keep the 
discussion open (Skirbekk 1994: 115). Compared with ethical anthropocen-
trism, adopting ethical gradualism “requires even greater caution” because, 
for example, it relies on rejecting analyses that are exclusively based on an-
thropocentric values due to which the “demands in question have far-
reaching” implications (Ibid). What are these implications regarding the sta-
tus of the participants in the ethical discourse? On a macro methodological 
level, Skirbekk emphasizes the tension between “an ecologically unin-
formed, short-term and local anthropocentrism” and “ecologically well-
informed, long-term and global anthropocentrism”565 (Ibid: 116). He also 
points out that in many cases, the “decisive practical difference” is the one 
between the aforementioned two versions of ethical anthropocentrism rather 
than the difference between a comprehensive ethical anthropocentrism and 
ethical gradualism (Ibid). 
In this context, I argue that the first form of anthropocentrism can be exam-
ined as supporting what Næss calls shallow ecology movement due to 
which the ecological problems are instrumentally solved within the anthro-
pocentric paradigm. On the other hand, the vision provided by so-called 
global anthropology may contribute to raising deeper ecological conscious-
ness in Skirbekk’s sense (Skirbekk 1992a: 103). 
Despite the fact that the definition of moral subject places the latter at the 
bottom of the ethical system since it presumes the ‘lowest’, or the lack of 
any ‘moral’ capabilities at all, moral discussants are presumably considered 
as moral subjects (Ibid: 105) in the sense that they are ‘morally developed’ 
moral subjects. The development could be understood as a matter of an ar-
ticulated moral engagement, namely, as a cultivation of sensitivity towards 
otherness in its representations, especially when it requires the principle of 
                                           
565 Discussing the role of deep ecology, Skirbekk outlines that except deep ecology, we have the fol-
lowing two main positions: the ones of short-term local interests and long-term global interests for hu-
man survival (Skirbekk 1992a: 103). In this context, he argues that we should work on mediating the 
short-term local interests with the long-term global ones for human survival (Ibid). This is another im-
portant example of why neglecting the role of human responsibility and obligations is not a necessary 
condition for including the living organisms as belonging to the category of moral subjects. 
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advocatory representation to be adopted. Furthermore, it is the competence 
of the moral discussants that makes the procedural consensus possible. 
If so, what would be the moral responsibilities of the ones preserving nature if 
they witness suffering, which can be relieved? For example, we may see an ani-
mal, which has fallen in a trap and needs help. On the other hand, this animal can 
be the last option for saving another animal from starvation. The issue becomes 
even more complicated, when the relationship presumes the dilemma to be ex-
trapolated to the representatives of human species and especially to the ones be-
longing to human and non-human species because in these borderline cases of 
suffering, the one who can react as a moral agent is the human being alone. 
Another issue arises when we have to apply this way of reasoning to plants, 
biological systems, understood in terms of Gaia theory etc. According to 
Skirbekk, such reasoning problematically encourages the notion of interest 
to be recognized as “conation”, without any connection to sentience (Ibid: 
112). Skirbekk points out that due to these speculations, the implications of 
‘conation’ are merely related to the inherent striving and the possibility of 
being harmed566 (Ibid). In this context, I argue that instead of discussing 
moral harm and ‘conation’ alone, we should also take into account the pro-
jections of empathy and solidarity, which contribute to avoiding not only 
the potential moral harms, but also benefit seeing how to strengthen moral 
well-being in qualitative terms. Thus the problem of whether to give a pref-
erence to negative or to positive needs will be sublated. 
On the other hand, overrating the role of sentience as a demarcation crite-
rion also brings to light some problems whose origin can be seen if we go 
back to Skirbekk’s though experiment with the robots and Martians. He de-
fines the concept of the latter as a flexible one567, which describes “prag-
                                           
566 In this context, Skirbekk examines John Rodman’s conception that rejects the role of sentience as 
a condition for being a moral subject, while examining so-called zoocentrist sentientism (Ibid: 125, 
Note 57). Skirbekk also refers to Jon Wetlesen’s theory arguing that not all the animals are morally 
equal, which requires a certain gradualism to be adopted. 
567 For the differences between robots and Martians, see Skirbekk’s latest article Ethical Gradualism 
and Reverence for Vulnerable Life. Ecophilosophical Reflections (Etisk gradualisme, og ærefrykt 
for sårbart liv. Øko- filosofiske refleksjonar) (2016) (Skirbekk 2016: 238-239). He outlines that arti-
ficial intelligence is not a necessary and sufficient condition for participating in ethical and meta-
ethical discussions (Ibid). In this context, ethical gradualism concerns the ethical difference between 
intelligent biological creatures and intelligent non-biological creatures (Ibid: 239). He gives the ex-
ample with the robots, which can participate in many fields, but are not able to participate in discus-
sions when ethical gradualism should be adopted (Ibid). 
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matically competent biological beings who are like us… in all relevant per-
spectives but who are genetically different from us” (Skirbekk 1992a: 99, 
Note 6). Some other contradictions stem from the distinction between intel-
ligent biological being and intelligent non-biological being, which raises the 
question whether we should talk in biological gradualist terms alone. The 
comparison follows the line of exploring reasonable co-mammals, with a 
body and with a pragmatic competence as well as analyzing the status of 
creatures without a bio-body and semantic competence. The latter, however, 
should be excluded due to already discussed conclusion that being deprived 
of bodies, they cannot obtain a ‘real’ moral experience (Skirbekk 1994: 122, 
Note 36). In this context, discussing biological gradualism provokes the 
question how can we evaluate the behavior of moral agents who have a bod-
ily experience, but at the same time, react as if they are deprived of such an 
experience being guided by an absolute duty? If we elaborate the thought 
experiment, we can argue that the robots and Martians can act as represent-
ing an ideal case of agents from the perspective of deontological ethics568, 
which presumes duty to be obtained in respect with a purely moral motiva-
tion of acting dutifully. 
In turn, defining rights569 in the field of discourse ethics, as Skirbekk sug-
gests, provides more complex solutions than the ones proposed by the utili-
tarianists, which are focused on elaborating decisions for the dilemmas re-
garding the properties debate. In turn, the latter can be defined as simplifying 
the relationship between the individual maturity and rights as well as the one 
between the rights and the moral status of these individuals. According to 
Skirbekk, discourse ethics gives a rational foundation for a universal ethics, 
also for an eco-ethics (Skirbekk 1992a: 101) to the extent that within its 
                                           
568One of the differences with moral agents who have bodily experience is that the latter react due to 
the specificities of the intersubjective relationships. Therefore, their notion of action is determined 
by the one of how to act responsibly to others. On the other hand, Skirbekk outlines that the differ-
entiation of the levels of responsibility affects the differentiation of the levels of blame, which in 
turn differs humans from animals. 
569 According to Skirbekk, broadening eco-consciousness should be also based on interest in and 
compassion with species, even if any specific individual creature of that species can be legitimately 
killed (Ibid). In this context, Skirbekk explains the lack of sensitivity towards species-perspective 
with the fact that it follows the logic of human rights as well as that there is a distinction between 
utilitarian positions and the ones supporting individual rights (Ibid: 96). Exploring why humankind 
as a species displays an ecological threat to other species, he gives arguments in favor of defending 
the future survival of endangered non-human species (Ibid). 
 486
framework, we can outline three important subjects: pragmatically competent 
participants, potential participants who are advocatory represented, and crea-
tures that are neither pragmatically competent, nor entitled to advocatory rep-
resentation570 (Ibid). On the other hand, he also emphasizes that extending 
the notion of potentially pragmatically competent participants to the whole of 
human species, we should not limit ourselves to the strict realm of discursive 
ethics and universal pragmatics discourse especially while discussing the 
status of the aforementioned subgroups of non-humans (Ibid: 102). 
Discourse ethics benefits clarifying the field of morality since moral rights 
are irreducible to natural rights. From the fact that moral rights are not iden-
tical to the natural ones, it follows that moral capability is irreducible to the 
‘natural’ one. The differentiation on the level of maturity should be pro-
jected to the questionable issue of what potential ‘full’ membership is, 
which hides the risk the latter to be understood in purely naturalist terms, 
albeit moral capability has natural capability merely as its necessary condi-
tion571.  
Otherwise, if the moral rights are examined as ‘developed’ natural rights, it 
would mean to fall into the trap of moral naturalism, which can provoke the 
establishment of moral absolutism. 
On a macro methodological level, the latter specification contributes to clar-
ifying why understanding the problem of rights presumes implying gradual-
ism of the interests behind, so that the latter to have a well-grounded norma-
tive validity because some of these interests concern the vital needs of mor-
al subjects, moral agents and moral discussants.  
Skirbekk claims that from a deontological point of view, the focus is on our 
obligations towards moral subjects, both humans and non-humans (Skir-
bekk 1994: 101), which, however, does not necessarily require a form of 
concern on side of the moral discussants to be expressed (Ibid). According 
                                           
570 In this context, a question arises how to deal with these subjects who cannot be advocatory repre-
sented since it becomes more problematic to discern what a moral harm is for them, i.e. whether we 
can interpret them as moral subjects at all, and if not, how relevant is to call them moral objects. Fur-
thermore, if we treat them as moral objects, then again the problem of ethical anthropocentrism 
gains a new strength. In this context, I argue that the category of moral subjects is not a homogene-
ous one, which provokes the concerns about differentiating the criteria of evaluation for the ones 
who cannot be entitled to advocatory representation. 
571 Otherwise, we should go back again to the debate about actual and potential properties regarding 
moral evaluation. 
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to the deontological conception, the obligations are examined as deriving 
from the agreement between autonomous individuals, which means that 
both non-humans and non-autonomous human beings are presumably ex-
cluded (Ibid: 108). That is why the contract is agreed “on the level of 
speech agents”572, not on the level of moral agents, nor on the one of moral 
subjects (Ibid). Thus the distinction between consensus and compromise 
disappears (Ibid) in so far as tracing the moral motivation becomes a diffi-
cult task in terms of specifying when it is a result of an enlightened discus-
sion or not. In this context, Skirbekk describes contractarianism as insuffi-
cient on the levels of moral discussants and moral agents since there is no 
distinction between strategic and communicative actions (Ibid). 
In contrast to deontological and utilitarian ethics, discourse ethics deter-
mines the basic obligations as “the pragmatically irrefutable normative pre-
conditions of argumentation” (Ibid: 105). On a micro methodological level, 
it means that the obligation has to follow the better argument and the recip-
rocal recognition among the discussants (Ibid). Furthermore, it is the recip-
rocal recognition that makes possible justice to be defined as universally 
valid because it is achieved by the attempts of the moral discussants to 
reach an enlightened agreement. Judging by the aforementioned investiga-
tions, I argue that the reciprocal recognition becomes possible if the univer-
salizability in Skirbekk’s sense is examined on the level of solidarity, which 
brings us back to the field of experiential morality573.  
Extrapolating Skirbekk’s theory, I draw the conclusion that elaborating the 
principle of advocatory representation due to some perspectives outlined by 
discourse ethics would concern the fact that its normative validity is justi-
fied by referring to a mode in which duty is transformed into a self-
obligation on side of the moral discussants, while deciding whether they 
should avoid treating moral subjects as moral objects. I also argue that this 
principle is based on the presumption regarding ideal understanding of in-
terests. First, it concerns moral agents’ awareness of what their duty is, and 
second, the awareness of what the interest of the moral subjects is, which 
might create some difficulties if these two aspects are merely interpreted 
                                           
572 However, speech agents cannot be treated by default as moral discussants, albeit the latter should 
be ‘capable’ speech agents. 
573 Morality in question can be better understood if we extrapolate the idea of knowing to the one of 
understanding, namely, to start arguing in favor of understanding by experiencing due to which the 
latter has an unquestionable normative validity. 
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from the perspective of deontological ethics. That is why we should keep in 
mind that if the idea of moral agency is grounded in the ideal presumption 
of pure ethical knowledge alone, which provokes, regardless of the circum-
stances, a moral engagement to be made, then it would mean to neglect the 
role of moral experience as such. Even if such a duty functions as an elabo-
ration of the notion of interests, it does not take into consideration the speci-
ficities of the latter, but rather stems from the aforementioned ideal pre-
sumption trying to adapt the moral cases to it in respect with the knowledge 
about what dutiful is. 
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2.3.2. Vital Needs and Vital Interests 
To what extent are such interests definable as vital ones? According to 
Skirbekk, there is a basic intuition regarding our obligation towards moral 
subjects, which depends on the moral interest of those subjects (Ibid: 111). 
The interest itself is determined as an interest of an explicit claim (Ibid: 
112). Furthermore, he argues that interests that are strongly defended by 
moral subjects should be respected in so far as the strength of the defense 
derives either from will and pure force, or from good reasons and justice 
(Ibid)574. The problem is that this strength of defense is not a sufficient cri-
terion for distinguishing between different types of motivation since a moral 
subject can make other interests be misrecognized as moral ones, even when 
one is motivated by good reasons. Another aspect of the problem is that 
even if we presume the existence of an ideal, morally aware moral agent, 
there is always a risk he/she to advocate for a good reason, which can be 
morally unacceptable, as I already showed. 
An important issue, which is emphasized by Skirbekk, concerns the twist 
from talking about a moral subject being interested in something to talking 
about a moral subject having an interest in something575 (Ibid). If the state 
of the former implies some mental capacitates as well as some sense of be-
longing to be developed on side of the moral subjects, the state of the latter 
does not require such a thing (Ibid). According to Skirbekk, this distinction 
presumes a gradualist analysis of obligations to non-humans to be accepted 
because higher mammals also have subjectively expressed interests, which 
are communicated by their behavioral and various objective interests576 
(Ibid). All these interests vary from the fulfillment of psychological needs to 
the need of some social setting (Ibid). Skirbekk also claims that in gliding 
                                           
574 Skirbekk argues that these interests can be either of verbal expression, or of bodily one as well as 
that the differences are crucial for defining the limits of our moral obligations towards humans and 
non-humans (Ibid). 
575 This social setting, however, does not have to be equated with the process of having a social 
identity. 
576 It is important to specify what the connection between behavioral and various objective interests 
is, namely, to what extent behavioral interests also meet the criteria of objective interests, especially 
when we talk about social behavior. As Skirbekk claims in the next sentence, these varying interests 
cover different types of needs including social ones. 
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down the scale of animals ranking, we get less of the subjective needs while 
the objective ones remain untouched (Ibid).  
Judging by the aforementioned investigations, we should specify the com-
plexity of the relationships between subjective and objective needs, and 
subjective and objective interests respectively since subjective interests may 
also require the fulfillment of given objective needs. It may occur in the 
process of evolution, or in the one of the inter-communal interaction, espe-
cially among the higher mammals. Another aspect of the problem is the no-
tion of so-called societal interest in maintenance and survival (Ibid: 114). 
Skirbekk points out that converting these interests into obligations requires 
to “filter” them discursively, which leads to separating morally legitimate 
from morally illegitimate interests (Ibid). Thus we have an obligation for 
the survival of the society in which we live (Ibid). This statement is an illu-
minative illustration of how one, at first sight, non-vital interest such as the 
societal one becomes a vital interest due to the fact that the survival of hu-
man beings is intrinsically connected with the development of the societal 
life. To a certain extent, we can claim that survival and social development 
posed as tasks are used as ontological synonyms in the modern welfare 
state577. 
The basic needs themselves, and basic human needs and interests in particu-
lar, are defined by Skirbekk in Habermas’s sense (Skirbekk 1992a: 94, Note 
3). In this context, Skirbekk outlines that such needs and interests also im-
ply a relation to some ideas of what a good life is, i.e. a relation to values, 
and not merely to the ideas of justice in the pragmatic preconditions, which 
are constitutive for the discursive rationality. Adopting such an approach 
presupposes the question of values’ context-dependence to be examined 
(Ibid). Skirbekk determines the double-bind meaning of the hierarchy of 
needs understood as a ranking of basic to superficial ones as well as the role 
of gradualism for our knowledge about them, namely, how to favor a better 
knowledge of negative rather than of positive needs578 (Ibid: 104). On the 
other hand, the knowledge in question should be examined as dialectically 
related to both positive and negative needs in so far as the process of favor-
                                           
577 Skirbekk discusses the role of so-called societal survival.  
578 The problem becomes even more complicated when we have to evaluate which of these posi-
tions and negative needs are vital and which ones are non-vital respectively. 
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ing does not presume an ontological hierarchy to be introduced579, but ra-
ther an axiological one. This means that better understanding the impact of 
basic needs is impossible without better understanding the non-vital ones 
and the other way around. The process depends on the evaluation of how 
this interrelatedness is interpreted within different methodological para-
digms such as the ones of utilitarianism, deontological ethics and discourse 
ethics, which in turn depends on the definition of what a moral subject is. 
Furthermore, the question how to relate (vital) interests to vital needs re-
quires further elaboration. It raises the concern whether all so-called objec-
tive interests, if we presume the ideal case when they meet the criteria of 
what objective interest is, do manage to satisfy vital needs at all. Another 
risk hides the development of some subjectively held points of view, which 
can be misunderstood as an elaboration of objective interests. Thus the mis-
evaluation of the objective interests may result either in equating biological 
with ethical gradualism, or in equating technological with ethical ones. 
Among many other consequences, it would mean to simplify the need of 
social identification, i.e. this need to be justified by mastering biological in-
stincts or technocratic ambitions for power and control580. In turn, such a 
reductionism would negatively affect the question how to distinguish be-
tween ‘more’ and ‘less’ developed (social) communities arguing in favor of 
a certain group-belonging speciesism. 
                                           
579 An important comment in this context is the one, which Skirbekk makes about the definition of 
need, namely, that it also embraces possible positive states, not only the absence of negative ones, 
viz. pain (Ibid: 102).  
580 On the other hand, leaving the connection between vital interests and vital needs unclear indi-
cates that they will restrict again the influence of the principle of fallibility in the ethical discourse. 
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2.3.2.1. Who Has the Right to Defend Animal Rights? 
Skirbekk claims that we move from libertarian to a social-democratic notion 
of rights, i.e. from formal to substantial one (Skirbekk 1994: 96). Such a 
change has an impact on the way animal rights are anticipated. Examining 
the moral status of the animals, his line of arguments starts with encounter-
ing the differences between the validity of utilitarian positions and the one 
of individual rights (Ibid: 120, Note 26). According to Skirbekk, utilitarian 
positions have their problems with the issues of justice and formal rights. 
They also have difficulties in displaying a “weak defense for endangered 
species” regarding the painless death of their representatives, which cannot 
meet (in most cases) the criteria of minimizing suffering and maximizing 
well-being (Ibid: 96). In this context, Skirbekk argues that ascribing indi-
vidual rights is equally weak as the defense of naturally endangered species. 
He points out that if a species is about to extinct by a rational selection, it is 
possible to talk about obligations to intervene in natural processes (Ibid).  
As Skirbekk relevantly claims, the problem of rights and obligations con-
cerns the one of normative validity. He argues that it is problematic to 
ground an ‘ought to’ mode in the ‘is’ one, by relying on evolutionary facts 
(Ibid: 121, Note 28) emphasizing that we may find it ‘correct’ to change na-
ture in terms of species and environment, even though we cannot, and there-
fore, ought not to do so, in terms of physical laws 581 (Ibid). This interpreta-
tion reveals the double blindness of the issue how to define the projections 
of the ‘ought to’ mode. We do not have unquestionable arguments to avoid 
turning ethical gradualism into ethical anthropocentrism since defining and 
thus differentiating the rights to environment and the ones to nature respec-
tively582 may easily be initiated from the perspectives of ungrounded moral 
relativism or moral absolutism. This in turn can cause the replacement of 
the moral obligations to the environment with the ones to nature. Skirbekk 
also points out that the concern is about so-called bottom line: i.e. how and 
where we could rationally posit a bottom line in evaluating human-non-
human relationships (Ibid: 110). The idea of bottom line requires further 
elaboration, taking into account that very often species’ interests for sur-
vival are very different from the individual ones (Ibid: 112), which affects 
the understanding of the idea of interest as a homogeneous concept. 
                                           
581The problem is whether we should intervene by correcting the natural process if these species are 
endangered by the process of natural evolution (Ibid).  
582 I refer to Páll Skúlason’s distinction between environment and nature. 
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Neglecting the complexity of the concept of vital interest would lead the 
whole process of evaluation to be justified by analogy as a matter of extend-
ing the concept of vital need as such, which inevitably presumes a certain 
form of moral naturalism to be adopted, i.e. some needs to be recognized as 
more important by nature than others, which does not necessarily mean that 
they are less vital indeed. In this context, another concern arises from the 
fact that the importance of interests will be evaluated in speciesist terms, 
while the complex evaluation, in so far as there are subjectively expressed 
interests, presumes an interspecies comparison to be made as well. Regard-
ing the existence of non-organic nature, it is more relevant to talk about rep-
resentatives rather than individuals of a given species. Skirbekk poses the 
question whether we have any obligations to preserve the landscape (Ibid: 
113), whose development, by the laws of nature, is independent of our im-
mediate being. There can be many reasons for this thesis such as instrumen-
tal ones (“if the landscape is of any value for some moral subjects”)583 
(Ibid), aesthetic reasons based on aesthetic values (if some aesthetic experi-
ence can be initiated by the contact with the landscape as such), and social 
ones (“if a human community has its social identity related to a certain 
landscape”) (Ibid). It is the social identity that is one of the elaborated ideas 
of what vital interest is since the social needs can be examined as developed 
vital needs within the ‘developed’ welfare society, as I argued above. 
Going back to the idea of conation, Skirbekk argues that “non-organic na-
ture cannot be described in terms of any conation” whatsoever (Ibid), albeit 
the latter is important in the sense of being relevant to the development of 
life and living creatures. That is why moral agents have an ‘indirect’ obliga-
tion to protect certain aspects of it. 
Why should the aforementioned idea of developing vital interests be ex-
plored in normative terms? I claim that it can be clarified by revealing what 
Skirbekk defined as a ‘being interested in’ mode, namely, by revealing why 
certain subjective interests gradually turn into vital ones due to the fact that 
moral evaluation comes on side of human beings alone who are able to mas-
ter the principle of advocatory representation. 
On a macro methodological level, the problem is how to introduce one and 
the same set of criteria for all living beings, which to be equally normative 
                                           
583 Skirbekk points out that even if all human beings are dead, the landscape should be preserved if 
there is a possibility for having animals around since it has “value for other beings, not only for us” 
(Ibid: 125, Note 60) as well as because these beings have a value in themselves. 
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in the sense of having equally objective grounding rather than providing the 
same prescriptions to the different species. Otherwise, it would mean to put 
in question the concept of normative validity as such, or to start operating 
with an imaginary concept of objectivity. For example, the vital needs of the 
one-cell organism are incomparable with the ones of the many-cell organ-
isms. The latter have more differentiated subjective interests, which also, di-
rectly or indirectly, affect the evolution of the basic ones. In this context, a 
possible evaluation would mean to merely discuss the role of evolutionary 
morality due to which the quantitative terms to replace the qualitative ones, 
or to adopt again a certain type of anthropocentrism. Then, the interests will 
be examined in terms of their ‘usefulness’ to human beings and their rights. 
Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I argue that the problem aris-
es from the fact that not all living beings have both already discussed ‘being 
interested in’ and ‘having an interest in’ modes. Regarding the process of 
evaluation, it is difficult to compare the vital needs of these organisms since 
such a comparing presumes prioritizing, as I already showed. 
Why should we question the distinction between subject and object as well 
as the one between anthropocentrism and biocentrism? (Ibid: 112). Among 
many different answers Skirbekk outlines the phenomenological explana-
tion, the ontological one (in Spinozian terms), the evolutionary explanation 
(in Darwinian terms) (Ibid: 125, Note 57), albeit he emphasizes the role of 
the teleological discussions in the field of casual explanations and already 
examined danger of naturalistic fallacy. The latter occurs when lower ani-
mals and plants are defined as having interests, which presumes “implying a 
duty for moral agents” (Ibid: 112). The complexity of the latter interpreta-
tion was explored as a matter of increasing the risk of interfering moral 
rights with natural rights, which in turn brings us back to the debate about 
actual and potential properties. 
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3. HOW TO GET RID OF THE ECOCRISIS? 
ECOLOGICAL SUSTAINABILITY 
AS A MAIN ECOPOLITICAL OBJECTIVE 
Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I argue that neglecting the 
principles of ethical gradualism leads to distinguishing ethical problems 
from the ones of justice, poverty, ecological sustainability and industrial de-
velopment, as in Næss’s writings. It occurs in so far as radical biocentrism 
advocates a different kind of ethical speciesism to be adopted, which affects 
the recognition of nature as a meta-species. On the other hand, presuming 
the complexity of ethical, social and ecological problems could benefit find-
ing an answer to the following question: Why is the argument of solidarity 
so important for defining a long-term ecological sustainability by providing 
solutions for overcoming the ecological crisis as a crisis, which affects the 
welfare state? 
Extrapolating Skirbekk’s thesis, I aim at revealing why his argument of sol-
idarity is crucial for clarifying the normative validity of ecological sustain-
ability in the welfare state as well as for the attempts at overcoming the eco-
logical crisis by cultivating a collective, socio-political responsibility. Ac-
cording to Skirbekk, solidarity, which encourages giving aid does not have 
to be considered as charity, but as a “communal sharing” organized through 
a “general welfare arrangement” (Skirbekk 1996: 34). He argues that the 
support of so-called reproductive tasks584 can be defined as closely tied 
with showing solidarity by pointing out that every “human being should 
have a right to live” getting some minimal economic support (Ibid).  
                                           
584Regarding Skirbekk’s definition, the minimum notion of welfare state includes the values of soli-
darity and reproductive rationality. According to him, the utilitarian argument of collective insur-
ance should be adapted to the situation, while the one of equality should be strongly moderated for 
the sake of achieving optimal survival (Ibid: 39). Skirbekk also emphasizes that the model implies 
some economic differences and “it does not guarantee that everybody will make it” (Ibid). 
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On a macro methodological level, the question how to reach ecological sus-
tainability in the long run is intrinsically concerned with the one what the 
modern welfare state should look like. In this context, Skirbekk examines 
both the arguments pros and cons welfare state emphasizing the crucial role 
of socialization for the cultivation of sensitivity towards environment. One 
of the arguments against welfare state is based on the negative attitudes to-
wards the idea of public property (Ibid: 28), which leads to raising the the-
ory that a welfare state that redistributes economic values is a “morally re-
jectable”585 one (Ibid). Skirbekk poses the counter argument that despite the 
fact that the libertarian conceptions of private property are opposed to the 
utilitarian defense of the latter, they both oppose the welfare state (Ibid: 43, 
Note 1). Furthermore, he argues against the statement that “any normative 
political theory that operates with rational and educated individuals as a ba-
sic notion disregards the necessity of socialization” (Ibid). Otherwise, the 
notion of self-sufficient individual would have been defined as an inade-
quately abstract one, which in turn would provoke some concerns about the 
(de)ontological premise for justifying an abstract individualism (Ibid). 
In turn, the issue of socialization becomes of crucial importance for increas-
ing the awareness of the representatives of a given society about ecological 
sustainability, which is one of the necessary conditions for building a wel-
fare state.  
                                           
585 According to the proponents of this theory, charity and private welfare are not considered as con-
tradictory notions (Ibid). 
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3.1. Vital Needs, Vital Interests and Vital Rights 
in Ecopolitics  
Revising the role of global ethics and solidarity concerns rethinking the 
problems of vital needs in environmental politics as well as outlining the 
specifications of the process of distribution of goods, which are examined 
against the background of the complex connections between vital interests 
and vital rights. However, it is important to point out that regarding politics 
and environmental politics in particular, Skirbekk talks about vital needs 
and vital rights of pragmatically competent participants. That is why I claim 
that we should analyze the specifications regarding vital needs, vital inter-
ests and vital rights because within the framework of ethical gradualism, 
these issues are examined in the context of interspecies interaction. Accord-
ing to Skirbekk, objective needs are discursively interpreted586; their ex-
amination is justified by reaching an enlightened consensus about how the 
normative validity and function of these vital needs can be recognized (Ibid: 
29).  
He also clarifies that objective needs are dependent on the traditions and 
“the material resources in each society” (Ibid). However, Skirbekk specifies 
that if the interpretation of “the question of need is left to certain traditions 
or professions, we can easily be overruled by entrenched power instead of 
being led by reason”587 (Ibid). The balance between the ‘reasonable’ tradi-
tion and the authoritarian one is a complicated issue in so far as the general 
consensus may be reached as imposed by a given interested group or groups 
regardless of the fact that the reason is coupled with tradition, i.e. regardless 
of the fact that universalizability is a result of a mutual agreement.  
On a macro methodological level, the question of specifying the role of vital 
needs is intrinsically connected with the notion of just distribution. One of 
the arguments against welfare state affects the aforementioned distribution 
because, as Skirbekk claims, there is a gap between the idea of exchange 
value in terms of money and the “value of use in terms of experienced and 
obtained well-being” (Ibid). In this context, he emphasizes the ambiguity of 
                                           
586 Skirbekk argues that “intersubjectively recognizable needs” can also be determined by adopting 
a discursive interpretation in so far as the intersubjectivity is opposed to subjective needs (Ibid: 29). 
587 He refers to Fraser (1989) (Ibid). 
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equal satisfaction in this paradigm since the issues of equality588 and justice 
“become even more acute when the time dimension is added589” (Ibid: 44, 
Note 5). Skirbekk also argues that the idea of the welfare state should not 
operate “with happiness as its goal”. It should rather try to avoid “some ba-
sic forms of unhappiness” because it is easier to reach a consensus on what 
counts as unhappiness590 (Ibid: 29). 
Exploring the methodological connections between vital needs, justice and 
well-being, as represented by Skirbekk, I argue that the crucial role of the 
normative validity of discursive interpretation can be seen in clarifying the 
validity of vital regarding the intrinsic relationship between the process of 
distribution of responsibilities and the delegation of rights, which concern 
both the integrity of individual freedom and individual (as well as collec-
tive) responsibility required by the welfare state. The enlightened public 
discussion is built upon the presumption of free, educated and self-reflective 
human beings, which have the capability to interact with others in order to 
reach a consensus beyond the need of making compromises. 
According to Skirbekk, one of the main arguments against the welfare state 
is the one that it “repudiates” what is regarded as a collective coercion of 
individual freedom (Ibid: 30). He claims that a sound version of the argu-
ment is that we cannot maximize all values at the same time revealing the 
impossibility to maximize the publicly organized welfare (Ibid). In this con-
text, I draw the conclusion that even if we presume an ideal connection be-
tween the collective arrangements and welfare, it is unreasonable to contra-
dict them unless we neglect the presumption of individual freedom as a pre-
condition for reaching a consensus in the process of delegating rights. Oth-
erwise, personal freedom would not have been defined as as a crucial factor 
for the process of delegation. 
                                           
588 Skirbekk also points out that understanding the idea of equality in terms of exchanging values is 
quite problematic in principle (Ibid: 29, 44, Note 5). 
589 As one of the problems in this context, we should outline the need of dialectically interpreting the 
processes of delegation and distribution for the purposes of specifying the definitions of delegation 
of rights and distribution of responsibility. 
590 However, we should go back to his statement that positive needs are defined as indispensible 
from the negative ones. That is why one of the arguments against welfare state relies on the risks of 
speculating with the implementation of utilitarian ethics since ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ are evaluated 
from the perspective of maximizing and minimizing, while building the ideal model of welfare state. 
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Furthermore, Skirbekk claims that since we have a public welfare, there are 
certain restrictions to one’s personal behavior: “not only the restrictions im-
posed by laws and regulations”, but also the ones, which operate due to “the 
functional need for a certain minimum of a behavioral solidarity” (Ibid). 
This need is defined as a need, which, on an individual level, “takes the 
forms of moral obligations and possibly of normative sanctions” (Ibid). 
Judging by the aforementioned investigations, we can examine how in the 
process of delegation in which people deliberately delegate their freedom 
for the sake of having their rights protected, the distribution of responsibil-
ity is one of the main criteria for justifying the role of the modern welfare 
state in Skirbekk’s sense. 
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3.1. “Be Solidary, Be Sustainable!” The Future 
of Ecological Sustainability in the Welfare State 
According to Skirbekk, ecological sustainability is explored within the 
broader debate about ecological and social reproductions. It takes place 
against the background of so-called appeal for recalling “the societal need 
for reproductive sustainability” as well as to indicate the relationship be-
tween rational criticism and the attempt to act politically (Ibid: 33). Skir-
bekk argues that in the modern society, the necessary types of reproduction 
concern either the market, or they are taken over the state since the market 
does not adequately respond to these fundamental demands (Ibid: 32). In 
this context, he claims that “the final intellectual institution has to be poli-
tics”, which to provide enlightened discussions organized among competent 
participants in the public sphere (Ibid: 33). In turn, the final operative insti-
tution should be politics, which also relevantly functions in terms of legal 
and administrative agreements (Ibid). It is due to the fact that the reproduc-
tions (both biological and socio-cultural ones) are of crucial importance for 
that system guaranteeing the societal survival whose role I already dis-
cussed (Ibid: 34). It is their appropriate implementation that supports the 
normative validity of a certain minimum of care that should be provided by 
the society. For this purpose, the welfare state justifies a basic support for 
the sick and unemployed people which is irreducible to the utilitarian calcu-
lations of costs and benefits, as Skirbekk argues (Ibid: 35). In this sense, the 
minimum has to be understood not only in quantitative terms, but also in 
qualitative ones in so far as the distribution is a matter of being morally en-
gaged on a societal level. 
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3.2.1. The Need of Solidarity 
The normative validity of solidarity in Skirbekk’s sense derives from the 
one of dignity as a prototype characteristic of the principle of non-
humiliation, which gives us the opportunity to talk about already discussed 
sense of commonly shared solidarity (Ibid: 34). However, maximizing the 
overall non-humiliation looks only at first sight as a principle with utilitar-
ian connotations since the normative validity of dignity makes the maximi-
zation a normative process. Thus it becomes one of the communal engage-
ments, which is irreducible to a cost-benefit analysis because thus the com-
munity becomes involved in its own functioning and development in time. 
Furthermore, the particular aspects of the argument of solidarity, which is 
displayed by Skirbekk as one of the arguments in favor of the welfare state, 
concern the issue of what ‘pure’ solidarity is skipping the problem of utility 
or societal sustainability (Ibid: 35). It is called an ethical argument in so far 
as the argument of solidarity is related to the question “who we are and who 
we want to be” (Ibid). Thus the implications of the ecological sustainability 
debate have an impact on how adopting this argument would benefit over-
coming global ecological crisis by achieving ethical and ecological univer-
salizability in the long run. 
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3.2.2. Ecological Sustainability and the Problem 
of Reproductions 
Skirbekk points out the risk of easily misrecognizing the need of biological 
reproduction with so-called cultural one provoked by adopting a utilitarian 
argument (Ibid: 34). However, he clarifies that the argument of utility gains 
a new meaning, especially, against the background of the ecological sus-
tainability591 debate (Ibid: Note 13). Skirbekk claims that sustainability can 
be seen as an objective per se, especially, if we shift the focus from the in-
strumental means to the good as a goal (Ibid). Regarding the aforemen-
tioned misrecognition, its genealogy is interpreted as coming from misun-
derstanding what “utility of life” is (Ibid) because it relies on “mixing the 
standard with that which is measured by the standard” (Ibid). In other 
words, the misrecognition in question can be defined as provoked by replac-
ing the quality of life with the standard of living. 
Furthermore, such a misunderstanding leads to replacing the ecological sus-
tainability with the ecological unsustainability in the long run due to which 
the notion of utility would be defined in purely utilitarian terms. The re-
placement derives from the normative validity of the per se mode, which is 
simplified by the ecological unsustainability as a utilitarian goal in itself. 
Adopting the latter leads to building curriculum vitiosum, in so far as it con-
tributes to determining the utility of life as an ontological oxymoron592. 
By analyzing the internal connections between different types of reproduc-
tion, we can find the crossing point between the ecological reproduction and 
societal one in the issues of immigration and population growth, as repre-
sented by Næss and Kvaløy. In turn, Skirbekk explores two aspects of emi-
gration, i.e. the ones of “coming and getting” due to which the substantial 
support is given by the welfare state (Ibid: 37). The latter is described as 
more sensitive to both immigration and emigration than a pure market soci-
                                           
591According to him, this is a premise requiring any society to preserve its own reproduction within 
given ecological frames (Ibid). Thus the idea of ecological reproduction contributes to grounding the 
concept of ecological sustainability by referring to the one of sustainable reproduction, which should 
be recognized as an environmentally friendly one. 
592Life’s utility can be seen as having both being in itself and being for itself. If the latter, which 
concerns how life to be used for ‘other purposes’ (i.e. for the ones of human kind), is misrecognized 
as a being in itself (i.e. how people to exploit life’s sources as resources, which is understood as 
life’s goal in itself), then we fall into the aforementioned vicious circle. 
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ety (Ibid), and this implies for both capital and people (Ibid). Against the 
background of the aforementioned examinations, the free movement of 
people and capital is defined by Skirbekk as “only compatible with a wel-
fare state when the desire to move is small” (Ibid). Otherwise, there would 
be a tension between the ideal of the state in question and the one of unre-
stricted movement (Ibid).  
Movement becomes a problem when it is unrestricted, and this is a point, 
which is also clearly emphasized by Kvaløy since it increases the impact of 
the ecological and demographical crisis worldwide. 
In turn, Skirbekk argues that evaluating the insufficiency of the vital re-
sources benefits answering the question why can the survival of everybody 
(Ibid: 46, Note 27) can be guaranteed by adopting a certain type of gradual-
ism, which does not concern the economic distribution alone? 
Another similarity between Skirbekk’s and Kvaløy’s conceptions is the re-
consideration of the problem of consumption. Skirbekk argues that in some 
cases it is not the population growth, but rather the issue of uncontrollable 
consumption (Ibid). According to him, where the consumption is ecologi-
cally too high, it should be reduced (Ibid: 47). Similarly, where the popula-
tion growth is too high, it should be reduced (Ibid). The reduction, however, 
concerns the issue of improving quality of life instead of leaving the ques-
tion open, as Næss does while discussing why we should be responsible for 
the reduction itself (Næss 2005c: 19). Both Kvaløy and Skirbekk look for 
solutions, which differ from the ones provided by Næss593. They argue in 
favor of alternatives, which do not concern taking responsibility for the di-
rect reduction of overpopulation, but rather for improving the quality of life. 
While Kvaløy gives an example with India, where the quality of life can be 
enhanced by reconsidering the status of women who are treated as ‘baby-
making machines’, Skirbekk compares the politics in Norway and Shanghai 
                                           
593 According to Næss, there are also three types of migration: people moving from one of high un-
sustainability increase to one of low unsustainability increase, the opposite as well as people moving 
to a place with a roughly equal status of sustainability (Næss 2005t: 284). In this context, one of the 
methodological benefits of adopting Næss’s theory can be traced to his conception of the two-fold 
migration. He talks not only about migration from poor to rich countries, but also clarifies under 
what circumstances citizens of rich countries travel to help people in poor countries as well as how 
the former to be encouraged to do so in the long run. However, since Næss thinks that a vital need 
should be vaguely defined for the sake of preserving pluralism, he does not manage to specify (due 
to neglecting the role of ethical gradualism in practice) how a green economy can contribute to help-
ing people in the different countries to distinguish need from demand (Næss 2008:113). 
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regarding the one-child policy (Skirbekk 1996: 46, Note 24). Furthermore, 
both of them emphasize the role of education and political culture for im-
proving the situation in so-called developing countries by raising the quality 
of life. 
In this context, I argue that the question whether we should give priority to 
the living standard at the expense of quality of life, has a strong impact on 
the need of introducing measures regarding ecological and demographic re-
productions in so far as their problematization derives from the embodiment 
of the differences between rich and poor on different levels of the societal 
interactions.  
Skirbekk outlines three extreme cases of a welfare state, namely, an “elimi-
nation of all political borders and of all restrictions on the movement of men 
and money”594, the justification of a basic social welfare on a global level 
promoted by introducing a certain legislation for welfare and for ecological 
sustainability595, which to be accepted in all countries as well as a “fortifi-
cation of a welfare system within one state or a group of states”596 (Ibid: 
37-38). By contrast to Næss’s vague scenarios regarding ecological sustain-
ability as a future project, Skirbekk sees the realization of the sustainability 
in question as inseparable from the sustainability of the welfare state. An-
other crucial argument regarding Skirbekk’s conception is that it is sustain-
                                           
594 The elimination of borders and restriction of men and money (Ibid: 37) corresponds again to the 
scenarios represented by both Kvaløy and Næss who criticize the potential accession of Norway to 
the EU. Skirbekk argues that the global equation of all the conditions for both capital and people 
will increase the differences between rich and poor in former welfare states and thus it will lower the 
material standard of living for most people leading to an abduction of the welfare state as such (Ibid: 
37-38).  
595 The second scenario concerning the legislation of the welfare state, which also includes the issue 
of ecological sustainability, should be accepted in all countries “equalizing the competition condi-
tions for capital worldwide” as well as “leveling the differences” in the living conditions worldwide 
(Ibid: 38). In turn, encouraging a basic welfare and ecological sustainability on a global scale pre-
sumes the ethically inappropriate differences to be erased.  
596 The third scenario is defined by Skirbekk as an “easier option”, but also as an option causing 
both moral and political problems for the decision making process (Ibid: 38). He claims that from 
the point of view of ideal universalizability, the second scenario is preferable, while from the point 
of view of political feasibility, the third one is attractive (Ibid). According to Skirbekk, to mediate 
between the two options means to create a local welfare state in which the average material standard 
of living to be radically reduced to basic welfare arrangements and some basic conditions for in-
vestments as well as for work (Ibid). 
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ability and not sustainable development that guarantees the universalizabil-
ity of this principle; one important comment, which should make us aware 
of the fact that the debate about environmental protection versus industrial 
development in Norway started in the mid-1960s as a debate about the 
complexity of the different aspects of growth itself, which are irreducible to 
the ones of sustainable development. 
In this context, I argue that by contrast to Skirbekk’s scenarios showing 
how the development of a relevant welfare state may affect the problems 
regarding the justification of ecological sustainability in the long run, 
Næss’s597 ones are focused on rather outlining, in a descriptive manner, 
what most of the ‘unsustainability scenarios’ would look like. Næss does 
not point out the normative aspects of a possible social, economic, and even 
ecological transformation, namely, how the sustainability in question can be 
achieved in practice by introducing given changes in an already existing so-
cial order. 
Promoting a basic welfare defined as built on positive arguments is based 
on what Skirbekk calls ethical universalizability, which makes that scenario 
be realizable with difficulties in the long run. Regarding the realization in 
question, Skirbekk’s arguments are similar to the ones proposed by both 
Næss and Kvaløy, namely that it is demanding to motivate rich countries to 
equate their basic needs with the ones of the developing countries. On a 
macro methodological level, it means that the optimism of this scenario de-
rives from the ethical universalizability that has implications in some differ-
ent scopes such as economics, politics etc.. However, we should keep in 
mind that the difficulties derive also from the fact that ethical universaliza-
bility is realizable since it should be based on a well-grounded, collectively 
shared responsibility between all countries.  
                                           
597As I already outlined in the chapter on Næss, according to him, there are three main classes work-
ing on the principle of contaminated vessels: those with a level of unsustainability “considerably be-
low the average”, those with “roughly an average level of unsustainability” and those “considerably 
above the average level of unsustainability” (Næss 2005o: 195).  
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3.2.3. Ecological Sustainability Scenarios and Ethical 
Universalizability 
According to Skirbekk, the norm of universalizability satisfactory implies 
that everyone seeks a form of life, which is ecologically universalizable, i.e. 
a form of life, which is sustainable worldwide and in the long run (Skirbekk 
1992: 74-75). However, we should also add to the latter statement that this 
principle intrinsically concerns the need of satisfying vital needs of the rep-
resentatives of the welfare state in the most complex way. Judging by the 
aforementioned investigations, I argue that the question of ethical gradual-
ism in Skirbekk’s sense, as projected within environmental politics, depends 
on what we understand by universalizability as well as how the consensus 
about objective needs can counter the strong tendency of abstracting these 
needs from their contents for the sake of imposing certain ideologies.  
Specifying the normative validity of consensus, which is irreducible to 
compromise, so that we to avoid these ideologies to annihilate each other’s 
normative validity, raises the problem how to keep the balance between the 
preservation of a lower welfare standard for all and the one regarding the 
diversity of cultures and natural resources. Skirbekk suggests that ecological 
sustainability is realizable by selectively interpreting and discursively adapt-
ing the norm of ecological universalizability to morally relevant differences 
(Ibid: 75). According to him, the constructive power, going beyond both 
moral relativism and moral objectivism, derives from the adaptation to 
some “morally relevant differences” (Ibid). The latter are examined in re-
spect with the connection between vital needs and vital sources598, which in 
turn inflicts the need of rehabilitating the normative validity of the vital 
needs as irreducible to both sources’ content and context. 
Extrapolating Skirbekk’s theory, I argue that ecological sustainability stems 
from the premise what ‘natural’ growth is rather than from the one of indus-
trial understanding of growth, and thus makes the criterion of universaliza-
bility unsubjectable to the rules of moral objectivism, which provoke the 
negative effects of the contemporary industrialization. On the level of sus-
tainable development, accepting such an interpretation shows why we 
                                           
598Ibid, Note 25. The insufficiency of the vital sources for the survival of everybody is defined as a 
crucial premise for understanding the content of the vital needs themselves. Last but not least, it is 
important to emphasize that according to Skirbekk, the low cost (Ibid: 76) is only one of the many 
aspects of the sustainable welfare. 
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should question not the idea of consumption itself. It is the replacement of 
univesalizability (understood in qualitative terms) with the universalization 
(determined in quantitative ones) that raises the need of distinguishing be-
tween ecological sustainability and ecological unsustainability, especially if 
we overestimate the role of sustainable development as the only one possi-
ble development599.  
Discussing the role of so-called developing and developed countries, we 
should talk about ethically universalizable principle of advocatory represen-
tation due to which the developing countries to be treated as potential moral 
discussants whose well-being is at stake, when they react as moral subjects. 
The common future requires more responsible commitments on side of the 
developed countries to be made, which to operate on the behalf of the de-
veloping ones for the sake of the development of the latter. Thus the devel-
oping countries can take their lives in their own hands as soon as possible 
and turn into moral discussants in practice. 
In this context, Skirbekk’s scenarios give us the opportunity for examining 
sustainability as based on ethically universalizable principles, which makes 
it possible to avoid the ecological unsustainability in the long run. The diffi-
culties derive from already discussed fact that equation is not universaliza-
bility, albeit the latter has the former as a necessary condition in a normative 
sense. That is why Skirbekk’s conception of universalizability is grounded 
in the normative validity of the possibility of applying global ethics due to 
which the relationship between equal-global-universal could be interpreted 
in Hegel’s sense as a dialectical relationship.  
Furthermore, universalizability can be examined as based on two different 
aspects regarding the normative validity of globality, namely, on the distri-
bution concerning the fulfillment of basic needs due to giving access to ex-
ploiting some material resources. The distribution itself functions as a proc-
ess of minimizing (leveling) “the differences in living conditions world-
wide”, as Skirbekk points out (Skirbekk 1996: 38) for the sake of equating. 
In other words, this process takes place for the sake of providing a given 
standard of living for everybody while justifying a certain lifestyle as based 
on fulfilling some basic needs. The second aspect is the one of common sol-
                                           
599However, from this point of view, Skirbekk’s theory of universalizability does not share many 
features with Næss’s criterion of universalization because the latter is rather focused on outlining the 
epistemological preciseness of deriving norms by testing whether they are based on verifiable hy-
potheses. 
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idarity defined as revealing better life’s possibilities since these possibilities 
are also examined as opportunities of recognizing the process of self-
realization as a vital need. Within the framework of the ideal universaliza-
bility in Skirbekk’s sense, the first aspect is realizable if the second one is 
cultivated.  
According to him, the ecologically universalizable forms of life are the 
ones, which are achieved by the people who are willing “to lower their ma-
terial consumption substantially” (Ibid). The willingness is a result of culti-
vating common solidarity interpreted as a social top norm. Thus environ-
mental politics can be grounded by adopting universalizable ethical values, 
which are not abstract ones, as Skirbekk argues. He emphasizes that it is 
crucial the ideal of welfare state to imply “a really low level of welfare” 
(Ibid), where ‘low’ is recognized in quantitative terms. However, this level 
should be understood as ‘high’ in qualitative ones, i.e. as satisfying the 
needs of the participants.  
Looking for universalizable solutions is what Skirbekk defines as strength-
ening the idea of welfare state in ethical terms (Ibid) in so far ethical and 
ecological universalizability provoke the reconsideration of the problem of 
justice. Skirbekk claims that if justice means universalizability, then we 
should argue that a form of life, which is not ethically universalizable is 
morally unacceptable, i.e. it is unjust (Ibid). This in turn presumes the con-
cept of justice, which has at least two meanings, namely, the ones of ‘fair’ 
and ‘equal’ to be examined. If they are defined as ontological synonyms, 
justice can be determined as universalizing since it is recognized as a dis-
tributive justice by default. Furthermore, we should discuss the normative 
validity of such an interpretation if we aim to discursively analyze the dif-
ferences in the process of distribution. 
Skirbekk points out that eco-ethically we can claim that the norm of univer-
salizability concerns the idea of need satisfaction, which implies that every-
one should seek a form of life that is ecologically universalizable (in the 
sense of being sustainable) in the long run (Ibid). He outlines the difference 
between the anthropocentric sustainability and ethical gradualism against 
the background of how the welfare state should function, claiming that we 
should also take into account the “social rights”600 of the non-human moral 
subjects as well as their habitat (Ibid: Note 26). The universal need satisfac-
                                           
600 Here, we should go back to the idea of social setting, which is irreducible to social behavior. In 
this context, the social rights of non-humans in Skirbekk’s sense are defined by analogy. 
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tion presumes not only the satisfaction of vital needs, but also the one of 
some basic rights, which makes these rights a matter of what Skirbekk de-
fines as social rights. Thus being sustainable worldwide is to recognize and 
compare sustainability within different welfare systems (Ibid). 
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3.2.3.1. Skirbekk’s Conception of Low Cost Welfare State 
and the Idea of Universalizability 
Skirbekk claims that there are three important advantages of adopting so-
called universal grant. It is universal, excludes some kinds of moral misuse 
and presupposes a lowering of the material standard in accordance with 
what society can afford. It is also a solution in a situation with permanent 
and extended unemployment (Ibid). 
In this context, the idea of low cost welfare state illustrates why the mini-
mum of universalization regarding mainly the equation of material re-
sources is a necessary but not sufficient condition for achieving minimum 
universalizability. According to the scenario, every adult person should re-
ceive a given basic sum each month, “enough to survive but not to live well 
on” eliminating all other redistributive transactions601 (Ibid: 39). From this 
total sum, we “can deduct all the present public costs of redistribution”, 
namely, payments to pensioners, the unemployed, the ill etc. (Ibid). This 
should also be the case with “the redistribution of economic resources to 
work sectors and regions” (Ibid). All “public salaries would be reduced ac-
cordingly” for the purpose of everybody to start with a universal substantial 
grant (Ibid). As Skirbekk points out, the main problem is where the money 
for supporting the welfare state should come from. It may turn out that pro-
viding the basic minimum for everybody is more expensive than the present 
system (Ibid).  
Skirbekk argues that such a welfare state has a “share-scarcity, ecologically-
oriented market socialism, with a universal grant ensuring tolerable subsis-
tence levels for all, plus material and other incentives for work” (Ibid: 47, 
Note 31). However, he claims that in the thought-experiment, we should 
keep not only the classical, universal system for health care and child care, 
but also the “possibility (and probability) of a major lowering of the mate-
rial expenditures” in these fields (Ibid: 39). In turn, all the administrative 
work for the redistribution should be reduced to this one system that “can-
                                           
601 As Skirbekk argues, his model differs from the one of van der Veen and Van Parijs (1986) (Ibid: 
Note 31). They presuppose some abundance, while Skirbekk examines the impact of scarcity and 
envisages the implications of the low standard of living (Ibid). According to him, van der Veen and 
Van Parijs aim at establishing “communism” “in the sense of giving equal grants to everybody re-
gardless of their personal work relationship” (Ibid). In turn, Skirbekk advocates a universal survival 
grant, but also a differentiated income of work (Ibid). 
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not be misunderstood, nor misused” (Ibid). Thus the politicians would be 
engaged with more meaningful tasks to deal with (Ibid). 
As another problem regarding the functioning of the welfare state, Skirbekk 
points out not the money but rather the motivation to work. A statement that 
partly corresponds to Kvaløy’s concerns about how meaningful work can 
contribute to engaging also children, which is crucial for building, and more 
important, for supporting what he coins as a life necessity society, as I al-
ready outlined in the chapter on Kvaløy. According to Skirbekk, in such a 
low cost welfare state, people should be motivated to work, “not to be satis-
fied with the meager support” from the state in question (Ibid). That is why 
keeping the differentiated payment affects the stability of the universal 
monthly grant. Despite the fact that society implies that everybody knows 
what to expect, the dropping down motivation is a serious factor, which 
does not have to be neglected if we want to avoid making the differentiated 
payment pointless as a social initiative, as Skirbekk warns (Ibid). Further-
more, the material basis is predictable (Ibid: 40), but from that it does not 
follow that it makes the motivation in question a stable one. One of the 
questions is how to motivate people to work more and get a differentiated 
payment602, taking into account that the latter also varies within what is de-
termined by the minimum welfare as an achievable income, i.e. it varies but 
still remains very low (Ibid). Skirbekk outlines that when the substantial 
grant drops towards the level of survival, those who are able to work would 
probably try to do so (Ibid). In this way, the assets will gradually be created 
to benefit the whole society and thus to provide the general support for the 
welfare state (Ibid).  
He relevantly argues that after some time, there probably will be a double 
market, one for the people on the substantial grant alone, and another for 
those who have an additional income. That is why the political price should 
be considered as providing both inequality and a lowering of the average 
material standard of living (Ibid). According to Skirbekk, the inequality in 
question is inherent to that system, which “implies a free labor market on 
the top of an equal share to absolutely everybody” (Ibid). On the other hand, 
it is lowering the average material standard of living for the purposes of 
meeting “the economic requirements of affordable public costs” and the 
ecological ones of reduced consumption that is encouraged (Ibid). Another 
                                           
602Increasing inequality can be avoided if what Skirbekk calls extended or permanent unemploy-
ment prevails, but then it would mean that the common solidarity will be instrumentalized (Ibid). 
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problem, however, is how to treat this inherent inequality of keeping afford-
able public costs without creating economic and social misbalance by in-
flicting bigger inequality. 
As Skirbekk suggests, the notion of common solidarity and political culture 
should be elaborated if we want to reduce the material aspects of living 
standard and inequality (Ibid). The simplification of the administrative pro-
cedures increases the possibility the ones who deserve the grant to be the 
ones who get it (Ibid: 39), albeit it is merely a necessary but not sufficient 
condition against inequality. It may turn out that the ones with differentiated 
payment to start to speculate with the outcomes of their labor. Skirbekk 
stresses that it is hard to say how high or how low we can go claiming that it 
can be “as high as economically and ecologically possible”, and “as low as 
necessary” (Ibid: 39, 47, Note 34). Thus the idea of expanding the criteria of 
possibility goes beyond the necessary and sufficient requirements regardless 
of the fact that possibility is its important premise. 
Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I argue that accepting this 
social disproportion can be recognized as a double-bind issue unless it is 
specified by referring to the principle of common solidarity due to which 
people would deliberately agree to work for the sake of the others without 
being exploited by the society as such. This can happen only if the latter 
category of people is not able to work for itself, i.e. when these people are 
unable to work rather than being satisfied to get something from the state, as 
Skirbekk argues (Ibid). In turn, establishing a differentiated market603 
would mean that the group of the ones satisfied with the universal income is 
a very small one. Thus the over-income will serve the purposes of covering 
both the universal grant and the possibility of differentiating the level of 
consumption.  
                                           
603 Furthermore, Skirbekk argues that the idea of welfare state presupposes a modern, differentiated 
society: “some material basis, both economically and ecologically”, which to “determine the level of 
possible expenditures” (Ibid: 36). 
 513
3.2.4. The Role of Political Culture 
According to Skirbekk, political culture should be defined in a normative 
sense as a “balanced interplay” between different dimensions (Skirbekk 
2007: 87)604. On the one hand, each dimension maintains its peculiarity, 
while, on the other one, it is co-determined by the “reciprocal interplay” 
(Ibid), which makes him argue in favor of drawing a conceptual triangle re-
garding the implementation of the aforementioned dimensions (Ibid). The 
interplay is described as a cohabitation between autonomy and dependence 
(Ibid) in so far as the normative notion of political culture implies multidi-
mensionality with an emphasis on a “sufficient equilibrium between the 
various dimensions” (Ibid). As Skirbekk claims, “the interesting political 
category” is the one of ‘enough’ and ‘not enough’, “not that of utopic goals” 
(Ibid). The latter statement is an argument supporting the thesis that the 
normative validity of the political culture has an ontological grounding, 
which derives from the ‘between’ mode, namely, from the one provoked by 
the tension, which is brought by the dimensions of the triangle. Skirbekk 
points out that when we try to obtain and maintain a sufficiently well-
balanced interplay between the various dimensions of our political scene, 
we start “a process of learning and formation (Bildung)”, which entails 
“both personal experience and multidisciplinary insight” (Ibid: 88).  
What is the ‘quality’ of the political culture itself? The answer to that ques-
tion would also clarify what a sufficiently well-balanced interplay is. Both 
answers are intrinsically related to understanding the competence of soci-
ety’s representatives who prudently evaluate what is enough to maintain the 
interplay as such. It is the normative validity of the necessary and sufficient 
conditions that goes beyond the cost-benefit analysis in so far as the balance 
of the latter is a goal in itself, while the quality of the culture presumes the 
interplay to be interpreted as a goal for itself. Thus one of the main projec-
tions of the interplay concerns how what is enough or not enough in prac-
tice mediates the justification of the basic norms. According to Skirbekk, 
these projections presume both “a personal experience within the various 
dimensions” as well as “a discursively enlightened knowledge” to be taken 
into account (Ibid). 
                                           
604 Skirbekk emphasizes the role of the sphere of rational and autonomous decisions, the one of jus-
tice and legality and the role of the sphere of truth. They cover the fields of democracy, human 
rights and enlightenment (Ibid). 
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Skirbekk argues that the need of a certain political culture is closely tied 
with the one of well-educated and politically trained citizens who take part 
in various ways in a mature and enlightened discussion (Skirbekk 1996: 35). 
Referring to Habermas’s theory, he points out that it “is intellectually im-
portant to transcend the implicit conceptual restrictions” of the market and 
“state bureaucracy” giving due “attention to the public sphere of argumenta-
tion and the personal sphere of post-conventional morality” (Ibid: 37). 
On a macro methodological level, Skirbekk clarifies that achieving ethical 
and ecological universalizability is due to defining what sustainable life is 
(Ibid: 38), which is irreducible to the life provided by the sustainable devel-
opment society. In this context, one of the arguments for the welfare state 
concerns how to cultivate political culture, which is examined in a democ-
ratic environment since it contributes to the justification of “a politically 
mature welfare culture” (Ibid: 35). As Skirbekk points out, the argument of 
political culture benefiting the building of a mature welfare culture is an ar-
gument related to the notion of moral agents as well as to “the realm of 
well-entrenched moral obligations”605 (Ibid).  
In turn, this argument can be explored within the framework of deontologi-
cal ethics in so far as moral agents advocate a societal maturity understood 
as a matter of cultivating collective duty. On a macro methodological level, 
developing political culture is in tune with so-called by Skirbekk social mo-
rality (Ibid: 31), which guarantees the long-term feasibility of the welfare 
state, namely, the development of a diverse welfare society. The concerns 
about the feasibility in question are defined by Skirbekk as regarding the 
cost-benefit analysis, i.e. as clarifying whether it is economically sustain-
able to operate in the field of social morality as well as how the latter can 
affect the decisive demographic and ecological changes worldwide (Ibid). 
The practical implications of the morality in question are driven by the need 
of introducing the idea of modesty due to which the welfare society should 
be regulated606. 
Furthermore, the normative validity of the welfare state has an impact on 
whether the dominating scenario will be the one of ecological sustainability, 
                                           
605 According to Skirbekk, such a morality can be cultivated if the moral discussants are enlightened 
moral citizens, who are “able and willing to conduct their lives in accordance with internalized con-
straints” (Ibid: 30). 
606 Skirbekk argues that most concerns are about the fact that the situation is already established 
while the functioning of the welfare state is becoming increasingly complicated (Ibid).  
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or the one of ecological unsustainability, i.e. whether the normative validity 
concerns the implications and the embodiment of sustainability itself as well 
as the one of its desirability, especially when such sustainability is politi-
cally desirable. 
In this context, I argue that the definition of political competence is not a 
sufficient condition for cultivating political culture, albeit it is a necessary 
factor for its functioning. This is due to the fact that the mode of together-
ness determines the normative validity of the competence in question. It is 
the discursively mediated insight in relevant discussions that contributes to 
coupling rational expertise with global ethics in Skirbekk’s sense (Ibid).  
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3.2.4.1. The Impact of Political Culture 
on the Modern Norwegian Topography 
On a macro methodological level, one of the biggest challenges to the po-
litical culture in the modern welfare state is how to counter the normative 
validity of the new topography analyzed by Kvaløy in his theory of indus-
trial development society, which I already discussed. According to Skir-
bekk, Norwegian topography concerns the fact that we often run subsea 
power cables607: due to that plan, the way in and the way out are “justifia-
bly secured”, compared, for example, to the ones in the mountain (Skirbekk 
2015: 2). The misuse of mapping encouraged the new topography, which is 
a matter of planning achieved by the process of calculating possible benefits 
for the society by elaborating a mapping with instrumental functions. Going 
back to already examined idea of moral mapping in Kvaløy’s theory of in-
dustrial development society, I draw the conclusion that Skirbekk’s scenar-
ios outline the justification of utilitarian morality’s mapping due to which 
the issues of safety and functionality are still embodied, albeit being pro-
jected on a different level, namely, on the one of providing mapping of na-
ture’s sources as resources. 
Furthermore, the epistemological distinction between the ‘old’ way of map-
ping in Nansen’s sense and the ‘new’ topography seriously affects the re-
consideration of the role of regional politics. As Skirbekk argues, revealing 
the negative ecological consequences of running such a subsea cable on the 
Norwegian side, makes the lack of feedback apparent, when the regional 
identity is at stake: “We have demonstrated again that the way between Os-
lo and Bergen is longer than the one between Bergen and Oslo”608 (Ibid: 6). 
In this context, he points out that the Hardangerfjord is not just a spot on the 
map. It is an issue of aesthetic and tourist interest, but also one concerning 
identity (Ibid). 
                                           
607 His comment concerns the debates in Norway about running subsea cables for the sake of gain-
ing more energy for commercial reasons (Skirbekk 2015: 2). In this context, the question is why do 
not we run such cables all along the fjords, where the electric power is produced? (Ibid: 16). The ex-
ample illustrates the new type of topography, which is based on examining natural sources as re-
sources alone. Due to such topography, the places are described as depending on sources’ potential 
as consumable resources rather than having an intrinsic value as belonging to the landscape. 
608 In this context, he emphasizes the role of ideology behind the centralization of Norwegian envi-
ronmental politics at the expense of bioregionalism. 
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While mapping has an impact on the sense of belonging, which gives us 
reasons to favor building the latter as a crucial premise for shaping our 
sense of identity, the topography as such aims at clarifying the boundaries 
of the places and their internal connections. It is the sense of belonging that 
makes us talk about both ethic and aesthetic aspects of nature, as Skirbekk 
argues, in so far as it regards the intrinsic dependence of man on nature and 
the other way around. In this context, the ‘old’ mapping can be illustrated 
by referring to already discussed statement formulated by Næss, namely, to 
the one Here I stand clarifying the boundaries of human sense of belonging 
to the biosphere. 
Analyzing the implications of Kvaløy’s and Skirbekk’s theories, I draw the 
conclusion that while mapping in Nansen’s sense, which was discussed in 
the first chapter of the current monograph, encourages grasping multidi-
mensionality of our existence in nature, the ‘new’ topography, provoked by 
the increasing technocratization and the requirements of the free market, is 
rather focused on grasping and compressing dimensions for the sake of im-




One of the main objectives of the current monograph is to clarify that Nor-
wegian ecophilosophies are a complex phenomenon whose genealogy can-
not be fully understood if it is examined as an umbrella term alone. Justify-
ing what I called horizontal relatedness as one of the prototype characteris-
tics of the philosophies in question contributes to outlining the dialectical 
entity of the relationships between man and nature as intrinsically connected 
with the rehabilitation of the principles of ethics. Thus only the ungrounded 
faith in (radical) ethical anthropocentrism, which Norwegian ecophiloso-
phies criticize, can be relevantly questioned without falling into the trap of 
moral objectivism, nor into the one of radical biocentrism. Furthermore, 
recognizing Norwegian ecophilosophies as process philosophies can benefit 
clarifying one of the main objects of investigation of the current mono-
graph, namely, how the biosphere, which is determined as a complex net of 
ecosystems having an intrinsic value, can be better understood by applying 
the methods of ethical gradualism. They illustrate why introducing relevant 
ecophilosophies affects building relevant environmental politics without 
neglecting the role of biological gradualism as such.  
As one of the crucial factors, which provoke the need of specifying the ge-
nealogy of Norwegian ecophilosophies, I point out the debates about growth 
and environmental protection which took place in the mid-1960 and which 
gradually turned into discussions about sustainable development vs. envi-
ronmental protection. In this context, I claim that one of the main challenges 
Norwegian ecophilosophies faced was how to revive the use of ‘and’ mode 
without supporting zero-growth. 
On the other hand, I draw the conclusion that clarifying the role of one’s 
self-realization as closely tied with nature’s realization can be done by in-
troducing the concept of moral experiential gestalt in so far as cultivating 
our sensitivity towards the net of biosphere is a matter of how to teach our-
selves to recognize the equal right of all living beings to live and blossom. 
Specifying the role of moral experiential gestalt is of crucial interest if it is 
referred to the principles of Norwegian ecophilosophies because reconsider-
ing the influence of so-called moral imagination, we can specify what it 
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means ‘to think like a mountain’ in Næss’s sense by going beyond the pure-
ly metaphorical interpretations. 
The aforementioned new mode of thinking, which appeals for avoiding the 
reduction of rationality to cognitive rationality by rehabilitating the role of 
feelings and emotions in our interaction with nature shows why by human 
self-realization we presumably understand the realization of an aware moral 
agent. That is why one of the main objectives is the individual to become 
morally engaged with preserving nature’s sources by avoiding their trans-
formation into resources of exploitation on both individual and collective 
levels. It is the reconsidered normative validity of feelings and emotions 
that helps cultivating compassion for other living beings even when they are 
not ‘similar’ to us, i.e. it contributes to cultivating our sensitivity to what it 
means to be in someone else’s shoes without being in his/her/its shoes 
themselves. On a macro methodological level, I draw the conclusion that 
cultivating moral imagination, as done within the Norwegian ecophiloso-
phies, benefits disenchanting the statement that understanding nature’s har-
mony is merely a matter of human understanding.  
Otherwise, due to the increasing anthropocentric invasion in nature, the idea 
of harmonization of the biosphere would have been replaced with human 
understanding of harmony, which presumes the exclusion of any contradic-
tion whatsoever. Furthermore, I argue that revealing the origin of the dis-
tinction harmonization vs. harmony is important for avoiding the unproduc-
tive way of talking about egalitarian and elitarian approaches towards na-
ture. 
In the first chapter, which is devoted to outlining the genealogy of Norwe-
gian outdoor life, I reach the conclusion that both Norwegian ecophiloso-
phies and Norwegian philosophy of outdoor life (friluftsliv) are based on 
some similar conceptions of the role of biosphere’s intrinsic value. This 
conclusion gives me grounds to examine Norwegian ecophilosophies as ex-
periential philosophies whose prototype characteristic is the strive for reha-
bilitating the initial total openness of man and nature. Another important 
similarity is found in the way the idea of nature’s complexity determines the 
process of self-realization by following the rhythm of nature without pro-
moting a certain type of objective naturalism.  
Regarding the genealogy of Norwegian philosophy of outdoor life, I draw 
the conclusion that Norwegian Romanticism, with its specific attitudes to-
wards nature, was not ‘more’ ‘anti-romantic’, as N. Witoszek suggests. 
Both of them presumed adopting mutually complementing perspectives, 
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which affected what Tordsson calls a common understanding of natural and 
cultural characteristics formulated in the name of building national identity.  
The projections of new ethics, which are brought with the Norwegian out-
door life, can be traced on the level of investigating the image of the Nor-
wegian fairy tale hero Ash-Lad and the attitudes towards nature understood 
as a part of Norwegian national identity. Examining the aforementioned 
projections, I argue that one of the methodological advantages of adopting 
Kvaløy’s reception of Bergson’s theory of laughter, which was extrapolated 
to the analysis of the fairy tale hero in question, benefits revealing how due 
to establishing a new type of rationality, the new experience (including the 
one of nature) can be relevantly interpreted by referring to the practices of 
moral understanding and moral learning.  
Analyzing Kvaløy’s interpretation of Ash-Lad’s tale, I outline how the dif-
ferences in the landscapes (the ones between Norwegian and Danish land-
scapes) function as socio-cultural limitations providing the contrast between 
two visions of time (between past and present, which in turn characterize 
two different types of national identity). This contrast can be determined as 
an axiologically grounded one, which is based on the contradiction of what 
Kvaløy calls organic time (embodied in Ash-Lad’s time) and mechanical 
time (as displayed by Per-and-Pål’s time).  
Going back to the aspects of time dimension and the genealogy of so-called 
by Tordsson Social project regarding the development of Norwegian out-
door life, I reach the conclusion that the class-stratification imposes a new 
understanding of time. The latter is considered as a matter of possession on 
man’s side due to which the idea of value is equated with the one of price. 
Thus Norwegian outdoor life is determined as having collective value 
whose functioning is regulated by the arising symbolic capital of the leisure 
time. In this context, I argue that the competence that guarantees Ash-Lad’s 
understanding of time is replaced with the one reducing time to accelerated 
tempo.  
In turn, regarding the challenges of so-called by Tordsson Modernization 
project, I reach the conclusion that the conflict between the objectives of in-
dustrial development and environmental protection became a fact due to the 
clash of the different interests, which had to be noncontradictory integrated 
in respect with the objectives of conservation ethics. The contradictions 
were more apparent in the post-war period since the need of compensating 
the losses of war inflicted the need of accelerated rationality for the pur-
poses of finding additional sources of exploitation and capital investments. 
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All the aforementioned changes affected the attitudes towards being in the 
mountain as a crucial part of Norwegian outdoor life. Referring to Nansen’s 
description of his experience in Jotunheimen, I draw the conclusion that the 
evaluation of Norwegian climbing experience relied on the contradiction 
between Homo Ascensus and Homo Viator entailing some reminiscences of 
Romanticism’s ideal due to which the vertical space was ascribed a high 
symbolic value. 
On a macro methodological level, I find one of the main prerequisites for 
comparing Nansen’s conception of nature with Næss’s ecophilosophy in de-
fining spontaneous experience as a prototype characteristic of experiential 
learning by adopting the principles of imaginative rationality. Furthermore, 
I argue that for Nansen ‘to live richly’ is what is for Næss ‘to live a life that 
is simple in means but rich in ends’ in so far as both of them emphasize the 
self-realization as a way of reconsidering man’s place in the biosphere by 
developing what it is to feel at home. Another methodological similarity is 
concerned with the diachronic implications of so-called by Tordsson moral 
geography determined from Nansen’s perspective of outdoor life. This is al-
so due to the fact that both Nansen and Næss referred the statement that ‘na-
ture is a home of man’ to an ideal past, which has to be revived by the prac-
tices of experiential learning and understanding. 
Judging by the impact of climbing on Norwegian outdoor life, I draw the 
conclusion that the mountaineering experience of Zapffe, Næss, Kvaløy and 
Faarlund was an important factor for developing their ecophilosophies since 
the change in the climbing techniques of KKK and NTK clubs illustrated 
how both the ideas of trackless experience in nature and the rehabilitation of 
nature’s intrinsic value have been elaborated in time. I justify the hypothesis 
that Norwegian philosophy of climbing is based on a particular applied eth-
ics whose prototype characteristics are cooperation rather than competition 
as well as the deep respect to nature manifested in so-called anti-expeditions 
due to which the way was recognized as more important than conquering 
the peak itself. In turn, outlining these ethical principles shows why phi-
losophy of climbing adopted by Zapffe, Næss, Kvaløy and Faarlund cannot 
be defined as a philosophy of sport.  
That is why I argue that the worldview change regarding the anticipation of 
climbing experience in Norway was driven by the increasing role of imagi-
native rationality, which contributed to seeing nature through the lens of 
‘numinous’; as an entity sui generis that puts in question the logic of the an-
thropocentric invasion of the biosphere.  
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Regarding the development of climbing techniques adopted by KKK and 
NTK, I point out that the introduction of bolt climbing by Næss in Norway 
determined the overcoming of experiential dualism, i.e. to separately talk 
about climbing experience as an object and climber as a subject. Judging by 
the aforementioned investigations, I reach the conclusion that the initially 
lower level of sportification of bolt climbing in Kolsås in the 1960s was 
provoked by the need of rehabilitating the value of safety, which addressed 
both the climber’s interactions with others and his/her contact with the 
mountain as such, albeit in different ways. Furthermore, clean climbing, as 
it was introduced by Faarlund in Norway, cannot be seen as a sport from the 
very beginning since its prototype characteristics ‘faster’ and ‘easier’ pri-
marily concerned the safety of the climber and have not been examined in 
terms of price as when they were promoted in climbing as a sport.  
Analyzing the implicit ethical foundation of the early 20th-century essays 
on Norwegian philosophy of outdoor life, I argue that Norwegian philoso-
phy of climbing can be defined as based on a given applied ethics also due 
to the fact that it was developed as a form of experiential learning whose 
normative validity arises from outlining practical wisdom as its main char-
acteristic. I draw the conclusion that it is applied ethics grounding Norwe-
gian philosophy of climbing that makes me specify the difference between 
sport and idrett in its initial meaning as corresponding to the one between 
speed and pace. While the pace reaching its maximum embodies pure natu-
ral rhythm, the maximum speed is associated with the best time available 
understood as a subject to calculations on man’s side. 
Extrapolating the investigations regarding Norwegian climbing ethics, I also 
conclude that Næss’s theory of what it means ‘to think like a mountain’ 
clarifies what it is ‘to see/hear like a mountain’ in so far as understanding 
the thinking, hearing and seeing can give us a clue what it is ‘to be like a 
mountain’, namely, to recognize the normative validity of the as if mode. 
Reconsidering the role of the aforementioned mode, I claim that regarding 
Norwegian philosophy of climbing, we can talk about adequation of under-
standing and things because the restrictions of the principle of adequation 
itself are driven by some conceptual limitations, not by the matter itself.  
With all this considered, I draw the conclusion that the ‘magical’ power of 
Norwegian climbing derives from the ontological tension created by the 
mode of beyondness, which shows how mastering practical wisdom in order 
to reveal nature as an object in itself is a result of adopting a complex sense 
of rationality that does not coincide with our common sense. Thus Zapffe’s 
definition of Dionysian is comparable with the booze since in the state of 
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ecstasy, the climber sees the open face of nature, which makes him/her ful-
filled with joy. Referring Zapffe’s analysis to the climbing experience in 
general, I argue that we should rather talk about mountain’s playfulness as a 
mode corresponding to what Næss calls playing (lek). I conclude that the 
climbing Homo Ludens is the one whose experiential gestalt has an existen-
tial joy as a prototype characteristic guaranteeing his/her complex self-
realization. That is why we can examine pessimism and optimism as two 
mutually connected aspects of the climbing philosophy, which are driven by 
the state of ecstasy experienced by the climber.  
In this context, I argue that contradicting Zapffe’s philosophy as a pessimist 
one to the philosophies of Næss and Faarlund recognized as optimist phi-
losophies raises some concerns about their ontological groundings since so-
called pessimist feelings are a necessary condition for people and nature to 
be ‘on one and the same side’, making man aware that he/she is not the 
master of the universe.  
Discussing the role of the mountains, I argue that developing a sense of be-
longing to them concerns the establishment of so-called cabin culture as 
well as its influence on building ecosophy in Næss’s sense. Furthermore, I 
emphasize that Norwegian cabin culture promotes a certain environmental 
ethics whose requirements are determined by the place itself. The lifestyle is 
the one appropriate for the place whose main norm is simplicity in means 
and richness in ends provided by nature as such, as Næss suggests. How-
ever, the latter formula does not have to be interpreted from the perspective 
of objective naturalism. That is why I argue in favor of justifying environ-
mental holism by adopting a certain type of ontological minimalism, which 
to bring a given type of existential maximalism to light. 
Extrapolating Gjefsen’s theory of the culture of cabin life, I draw the con-
clusion that the initial strive for rediscovering a place as a home is con-
cerned with the implicit willingness to ‘demonstrate’ a sense of authenticity 
beyond the possible definitions of otherness. It means that by choosing the 
authentic life in the mountain, one no longer wants to be recognized as a 
guest in the bosom of biosphere. If ecology is defined as a science of home 
(eco-logy), Norwegian ecophilosophies can be described as based on a cer-
tain type of enlightened knowledge, i.e. on ‘wisdom about home’ (eco-
sophy), which means that rediscovering man’s fundamental place in the 
universe presumes developing a specific personal philosophy. 
Regarding Faarlund’s philosophy of outdoor life, I draw the conclusion that 
it is the process of conwaying that determines outdoor life to be recognized 
as a pedagogical arena. It should be examined not only from a utilitarian 
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perspective, but also from a deontological one. The differences in the choice 
of means justify the differences in the choice of approaches, but the differ-
ences in the latter inflict differences in values as well. Thus preferring one 
approach or another shapes the way we choose the means of determining 
outdoor life as axiologically-loaded phenomenon. 
On a micro methodological level, I argue that one of the benefits of Faar-
lund’s approach is that he investigates the values of contemplation and 
modernization not only as mutually excluding ones, but also as values 
whose contradiction is a guarantee for their further development. Reviving 
the symbolic capital of the values of contemplation is a ‘natural’ reaction 
against the arising role of the values of modernization, which have to be 
somehow restricted in the name of preserving the value of self-realization. 
Exploring the aforementioned values as functioning on the principle of con-
taminated vessels, as I suggest, reveals why Norwegian philosophy of out-
door life provides a way home in Faarlund’s sense due to which establishing 
ecolife requires adopting particular values. In this context, his conception of 
ecolife can be justified as a measure against the threat of increasing moral 
relativism, which is provoked by the contemporary technological culture. 
Analyzing Faarlund’s illuminative statement that one feels at home in na-
ture, I draw the conclusion that the normative aspects of this life have to be 
explored by specifying what profitable life in nature is. The latter does not 
have to be interpreted within the paradigm of utilitarian benefits, but rather 
as a way of being personally enriched in the process of self-realization. In 
other words, leading a profitable ecolife can be recognized as taking the re-
sponsibility to become a Self with a capital letter while respecting nature as 
a net of biospherical knots.  
As long as the competition has to be evaluated from the perspective of co-
operation in outdoor life, I argue that Faarlund’s theory can be read as 
grounded in two coordinate systems implying two different types of moral-
ity. The coordinate system of technological culture is the one, which I de-
fine as driven by a ‘vertical’ moral geography, while the Norwegian phi-
losophy of outdoor life is explored as establishing a ‘horizontal’ moral ge-
ography due to which situating places on the same plane means to provide 
the participants with equal opportunities for self-realization. Thus moral ge-
nealogy can be explored as encouraging the transformation of the selves in-
to Selves with a capital letter in contrast to the ‘vertical moral geography’, 
which presumes that the Selves with a capital letter are born this way. 
I also argue that the distinction between the two types of understanding 
based on the different definitions of what living beings are determines dif-
 526
ferent types of motivation to be developed, which individuals should culti-
vate depending on the moral geography they choose. The ‘vertical’ moral 
geography requires adopting the competition as a stimulus with a high val-
ue, which to dominate the process of self-realization. On the other hand, so-
called by Faarlund motive of achieving (prestasjonsmotivet) can be exam-
ined as a crucial component of the ‘horizontal’ moral geography since it en-
courages the reconsideration of life’s quality within the framework of onto-
logical ethics. 
In this context, I draw the conclusion that while for the adopters of outdoor 
life the mutual interests are interpreted as arising from the common experi-
ential knowledge, the ones of life promoted by the technological culture 
give priority to the scientific knowledge, which is defined as favorable to 
obtaining practical benefits from supporting different types of interests. 
That is why one of the main methodological advantages of extrapolating 
Faarlund’s idea of conwaying could be traced on the level of building col-
lective imaginative rationality due to which to rehabilitate the normative va-
lidity of experiential learning as such. 
Furthermore, I argue that rethinking the role of experiential learning 
through Faarlund’s formula ‘the way is the goal’ (veien er målet), we not 
only make meaningful decisions in meaningful situations, but also manage 
to see the meaning of situations, which are used to be considered as de-
prived of any concrete meaning whatsoever. Judging by those investiga-
tions, I reach the conclusion that the latter is a result of expanding the dom-
inance of technological culture, which reduces the role of experience at the 
expense of pure rationality and thus turns the philosophy of outdoor life into 
a leisure time activity. 
In turn, examining Zapffe’s theory of biosophy in the second chapter of the 
current monograph reveals how one unique, not only for Norway, philoso-
phy exploits the methods of applied biology for finding solutions to some 
crucial existential problems, albeit it is not restricted to the use of biological 
methods alone. Taking into account that Zapffe himself ambiguously de-
fines to what biosophy as a method is using ‘biosophical’ and ‘biological’ 
as interchangeable concepts, I argue that the two concepts could be inter-
preted as ontological synonyms for the purposes of clarifying biosophy’s 
potential as an experiential philosophy. Regarding Zapffe’s definition of 
biosophical as “mystical”, which, according to Hessen, is used in his later 
writings, while “biological” indicates something “more empirical”, I draw 
the following conclusion. The use of ‘mystical’ does not have to be inter-
preted as a matter of pure spiritualism, but rather as indicating the difficul-
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ties in specifying what purely biosophical is because otherwise, it would 
have contradicted Uexküll’s idea of Umwelt that is crucial for Zapffe’s bio-
sophy. Furthermore, if biosophical was interpreted as deprived of substanti-
ality, it would have put in question the normative validity of the four inter-
est fronts in Zapffe’s sense, as well as we would not have been able to talk 
about interest bearers, which is a key concept in his theory. 
Taking into account that the conceptualization of biosophy is strongly influ-
enced by both Berkeley’s theory of “esse est percipi” and Uexküll’s bio-
semiotics, I argue that clarifying the role of perception, Zapffe’s theory pro-
vokes some contradictions regarding the definition of so-called unimportant 
perception. Presuming that one perception might be ‘unimportant’ from a 
biosophical point of view raises the question what are the reasons for justi-
fying one perception as more important than another one? Extrapolating this 
explanation would lead to the ambiguous conclusion that one individual’s 
interests matter more than others. On a macro-methodological level, it 
would mean that one Umwelt in Uexküll’s sense is more important (in both 
epistemological and moral sense) than another one, which is against the 
theories of both Uexküll and Zapffe. Otherwise, it should have provoked the 
problematic conclusion that ‘esse’ coincides with ‘percipi’ imposing either 
epistemological absolutism, or epistemological relativism. 
On the other hand, as one of Zapffe’s methodological contributions, I point 
out his investigations of human biological constitution as irreducible to its 
biological features. Thus he reveals how human unfixibility makes human 
kind different from the other species including so-called higher animals. In 
this context, I conclude that biological gradualism in Zapffe’s sense regard-
ing the interspecies differences in their biological constitutions is merely a 
necessary condition for exploring the role of unfixibility in question since 
biological interests are only one of the four types of interests outlined by 
Zapffe. Thus we can explain why the degree of fixation mechanisms partly 
depends on the physical abilities of the organisms to fulfill their interests.  
Analyzing the genealogy of biosophy, I draw the conclusion that it is the 
normative validity of what I called horizontal relatedness that makes bioso-
phy irrelevant to the justification of objective naturalism, i.e. the mode of 
becoming to be reduced to the one of being. Otherwise, thinking from the 
perspective of defining biosophy and biology as alternatives hides the risk 
they to be examined as substantially different alternatives, which in turn 
would negatively affect reducing biosophy to the methods of applied biol-
ogy as well as to intermingling the specifications of biosophy as an alterna-
tive with the ones of biosophy as a method. If Zapffe had provided argu-
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ments in favor of objective naturalism, which he did not do, it would have 
meant that the realization of nature would have been a necessary and suffi-
cient condition for the realization of man, but not vice versa. Such a state-
ment would have questioned both the process of man’s self-realization and 
the idea of horizontal relatedness itself. Furthermore, it would have implied 
that nature is in a ‘higher’ position in respect with man having ‘bigger’ (bet-
ter) normative validity. 
Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I draw the conclusion that the 
difference between biosophical and biological remains unclear if we neglect 
the ontological grounding of Zapffe’s experiential philosophy whose projec-
tions can be outlined by what Fløistad defines as an ecological perspective 
in the broad sense of the word. That is why I claim that biosophical is a 
mode of philosophical thinking that is initially based on the philosophy of 
nature rather than on nature’s mechanisms and their application as such. 
This philosophy of nature does not have to be interpreted as a sophisticated 
construct, but rather as clarifying the internal logic of nature’s development, 
which has its own dialectics. I argue that it is the normative validity of bio-
sophy understood as an experiential philosophy that makes the recognition 
of its own judgments both rationally acceptable and deriving from the real 
matter.  
In turn, understanding the complexity of vital balance in Zapffe’s sense can 
be revealed by analyzing the reasons behind his statement that expressibility 
in biological front is a heterotelic one. Referring to Zapffe’s examples of the 
released bird and the one in captivity, I draw the conclusion that the differ-
ences in defining the relations between autotelic and heterotelic needs de-
rive from the fact that the degree of expressibility is not necessarily deter-
mined by the degree of individual equipment and over-equipment in par-
ticular, especially when the latter is a result of overexposing the role of ex-
ternal environmental conditions. As another argument in favor of claiming 
that biological equipment in Zapffe’s sense is only a necessary condition, I 
point out the one that some representatives of a given species may have the 
surplus of capabilities but not to use them, for one reason or another. 
In this context, I reach the conclusion that Zapffe’s biosophy is one of the 
first Norwegian philosophies showing how the pitfalls of ethical anthropo-
centrism can be overcome without supporting a certain form of radical bio-
centrism’ while examining the biological interest front as intrinsically con-
nected with the social, autotelic and metaphysical fronts. 
The paradoxical at first sight intermingling of autotelic and heterotelic 
needs regarding man’s over-equipment, as represented by Zapffe, is another 
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argument that what he described as biologically predetermined intentional-
ity is a necessary but not sufficient condition for revealing man’s complex 
capabilities in so far as life’s meaningfulness is irreducible neither to the 
fulfillment of a certain set of objective goals, nor to the one of given objec-
tifiable meanings. That is why I draw the conclusion that this intentionality 
has much to do with understanding life as an experiential strive, which can 
be embodied in different ways in one and the same organism in time, espe-
cially if we take into account the role of what Zapffe calls living energies. 
On the other hand, I claim that another paradox, deriving from the possible 
absolutization of the biological interest front as a leading one, would stem 
from intermingling biological autotelic and heterotelic needs. Biological 
behavior cannot be determined as driven by autotelic needs alone even if we 
accept Zapffe’s theory of the role of biological directives, unless we pre-
sume a certain type of moral (epistemological) naturalism to be adopted, or 
take for granted his questionable conception of biological morality. In this 
context, I point out that biological front in Zapffe’s sense is irreducible to 
biological behavior because the normative validity of the biological behav-
ior presumes it to be examined within so-called by Zapffe multi-frontal en-
gagements; such a presumption contributes to finding an answer to his ques-
tion how what is coined as autotelic in one front is recognized as heterotelic 
in another one. 
In turn, the contradictions regarding Zapffe’s specification of the surplus 
and lack of capabilities cannot be solved unless we specify that the surplus 
of capabilities is irreducible to expressibility as representing a given type of 
surplus. That is why I draw the conclusion that expressibility in Zapffe’s 
sense concerns the understanding of impossibility as a possibility for itself 
that derives from the fact man can have more capabilities than the ones re-
quired for fulfilling the task. 
Referring to Zapffe’s descriptions of so-called over-biological (overbiolo-
gisk) and its definition as autotelic, we should take into account that the im-
possibility of fulfilling the intension is determined as a given kind of meta-
possibility. I argue that the latter affects the qualitative implications of what 
over-biological is because the meta-possibility is irreducible to the sum of 
the possible compensatory objects. Judging by the aforementioned investi-
gations, I conclude that one of the illuminative embodiments of over-
biological is the existence of moral norms. 
Furthermore, exploring Zapffe’s thesis of the internal connections between 
the four interest fronts, I claim that man’s indifference to others and ani-
mals’ indifference are of a different rank in so far as animals’ sense of be-
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longing is used to have a normative validity mainly within the biological 
front. In contrast to animals, man’s sense of belonging gains its validity 
from the intersection of some autotelic and metaphysical engagements as 
well as while one is realizing one’s potential in the social front. On a macro 
methodological level, it means that developing different types of engage-
ments, humans aim at recognizing a chosen locus as a home by making 
one’s environment not only a biological, but also a social habitat, where 
they choose to live with others. 
The differences between biological interests of animals and human beings 
can be made apparent by examining what Zapffe defines as a matter of 
achieving unifying result. That is why I draw the conclusion that while for 
the animals continuity is a matter of temporal fragments, for the human be-
ings, it is an existential continuity. Furthermore, regarding the process of 
protecting the heirs, in the former case, we see how the mode of temporality 
is guaranteed by the instincts, while in the latter one, it is a result of the ex-
istential projections that are not axiologically neutral.  
Comparing Zapffe’s conception of life’s unfolding and life’s feeling against 
the background of the presumption that autotelic and metaphysical fronts 
are not one and the same, albeit they encourage autotelic-metaphysical en-
gagements, I argue that we should compare two conceptions of existential 
continuity, which gain their normative validity due to the principles of im-
aginative rationality. On a macro methodological level, I reach the conclu-
sion that Zapffe’s theory of world’s feeling is defined within the framework 
of autotelic-metaphysical engagements. From an autotelic perspective 
alone, the emphasis is put on the self-sufficiency of the world, which has a 
predetermined order, while from a metaphysical perspective, the crucial 
questions of both life’s meaning and human being’s life illustrate how hu-
man beings are not able to grasp the meaning of life regardless of the fact 
that they elaborate different mechanisms of living with such an inability. In 
this context, the metaphysical tension can be described as brought by the 
one between autotelic and heterotelic needs of finding a meaning in being, 
as displayed by Zapffe. 
In turn, the aforementioned specifications depend on the role of fantasy in 
his sense. That is why I draw the conclusion that while autotelic activity of 
fantasy concerns life’s feeling, its heterotelic activity characterizes the met-
aphysical need of finding meaning in life’s feeling itself. 
Analyzing the complex relations between different multi-frontal engage-
ments is grounded in outlining the diverse connections between the individ-
ual abilities, the degree of fixation and the type of solutions due to the dif-
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ferent opportunities for fulfilling a given task under given circumstances. 
Applying this approach to Zapffe’s theory, I draw the conclusion that it 
would not only contribute to revealing why having a capability is not equiv-
alent to mastering expressibility, but also to specifying why Zapffe leaves 
the boundary between compensatory objects and surrogates, as well as the 
one between real and imaginary anchoring unclear. First, I justify that the 
over-fixation and the surplus of abilities are not necessarily set in a corre-
sponding relation because a contradiction arises from Zapffe’s definition of 
over-fixation as including ability, which is too much fixed and the one of 
surplus that may include abilities that are not required for fulfilling the task, 
as I showed above. 
I also emphasize that he does not examine how the abilities and fixations 
regarding the unification in question may vary in time depending on the cir-
cumstances, i.e. he does not investigate when and how one well-adapted 
fixation can become a wrong one. 
Going back to the issues of both imaginary and real anchoring, and the un-
clear boundaries between the compensatory objects and surrogates, I con-
clude that Zapffe’s criteria of real and unreal are only a necessary condition 
for revealing the multiple opportunities for fulfilling given tasks. As an il-
lustration of this thesis, I refer to his example of having ‘good’ and ‘plain’ 
surrogates, both of which are imaginary objects. Furthermore, as one of the 
possible arguments for revealing the insufficiency of the criteria of real and 
unreal, I point out that achieving a result by performing different abilities is 
recognized by default as a real objective regardless of the contents of the 
latter since they concern the fulfillment of a real need. 
On the other hand, the complexity in specifying the boundary between real 
and unreal solutions can be defined as a matter of behavioral solutions be-
cause they are achieved by interest bearers. That is why we may have real 
solutions, which are less sufficient than some imaginary solutions from the 
interest bearer’s point of view. 
Clarifying the role of evaluation itself raises the question how to interpret 
Zapffe’s statement that we should assume a condition of surplus in an auto-
telic state of readiness since it would mean that merely high values encour-
age the self-sufficiency of realization. Accepting such a thesis, however, 
would lead to the problematic conclusion that high values alone determine 
the fulfillment of real solutions, which would cause confronting the proc-
esses of sublimation and (over)compensation with some ‘good’ surrogates 
in Zapffe’s sense. 
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Furthermore, I draw the conclusion that if we remain on the level of com-
paring and contrasting imaginary and real anchoring due to the ambiguous 
criterion of what objective and subjective values are, as Zapffe suggests, it 
would provoke questioning the normative validity of imaginary anchoring. 
There would be at least two problematic consequences. First, imaginary an-
choring to be interpreted from the perspective of epistemological relativism, 
which would trigger the second one, namely, epistemological relativism to 
become irrelevant to the process of real anchoring. 
In turn, analyzing the contextualization of Zapffe’s ethical “yes and no” 
against the background of what he defines as rich outer and inner life (cul-
ture), I draw the conclusion that the cultural break in Zapffe’s sense is as 
important as the biological one since the multi-frontal engagements pre-
sume not only to outline how autotelic needs are compared with heterotelic 
ones, but also why and how they contradict each other. In this context, I 
conclude that it is the tension brought by confronting autotelic and het-
erotelic needs that illustrates why in given cases autotelic need regarding 
finding a meaning in life has “higher” normative validity than a heterotelic 
one: namely, in some borderline cases, when the versus mode concerns not 
the survival of the fittest and luckiest but survival as such. Regarding the 
clarification of the process that is not an axiologically neutral one, I argue 
that referring to the concept of moral experiential gestalt would contribute 
to revealing the implications of so-called by Zapffe cosmic feeling of panic.  
Within the framework of fixation mechanisms, the following conclusions 
can be reached. If autotelic needs were coinciding with the living ones, it 
would have meant that defining a set of choices is equivalent to the process 
of choosing. Furthermore, missing the metaphysical component would have 
indicated that the act of choosing is irrelevant to the question of what man’s 
life is. That is why I argue that so-called by Zapffe universal behavior can 
be defined as experiencing world’s feeling-mode, which is due to the poten-
tial openness of the mode in itself. However, it also presumes performing an 
experiential behavior on side of the subject, which to be driven by some 
metaphysical motives as well as revealing why one should search for mean-
ing. 
Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I conclude that specifying the 
normative validity of metaphysical front benefits understanding the role and 
the multiple types of morality in Zapffe’s sense.  
Regardless of the fact that he does not aim at discussing the interactions be-
tween man and environment on the level of ethical gradualism, I claim that 
Zapffe’s parallels between morality and biology should be paid special at-
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tention. By contrast to his well-grounded examinations of the origin of so-
called social and autotelic-metaphysical morality, Zapffe’s conception of 
rehabilitating the role of biological dispositions of human beings raises 
many concerns about the normative validity of ethics, which derives from 
purely biological factors. The complexity of these problems will be later 
formulated with different words by G. Skirbekk, namely, how could we talk 
about ethical gradualism without entirely rejecting biological gradualism as 
such? 
Zapffe provides another comparison between morality and biology in re-
spect with foreseeing the consequences of the deeds and their normative va-
lidity. That is why I reach the conclusion that he underrates the fact that cul-
tivating responsibility takes place in the fields of so-called by him social 
and metaphysical morality, while in the one of biological morality, it would 
be examined as a matter of evolutionary development of the instincts of 
survival due to the changes posed by the environment.  
Zapffe also discusses the value-biological paradox, but it does not affect his 
theory of biological grounding of morality. If we accept Zapffe’s concep-
tion of biological morality, as well as extrapolate his theory of the afore-
mentioned paradox, it would mean that all living beings are ‘naturally’ mor-
al, which in turn would question the role of morality and the one of ethical 
gradualism in particular.  
On the other hand, investigating Zapffe’s theory of social morality raises the 
problem that we should either wrongly postulate a certain paradoxical aso-
cial morality (if morality of social nature is only one among many other 
types of morality, as he suggests), or if we accept it, it would lead to the 
ambiguous interpretation of juridical and ethical as ontologically inter-
changeable concepts. Extrapolating these investigations, I draw the conclu-
sion that we have more arguments in favor of immoral society rather than 
asocial morality, which questions again, albeit in a different manner com-
pared to biological morality, the normative validity of social morality. 
The problem how to discern biological morality from social one in Zapffe’s 
sense is an important issue because it can contribute to rethinking how it is 
possible to minimize pain and suffering not only for human beings. The top-
ic is also an object of investigation on side of Næss, Kvaløy and Skirbekk 
since it concerns the transition from ethical anthropocentrism to ethical 
gradualism. In this context, I draw the conclusion that the examination of 
suffering and pleasure, as displayed by Zapffe, derives from minimizing the 
risks of simplifying the normative validity of experience if it is reduced to a 
set of biological functions. Otherwise, it would have meant that tragic in 
 534
Zapffe’s sense should have always been examined as driven by physical 
pain alone. 
If we go back to the arguments of adopting Zapffe’s methods of applied bi-
ology, we would leave room for defining the meaning of life in respect with 
meaningfulness as a purely biological issue. Then tragic, as determined by 
Zapffe, would have been reduced to the physical end of being and thus it 
should have been noncontradictory extrapolated to all living beings on 
Earth, which is against Zapffe’s claim. On a macro methodological level, it 
would have meant to neglect the distinction between what he calls deficient 
and surplus pessimism.  
On the other hand, suffering covers the whole spectrum of existential rest-
lessness, fear, emptiness, meaninglessness in the framework of metaphysi-
cal front. In turn, meaninglessness is one of the most illuminative represen-
tations of why man’s existential mode should be defined as having higher 
normative validity compared to other species.  
The mechanisms of compensation elaborated on man’s side cannot contrib-
ute to overcoming the existential pessimism that has the biological nature of 
human species merely as a necessary condition. Judging by the aforemen-
tioned investigations, I argue that Zapffe’s surplus (or what we can call a 
‘higher type’) pessimism does not have to be negatively examined as a form 
of nihilism, but rather as a constructive criticism of the arising faith in tech-
nocratic invasion and interpersonal alienation, which can be minimized by 
cultivating empathy and love.  
In this context, I draw the conclusion that regardless of the methodological 
similarities between Schopenhauer’s and Zapffe’s theories of pessimism, 
we should also pay attention to the way Zapffe criticizes Schopenhauer’s 
pessimism and his theory of tragic in particular. The practical implications 
of this issue can be outlined if we examine what Zapffe calls value pessi-
mism.  
Extrapolating Zapffe’s conception, I conclude that the cosmic feeling of 
panic determines man’s experiential gestalt to be referred to what I called 
moral experiential gestalt: a gestalt that contributes the process of self-
realization to be guaranteed by showing respect and solidarity with all liv-
ing beings. On a macro methodological level, I suggest that one of the 
crossing points with Schopenhauer’s philosophy can be found in his theory 
of empathy and compassion as one of the few ways of living with the fun-
damental feeling of alienation and cosmic panic.  
However, a serious problem arises if we establish a certain type of conse-
quentialist morality in Zapffe’s sense, which would lead to ambiguously 
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equating social and moral motivation as well as neglecting the premises and 
the impact of egoistic and altruistic demands. Furthermore, adopting the 
principles of consequentialist morality would mean to simplify the role of 
autotelic-metaphysical engagements by reducing them to an autotelic need, 
which is a certain type of a modified embodiment of the survival instinct. 
The other alternative is to investigate the genealogy of the norms and their 
practical application as determined again from a utilitarian perspective since 
the latter concerns the quantitative minimization of suffering that derives 
from the unquestionable presupposition of biological morality. Thus egoism 
and altruism would be problematically described as depending on whether 
they affect one or many individuals, while the qualitative aspects of the def-
inition itself would have been provoked by so-called desire for happiness 
specified in naturalist terms. That is why it is important to emphasize that 
the other is justified as a bearer of similar or different interests merely in 
sympathetic environment, which is another proof in favor of the thesis that 
the problems of biological morality and utilitarian ethics require further 
elaboration. 
On a macro methodological level, I argue that it is the issue of normative 
validity that can make us understand Zapffe’s explanation of tree’s tragic 
destiny, which misses both the opportunity to choose and the strive for ac-
complishment. I conclude that the projections of the normative validity of 
tree’s tragic concern the possibility to recognize and question the impossi-
bility of realization not as a fact, but as a mode. The latter in turn presumes 
not only to be aware of what unrealizable is, but also the clarification of the 
double-bindness of the multiple mechanisms of fixations and surrogates, 
which illustrate why the metaphysical interests are dominating. 
Examining the methodological advantages and disadvantages of adopting 
deep ecology in the third chapter of the current research, I argue that the 
critical attitudes are mainly provoked by the fact that Næss neglects the 
problem of normative validity on the levels of morality and environmental 
politics, which leads to introducing radical biocentrism at the expense of 
ethical gradualism. As one of the most illuminative illustrations of this the-
sis, I point out his statement that the ecological problems should be sepa-
rately treated from the ones of poverty and justice. This would explain why 
Næss mainly interprets the scenarios of ecological sustainability as a subject 
to vague futurism. 
What are the implications of the mountain philosophy embodied in the 
mode ‘thinking like a mountain’? Justifying a process of identification by 
referring to some practices of animism, which Næss, Kvaløy and Faarlund 
 536
witnessed in their contacts with the Sherpa in Tibet, shows how we co-
experience the state of feeling the mountain and the one of feeling for the 
mountain, namely, how we tacitly intermingle the process of identification 
with the one of equanimity. If we completely reject the influence of ani-
mism (coming through Tibetan Buddhism) on Næss’s theory, we cannot 
fully explain why self-realization should be determined in a normative way 
as dependent on nature’s realization. 
Furthermore, accepting the thesis that animism and panpsychism may not 
necessarily have a scientific justification, as he suggests, would mean that 
the symbolic characteristics directly derive from reality as such. Thus the 
symbol would be misleadingly equated with the physical phenomena it rep-
resents. That is why I reach the conclusion that the connection between my-
thopoesis and Næss’s Ecosophy T can be sought on the level of adopting 
culturally common gestalts as well as gestalts, which may entail different 
structural experience regarding both the understanding and the interaction 
with nature. 
Judging by those investigations, I draw the conclusion that the normative 
validity of the mountain’s gestalt can be explained by referring to Næss’s 
formula ‘live and let live’, which implies two modes at once, namely, 
mountain’s being in itself and mountain’s being for itself concerning the be-
ing of the one who is in the mountain. 
These arguments are important for revealing the genealogy of the sense of 
belonging, as introduced by Næss. I reach the conclusion that if the place 
can be justified as a place of being in his sense, the home functions as a to-
pos of becoming, where the individual turns into a person by cultivating 
his/her sensitivity towards the holistic character of nature. In turn, analyzing 
the sense in question requires understanding the scientific grounding behind 
the transformation of Næss’s statement Here I stand. 
Investigating the way Næss determines intuition as a-moral (as being irrele-
vant to morality), I suggest that if we manage to recognize the normative 
validity of intuition, we can noncontradictory determine how ecosophy’s 
wisdom is related to practice. In this context, I draw the conclusion that the 
role of Ecosophy T cannot be fully revealed by referring to Næss’s under-
standing of moral intuition since relying on the latter, we should unques-
tionably adopt the problematic principles of moral relativism. 
Furthermore, I argue that what Næss calls intuition is not a sufficient condi-
tion for justifying the role of moral choices, albeit I agree with him that 
moral intuition is irreducible to moral duty as well as that the cultural set-
ting affects how we define felt closeness to the different living beings. 
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However, I question Næss’s statement that duty is ‘relational’ rather than 
‘relative’ because it does not contribute to understanding why acting from 
inclination should be ‘superior’ to acting from duty. I conclude that adopt-
ing such a theory does not provide a sufficient explanation while postulating 
an ethical system based on superior and inferior relationships. Otherwise, it 
would have led to determining the system in question by reviving a certain 
moral objectivism. 
On the other hand, one of the main methodological problems comes from 
the discussions whether deep ecology can be interpreted as holist metaphys-
ics or ontology, as Næss suggests. Such an issue provokes two other con-
cerns. First, if deep ecology is recognized as holist metaphysics, it would 
still leave the question of normative validity of man’s self-realization and 
nature’s one open because defining the intrinsic value of all living beings 
presumes cultivating environmental awareness that can be merely achieved 
by moral understanding and moral learning. I draw the conclusion that talk-
ing about holist metaphysics would mean to neglect the complex role of 
morality and thus to encourage one to go back to the paradigm of ethical an-
thropocentrism due to which Self with a capital letter is understood as born 
this way, as I already showed. I also prove that defining deep ecology as ho-
list ontology alone raises similar concerns in so far as the gestalt shifts are a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for justifying man’s moral experien-
tial gestalt. Furthermore, the implications of the latter can be clarified by re-
ferring to Næss’s reception of Spinoza’s theory of the different types of joy, 
which contributes to better understanding the genealogy of what Næss de-
scribes as moral inclination. 
Neglecting the normative validity of morality, as Næss suggests, we would 
keep facing serious ethical contradictions because then empathy would be 
simplified to a process of identification merely with the ones who are close 
to us. On a micro methodological level, it would mean that there is an in-
creasing risk the ecological self to be identified with the narrow one in 
Næss’s sense. Extrapolating this issue on the level of environmental poli-
tics, I argue that the principle of identification may negatively affect the in-
terests of conservation, namely, they to be determined as interests with a 
capital letter and thus instead of building a bridge between self-love and 
self-realization, as Næss claims, to strengthen love to the ego and its narrow 
realization respectively. 
Furthermore, I draw the conclusion that the implicit ontological ethics 
grounding deep ecology can be described as based on the need of reevaluat-
ing the intrinsic value of natural rhythm and organic coherence, which does 
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not mean that shallow ecology movement is necessarily encouraging com-
plication in Kvaløy’s sense. However, we should take into account that the 
lack of explicit principles of ontological ethics may provoke the ones of 
complication to be justified. 
In this context, I argue that both deep ecology and shallow ecology move-
ments address the social transformations as a desirable aim. On the other 
hand, merely the act of addressing from the perspective of ethical gradual-
ism can encourage the changes to be performed and maintained in time. 
On a macro methodological level, I see one of the main concerns about 
Næss’s justification of radical biocentrism in establishing a certain kind of 
utilitarian ethics, which is supposed to contribute to reducing ethical an-
thropocentrism. Disenchanting this misconception requires reconsidering 
the ethical implications of Næss’s deep ecology platform by focusing on the 
way the idea of intrinsic value is recognized. That is why I draw the conclu-
sion that it is the normative validity of the interrelatedness of human and 
nonhuman world that benefits intrinsic value to be defined beyond the para-
digm of moral objectivism. If we keep anticipating this interrelatedness as a 
form of moral objectivism, it would mean either to keep supporting ethical 
anthropocentrism, or to fall into the trap of radical biocentrism, which in 
turn would become an obstacle for evaluating the methodological benefits 
of ethical gradualism. Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I claim 
that the latter is implicitly formulated in point three of Næss’s deep ecology 
platform, albeit it still requires further clarification of what ‘vital human 
need’ is as well as how ethical gradualism can be applied to the other spe-
cies in practice. 
If we follow Næss’s line of thoughts regarding man’s natural ability to act 
beautifully, the ethical model he provides would meet the requirements of a 
self-sufficient form of radical biocentrism that is as questionable as the nar-
row moralization is.  
In turn, the potential justification of ethics as a part of a total premise-
conclusion pyramid, as Næss insists, would lead to reducing the latter to a 
causal system whose normative validity would be simplified to outlining 
logical connections that do not necessarily imply ethical ones.  
As one of the main methodological problems regarding Næss’s difficulties 
in establishing ethical gradualism, I outline his willingness to leave the def-
inition of vital needs ‘deliberately vague’, which in turn provokes the ques-
tion how to interpret the statement that all living beings are ‘equal in worth’. 
I suggest that Næss’s definition due to which ‘the same’ can be described as 
a generic term does not have to be understood in terms of contents alone. 
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Otherwise, it would have meant that the value of all human beings has the 
‘same content’. Such a specification would have made it impossible to take 
a stance when the lives of two different individuals are at stake. On the oth-
er hand, there are some typological differences while talking about equal 
value, when the right as such is embodied in life. On a macro methodologi-
cal level, I reach the conclusion that equality, which concerns the general 
level of rights, affects the one of the intrinsic values, taking into account 
that ‘equal’ and ‘same’ are synonyms but not ontological ones. In this con-
text, I argue that ‘same’, however, can be referred to the value of having a 
universal right but not to the treatment itself, as Næss claims, because the 
definition of the universal right may provide a noncontradictory differentia-
tion treatment.  
Analyzing the origin of the aforementioned issues, I draw the conclusion 
that introducing ethical gradualism should be based not only on the complex 
relations between vital and non-vital needs, interests etc., but also on the 
ones between the subjects they are applied to. Furthermore, the problem of 
the normative validity of equality cannot be solved by examining basic-non-
basic and human-non-human relationships alone; otherwise, they would be 
determined on the principle of contaminated vessels.  
If we agree with Næss that environmental ethics means to accept the phi-
losophy of natural right, we do not have any chance to avoide the specula-
tions with moral objectivism, namely, to avoide the identification of ‘natu-
ral’ with ‘intrinsic’. Nor does Næss clarify the aspects of the potential de-
pendence of natural right on the law of nature in so far as the natural right 
should be examined as the one of living and blossoming. 
In my point of view, another problem derives from Næss’s misunderstand-
ing that he can easily justify ethical gradualism by providing experiments in 
mixed communities while implicitly interfering different attitudes towards 
‘priority in principle’. Even if we assume that it makes sense to ascribe 
rights to bears without attributing moral abilities to them, from that it does 
not follow that the right to live and blossom depends on one norm alone, 
nor does the species’ egalitarianism ‘in principle’ concern many different 
types of mixed communities by default. On the other hand, I claim that by 
providing a certain type of species’ egalitarianism, Næss gives relevant ar-
guments in favor of replacing the criterion of similarity in so far as thus he 
qualitatively extends the target group of his investigations. 
Going back to the point that Næss underrates the role of ethical gradualism, 
I draw the conclusion that we should pay attention to two main questions in 
his theory at least. First, how can we guarantee that the intergenerational 
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perspective is a necessary and sufficient condition for establishing sustain-
able communities; especially, for building local communities whose devel-
opment is inseparable from the one of the unsustainable (big) ones? Fur-
thermore, how can we prove that the principle of preservation would not be 
distorted due to the one of docta ignorantia, or due to the impossibility (in 
the ideal case) to reasonably count the results of a possible intervention, i.e. 
to presume that the value of future generations is ‘higher’ by default? Sec-
ond, defining sustainable community is always done from man’s perspec-
tive since humankind is the only one species that can take moral responsi-
bility. Then, what would prevent the idea of sustainability to be replaced 
(deliberately or due to the lack of knowledge) with the one of unsustainabil-
ity, which might be disguised as fulfilling the ideal of ‘the most sustainable 
community’ in the name of future generations? Last but not least, I argue 
that the latter interpretation would bring us back to the vicious circle of eth-
ical speciesism because other living beings have generations as well. 
Analyzing the projections of the aforementioned investigations, I draw the 
conclusion that if we face some problems in this context, we should keep 
being aware of avoiding the reduction of ethical gradualism to ethical an-
thropocentrism rather than criticizing the identification and self-realization 
as anthropocentric concepts, as Næss suggests. 
Regarding gestalt ontology, Næss’s contribution can be seen in the way he 
determines the experiential gestalts to be described as belonging to a lower 
or higher order by providing a mental dissection alone, namely, by imple-
menting a certain gestalt thinking rather than finding distinctions between 
the gestalts as such. One of the main concerns about this approach is that 
from seeing does not automatically follow a certain kind of understanding 
and doing, as Næss points out, in so far as the latter is achievable merely by 
making a form of moral commitment.  
In this context, I draw the conclusion that one of the main methodological 
problems of Næss’s theory is provoked by his unwillingness to examine ge-
stalt ontology within the field of ontological ethics, as I already emphasized, 
albeit he refers the normalization of gestalt shifts to the intrinsic value of 
nature. Furthermore, I argue that if Næss had explicitly stated that his ge-
stalt ontology meets the requirements of ontological ethics, his contradic-
tory expression of ‘being normative by nature’ could have been replaced 
with the one of being ‘intrinsically normative’. Thus we would have had 
good reasons to talk about value priority system in the field of ecosophy 
rather than in the one of ecology.  
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In turn, some of the aforementioned specifications also affect the contextu-
alization of Næss’s Apron diagram. If unity was merely recognized on level 
two of the diagram, as Næss suggests, the latter should have had a higher 
normative validity than level one, which entails some diverse normative 
premises. I argue that it is not the premises that are inconsistent, but their 
embodiment in different backgrounds, which support different worldviews 
to be adopted; from which, however, it does not follow that these premises 
are initially incomparable. That is why one of my main concerns is how to 
avoid the inconsistencies in question to supporting uncontrollable disagree-
ment, which would provoke some obstacles for the transition from level one 
to level two of the Apron diagram. 
Remaining at the stage of derivation, I point out that the deductive approach 
to ethics does not benefit the internal contradictions to be constructively an-
ticipated. On the other hand, if this process is based on our intuition, it 
would mean that we may face serious disagreements not only on levels 
three and four, but also on level two since the intuition does not have a 
normative validity. I reach the conclusion that if the logical derivation partly 
(or sometime) coincides with the ethical one, then we should question the 
decision-making process on level four. A significant problem arises if we 
presume that shallow and deep ecology movements sometime reach an 
agreement on level two, and the differences are only on levels three and 
four, as Næss insists. If so, what would be the status of their ultimate prem-
ises? 
I suggest that there are two possibilities. The first one is the ultimate prem-
ises of the shallow ecology movement to differ from the ones of the deep 
ecology movement in a normative sense, but then, there would be some 
complications to specify under what circumstances these two movements 
can reach an agreement on level two. The second possibility is the deep and 
shallow ecology movements to derive from similar fundamental grounds. 
However, then the question is how can ‘shallowness’ be still justifiable on 
level two since judging by Næss’s description, it should be described as 
mainly concerning some differences on levels three and four?  
Furthermore, I claim that the lack of awareness about the role of ethical 
gradualism implied in point three of the deep ecology platform leads to 
misunderstanding Næss’s radical biocentrism as bio-fascism, or eco-
brutalism by some researchers such as the social ecologist M. Bookchin. 
The misunderstanding has apparent implications while examining the prob-
lem of population reduction. That is why I draw the conclusion that there is 
no objective goal of reaching a given number of living beings that may de-
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pend on the existence of five billion of them, as Næss argues, so that the 
quantity cannot be used as an argument encouraging both quantitative and 
qualitative reductions. It means that there is no basic contradiction between 
the number of the human population and the one of the other living beings, 
nor is there a correspondence in the exact numbers that should be reached. 
As one of the problems regarding the evaluation criteria, I point out the po-
litical speculation with the idea of permissible policies ‘near the average 
level’ of sustainability in Næss’s sense. I conclude that one of the main 
methodological problems which arise is whether we can keep the balance 
by imposing sanctions alone, as Næss suggests, unless a certain kind of 
moral responsibility is cultivated. Adopting the latter would contribute to 
specifying why the compromise with reaching status quo is not arbitrary, 
but rather politically motivated.  
Going back to Næss’s statement that ecological problems should be sepa-
rately treated because solving the ones of justice and poverty takes time, I 
draw the conclusion that this approach questions not only the role of ethical 
gradualism, but also the one of what relevant environmental politics should 
look like. In turn, comparing and contrasting deep ecology movement and 
the ones of peace and social justice would positively affect achieving the 
objectives of environmental politics by appreciating the quality of life rather 
than the increasing standard of living. 
In this context, I reach the conclusion that Næss’s comparison of so-called 
degrees of pain, which are specified on the basis of measuring ‘felt pain’, 
provokes some serious concerns such as the ones about how subjective ex-
perience of pain is defined as objectively measurable by default as well as 
why it is the bystander who can objectively evaluate someone else’s experi-
ence of pain. Referring to this thesis would lead to the ideal justification of 
quantitative criteria of pain measurement by letting numbers decide, as 
Næss specifies, which, however, questions both the process of evaluation 
and the idea of biological gradualism as such. 
On a macro methodological level, I argue that the need of reconsidering the 
aforementioned issues affects the opportunity of showing why achieving 
ecological sustainability in the long turn is not a matter of building a uto-
pian scenario, which may be fulfilled in the 22nd century, as Næss claims. I 
reach the conclusion that by contrast to Næss’s vague definitions regarding 
ecological sustainability as a future project, Skirbekk sees the realization of 
sustainability as inseparable from the sustainability of the welfare state. As 
a crucial argument in Skirbekk’s conception, I outline the one that it is sus-
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tainability and not sustainable development that guarantees applying the 
principles of universalizability to the state in question. 
Furthermore, in contrast to Skirbekk’s scenarios showing how the develop-
ment of a relevant welfare state may affect the problems regarding the justi-
fication of ecological sustainability in the long run, Næss’s ones are focused 
on descriptively outlining what most unsustainable scenarios could look 
like. That is why I conclude that Næss does not fully take into consideration 
the normative aspects of the possible social, economic, and ecological trans-
formations, namely, how sustainability can be achieved in practice by intro-
ducing given changes in an already existing social order.  
As another methodological problem concerning the process of building col-
lective socio-political responsibility, I point out the way Næss reduces soli-
darity to a process of spontaneous identification. However, from the fact 
that solidarity strengthens the identification, it does not follow that the other 
way around is necessarily realizable. If morality is reduced to a ‘natural’ 
identification, then by ‘feeling’ solidarity, we would be able to approach 
mainly the other representatives of human species. In turn, it would cause 
the justification of ethical anthropocentrism rather than the one of ethical 
gradualism.  
If the process of identification is not defined as a having moral value, then 
at least three main problems arise. First, spontaneous recognition in Næss’s 
sense would be deprived of normative validity. Second, even if the sponta-
neous recognition is determined as a natural state, it would not explain how 
we end up with a certain form of anthropocentrism, and not with one of bio-
centrism, as Næss insists. And third, we cannot rely on the criteria of degree 
and recognition, as he suggests. Otherwise, we would have kept facing the 
risks of adopting ethical anthropocentrism as well as examining the moral 
consequences from the perspective of Hume’s dilemma, namely, to presume 
that what comes next is intrinsically dependent on what precedes it, in both 
moral and ontological sense. Last but not least, I reach the conclusion that 
the examination of these problems would bring us back to Næss’s ambigu-
ous discussions about the role of biospherical egalitarianism as a ‘realist’ 
process. 
On the other hand, investigating his distinction between deep ecology and 
shallow ecology movements, I claim that the differences derive from two 
different modes of thinking, namely, from the one focused on solving given 
problems and the one of perspective thinking. That is why I draw the con-
clusion that the concerns about the shallow ecology movement may be de-
fined as ignoring the role of the ‘big’ gestalt entities by absolutizing the 
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subordinate ones in Næss’s sense as well as neglecting both the constructive 
role and the multiple aspects of the sense of belonging of all species. 
Analyzing what Næss argues about the similarities and differences between 
deep ecology and the greens, I see the following contradictions. If we pre-
sume that environmental politics is ‘neutral’ to the extent that it is a form of 
ecophilosophy in Næss’s sense, such a presumption would lead us to ques-
tioning the normative validity of deep ecology. There are two options. First, 
deep ecology would be described as ‘more responsible’ than greens’ poli-
tics. However, it is a vague definition, which would bring us back to the 
well-known discussions about replacing the qualitative aspects of evaluation 
with quantitative ones. The other option is deep ecology to be defined as 
‘less responsible’ than greens’ politics. This statement also remains prob-
lematic because it leaves the question how to justify life’s democracy in 
Næss’s sense undiscussed. 
In this context, I reach the conclusion that keep thinking about the evalua-
tion in terms of ‘more’ and ‘less’ does not contribute to solving the prob-
lems with so-called by Næss hybrid cases, when according to the principles 
of deep ecology, we should impose both centralizing and decentralizing pol-
icies. That interpretation still limits the discussions to the quantitative pro-
jections of the problem by thinking in oppositions such as shallow vs. deep, 
local vs. regional, national vs. global etc. The only ‘qualitative’ distinction 
outlined by Næss is the one of favored vs. unfavored, which still needs to be 
elaborated from a dialectical perspective. 
On the other hand, revealing the methodological concerns about both deep 
ecology and environmental politics in Næss’s sense requires the reception 
of some principles of both Mahayana Buddhism and Bhagavad Gita to be 
explicated.  
Regarding Gandhi’s influence on Næss, I reach the conclusion that one of 
the crossing points of their theories is the way they recognize friendly 
communication and pluralism as prototype characteristics of non-violent 
life, which in turn could set on level four of the Apron diagram. However, I 
give arguments against Næss’s statement that Gandhists look more inten-
sively for conflicts than the pacifists because in both cases there are values 
involved, as well as consensus about the fact that violence reduces self-
realization. That is why I draw the conclusion that the friendly attitude is a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for self-realization if it is interpreted 
for the purposes of achieving nature’s realization as a goal. 
Another problem deriving from Næss’s reception of Gandhi’s principles 
concerns his distinction between action, demonstration and reformation. 
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Analyzing Næss’s theory, I reach the conclusion that he examines demon-
strations and actions mainly due to their quantitative implications, which are 
determined as illuminative for the impact these activities have, namely, 
demonstration is considered as ‘bigger’ than the action as such. In my point 
of view, the tension is raised by justifying the quantitative implications of 
the correspondence between risks and alternatives (neglecting the fact that 
big risks can also reveal big alternatives even within the small activities), 
which, however, does not benefit specifying what the qualitative differences 
between activism, demonstrations and reformation are.  
In turn, I see another methodological problem in Næss’s too general refer-
ence to some principles of Mahayana Buddhism, which makes me draw a 
conclusion that is similar to the one reached by Kvaløy in respect with 
Næss’s interpretation of Spinoza (that it is rather Næss than Spinoza), 
namely (as in our case), that it is rather Næss than Mahayana Buddhism.  
Extrapolating Kvaløy’s investigations of the parallels between Mahayana 
Buddhism and Western environmental philosophy, I emphasize that we 
cannot claim that Næss’s and Kvaløy’s environmental philosophies directly 
borrow some principles of Mahayana Buddhism. The parallels could be 
sought on the level of process philosophies in general, which include some 
principles of Western process philosophies as well as the first principle of 
ecology “everything hangs together”. 
Comparing Næss’s and Kvaløy’s environmental philosophies in the forth 
chapter of the current monograph, I conclude that it is Kvaløy’s ecophi-
losophy that contributes to understanding how the impact of radical biocen-
trism can be restricted on the level of environmental politics if environ-
mental problems are examined as inseparable from the socio-political ones. 
Adopting this approach, however, does not mean to appeal for reviving the 
role of ethical anthropocentrism. On the contrary, I argue that with his criti-
cal reception of Næss’s ideas, Kvaløy brings to light what Skirbekk justifies 
as a need of implementing the principles of ethical gradualism. 
In this context, I clarify that while Næss’s ‘thinking like a mountain’ mode 
is based on a certain type of gestalt thinking, Kvaløy’s one can be described 
as a process philosophy grounded in the mode ‘thinking like a river’. The 
latter is justified by the embodiment of natural rhythm that may not neces-
sarily be harmonic, but rather harmonizing time.  
Furthermore, I draw the conclusion that similarly to Næss, Kvaløy analyzes 
what it means to adopt Here I stand mode by developing a unique sense of 
belonging, which presumes to follow the river time and learn how to resist 
to be carried away by the stream. The sense of belonging to nature, as intro-
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duced by Skirbekk, corresponds to the interpretations of Næss and Kvaløy 
providing an answer to the question why should we give preference to the 
experiential knowledge rather than to the purely cognitive one due to so-
called by Skirbekk ecosophic reverence for life? 
Referring again to Tordsson’s conception of Nansen’s moral geography, I 
claim that Kvaløy’s theory contributes to avoiding the reduction of geogra-
phy in question to cartography, which deprives the locus of life by com-
pressing its multidimensionality.  
Analyzing the implications of Kvaløy’s ecophilosophy, I raise the hypothe-
sis that it is an experiential philosophy whose prototype characteristic is the 
normative validity of wholeness recognized as a being ‘in process’. The lat-
ter could be interpreted as corresponding to the definition of ‘in progress’, 
taking into account that the progress itself is not a product of technological 
expansion alone. I also argue that the specification of ‘in process’ is equiva-
lent to the one of ‘in progress’ if it is evaluated from the perspective of the 
complexity of nature because the progress in Kvaløy’s sense is not a strive 
for achieving aim by aim, but rather for revealing the potential of the new 
living energies. 
However, I emphasize that Kvaløy’s process philosophy has apparent po-
litical implications since his appeal for ‘teaching yourself to swim’ can be 
described as a matter of taking moral and political responsibility by com-
mitting to life. In turn, Kvaløy’s reception of Gandhi’s philosophy can be 
traced on the level of internalizing Gandhi’s formula ‘the way is the goal’ 
for the purposes of defining ecophilosophy as a type of process philosophy 
with political connotations. 
Comparing Kvaløy’s ecophilosophy with Næss’s Ecosophy T, I draw the 
conclusion that ecophilosophy is not merely a result of combining the two 
ancient Greek words of ‘eco’ and ‘sophia’, as Næss claims. It presumes the 
need of adopting and developing moral engagement, which in turn encour-
ages the responsibility for making relevant political engagements. That is 
why I argue that it is the interpersonal commitment that provides the integ-
rity of moral and political as two interconnected sides of changing environ-
mental politics as well as strengthening the collective responsibility towards 
preserving nature. 
Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I conclude that the rehabili-
tated role of human ecology in Næss’s and Kvaløy’s writings contributes to 
building environmentally sustainable politics by avoiding ecophilosophical 
competence to be reduced to a narrow expert knowledge. In this context, I 
outline that both Næss and Kvaløy justify the competence in question, 
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which has the process of understanding as its necessary condition for recog-
nizing the need of moral and political commitments. Thus the image of su-
per-amateur in Kvaløy’s sense corresponds to the one of so-called by Næss 
super-generalist due to the fact that one not only aims at elaborating the 
ecological knowledge as crucial for grounding the political decision-making 
process, but also defending how this knowledge can fully benefit experienc-
ing all the aspects of the situation we live in. 
I also claim that it is the critical attitude emphasized by both Tranøy and 
Kvaløy that questions taking for granted the new knowledge as the best one. 
Despite the fact that Tranøy does not provide an explicit distinction between 
generalists and specialists, his theory of the role of scientists is similar to the 
one of generalists, as represented by Næss and Kvaløy. 
On a macro methodological level, I conclude that super amateur’s expertise 
in Kvaløy’s sense is the one adopted in democratic society because it is 
built on the idea of pluralism of vital needs. Furthermore, super amateur’s 
expertise can be described as based on what Kvaløy defines as life necessity 
society’s vital needs. They are proposed as an ideal in so far as the society 
in question takes the genuine experience of different situations as a premise, 
which to determine what vital needs are and how they should be covered re-
spectively.  
That is why I argue that investigating the image of super-amateur/super-
generalist, both Kvaløy and Næss see the possibility of socio-political trans-
formation to environmental sustainability in changing the public opinion 
about the role of technologies. In this context, I draw the conclusion that by 
questioning monoculture as an embodiment of socio-political centralization, 
Næss and Kvaløy clarify the need of restricting the use of so-called hard 
technologies at the expense of the soft ones. 
Regarding Kvaløy’s fundamental distinction between complexity and com-
plication, I claim that life necessity society encourages the engagement with 
organicity to be understood as a meaningful engagement with the world by 
adopting meaningful work strategies, i.e. strategies due to which work is de-
fined as a goal rather than a means in itself. It shows that cooperation is a 
significant activity that contributes to cultivating the sense of situatedness 
internalized as a sensitivity towards group belonging. Furthermore, I draw 
the conclusion that life necessity society is built not on ‘freedom from’ but 
rather on ‘freedom to’ justifying meaningfulness as such. To a certain ex-
tent, the ‘freedom from’ can be determined as operating with given mean-
ings for the sake of engaging with the idea of what meaningful is. 
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Analyzing Kvaløy’s critique of contemporary technocratic society, I argue 
that it is the substitution of life necessity society with the industrial devel-
opment one that makes the idea of multiplicity of growth be replaced with 
the one of development whose climax is the idea of sustainable develop-
ment. That is why I draw the conclusion that the symmetry of complexity 
including asymmetrical moral relationships is erased by the technological 
invasion at the expense of the symmetry of formal relationships, which are 
based on the principles of meritocracy. Exploring the methodological ad-
vantages of what Kvaløy disenchants as a techno-capitalist model, I con-
clude that the latter is grounded in supporting so-called omnipotent exper-
tise by all means, namely, by the ones of hard technologies reducing the 
need of conducting critical research, which to strengthen pluralism.  
In this context, I outline that Tranøy’s contribution to the debate can be seen 
in revealing how the uncritical reception of our (intellectual) cultural heri-
tage affects the gradual replacement of the contents of the categories of 
growth and knowledge. In turn, this problem can be solved by rehabilitating 
the connection between ethical and epistemological normative validity. 
On a macro methodological level, it would lead to fighting the ideology of 
sustainable development understood as growth with a capital letter by build-
ing relevant environmental politics, which to overcome the naivety of inter-
preting the process of complication in Kvaløy’s sense as if it is complex. If 
we accept sustainable development for granted, the management of the nat-
ural dynamic systems would be defined as a problematic from the perspec-
tive of social constructivism.  
Referring to Kvaløy’s theory of the distinction between life necessity soci-
ety and industrial development society as influenced but not restricted to the 
distinction between Gaia theory and Servoglobe one, I argue that pretending 
to fight chaos, Servoglobe falls into a vicious circle because the fight results 
in provoking a different type of chaos. I draw the conclusion that Servo-
globe activates the fear of empty space (terror vacui) in so far as the latter 
does not come from man, but from nature itself, albeit humankind is the 
only one species that consciously anticipates it. Thus Servoglobe fails in the 
way it pretends to find a panacea for the fear in question. 
Furthermore, I see the micro methodological projections of Servoglobe’s 
vicious circle outlined by Kvaløy in revealing how mankind’s tragedy, 
which is driven by the feeling of being a temporary species in the universe, 
turns into a tragedy of Homo Consumens. The latter is multiplied into some 
other tragedies because the mechanisms of compensating the initial tragedy, 
which stems from the fragility of humankind as such, are strengthened by 
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the unsuccessful attempts at playing different happy endings that result in 
tragedies. Such a conception corresponds to Zapffe’s theory regarding the 
role of tragic. Furthermore, I argue that the fixation mechanisms in 
Kvaløy’s sense benefit personalizing tragedy and thus multiplying its em-
bodiments by recognizing consumption as what Næss calls a top norm. This 
would lead the self-realization to remain a norm, but with a different norma-
tive validity: it would be modified within the field of meritocracy whose 
target group is the shopping gifted audience, which exploits nature’s 
sources, as Kvaløy points out. Judging by the aforementioned investiga-
tions, I conclude that time compression is strengthened not only by the myth 
of final solution, but also by the one saying that organic time can artificially 
be extended to eternity. 
I also argue that the myth of perfection, which is closely tied with the myth 
of final solution, contradicts the stop-time aesthetics in Kvaløy’s sense since 
the latter is ontological aesthetics supported by the understanding of nature 
as a knowledge of home. If we extrapolate Næss’s and Kvaløy’s theories, 
and choose to favor hyper-aesthetics at the expense of the ontological one, it 
would lead to confronting generalists and specialists-saboteurs who overex-
ploit the use of service as servitude by reducing the transperspectivity of 
knowledge to the one-dimensional eco-ideology. 
Examining the projections of Kvaløy’s theory of complexity and complica-
tion, I reach the conclusion that the division between organic and mechani-
cal time benefits avoiding the wrong equation of organic time with the free 
one; a tendency provoked by the growing normative validity of the model of 
complication. Otherwise, defining organic time as free time would be trig-
gered by the transformation of the debate about ‘economic growth and envi-
ronmental protection’ into the one about ‘industrial development vs. envi-
ronmental protection’, which in turn contributes the environmentally un-
friendly politics to be justified by the maxima ‘grow or die’.  
Clarifying these conceptions, I also claim that Kvaløy’s definition of so-
called Tivoli-effect understood as a pseudo-complex phenomenon concerns 
the recognition of technological strength at the expense of life’s strength by 
reducing the latter to the survival one as well as decreasing the multi-
cultural diversity to a simple set of given, self-sufficient monocultures in 
which ‘mono’ becomes an ontological synonym of ‘global’. 
On a macro methodological level, I draw the conclusion that the develop-
ment of society, which meets the requirements of what Kvaløy calls a life 
necessity society, functions on the principle of ecosystems. The crossing 
points can be found in justifying equilibrium since the society in question is 
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grounded in satisfying the vital needs and interests of its participants, which 
are ‘natural’ but not in the sense of being given by nature alone. That is why 
I argue that if the development of the equilibrium in nature is determined 
due to the principles of evolution adopted in the process of common work 
(in the democratic society), the common work would affect the deliberate 
delegation of rights and duties in respect with the need of establishing 
common moral and political engagements. 
Analyzing Kvaløy’s theory, I also argue that both nature and society pre-
sume a certain type of decentralization of the system control to be estab-
lished, taking into account that the centralization in human societies is a 
matter of adopting rationalized procedures, which are based again on the 
mutual delegation of rights and duties. On the other hand, I pay attention to 
the fact that in both cases, the decentralization is irreducible to the annihila-
tion of the system control because it contributes to the process of develop-
ment. 
By contrast to Kvaløy’s conception, Næss’s theory of ecosocial crisis raises 
some other concerns since he examines the social reasons of the environ-
mental crisis, but only for the sake of overcoming it as a goal in itself, with-
out tracing the origin of the need of social transformations as well as how 
the latter could affect the members of a given society. 
In turn, it is important to outline that the literal interpretation of democ-
racy’s problems as biospherical ones in Næss’s sense would lead to under-
rating the specifically political implications of these problems, namely, to 
underrating that people are not only fragments of the biosphere, but also re-
sponsible moral and political agents who can take care of both themselves 
and environment as such. 
Regarding the discussions about Norway’s potential accession to the EU, I 
argue that Kvaløy’s skepticism can be described as provoked by the trans-
formation of the growth and environmental protection debate. The latter af-
fects the realization of ecological sustainability since it is based on the con-
tradiction between ideology and axiology due to the fact that the ideology 
pretends to be an axiology with a capital letter. 
Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I draw the conclusion that 
Kvaløy and the other representatives of snm see the main threat of the aris-
ing flow of people in the increasing instrumentalization of human power, 
which is simplified to exchangeable capital, i.e. in reducing the flow of 
people to the one of goods in so far as both are determined as exchangeable 
resources. 
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Furthermore, neglecting the role of bioregionalism in environmental politics 
for the sake of justifying one global market would lead to revising the role 
of national on the global arena. That is why I claim that Kvaløy’s appeal for 
restricting tourists’ flow is not a matter of hate, as his critics argue. It em-
phasizes the need of reviving the ideal model of the most relevant environ-
mental politics as based on solidarity and equal distribution of goods by 
recognizing the process of self-realization as maximally supported by the 
society. In turn, restricting the flow of tourists is done for the purposes of 
preserving both biospherical equilibrium and the opportunity the flow of 
migrants to be regulated by improving the quality of life in the developing 
countries. 
In this context, I draw the conclusion that the ecocatastrophe turns into a 
global one due to the fact that two different projects collapse, namely, the 
one of expanding free trade and the one of local markets, which impose two 
different perspectives for self-realization. Both models are models of de-
pendence, but they presume different modes of fulfillment. The first model 
is Kvaløy’s model whose philosophical groundings correspond to the ones 
of Næss’s deep ecology, while the second one is the model of global eco-
nomics turning nature’s sources into unlimited resources of exploitation. 
Extrapolating Kvaløy’s statement that there are two levels of discussing 
life’s richness, namely, the one of local systems and the one of biosphere, I 
draw the conclusion that we could talk about two types of globality. The 
first one is based on what I called horizontal relatedness concerning the 
normative validity of the initial (natural) relationships in the globe. Due to 
the second perspective, global should be defined as an ontological synonym 
of ‘bigger’, which is underlied by the presumption that the local systems 
should become bigger (global), i.e. that we should reconcile with one polar-
ized globe. 
Extrapolating Tordsson’s investigations of Nansen’s moral geography, I 
claim that similarly to Næss, Kvaløy introduces a moral geography based on 
having a home as a norm. He sees the biggest threat of the potential acces-
sion of Norway to the EU in so-called new colonialism provoked by the 
globalization, which I describe as forcefully depriving people of the oppor-
tunity to have a home and thus inflicting social chaos by triggering an eco-
logical one. 
However, I am skeptical about justifying the correspondence between the 
size of the country and the degree of solidarity it shows, as Seierstad sug-
gests, as well as whether to be outside of the EU is a necessary and suffi-
cient condition for being a morally engaged political state since there are 
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some other small countries, which are not members of the EU, but do not 
have the potential to become visible political actors. 
As one of the main methodological arguments against the extrapolation of 
the relation between ‘big’ and ‘small’ in the field of politics, I see the argu-
ment that we do not have to examine solidarity as a ‘possession’ of the mi-
nority against majority, i.e. as a relation determined by analogy with the one 
between ‘big’ and ‘small’. A possible solution can be found in Kvaløy’s 
principle of collaboration due to which the unity is initiated by respecting 
not only the interspecies interests, but also the human interests as such. On 
the other hand, I point out that his position of keeping the physical isolation 
does not provide a satisfying solution either because keeping so-called of-
fensive close interests ‘smaller’ does not make them less offensive, nor are 
they less interests at all. Such a problematic conception underlies the proc-
ess of pseudo-justification of the globe, which in turn leads to making rich 
countries richer and poor ones poorer.  
That is why I also argue that the representatives of snm, and Kvaløy in par-
ticular, appeal for a global transformation, which to provide the need of re-
habilitating the concept of global responsibility (not only the one of global 
justice) as a prototype characteristic of the ecologically sustainable national 
politics.  
In this context, analyzing Næss’s and Kvaløy’s no to the EU can be exam-
ined as a tentative yes, which is recognized in favor of establishing an ecol-
ogically sustainable society in the long run. It presumes the development of 
welfare state to be done by solving the problem how to eradicate ecological 
unsustainability worldwide. The latter is possible if the state in question en-
courages a form of life necessity society, where achieving high living stan-
dard is less important than achieving good quality of life for its members. 
Furthermore, another methodological benefit of examining Næss’s and 
Kvaløy’s conceptions is that we can reveal the complex picture of the ad-
vantages and disadvantages concerned with decoupling growth from envi-
ronmental protection as well as outlining how sustainable development not 
only provokes ecological unsustainability in the long run, but also depends 
on the current societal conceptions to the extent to which we can neglect the 
ecological limitations.  
That is why I draw the conclusion that the analysis of so-called biological 
growth is negatively influenced by already discussed myth of final solution. 
Going back to Kvaløy’s examination of the pitfalls regarding the analogy of 
nature with the ‘trial-and-error mode’, I claim that biological growth, de-
fined as supporting nature’s diversity, is simplified by the myth that every-
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thing can be fixed with proper means, when we are used to interpret the 
contradictions as a matter of imperfections that have to be corrected. Fol-
lowing this line of thoughts, we should define biological growth as display-
ing a lower stage of development, which gains its ontological validity by 
analogy with the technological growth having a higher value. 
Comparing and contrasting Næss’s and Kvaløy’s environmental philoso-
phies, I reach the conclusion that many crucial questions, which they leave 
open, find their answers in Skirbekk’s theory of environmental philosophy 
that is an object of investigations in the fifth chapter of the current mono-
graph. Some of his solutions such as how ethical anthropocentrism can be 
overcome by rehabilitating the role of ethical gradualism, as well as by ful-
filling the scenarios of ecological sustainability illustrate why reaching the 
sustainability in question is not a utopian scenario. 
Examining the issue what relevant environmental politics should look like 
in respect with the development of welfare state, as Skirbekk suggests, I 
claim that his solutions can be described as conceptually closer to Kvaløy’s 
ones rather than to Næss’s solutions. One of the crossing points with 
Kvaløy’s theory is found in the way Skirbekk rehabilitates the connection 
between ecophilosophy and environmental politics by revealing the role of 
morality in cultivating solidarity on a collective level. As a methodological 
advantage of reconsidering the role of solidarity as an issue with normative 
implications, I point out the possibility of examining environmental prob-
lems as closely tied with the political and societal problems.  
In this context, I draw the conclusion that in contrast to Næss, Skirbekk em-
phasizes one of the most important consequences of adopting moral per-
spective in environmental politics, namely, the rehabilitation of ecological 
expertise. Taking into account that Skirbekk’s definition of hermeneutic 
competence benefits broadening the scope of generalists’ expertise, I argue 
that it is the justification of informed consent as an issue with strong ethical 
connotations that makes the decision-making process irreducible to a cost-
benefit analysis. Comparing Skirbekk’s, Næss’s and Kvaløy’s conceptions 
of what competence should look like, I argue that they share a similar un-
derstanding of how a new type of competence to be introduced, which to 
strengthen both the normative validity of expert’s role and his/her expertise 
by challenging the impossibility of having rationality without understand-
ing.  
Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I reach the conclusion that 
Skirbekk makes a step further in rehabilitating the normative validity of 
values in the field of expertise by revealing why their normative validity is 
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irreducible to the criterion of verification. Regarding environmental politics, 
it would mean that political planning presumes environmental politics to be 
based on a discursive understanding provided by both politicians and ex-
perts, as Skirbekk suggests, which in turn would positively affect mastering 
ecological sustainability in the future. 
Another crucial question, which finds its answer in Skirbekk’s writings, is 
how can we avoid the extremes of both ethical anthropocentrism and radical 
biocentrism without denying neither the responsibility of humans for the 
decision-making process nor the moral status of the other living beings, 
which can merely be justified by adopting the principle of advocatory repre-
sentation? Analyzing Skirbekk’s theory, I draw the conclusion that the ori-
gin of the problem of choosing ‘either-or’ concerning the relationships be-
tween humans and other species is grounded in absolutizing the issue of 
giving priority regardless of whether we talk about anthropocentrism or bio-
centrism. On a practical level, denying the role of ethical gradualism raises 
concerns about how to choose if two biographical lives are at stake, as Skir-
bekk points out, especially, when killing is unavoidable.  
Extrapolating his investigations, I claim that adopting Skirbekk’s theory of 
ethical gradualism provides some suggestions for the debate about so-called 
actual and potential properties of the beings and the principle of advocatory 
representation respectively. Otherwise, if we remain on the level of choos-
ing between different types of properties, we raise the risk of misconceptu-
alizing the ‘is’ mode as an ‘ought’ one, regardless of the fact that ‘is’ prem-
ises do not lead to a normative conclusion by default. 
By referring to Skirbekk’s theory of ethical gradualism, I argue that we 
should specify whether ontological gradualism, concerning the question of 
actual and potential properties, is not represented as an ethical one by over-
exposing the role of biological gradualism. If so, we would be forced to jus-
tify ethical speciesism, which to be evaluated again from the perspective of 
ethical anthropocentrism. Thus the unilateral functioning of the latter re-
garding the priority of human vital needs and vital interests over the rest 
would be defined as what Skirbekk calls eco-ethical speciesism. 
In this context, I draw the conclusion that the argument of potentiality can 
be accepted while introducing ethical gradualism if we compare what Skir-
bekk calls first and second orders of potentiality. In turn, questioning the 
debate about actual and potential properties presumes the concept of moral 
difference to be examined on a different level, as he suggests, namely, on 
the level of meta-ethical discourse. That is why I point out that the debate 
on properties affects how to interpret this difference beyond the scope of 
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moral naturalism by avoiding falling into the trap of a certain kind of moral 
absolutism.  
However, we should keep in mind that evaluating the moral similarities is 
easier compared to clarifying the role of moral differences in Skirbekk’s 
sense because it is easier to imagine a case in which moral agents become 
moral discussants by participating in open and enlightened discussions. Ex-
ploring the role of moral differences alone hides the risk to go back to the 
case of so-called paradigmatic beings, albeit this time the potential and ac-
tual capabilities would be elaborated on the level of morality as moral (po-
tential or actual) qualities. Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I 
reach the conclusion that if exploring the distinction between actual and po-
tential capabilities is done from an ontological perspective, it may culminate 
in following the principles of utilitarian ethics. By contrast to when the 
elaboration is examined as a process of evolution (as a certain type of bio-
logical development), in the case with the moral qualities, it should be justi-
fied as a cultivation, which requires moral agency to be explored beyond the 
debate about potential and actual capabilities.  
On the other hand, I argue that the evaluation of moral similarities and dif-
ferences depends on how we initially define moral subject as such: as ‘inca-
pable’ moral agent and discussant or as a subject who has the potential to 
become moral agent and moral discussant under given circumstances. That 
is why I draw the conclusion that while ‘the positive’ definition of moral 
subjects mainly concerns the representatives of humankind, the ‘negative’ 
one characterizes the group of non-human representatives including given 
groups of people such as mentally retarded people etc. i.e. moral subjects 
who are unable to become neither moral agents, nor moral discussants. 
Furthermore, I claim that thus we can avoid calling not only non-humans, 
but also certain groups of humans ‘insufficient’ moral subjects in so far as 
‘insufficiency’ in morality is no longer based on the ontological, and espe-
cially on the biological implications of the debate on properties. We can jus-
tify the competence of being morally engaged as a prototype characteristic 
of so-called by Skirbekk communicative competence. 
In this context, I conclude that one of the main methodological difficulties 
concerns whether good will can be recognized as one of the premises of de-
fining someone as a moral agent, which in turn would mean to presume a 
complete overlapping between deeds and motivation. In practice, this would 
cause leaving the questions how a moral agent can do immoral things as 
well as how to discuss the motivation of the white lie (for instance) open.  
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Introducing ethical gradualism in Skirbekk’s sense contributes to clarifying 
what would oblige us to treat other beings morally even when they cannot 
be morally responsible? I draw the conclusion that due to adopting the prin-
ciples of ethical gradualism we can find an alternative in grounding the 
principle of advocatory representation as an ethical principle without com-
pletely denying the role of biological gradualism.  
Another problem regarding the status of moral agents is overcome if we 
elaborate Skirbekk’s thought experiment with the robots and Martians rep-
resenting borderline cases. Judging by these investigations, I reach the con-
clusion that the robots and Martians are an ideal case of moral agents, which 
displays an ideal vision of deontological ethics, i.e. in the best case, they 
can adopt an abstract duty alone. 
Exploring the methodological advantages of Skirbekk’s interpretation of 
well-being, first, I outline his contribution to specifying that discourse ethics 
affects examining the internal relations between vital needs and vital inter-
ests beyond the principles of utilitarian ethics (however, without entirely 
denying its role), and second, Skribekk’s contribution to avoiding vital 
needs getting purely eudemonic embodiments. That is why I conclude that 
referring to the methods of discourse ethics can benefit overcoming the dif-
ficulties while discussing the mutual connections between moral agents, 
moral discussants and moral subjects if we expand the concept of obligation 
to the one of responsibility.  
Referring to Skirbekk’s theory of mini-ethics, I claim that it can be inter-
preted as a premise of establishing mini-rationality and the other way 
around in so far as both of them are mutually determined in a normative 
way. Otherwise, mini-ethics should have functioned as a utilitarian ethics 
based on a cost-benefit analysis: the other problematic alternative is ration-
ality to remain incompatible with the idea of solidarity as such. 
On a macro methodological level, I draw the conclusion that exploring ethi-
cal gradualism intrinsically depends on what Skirbekk understands by uni-
versalizability as well as how the consensus about objective needs can 
counter the strong tendency of abstracting vital needs from their contents, 
which favors imposing certain ideologies. 
Against the background of already examined problem of leaving the con-
cept of vital needs deliberately vague, as Næss suggests, I reach the conclu-
sion that Skirbekk’s contribution can be seen in analyzing how vital needs 
can be objectively determined without losing their normative validity. Oth-
erwise, if they were examined as ‘natural’ needs, it would have meant a cer-
tain type of moral objectivism to be justified. 
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I also argue that the question how to relate vital interests to vital needs re-
quires special attention due to the fact that some subjective needs such as 
some societal needs and interests may turn into objective ones in the process 
of evolution. This can explain why Skirbekk defines the inter-subjective 
needs as irreducible to the subjective ones. On the other hand, simplifying 
the role of vital needs raises the concern whether so-called objective inter-
ests, if we presume the ideal case when they can be established as objective 
ones, do manage to encourage the satisfaction of vital needs. In this context, 
I emphasize the risk of the problematic elaboration of some subjectively 
held points of view as vital interests.  
Judging by these investigations, I conclude that the evaluation of vital needs 
as objective ones alone may result either in equating biological with ethical 
gradualism, or in equating technological with ethical ones. It would mean to 
simplify the concept of fallibility in Skirbekk’s sense as well as the need of 
building social identity to be recognized as mastering biological instincts or 
technocratic ambitions for power and control. If so, such a reductionism 
would negatively affect the question how to distinguish between ‘more’ and 
‘less’ developed (social) communities arguing in favor of a given group-
belonging speciesism. 
That is why I emphasize that the whole process of evaluation would have 
been justified as a matter of extending the concept of vital need by analogy. 
In turn, it would have inevitably led to establishing a given type of moral 
naturalism. Another concern arises from the fact that vital interests would 
have been evaluated in speciesist terms, while the complex evaluation pre-
sumes, in so far as there are different subjectively expressed interests devel-
oped in time, comparison of species to be made. 
Going back to the problem how to interpret biological gradualism as refer-
ring to ethical gradualism, I draw the conclusion that the projections of bio-
logical gradualism can be seen since vital needs and vital interests are not 
equally applicable to all living beings. I claim that the contradictions arise 
from the fact that not all living beings have both ‘being interested in’ and 
‘having an interest in’ modes in Skirbekk’s sense. Regarding the modes in 
question, it is difficult to compare vital needs of different organisms be-
cause such a comparison implicitly presumes the criterion of giving priority 
to be adopted. 
We may argue whether it is still problematic to define unquestionable crite-
ria for applying biological gradualism by justifying sentience as a demarca-
tion criterion that determines the evaluation of suffering of all beings (even 
the suffering of the ones, which are not sentient beings) as morally inappro-
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priate. Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I conclude that relying 
on the criterion of sentience alone would lead to adopting the mode ‘Whose 
justice? Which rationality?’. It raises the concern whether we would not re-
main trapped again in the framework of ethical anthropocentrism because 
sentience is always defined and witnessed from a human point of view.  
This problem provokes the question how do we know that pain is the ‘same’ 
for all evaluated beings, namely, how do we know that there is an un-
doubted connection between physical experience and its moral evaluation as 
well as our knowledge about it? Otherwise, arguing that we are moral dis-
cussants who interact with moral subjects, which are initially deprived of 
the consciousness of being moral, may not result in reducing the pain-
calculus, nor would it cause leaving room for compassion.  
As one of the methodological benefits of Skirbekk’s theory of compassion, I 
outline his argument that compassion can be felt without reaching a proce-
dural consensus, even when we talk about mutual compassion. On a macro 
methodological level, I draw the conclusion that the impact of compassion 
on building experiential morality could be explored by clarifying how com-
passion can affect cultivating eco-consciousness, which to rehabilitate the 
normative validity of feelings and emotions. Regarding the role of ethical 
anthropocentrism, I claim that the need of introducing so-called by Skirbekk 
preference utilitarianism is driven by the one of specifying whether the 
maximization of intrinsic value is examined in respect with the representa-
tives of one and the same species, or in respect with the ones of different 
species.  
In this context, I draw the conclusion that it is important to clarify Skir-
bekk’s conception of welfare state as an ecologically sustainable state by 
outlining how the arguments in favor of the state in question encourage the 
embodiment of sustainability itself. Such an analysis would benefit reveal-
ing the role of desirability, especially when sustainability is considered as a 
politically desirable one.  
Judging by the aforementioned specifications, I reach the conclusion that 
the distinction between the standard of living and the quality of life, as rep-
resented by Kvaløy and Skirbekk, has an influence on the need of introduc-
ing measures regarding ecological and demographic reproductions because 
the problematization of the latter stems from the multiplicity of differences 
between rich and poor, which are embodied on different levels of societal 
interactions. 
Furthermore, I argue that referring to Skirbekk’s theory about the three ex-
treme cases of movement of people and capital contributes to better under-
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standing the problems Næss faces while talking about the three types of mi-
gration against the background of the discussions about how to achieve eco-
logical sustainability in time.  
As another methodological similarity between Skirbekk’s and Kvaløy’s 
conceptions, I point out the reconsideration of the problem of consumption 
in the debate about gradualism. Examining the genealogy of the concerns 
deriving from the production-consumption dilemmas in the sustainable de-
velopment society, as represented by both of them, we should pay attention 
to the way Kvaløy and Skirbekk justify the role of education and political 
culture in rethinking the role of quality of life, especially in so-called devel-
oping countries. 
For the purposes of examining the pitfalls of growing industrialization, re-
ferring to Skirbekk’s interpretation gives some clues why we should ques-
tion not only the idea of production, but also the one of consumption. I ar-
gue that it is the replacement of the idea of universalizability, which is un-
derstood in qualitative terms, with the process of universalization evaluated 
in quantitative ones that raises the need of distinguishing between ecologi-
cal sustainability and ecological unsustainability, especially if sustainable 
development is overestimated as the only one possible development. That is 
why I claim that Skirbekk’s conception of universalizability does not share 
many features with Næss’s one of universalization because the latter is ra-
ther focused on outlining the epistemological preciseness of deriving norms 
by providing verifiable hypotheses.  
Regarding the future of environmental politics, I point out that ethical uni-
versalizability is achievable with difficulty because it should be based on a 
well-grounded, collectively shared responsibility taken by all countries. I 
draw the conclusion that talking about developing and developed countries, 
we should talk about ethically universalizable principle of advocatory repre-
sentation due to which the developing countries to be treated as potential 
moral discussants whose well-being is at stake, when they react as moral 
subjects alone. The common future requires more responsible commitments 
on side of the developed countries to be made, which to operate on the be-
half of the developing ones for the sake of the development of the latter. 
Thus the developing countries can take their life in their own hands as soon 
as possible and turn into moral discussants in practice. 
Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I argue that Skirbekk’s 
thought experiment of how a low cost welfare state can work illustrates the 
importance of specifying that the minimum of universalization is not equiv-
alent to establishing a minimum, which meets the criteria of universalizabil-
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ity. Analyzing the aspects of Skirbekk’s experiment, I reach the conclusion 
that achieving ethical and ecological universalizability can be based on 
‘positive’ arguments, namely, on the ones how to cultivate political culture 
if we want to build relevant environmental politics. In turn, the benefits of 
examining political culture in his conception concern how to create a cli-
mate of enlightened democracy, which to contribute to the justification of 
so-called politically mature welfare. 
In this context, I claim that clarifying the normative validity of the idea of 
welfare state by outlining what political culture should look like reveals 
how we reframe the idea of unsustainability in so far as political sustainabil-
ity is a crucial premise for obtaining and regulating both the economic and 
ecological reproductions in Skirbekk’s sense. Furthermore, I argue that try-
ing to attract people’s attention to crucial ecological problems, he also out-
lines the risks how the language of ecophilosopy can easily turn into the one 
of ideology regarding ecological unsustainability as well as how the tradi-
tional way of mapping (reaching back to Nansen’s time) is modified into the 
one of sustainable development’s topography as a mapping with a capital 
letter. Regarding the change in the way the sense of belonging is internal-
ized as a crucial premise for building identity, I conclude that this new to-
pography, which finds a similar interpretation in both Skirbekk’s and 
Kvaløy’s writings, aims at revealing the new symbolic capital of the places 
and their internal connections.  
*** 
Examining the role of Norwegian environmental philosophies is a task, 
which requires finding answers not only to questions such as “What is typi-
cally Norwegian?”, but also to the one “How does ‘typically Norwegian’ 
contribute to addressing global issues, which to provide relevant local solu-
tions?”, taking into account that ‘local’ is irreducible to ‘less meaningful’. I 
point out that analyzing the impact of Norwegian environmental philoso-
phies is inseparable from outlining what the global challenges in front of 
Norwegian environmental politics are. In this context, the slogan “Think 
globally, act locally!” can be interpreted within the framework of Norwe-
gian environmental philosophies as “Think meaningfully, act responsibly!” 
which in turn presumes the engagements to be examined as moral, cultural 
and socio-political ones rather than as epistemologically justifiable engage-
ments. That is why arguing for Norwegian environmental philosophies in 
plural does not mean to think about ‘global’ and ‘local’ in relative terms, 
but in what Næss calls relational terms. Thus we can preserve the diversity 
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of the philosophies in question while they address common problems such 
as clarifying the pitfalls of ethical anthropocentrism, disenchanting the po-
litical lack of environmental constructivism etc. 
On a macro-methodological level, “Think meaningfully, act responsibly!” 
becomes possible if the way of asking which questions we do not have to 
lose is internalized as an issue regarding how one to find a place in the net 
of the biospherical knots, which to call home (Næss). Similar issues concern 
the ineradicable cosmic feeling of panic (Zapffe), how to build a balanced 
society as a life necessity one (Kvaløy), as well as how dangerous is to find 
an asylum from the threat of environmental catastrophe in the myth of final 
solution (Skirbekk). Regardless of the different ways of emphasizing the 
need of rethinking the role of biocentrism, these questions derive from the 
fundamental dilemma “Whose Environment? Which Nature?”. Thus Nor-
wegian environmental philosophies’ approach to challenging the ideal of 
cognitive rationality reveals how we can keep posing the micro-questions 
‘which’ and ‘whose’ without losing the macro-ones, namely, the questions 
‘why’ and ‘how’ in a world where reconsidering the role of ethical gradual-
ism is one of the few ways of learning how not only to be in, but also with 




The aim of this monograph is to reveal the complex development of 20th-cen-
tury Norwegian environmental philosophies from a comparative perspective 
by outlining not only the role of the similar philosophical premises they de-
rive from, but also how the differences in the chosen strategies affected the 
changes in the Norwegian environmental politics. That is why one of my 
main objectives is to analyze the origin and the elaboration of some concepts 
and ideas, which contribute to clarifying the multi-sidedness of the topic by 
going beyond the well-known theory of the founder of deep ecology, namely, 
the one of the Norwegian philosopher, mountaineer and environmental activ-
ist Arne Næss. 
Before examining which ones are the questions we should not lose while ex-
amining both the genealogy and the impact of Norwegian ecophilosophies, I 
first specify why ecophilosophies and why in Norway. In this context, I raise 
the hypothesis that it is not accidental that the Nordic conceptualization of 
ecophilosophies took place in Norway since the Norwegian mountains be-
came a crucial condition for the appearance of a unique philosophy of climb-
ing developed in the 20th century.  
I investigate how the possibility to talk about Norwegian environmental phi-
losophies in plural is driven by what I call turn of imaginative rationality (also 
due to some intellectual influences of Mahayana Buddhism and Hinduism), 
which revives the idea of rationality as irreducible to the one of cognitive ra-
tionality. I will also examine how rehabilitating the normative validity of 
imaginative rationality can benefit revealing the ambiguous groundings of 
both radical anthropocentrism and radical biocentrism. 
Justifying what I called horizontal relatedness as one of the prototype charac-
teristics of the philosophies in question contributes to outlining the dialectical 
entity of the relationships between man and nature as intrinsically connected 
with the rehabilitation of the principles of ethics. Thus only the ungrounded 
faith in (radical) ethical anthropocentrism, which Norwegian ecophilosophies 
criticize, can be relevantly questioned without falling into the trap of moral 
objectivism, nor into the one of radical biocentrism. Furthermore, recognizing 
Norwegian ecophilosophies as process philosophies can benefit clarifying one 
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of the main objects of investigation of the current monograph, namely, how 
the biosphere, which is recognized as a complex net of ecosystems having an 
intrinsic value, can be better understood by applying the methods of ethical 
gradualism. They illustrate why introducing relevant ecophilosophies affects 
building relevant environmental politics without neglecting the role of bio-
logical gradualism as such.  
As one of the crucial factors, which provoke the need of specifying the gene-
alogy of Norwegian ecophilosophies, I point out the debates about growth and 
environmental protection which took place in the mid-1960 and which gradu-
ally turned into discussions about sustainable development vs. environmental 
protection. In this context, I claim that one of the main challenges Norwegian 
ecophilosophies faced was how to revive the use of ‘and’ mode without sup-
porting zero-growth. 
On the other hand, I draw the conclusion that clarifying the role of one’s self-
realization as closely tied with nature’s realization can be done by introducing 
the concept of moral experiential gestalt in so far as cultivating our sensitivity 
towards the net of biosphere is a matter of how to teach ourselves to recognize 
the equal right of all living beings to live and blossom, as Næss suggests. 
Specifying the role of moral experiential gestalt is of crucial interest if it is re-
ferred to the principles of Norwegian ecophilosophies because reconsidering 
the influence of so-called moral imagination, we can specify what it means ‘to 
think like a mountain’ in Næss’s sense by going beyond the purely meta-
phorical interpretations. 
The aforementioned new mode of thinking, which appeals for avoiding the 
reduction of rationality to cognitive rationality by rehabilitating the normative 
validity of feelings and emotions in our interaction with nature shows why by 
human self-realization we presumably understand the realization of an aware 
moral agent. That is why one of the main objectives is the individual to be-
come morally engaged with preserving nature’s sources by avoiding their 
transformation into resources of exploitation on both individual and collective 
levels. It is the reconsidered normative validity of feelings and emotions that 
helps cultivating compassion for other living beings even when they are not 
‘similar’ to us, i.e. it contributes to cultivating our sensitivity to what it means 
to be in someone else’s shoes without being in his/her/its shoes themselves. 
On a macro methodological level, I draw the conclusion that cultivating moral 
imagination, as done within the Norwegian ecophilosophies, benefits disen-
chanting the statement that understanding nature’s harmony is merely a matter 
of human understanding.  
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In the first chapter, which is devoted to revealing the genealogy of Norwegian 
outdoor life against the background of so-called by Tordsson National, Social, 
Modernization and Ecosocial projects, I reach the conclusion that both Nor-
wegian ecophilosophies and Norwegian philosophy of outdoor life are based 
on some similar conceptions of the role of biosphere’s intrinsic value. This 
conclusion gives me grounds to examine Norwegian ecophilosophies as expe-
riential philosophies whose prototype characteristic is the strive for rehabili-
tating the initial total openness of man and nature (i.e. their phenomenological 
openness). Another important similarity is found in the way the idea of na-
ture’s complexity in Kvaløy’s sense determines the process of self-realization 
by following the rhythm of nature without promoting a certain type of objec-
tive naturalism.  
All the aforementioned changes affected the attitudes towards being in the 
mountain as a crucial part of Norwegian outdoor life. Referring to Nansen’s 
description of his experience in Jotunheimen, I draw the conclusion that the 
evaluation of Norwegian climbing experience relied on the contradiction be-
tween Homo Ascensus and Homo Viator entailing some reminiscences of 
Romanticism’s ideal due to which the vertical space was ascribed a high sym-
bolic value. 
In turn, analyzing the implicit ethical foundation of the early 20th-century es-
says on Norwegian philosophy of outdoor life, I argue that Norwegian phi-
losophy of climbing can be defined as based on a given applied ethics also 
due to the fact that the latter was developed as a form of experiential learning 
whose normative validity arises from outlining practical wisdom as its main 
characteristic. 
Discussing the role of the mountains for the Norwegian culture, I argue that 
cultivating a sense of belonging to them concerns the establishment of so-
called cabin culture as well as its influence on building ecosophy in Næss’s 
sense. Furthermore, I emphasize that Norwegian cabin culture promotes a cer-
tain environmental ethics whose requirements are determined by the place it-
self. The lifestyle is the one appropriate for the place whose main norm is 
simplicity in means and richness in ends provided by nature as such, as Næss 
suggests. However, the latter formula does not have to be interpreted from the 
perspective of objective naturalism. That is why I argue in favor of justifying 
environmental holism by adopting a certain type of ontological minimalism, 
which to bring a given type of existential maximalism to light. 
In this context, explaining Faarlund’s illuminative statement that one feels at 
home in nature, I draw the conclusion that the normative aspects of this life 
have to be explored by revealing what profitable life in nature is. The latter 
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does not have to be interpreted within the paradigm of utilitarian benefits, but 
rather as a way of being personally enriched in the process of self-realization. 
In other words, leading a profitable ecolife can be recognized as taking the re-
sponsibility to become a Self with a capital letter while respecting nature as a 
net of biospherical knots.  
In turn, examining Zapffe’s theory of biosophy in the second chapter of the 
current monograph reveals how one unique, not only for Norway, philosophy 
exploits the methods of applied biology for finding solutions to some crucial 
existential problems, albeit it is not restricted to the use of biological methods 
alone. Taking into account that Zapffe himself ambiguously defines what bio-
sophy as a method is using ‘biosophical’ and ‘biological’ as interchangeable 
concepts, I draw the conclusion that the two concepts could be interpreted as 
ontological synonyms due to revealing biosophy’s potential as an experiential 
philosophy. 
In this context, I reach the conclusion that Zapffe’s biosophy is one of the first 
Norwegian philosophies showing how the pitfalls of ethical anthropocentrism 
can be overcome without supporting a certain form of radical biocentrism 
while examining the biological interest front as intrinsically connected with 
the social, autotelic and metaphysical fronts. 
Regardless of the fact that Zapffe does not aim at discussing the interactions 
between man and environment on the level of ethical gradualism, I claim that 
the parallels he draws between morality and biology should be paid special at-
tention. By contrast to Zapffe’s well-grounded examinations of the origin of 
so-called social and autotelic-metaphysical morality, his conception of reha-
bilitating the role of biological dispositions of human beings raises many con-
cerns about the normative validity of ethics, which derives from biological 
factors. The complexity of these problems will be later formulated with dif-
ferent words by G. Skirbekk, namely, how could we talk about ethical gradu-
alism without entirely rejecting biological gradualism as such? 
The issue how to discern biological morality from social one in Zapffe’s sense 
is an important issue because it can contribute to rethinking how it is possible 
to minimize pain and suffering not only for human beings. This topic is also 
an object of investigation in the writings of Næss, Kvaløy and Skirbekk since 
it concerns the transition from ethical anthropocentrism to ethical gradualism. 
I draw the conclusion that the examination of suffering and pleasure, as dis-
played by Zapffe, derives from minimizing the risks of simplifying the nor-
mative validity of experience if it is reduced to a set of biological functions. 
Otherwise, it would have meant that tragic in Zapffe’s sense should have al-
ways been examined as driven by physical pain alone. 
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The mechanisms of compensation elaborated on man’s side cannot benefit 
overcoming the existential pessimism that has the biological nature of human 
species merely as a necessary condition. Judging by the aforementioned in-
vestigations, I argue that Zapffe’s understanding of surplus (or what we can 
call a ‘higher type’) pessimism does not have to be negatively examined as a 
form of nihilism, but rather as a constructive criticism of the arising faith in 
technocratic invasion and interpersonal alienation, which can be minimized 
by cultivating empathy and love.  
Examining the methodological advantages and disadvantages of adopting 
deep ecology in the third chapter of the current research, I argue that the criti-
cal attitudes are mainly provoked by the fact that Næss neglects the problem 
of normative validity on the levels of morality and environmental politics at 
the expense of the criterion of verification, which leads to introducing radical 
biocentrism at the expense of ethical gradualism. As one of the most illumina-
tive illustrations of this thesis, I point out his statement that the ecological 
problems should be separately treated from the ones of poverty and justice 
because solving the latter would take some time. This would explain why 
Næss interprets the scenarios of ecological sustainability as a subject to vague 
futurism, which is grounded in the way he leaves the concept of vital need de-
liberately vague. 
Investigating the way Næss determines intuition as a-moral (as being irrele-
vant to morality), I suggest that if we manage to justify the normative validity 
of the intuition, we can noncontradictory determine how ecosophy’s wisdom 
is related to practice. In this context, I draw the conclusion that the role of 
Ecosophy T cannot be fully revealed by referring to Næss’s understanding of 
moral intuition since relying on the latter, we should unquestionably adopt the 
problematic principles of moral relativism. 
Neglecting the normative validity of morality, as Næss suggests, we would 
keep facing serious ethical contradictions because then empathy would be 
simplified to a process of identification merely with the ones who are close to 
us. On a micro methodological level, it would mean that there is an increasing 
risk the ecological self to be identified with the narrow one in Næss’s sense. 
Extrapolating this issue on the level of environmental politics, I argue that the 
principle of identification may negatively affect the interests of conservation, 
namely, they to be determined as interests with a capital letter and thus in-
stead of building a bridge between self-love and self-realization, as Næss ap-
peals, to strengthen love to the ego and its narrow realization respectively. 
On a macro methodological level, I see one of the main concerns about 
Næss’s justification of radical biocentrism in establishing a certain kind of 
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utilitarian ethics, which is supposed to contribute to reducing ethical anthro-
pocentrism. Disenchanting this misconception requires reconsidering the ethi-
cal implications of Næss’s deep ecology platform by focusing on the way the 
idea of intrinsic value is recognized. That is why I draw the conclusion that it 
is the normative validity of the interrelatedness between human and nonhu-
man world that benefits intrinsic value to be defined beyond the paradigm of 
moral objectivism. 
Furthermore, I claim that the lack of awareness about the role of ethical 
gradualism implied in point three of the deep ecology platform leads to mis-
understanding Næss’s radical biocentrism as bio-fascism, or eco-brutalism by 
some researchers such as the social ecologists. This misunderstanding has ap-
parent implications while examining the problem of population reduction. 
In this context, I draw the conclusion that there is no objective goal of reach-
ing a given number of living beings that may depend on the existence of five 
billion of them, as Næss suggests, so that the quantity cannot be used as an 
argument in inflicting both quantitative and qualitative reductions. It means 
that there is no basic contradiction between the number of the human popula-
tion and the one of the other living beings, nor is there a predetermined corre-
spondence in the exact numbers that should be reached. 
Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I draw the conclusion that 
Næss’s comparison of so-called degrees of pain, which are specified on the 
basis of measuring ‘felt pain’, provokes some serious concerns such as the 
ones about how subjective experience of pain is defined as objectively meas-
urable one by default as well as why it is the bystander who can objectively 
evaluate someone else’s experience of pain. Referring to this thesis would 
lead to the ideal justification of quantitative criteria of pain measurement by 
letting numbers decide, as Næss suggests, which, however, questions both the 
process of evaluation and idea of biological gradualism as such. 
Comparing Næss’s and Kvaløy’s environmental philosophies in the forth 
chapter of the current monograph, I conclude that it is Kvaløy’s ecophiloso-
phy that contributes to understanding how the impact of radical biocentrism 
can be restricted on the level of environmental politics if environmental prob-
lems are examined as inseparable from the socio-political ones. Adopting this 
approach, however, does not mean to appeal for reviving the role of ethical 
anthropocentrism. On the contrary, I argue that with his critical reception of 
Næss’s ideas, Kvaløy brings to light what Skirbekk justifies as a need of im-
plementing the principles of ethical gradualism. 
In this context, I clarify that while Næss’s ‘thinking like a mountain’ mode is 
based on a certain type of gestalt thinking, Kvaløy’s one can be described as a 
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process philosophy grounded in the mode ‘thinking like a river’. In turn, the 
latter is justified by the embodiment of natural rhythm that may not necessar-
ily be harmonic, but rather harmonizing time.  
Regarding the aforementioned investigations, I conclude that the rehabilitated 
role of human ecology in Næss’s and Kvaløy’s writings contributes to build-
ing ecologically sustainable politics by avoiding ecophilosophical competence 
to be reduced to a narrow expert knowledge. I outline that both Næss and 
Kvaløy justify the competence in question, which has understanding as its 
necessary condition for recognizing the need of moral and political commit-
ments.  
Regarding Kvaløy’s fundamental distinction between complexity and compli-
cation, I claim that life necessity society encourages the engagement with or-
ganicity to be understood as a meaningful engagement with the world by 
adopting meaningful work strategies. It shows that cooperation is a significant 
activity that contributes to cultivating the sense of situatedness internalized as 
a sensitivity towards group belonging. Furthermore, I draw the conclusion 
that life necessity society is built not on ‘freedom from’ but rather on ‘free-
dom to’ justifying meaningfulness as such.  
Analyzing Kvaløy’s critique of contemporary technocratic society, I argue 
that it is the replacement of life necessity society with the industrial develop-
ment one that makes the idea of multiplicity of growth be substituted with the 
one of development, whose climax is the idea of sustainable development. 
That is why I draw the conclusion that the symmetry of complexity including 
asymmetrical moral relationships is erased by the technological invasion at 
the expense of the symmetry of formal relationships, which are based on the 
principles of meritocracy. 
Referring to Kvaløy’s theory of the distinction between life necessity society 
and industrial development society as influenced but not restricted to the dis-
tinction between Gaia theory and Servoglobe one, I argue that pretending to 
fight chaos, Servoglobe falls into a vicious circle because the fight results in 
provoking a different type of chaos. That is why I draw the conclusion that 
Servoglobe activates the fear of empty space (terror vacui) in so far as the lat-
ter does not come from man, but from nature itself, albeit humankind is the 
only one species that consciously anticipates it. I argue that Servoglobe fails 
in the way it pretends to find a panacea for the fear in question. 
Clarifying these problems, I also claim that Kvaløy’s definition of so-called 
Tivoli-effect understood as a pseudo-complex phenomenon concerns the rec-
ognition of technological strength at the expense of life’s strength by reducing 
the latter to the survival one as well as decreasing the multi-cultural diversity 
 570
to a simple set of given, self-sufficient monocultures in which ‘mono’ be-
comes an ontological synonym of ‘global’. 
Regarding the discussions about Norway’s potential accession to the EU, I 
draw the conclusion that Kvaløy and the other representatives of snm see the 
main threat of the arising flow of people in the increasing instrumentalization 
of human power, which is simplified to a capital, i.e. in reducing the flow of 
people to the one of goods in so far as both are determined as exchangeable 
resources. 
Comparing and contrasting Næss’s and Kvaløy’s environmental philosophies, 
I reach the conclusion that many crucial questions, which they leave open, 
find their answers in Skirbekk’s theory of environmental philosophy that is an 
object of investigation in the fifth chapter of the current monograph. Some of 
his solutions such as how ethical anthropocentrism can be overcome by reha-
bilitating the role of ethical gradualism, as well as by fulfilling the scenarios 
of ecological sustainability illustrate why reaching the sustainability in ques-
tion is not a utopian scenario. 
Examining the issue what relevant environmental politics should look like in 
respect with the development of welfare state, as Skirbekk suggests, I claim 
that his solutions can be described as conceptually closer to Kvaløy’s ones 
rather than to Næss’s solutions. One of the crossing points with Kvaløy’s the-
ory is found in the way Skirbekk rehabilitates the connection between ecophi-
losophy and environmental politics by revealing the role of morality in culti-
vating solidarity on a collective level. As main methodological advantage of 
reconsidering the role of solidarity as an issue with normative implications, I 
point out the possibility of exploring environmental problems as closely tied 
with the political and societal problems.  
Another crucial question, which finds its answer in Skirbekk’s writings, is 
how can we avoid the extremes of both ethical anthropocentrism and radical 
biocentrism without denying neither the human responsibility for the deci-
sion-making process nor the moral status of the other living beings, which can 
merely be justified by adopting the principle of advocatory representation? 
Analyzing Skirbekk’s theory, I draw the conclusion that the origin of the 
problem of choosing ‘either-or’ concerning the relationships between humans 
and other species is grounded in absolutizing the issue of giving priority re-
gardless of whether we talk about anthropocentrism or biocentrism.  
Investigating the consequences of his conception regarding the lack of com-
plete ‘reducibility’ of moral discussants to moral agents, I claim that thus we 
can avoid calling not only non-humans, but also certain groups of humans ‘in-
sufficient’ moral subjects in so far as ‘insufficiency’ in morality is no longer 
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based on the ontological, and especially on the biological implications of the 
debate on properties. Furthermore, I argue that we can justify the competence 
of being morally engaged as a prototype characteristic of so-called by Skir-
bekk communicative competence. 
Going back to the problem how to interpret biological gradualism as referring 
to ethical gradualism, I draw the conclusion that the projections of biological 
gradualism can be seen since vital needs and vital interests are not equally ap-
plicable to all living beings. I claim that the contradictions arise from the fact 
that not all living beings have both ‘being interested in’ and ‘having an inter-
est in’ modes in Skirbekk’s sense. In this respect it is difficult to compare vital 
needs of different organisms because such a comparison implicitly presumes 
adopting the criterion of giving priority. 
The problem provokes the question how do we know that pain is the ‘same’ 
for all evaluated beings, namely, how do we know that there is an undoubted 
connection between physical experience and its moral evaluation, as well as 
our knowledge about it? Otherwise, arguing that we are moral discussants 
who interact with moral subjects, which are initially deprived of the con-
sciousness of being moral, may not result in reducing the pain-calculus, nor 
would it cause leaving room for compassion.  
As one of the methodological benefits of Skirbekk’s theory of compassion, I 
outline his argument that compassion can be felt without reaching a proce-
dural consensus, even when we talk about mutual compassion. On a macro 
methodological level, I draw the conclusion that the impact of compassion on 
building experiential morality could be explored by clarifying how compas-
sion can affect cultivating eco-consciousness by rehabilitating the normative 
validity of feelings and emotions.  
On the other hand, comparing Skirbekk’s and Kvaløy’s conceptions, I point 
out the reconsideration of the problem of consumption in the debate about 
ethical gradualism. Examining the genealogy of the concerns deriving from 
the production-consumption dilemmas in the sustainable development soci-
ety, as represented by both of them, we should pay attention to the way 
Kvaløy and Skirbekk justify the role of education and political culture in re-
thinking the role of quality of life, especially in so-called developing coun-
tries. 
Furthermore, I argue that it is the replacement of the idea of universalizability 
(which is understood in qualitative terms) with the process of universalization 
evaluated in quantitative ones that raises the need of distinguishing between 
ecological sustainability and ecological unsustainability, especially if sustain-
able development is overestimated as the only one possible development. 
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That is why I claim that Skirbekk’s conception of universalizability does not 
share many features with Næss’s one of universalization because the latter is 
focused on outlining the preciseness of deriving norms by providing verifiable 
hypotheses.  
In conclusion, I argue that examining the role of Norwegian environmental 
philosophies is a task, which requires finding answers not only to questions 
such as “What is typically Norwegian?”, but also to the one “How does ‘typi-
cally Norwegian’ contribute to addressing global issues, which to provide 
relevant local solutions?”, taking into account that ‘local’ is irreducible to 
‘less meaningful’. I point out that analyzing the impact of Norwegian envi-
ronmental philosophies is inseparable from outlining what the global chal-
lenges in front of Norwegian environmental politics are. In this context, the 
slogan “Think globally, act locally!” can be interpreted within the framework 
of Norwegian environmental philosophies as “Think meaningfully, act re-
sponsibly!”, which in turn presumes the engagements to be examined as 
moral, cultural and socio-political ones rather than as epistemologically justi-
fiable engagements. That is why arguing for Norwegian environmental phi-
losophies in plural does not mean to think about ‘global’ and ‘local’ in rela-
tive terms, but in what Næss calls relational terms. Thus we can reveal the di-
versity of the aforementioned philosophies, while they address common prob-
lems such as clarifying the pitfalls of ethical anthropocentrism, disenchanting 
the political lack of environmental constructivism etc. 
On a macro-methodological level, “Think meaningfully, act responsibly!” be-
comes possible if the way of asking which questions we do not have to lose is 
internalized as an issue regarding how one to find a place in the net of the bio-
spherical knots, which to call home (Næss). Similar issues concern the in-
eradicable cosmic feeling of panic (Zapffe), how to build a balanced society 
as a life necessity one (Kvaløy) as well as how dangerous is to find an asylum 
from the threat of environmental catastrophe in the myth of final solution 
(Skirbekk). Regardless of the different ways of emphasizing the need of re-
thinking the role of biocentrism, these questions derive from the fundamental 
dilemma “Whose Environment? Which Nature?”. Thus Norwegian environ-
mental philosophies’ approach to challenging the ideal of cognitive rationality 
reveals how we can keep posing the micro-questions ‘which’ and ‘whose’ 
without losing the macro-ones, namely, the questions ‘why’ and ‘how’ in a 
world where reconsidering the role of ethical gradualism is one of the few 
ways of learning how not only to be in, but also with nature in the long run. 
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РЕЗЮМЕ 
Целта на настоящата монография е да се анализира в сравнителна 
перспектива комплексното развитие на норвежките екологически фи-
лософии през XX в. чрез артикулирането не само на сходствата във 
философските предпоставки, но също така и как методологическите 
различия оказват влияние върху промените в сферата на екологическа-
та политика в Норвегия. Ето защо една от основните цели е да се изс-
ледва произходът и развитието на онези понятия и идеи, които допри-
насят за проясняването на сложността на проблема отвъд добре позна-
тите концепции на основателя на дълбинната екология (dypøkologi) - 
норвежкия философ, катерач и екоактивист Арне Нес. 
Преди да бъдат откроени въпросите, „които не трябва да губим” (Г. 
Ширбек) докато проучваме генеалогията и влиянието на норвежките 
екологически философии, в рамките на настоящата монография първо 
се аргументира употребата на понятието норвежки екологически фи-
лософии в множествено число, както и причините за тяхното заражда-
не именно в Норвегия. В този контекст е формулирана хипотезата, че 
нордската концептуализация на въпросните философии се реализира в 
Норвегия, тъй като норвежките планини се превръщат в ключов фак-
тор за появата на уникална философия на катеренето през XX в.  
Нещо повече, изследвано е как възможността за обговарянето на 
норвежките екологически философии се обуславя от т.нар. обрат на 
въобразимата рационалност  (не на последно място и под влиянието на 
Махаяна будизма и хиндуизма), който реабилитира идеята, че рацио-
налността е несводима до когнитивната рационалност. Същевременно 
е анализирано как преосмислянето на нормативната валидност на въ-
образимата рационалност би оказало влияние върху проблематичните 
основания както на радикалния антропоцентризъм, така и на радикал-
ния биоцентризъм. 
На свой ред, аргументирането на т.нар. хоризонтална съотносимост 
като една от прототипните характеристики на въпросните философии 
допринася за открояването на диалектическата природа на взаимоот-
ношенията човек - природа като имплицитно зависими от усвояването 
на определени етически принципи. Само така преекспонираното дове-
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рие в ролята на (радикалния) етически антропоцентризъм, който е 
обект на критика от страна на норвежките екологически философии, 
може успешно да бъде поставено под въпрос като се избегнат проти-
воречията, провокирани както от моралния обективизъм, така и от ра-
дикалния биоцентризъм. Дефинирането на норвежките екологически 
философии като процесуални философии би допринесло за прояснява-
не на един от основните обекти на изследване в настоящата моногра-
фия, а именно, как биосферата, която функционира като комплексна 
мрежа от екосистеми, имащи изначална ценност, може да бъде разбра-
на по-добре чрез прилагането на методите на етическия градуализъм 
(ethical gradualism). Въпросните методи обуславят разбирането на ос-
нованията за въвеждането на релевантни екологически философии ка-
то фактор за утвърждаването на релевантни екологически политики, 
без да се пренебрегва ролята на биологическия градуализъм. 
Като един от ключовите фактори, който провокира необходимостта 
от осмисляне на генеалогията на норвежките екологически философии 
е откроена ролята на дебатите относно растежа и опазването на окол-
ната среда (vekst og vern) от средата на XX в., които постепенно се 
превръщат в дебати за ролята на устойчивото развитие versus опазва-
нето на околната среда. В този контекст се анализира как едно от ос-
новните предизвикателства пред норвежките екологически философии 
е свързано с  реабилитирането на „и” конектора, без да се апелира към 
налагането на т.нар. нулев растеж (zero growth). 
От друга страна е направено заключението, че проясняването на 
ролята на себереализацията на индивида като тясно свързана с реали-
зацията на природата може да се осъществи чрез въвеждането на поня-
тието морален експериенталистки гещалт, доколкото култивирането на 
чувствителността към биосферата предполага да се научим да призна-
ваме правото на всички живи същества „да живеят и да просперират” в 
смисъла на Нес. Специфицирането на морaлния експериенталистки 
гещалт е от значение за съотнасянето му с принципите на норвежките 
екологически философии в степента, в която преосмисляйки влияние-
то на т.нар. морално въображение, ние можем да конкретизираме как-
во означава апелът на Нес „да мислим като планина”609, надхвърляйки 
чисто метафоричните обяснения. 
Тази нова мисловна парадигма, която предполага избягване на ре-
дукцията на рационалността до когнитивна рационалност чрез реаби-
                                           
609 За първи път формулировката е въведена от Алдо Лиополд. 
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литиране на нормативната валидност на чувствата и емоциите в проце-
са на взаимодействието ни с природата, илюстрира защо под себереа-
лизация на индивида ние по презумпция разбираме реализацията на 
съзнателния морален агент. Поради това една от основните цели е ин-
дивидът да бъде морално ангажиран с опазването на природните из-
точници, избягвайки тяхната трансформация в ресурси за експлоата-
ция както на индивидуално, така и на колективно ниво. 
Именно преосмислянето на нормативната валидност на чувствата и 
емоциите допринася за култивирането на състрадание към тези, които 
не са „подобни” на нас, т.е. тя обуславя култивирането на чувствител-
ността ни към това какво означава да бъдем „на мястото на някой 
друг”, без буквално да бъдем на мястото на въпросния друг. На макро-
методологическо ниво е направено заключението, че култивирането на 
моралното въображение така, както това е направено в рамките на 
норвежките екологически философии, допринася за осмисляне на 
твърдението, че осъзнаването на природната хармония не е проява на 
разбиране единствено от страна на човека. 
В първа глава на настоящата монография, която е посветена на изс-
ледването на генеалогията на норвежката философия на живота на от-
крито (friluftsliv) на фона на т.нар. от Тордсон Национален проект, Со-
циален проект, Модернизационен проект и Екосоциален проект, е 
направено заключението, че норвежките екологически философии и 
норвежката философия на живота на открито се основават на сходни 
концептуализации относно ролята на имплицитната ценност на биос-
ферата. 
Това заключение дава основания норвежките екологически фило-
софии да бъдат дефинирани като експериенталистки философии, чиято 
прототипна характеристика е стремежът към реабилитиране на изна-
чалната тотална откритост на човека и природата (т.е. на тяхната фе-
номенологична откритост). Друго важно сходство се проявява в начи-
на, по който идеята за комплексност на природата в смисъла на Ква-
льой определя процеса на себереализация чрез следване на ритъма на 
природата, без да се утвърждава специфичен тип обективен натурали-
зъм. 
Особено влияние оказват и нагласите към процеса на пребиваване в 
планината, представляващ ключов аспект от норвежкия живот на отк-
рито. На базата на позоваване на описанията на Нансен, свързани с 
преживяванията му в Йотунхаймен, е направено заключението, че 
оценяването на катераческия опит в Норвегия се базира на противо-
поставянето на Homo Ascensus на Homo Viator, които съдържат реми-
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нисценции от идеала на Романтизма, утвърждаващ позитивната сим-
волна стойност на вертикалното пространство. 
На свой ред, чрез анализиране на имплицитните етически основа-
ния, изложени в ранните есета, отразяващи норвежката философия на 
живота на открито от началото на XX в., е формулирана хипотезата, че 
норвежката философия на катеренето може да бъде дефинирана като 
основаваща се на специфичен тип приложна етика. Въпросната етика е 
доразвита като форма на научаване в опита, чиято нормативна валид-
ност произтича от утвърждаването на практическата мъдрост като 
нейна прототипна характеристика. 
При проучването на ролята на планините за норвежката култура е 
аргументирана хипотезата, че култивирането на чувството за принад-
лежност има отношение към налагането на т.нар. култура на хижния 
живот (Т. Гефсен), както и към нейната роля за формирането на еко-
софията в смисъла на Нес. Нещо повече, акцентирано е върху наблю-
дението, че норвежката култура на хижния живот насърчава усвоява-
нето на определен тип екологическа етика, чиито изисквания се опре-
делят от самото място. Начинът на живот е този, който е подходящ за 
мястото, чиято основна норма по думите на Нес е „умереност в средст-
вата, многообразие в целите”, зададени от природата. Въпросната 
формулировка обаче не трябва да бъде интерпретирана от гледна точка 
на обективния натурализъм. Ето защо е формулирана хипотезата, че 
утвърждаването на екологическия холизъм се реализира чрез усвоява-
нето на определен тип онтологически минимализъм, който да прово-
кира екзистенциален максимализъм. 
В този контекст анализът на добре познатото твърдение на Фаар-
лунд, че „човек се чувства у дома си в лоното на природата” води до 
заключението, че нормативните аспекти на въпросния живот могат да 
бъдат анализирани чрез рефлексия върху това какво означава смислен 
(удовлетворителен) живот в природата. Смисленият живот не трябва 
да бъде разглеждан в парадигмата на утилитаризма, а по-скоро като 
начин на личностно обогатяване в процеса на себереализация. С други 
думи, воденето на „удовлетворителен” екологичен начин на живот 
може да се възприеме като поемане на отговорност към Аза с главна 
буква в смисъла на Нес (т.е. към екологическия Аз) чрез проява на 
уважение към природата като „мрежа от биосферни възли” (Нес). 
От своя страна изследването на биософската теория на Запфе във 
втората глава на настоящата монография цели да проясни как една 
философия, която е уникална не само за Норвегия, се позовава на ме-
тодите на приложната биология в търсенето на отговори на някои съ-
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ществени екзистенциални въпроси, без да се ограничава до употребата 
на въпросните методи.  
Обръщайки внимание на факта, че самият Запфе нееднозначно де-
финира какво представлява биософията като метод (използвайки „био-
софски” и „биоложки” като взаимозаменяеми понятия), правим заклю-
чението, че въпросните две понятия трябва да се разглеждат като он-
тологически синоними, доколкото биософията има потенциала на екс-
периенталистка философия. 
В този контекст е достигнато до заключението, че биософията на 
Запфе е една от първите норвежки философии, разкриваща как проб-
лемите на етическия антропоцентризъм могат да бъдат преодоляни без 
да се утвърждава радикален биоцентризъм. Това е възможно в степен-
та, в която фронтът на биологичните интереси е изначално свързан с 
интересите в сферата на т.нар. от Запфе социален, аутотеличен и мета-
физичен фронт. 
Независимо че Запфе не проблематизира взаимовръзката между 
човека и природата на нивото на етическия градуализъм, е изложена 
хипотезата, че паралелите между морала и биологията, които авторът 
откроява, представляват особен интерес със своята иновативност. За 
разлика от детайлно обоснованите наблюдения върху т.нар. социален и 
аутотелично-метафизичен морал, концепцията на Запфе за реабилити-
ране на биологичните предразположения на човека поражда редица 
въпроси относно нормативната валидност на етиката, основаваща се на 
биологични фактори. Впоследствие, комплексността на този проблем е 
преформулиран от Г. Ширбек по следния начин – как можем да гово-
рим за етически градуализъм без изцяло да отричаме ролята на биоло-
гичния градуализъм като такъв? 
Разграничаването на биологичния морал от социалния в смисъла на 
Запфе е важно, защото то допринася за преосмислянето на питането 
как е възможно да се минимализират болката и страданието не само по 
отношение на човешките същества. Въпросът е обект на анализ и в съ-
чиненията на Нес, Квальой и Ширбек, доколкото има отношение към 
прехода от етически антропоцентризъм към етически градуализъм. В 
този контекст е направено заключението, че анализирането на страда-
нието и удоволствието в концепцията на Запфе произтича от минима-
лизиране на рисковете, свързани със пренебрегване на нормативната 
валидност на опита, когато той бъде редуциран до набор от биологич-
ни функции. В противен случай това би означавало, че трагичното в 
смисъла на Запфе трябва да се изследва като провокирано единствено 
от физическата болка. 
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На свой ред, механизмите на компенсация, разработени от човека, 
не допринасят за преодоляването на екзистенциалния песимизъм, кой-
то третира биологичната природа на човешкия вид единствено като 
необходимо основание. На базата на гореспоменатото наблюдение е 
направено заключението, че песимистичният „излишък” (който можем 
да определим като „висш тип” песимизъм) в смисъла на Запфе, не 
трябва да се разглежда като форма на нихилизъм, а по-скоро като кон-
структивна критика на нарастващата увереност в ролята на технократ-
ската инвазия и междуличностната алиенация, които могат да бъдат 
редуцирани чрез култивиране на любовта и емпатията. 
Чрез анализа на методологическите предимства и недостатъци, 
свързани с усвояването на дълбинната екология, в третата глава на 
настоящата монография е формулирана следната хипотеза. Критичес-
ките аргументи, свързани с теорията на Нес, са провокирани от факта, 
че Нес пренебрегва проблема за нормативната валидност на морала и 
екологическата политика за сметка на принципите на логическата ве-
рификация, което на свой ред води до утвърждаването на радикален 
биоцентризъм за сметка на етическия градуализъм. Като една от емб-
лематичните илюстрации на тази хипотеза е посочено твърдението на 
Нес, че екологическите проблеми трябва да бъдат разглеждани отдел-
но от проблемите на бедността и справедливостта. Проучването на 
въпросното твърдение би обяснило защо Нес интерпретира сценариите 
за екологическа устойчивост като проблем в сферата на футуризма, 
доколкото той целенасочено не конкретизира понятието за жизнена 
нужда (livsnød). 
Изследвайки начина, по който Нес дефинира интуицията като амо-
рална, т.е. като ирелевантна към морала, формулираме хипотезата, че 
ако съумеем да легитимираме нормативната валидност на въпросната 
интуиция, бихме могли по непротиворечив начин да определим как 
„мъдростта” на екософията се съотнася с практиката. В този контекст е 
направено заключението, че ролята на Екософия Т не може да бъде 
напълно прояснена чрез съотнасянето й с моралната интуиция в сми-
съла на Нес, тъй като подобно позоваване би допринесло за усвояване-
то на проблематичните принципи на моралния релативизъм. 
Нещо повече, пренебрегването на нормативната валидност на мо-
рала, както предлага Нес, би довело до необратимото изпадане в ети-
чески противоречия, защото по този начин емпатията би била сведена 
до процес на идентификация единствено с тези, които са ни близки. На 
микрометодологическо ниво това би означавало, че съществува нарас-
тващ риск екологическият Аз да бъде идентифициран с т.нар. от Нес 
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„ограничен Аз” (narrow self). Екстраполирането на този проблем на 
нивото на екологическата политика предполага, че принципът на 
идентификация може да се отрази негативно върху интересите, свър-
зани с процеса на опзаване на околната среда, а именно, те да бъдат 
детерминирани като водещи интереси и така вместо да се установи 
приемственост между любовта и себереализацията в смисъла на Нес, 
да се провокира любовта към егото и неговата ограничена роля. 
На макрометодологическо ниво едно от основните възражения 
срещу легитимирането на радикалния биоцентризъм в концепцията на 
Нес е свързано с утвърждаването на специфичен тип утилитаристка 
етика, чиято функция е да минимализира влиянието на етическия ант-
ропоцентризъм. Проблематизирането на въпросната концепция изиск-
ва преосмисляне на етическите импликации, характеризиращи т.нар. 
платформа на дълбинната екология (deep ecology platform) чрез прояс-
няване на начина, по който е осмислена идеята за имплицитна ценност. 
Ето защо е направено заключението, че именно нормативната валид-
ност на взаимосвързаността на човешкия свят с биосферата е това, ко-
ето допринася гореспоменатата ценност да бъде дефинирана извън па-
радигмата на моралния обективизъм.  
Изложена е и хипотезата, че липсата на съзнание относно ролята на 
етическия градуализъм на ниво три от въпросната платформа е факто-
рът, който води до преиначаването на радикалния биоцентризъм на 
Нес като биофашизъм, или еко-брутализъм от страна на някои предс-
тавители на социалната екология. Подобно преиначаване придобива 
видими импликации, когато Нес разглежда проблема за редуцирането 
на населението. 
В този контекст е формулирано заключението, че не съществува 
обективна цел, изискваща достигането на определена численост на 
живите същества, която да предполага съществуването на пет милиар-
да от тях, както твърди Нес. Ето защо количеството не може да бъде 
разглеждано като аргумент за прилагането на количествени и качест-
вени редукции. Това означава, че не съществува изначално несъответ-
ствие между броя на хората и този на останалите живи същества, нито 
предварително зададено съответствие между броя на техните предста-
вители, който трябва да бъде достигнат. 
На базата на гореспоменатите наблюдения е направено заключени-
ето, че сравняването на видовете болка, предложено от Нес, които са 
реализирани на базата на „почувстваната” болка, поражда редица се-
риозни възражения, а именно - как субективното преживяване на бол-
ката да бъде дефинирано като изначално обективно измеримо, а също 
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така и как наблюдателят може обективно да оцени преживяването на 
болката от страна на друг субект. 
Чрез съпоставката на екологическите философии на Нес и Квальой 
в четвъртата глава на настоящото изследване е направено заключе-
нието, че именно екофилософията на Квальой допринася за осмисля-
нето на въпроса за ограничаване на влиянието на радикалния биоцент-
ризъм на нивото на екологическата политика, ако екологическите ди-
леми се разгледат като изначално свързани със социално-
политическите проблеми. Усвояването на подобен подход обаче, не 
означава да се реабилитира ролята на етическия антропоцентризъм. 
Напротив, изложена е хипотезата, че критическата рецепция на идеите 
на Нес от страна на Квальой прояснява проблема, който Ширбек ха-
рактеризира като необходимост от имплициране на принципите на 
етическия градуализъм. 
В този контекст е проучено как за разлика от модела на Нес „да 
мислим като планина”, който се характеризира с определен тип гещал-
тно мислене, моделът на Квальой може да бъде определен като специ-
фичен тип процесуална философия, основаваща се на принципа „да 
мислим като река”.  
Направено е заключението, че реабилитираната роля на т.нар. еко-
логия на човека (human ecology) така, както тя е анализирана в съчине-
нията на Нес и Квальой, допринася за изграждането на екологически 
устойчива политика, която избягва редуцирането на екологическата 
компетенция до специфично експертно знание. На базата на гореспо-
менатите изследвания е проучено как Нес и Квальой утвърждават не-
обходимостта от подобна компетенция, чиято ключова особеност при 
формирането на морални и политически ангажименти е именно разби-
рането. 
На свой ред, на фона на фундаменталната дистинкция между комп-
лексност и комплицираност, предложена от Квальой, е формулирана 
хипотезата, че т.нар. общество на жизнените необходимости (“livsnød-
vendighetssamfunnet”) насърчава ангажирането с органичността на 
природата да бъде разбрано като смислово-натоварен ангажимент към 
света чрез усвояването на изпълнени със смисъл стратегии. Въпросно-
то общество показва, че съвместната дейност е значима дейност, доп-
ринасяща за култивирането на чувство за ситуираност, което се интер-
нализира като чувствителност по отношение на груповата принадлеж-
ност. Нещо повече, направено е заключението, че обществото на жиз-
нените необходимости е формирано не на принципа „свобода от”, а на 
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принципа „свобода да”, утвърждаващ идеята за смисленост като така-
ва. 
Анализът на критичните основания от страна на Квальой по отно-
шение на технократското общество допринася за формулиране на хи-
потезата, че замяната на обществото на жизнените необходимости с 
обществото на индустриалното развитие (“industrivekstsamfunnet”) во-
ди до подмяната на идеята за многообразие на растежа с идеята за ус-
тойчиво развитие. Ето защо е направено заключението, че “симетрията 
на комплексността”, включваща асиметричните релации в сферата на 
морала, е дискредитирана чрез технологическата инвазия за сметка на 
симетрията на формалните отношения, които се основават на принци-
пите на меритокрацията. 
Въз основа на теорията на Квальой за дистинкцията между общест-
вото на жизнените необходимости и обществото на индустриалното 
развитие като повлияни, но не и ограничени до противопостяването на 
концепциите за Гая и Сервоглоуб, формулираме хипотезата, че в стре-
межа на човека да овладее и победи хаоса, Сервоглоуб активира страха 
от празното пространство (terror vacui), доколкото въпросният страх 
не протича от човека, а от природата като такава, независимо че чо-
вешкият вид е единственият вид, който изпитва подобен страх. В този 
контекст е направено заключението, че Сервоглоуб се проваля като 
проект поради начина, по който претендира да намери панацея за 
страха от празното пространство. 
Чрез проясняването на тези проблеми е аргументирана хипотезата, 
че дефиницията на Квальой за т.нар. Тиволи ефект, разбран като псев-
докомплексен феномен, има отношение към утвърждаването на техно-
логичната сила за сметка на жизнената сила чрез редуцирането на 
жизнената сила до сила на оцеляването. По този начин мултикултур-
ното многообразие е сведено до набор от определени самодостатъчни 
монокултури, при които „моно” се превръща в онтологически синоним 
на „глобален”. 
По отношение на дискусиите, свързани с потенциалното присъеди-
няване на Норвегия към Европейския съюз, е достигнато до заключе-
нието, че Квальой и другите представители на есенем движението 
(snm) виждат основната заплаха в нарастващия поток от хора поради 
увеличаващата се инструментализация на човешката сила, която е ре-
дуцирана до капитал, както и в свеждането на потока от хора до поток 
от стоки, доколкото и хората, и стоките, са определени като разменни 
ресурси. 
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Сравнителният анализ на екологическите философии на Нес и Ква-
льой води до заключението, че много съществени въпроси, които оста-
ват неразрешени, намират своя отговор в екологическата философия 
на Ширбек, представляваща обект на изследване в петата глава на 
настоящата монография. В нея са анализирани някои от неговите ре-
шения, например, как етическият антропоцентризъм може да бъде 
преодолян чрез реабилитирането на ролята на етическия градуализъм, 
а също така и как чрез реализирането на сценариите за екологическа 
устойчивост, въпросната устойчивост може да бъде постигната извън 
сферата на спекулациите с утопични сценарии. 
Изследвайки проблема каква трябва да бъде екологическата поли-
тика по отношение на развитието на социалната държава в смисъла на 
Ширбек, е направена хипотезата, че неговата теория може да бъде ха-
рактеризирана по-скоро като концептуално близка с теориите на Ква-
льой, отколкото с теориите на Нес. Една от пресечните точки с кон-
цепцията на Квальой се открива в начина, по който Ширбек реабили-
тира връзката между екофилософията и екологическата политика, раз-
кривайки ролята на морала за култивиране на солидарността на колек-
тивно ниво. Едно от основните методологически предимства, свързани 
с преосмислянето на нормативната роля на солидарността, е възмож-
ността за изследване на екологическите проблеми като имплицитно 
свързани с политическите и социалните проблеми. 
Друг ключов проблем, който намира своето решение в съчиненията 
на Ширбек, е възможността едновременно да бъдат избегнати край-
ностите на етическия антропоцентризъм и радикалния биоцентризъм, 
без да се пренебрегва отговорността на хората при вземането на реше-
ния, както и моралният статус на другите живи същества, който може 
да бъде утвърден единствено чрез усвояването на принципа на замест-
ващата представителност (principle of “advocatory” representation). 
Анализирайки теорията на Ширбек, стигаме до извода, че генезисът на 
проблема, а именно преекспонирането на избора „или-или” (или ант-
ропоцентризъм, или биоцентризъм), е свързан с отношенията между 
хората и другите живи същества, основавайки се на абсолютизацията 
при даването на приоритет, независимо дали става въпрос за антропо-
центризъм или биоцентризъм. 
Проучвайки ролята на решенията, предложени  от Ширбек, които 
са свързани с невъзможността за отъждествяване на моралните диску-
танти с морални агенти, формулираме хипотезата, че по този начин 
можем да избегнем както дефинирането на живите същества, така и на 
определени групи хора като „непълноценни” морални субекти, докол-
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кото „непълноценността” в морала не се основава на онтологически и 
особено на билогични импликации, отнасящи се до т.нар. дебат за ре-
алните и потенциални характеристки на субектите (the debate about 
actual and potential properties). Нещо повече, аргументирана е хипотеза-
та, че ние можем да дефинираме компетенцията, свързана с моралната 
ангажираност, като прототипна характеристика на т.нар. от Ширбек 
комуникативна компетенция. 
Връщайки се към въпроса за интерпретацията на биологическия 
градуализъм като съотнасящ се с етическия градуализъм, стигаме до 
заключението, че проекциите на биологическия градуализъм могат да 
бъдат откроени в степента, в която жизнените нужди и жизнените ин-
тереси не са еднакво приложими към всички живи същества. На свой 
ред, противоречията произтичат от факта, че не всички живи същества 
притежават модусите „да бъда заинтересован” и „да имам интерес 
към” в смисъла на Ширбек. Ето защо възникват затруднения при съ-
поставянето на жизнените нужди на различните организми, тъй като 
подобно сравнение имплицитно предполага да бъде приложен крите-
рият за приоритет. 
Този проблем провокира отново въпроса откъде знаем, че болката е 
„еднаква” при всички същества, а именно, откъде знаем, че съществува 
неоспорима връзка между физическия опит и неговата етическа оцен-
ка, както и знанието ни за него. В противен случай, твърдението, че 
сме морални дискутанти, взаимодействащи с морални субекти, които 
изначално са лишени от съзнанието да бъдат морални, не води до фор-
мулирането на механизъм за изчисляване на болката (pain calculus), 
нито до разглеждане на възможността за изпитване на състрадание. 
Като едно от основните методологически предимства, свързани с 
теорията на Ширбек за състраданието, се посочва неговият аргумент, 
че състраданието може да бъде изпитано без да се достига до процеду-
рен консенсус, дори когато говорим за минимални прояви на състра-
дание. На макрометодологическо ниво е направено заключението, че 
състраданието оказва влиние върху култивиране на екологическото 
съзнание чрез реабилитиране на нормативната валидност на чувствата 
и емоциите. 
От друга страна, при сравняването на концепциите на Ширбек и 
Квальой е откроена необходимостта от преосмисляне на ролята на 
консумацията в дебата за етическия градуализъм. Изследвайки генези-
са на затрудненията, свързани с парадигмата на произвеждане и кон-
сумиране в обществата с устойчиво развитие, така както те са предста-
вени от двамата автори, разглеждаме начина, по който Квальой и 
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Ширбек утвърждават ролята на образованието и политическата култу-
ра за реабилитирането на качеството на живот, особено в т.нар. разви-
ващи се страни. 
Нещо повече, формулирана е хипотезата, че именно подмяната на 
идеята за универсализиране (в нейните качествени измерения) с про-
цеса на универсализация (имаща количествени измерения) поражда 
необходимостта от разграничаване на екологическата устойчивост от 
екологическата липса на устойчивост (ecological unsustainability), осо-
бено когато устойчивото развитие е преекспонирано като единствено-
то възможно развитие. Ето защо е направено заключението, че кон-
цепцията на Ширбек за ролята на универсализирането се различава от 
тази на Нес, доколкото критерият на Нес за универсализация е фоку-
сиран по-скоро върху открояването на прецизността при извеждането 
на норми чрез полагането на верифицируеми хипотези. 
В заключение e аргументирано твърдението, че ролята на норвеж-
ките екологически философии е задача, която изисква намирането на 
отговори не само на въпроси от типа „какво е типично норвежкото в 
тях?”, но също и „как „типично норвежкото” допринася за поставянето 
на глобални проблеми, които изискват релевантни локални решения?”, 
имайки предвид, че „локален” не означава „маловажен”. На свой ред 
анализът на влиянието на норвежките екологически философии е имп-
лицитно свързан с открояването на глобалните предизвикателства пред 
норвежката екологическа политика. В този контекст призивът „Мисли 
глобално, действай локално!” може да бъде реинтерпретиран в сферата 
на норвежките екологически философии като „Мисли по начин, из-
пълнен със смисъл, действай отговорно!”, което на свой ред предпола-
га ангажираността да се проявява по-скоро на морално, социокултурно 
и политическо ниво, отколкото в епистемологически план. Ето защо 
утвърждаването на термина норвежки екологически философии в 
множествено число предполага мисленето на категориите „глобален” и 
„локален” не като релативни, а като релационистки термини в смисъла 
на Нес. Така можем да откроим многообразието на въпросните фило-
софии при поставянето на сходни проблеми от типа на проясняването 
на противоречията, свързани с етическия градуализъм, преформулира-
нето на политическите задачи на екологическия конструктивизъм и 
др.. 
На макрометодологическо ниво призивът „Мисли по начин, изпъл-
нен със смисъл, действай отговорно!” е възможен, ако питането кои 
въпроси не трябва да бъдат загубени (Ширбек) се интернализира като 
въпрос как човек да намери своето място „в мрежата от биосферни 
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възли” (Нес), което да нарече дом. Подобни проблеми са свързани с 
неизкоренимото космическо чувство на паника (Запфе), със създаване-
то на екологически балансирано общество от типа на обществото на 
жизнените нужди (Квальой), както и с редуциране на опасността да се 
търси убежище от заплахата от екологическа катастрофа в мита за 
окончателното решение (Ширбек). Независимо от различните начини 
на артикулиране на необходимостта от преосмисляне на ролята на би-
оцентризма, тези въпроси произтичат от фундаменталната дилема „чия 
околна среда? коя природа?”. Така подходът на норвежките екологи-
чески философии към проблематизирането на идеята за когнитивна 
рационалност разкрива как ние можем да продължим да поставяме 
„микро” въпроси от типа „кой?” и „чий?” без да изгубим глобалните 
въпроси („макро” въпросите), а именно, въпросите „защо?” и „как?” в 
свят, където преосмислянето на ролята на етическия градуализъм е 
един от малкото начини да се научим не само как да бъдем в, но и с 
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